BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//InvisionCommunity Events 5.0.18//EN METHOD:PUBLISH CALSCALE:GREGORIAN REFRESH-INTERVAL:PT15M X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT15M X-WR-CALNAME:RMCommunityCalendar NAME:RMCommunityCalendar BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Europe/London TZURL:https://tzurl.org/zoneinfo/Europe/London X-LIC-LOCATION:Europe/London BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20250330T020000Z RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=3;BYDAY=-1SU END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20251026T020000Z RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=10;BYDAY=-1SU END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT SUMMARY:Economic Corner 29 11/30/2025 DTSTAMP:20251130T194556Z SEQUENCE:0 UID:605-7-c3fe8195a3dde498d013e477e2142422@aalbc.com ORGANIZER;CN="richardmurray":noreply@aalbc.com DESCRIPTION:\n Non Profit to Profit in 2025 and vice versa\n\n\n\n  \n\ n\n\n Sociedade Anônima do Futebol is the name of former socios\, or soci al club entities. Socios are non profits\, that are not allowed to be taxe d\, but also can't accept investment control from owners.  Meaning\, soc ios can accept money but the use of said money can't be controlled by the person giving the money. And the club members have to vote on various thin gs\, from sponsorship contracts to other. \n\n\n\n Expanding on this idea I thought about the inversion. How can a football club go from paying inv estors to a Socio\, a non profit\, that is still profitable? oddly enough I think elements of my thoughts below allow for an inversion. one of the p roblems with Black countries is the years of fiscal capitalism have taught \, very negative lessons\, not wrong ones\, but negative ones. Meaning wha t? \n\n\n\n Most black governments or the populaces in them\, love fiscal capitalism. But not the rule of law. They love fiscal capitalism because it allows anyone to: make the rule of law legalize their crimes[ala whites [whether european/muslim/asian or other] with enslaving black people] \,t o skip the rule or penalty of law [ala non blacks the world over who used to have the law on their side committing the same acts illegally but evadi ng penalty] \, while also skirt the responsibility of government [that man y blacks don't want to have while wanting to be very financially wealthy] .\n\n\n\n So when I look at a Nigeria\, the populace will never accept a m odulation of For Profit football clubs in Nigeria to a Not For Profit foot ball clubs in Nigeria. \n\n\n\n Consider that the NFF\, nigerian football federation\, has never won the  African Nations Championship. \n\n\n\n Now what is the  African Nations Championship. It is a championship des igned for members of CAF\, the confederation of African Football \, to fie ld players in their domestic tournament in a flag competition. Meaning wha t? All members are entered\, but  each member can only field those who pl ay in their domestic league. \n\n\n\n Here are the winners\, with the num ber of times they won\, from first to most recent\, it started in 2009: DR Congo 2\, Tunisia 1\, Libya 1\, Morocco 3\, Senegal 1 \n\n\n\n Now look at some winners of the cup of nations  started in 1957\, based on quantit y\, most to least: Egypt 7\, Cameroon 5\, Ghana 4\, Nigeria 3\, Ivory Coas t 3\, Algeria 2\, DR Congo 2 so... the top six clubs in the cup of nations \, open to CAF players who play anywhere\, have never won a tournament bas ed on only domestic players in the same geographic zone. \n\n\n\n Thus wh y I think the NFF is a great marker of the quality of CAF football associa tions. Nigeria recently has complained about their inability to enter the world cup but Nigeria has only been the top two of the Nations championshi p once. \n\n\n\n And this goes back to fiscal capitalism. Many Black peop le love the ability of whites to pay for their services\, generational wea lth\, saving their town or villages or communities. Sadio MAne/Ngolo kante /Koulibaly/Samuel Eto'o ... a long list of CAF players with very financial ly profitable careers outside CAF have helped the strangers in their blood line. But\,in a competition absent the money focused on the quality\, many of those players countries have never placed or have an atrocious record of placement. \n\n\n\n That proves the profit to nonprofit will probably not be implementable\, because affordable\, management\, isn't where the m oney is. \n\n\n\n And that connects to how they view fiscal capitalism. T his is what happens when you don't have the \"immigrant story\" the fiscal ly poor stranger came into an unwelcomed place and was allowed to work and made a happy life for themselves. \n\n\n\n The black people in the carib bean/continent/south america/north america who have been in said places si nce eighteen hundreds have the survived enslavement story. That story isn' t about the rule of law\, it is about getting enough power to be above the rule of law or to bend the rule of law. \n\n\n\n And too often black peo ple who have come to embrace the idea of fiscal capitalism aside the rule of law as a brilliant positively inspiring power couple for individual ach ievement aside collective peace \, miss how most other black people have n o personal history or historical view to the global black village to come to such conclusions on their own \, absent a sickly delusion. \n\n\n\n   \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n My Thoughts After Reading S.A.F. info below and thinki ng on Santos\n\n\n\n Interesting how it was admitted dividends are rarely the goal\, meaning most of the S.A.F.'s are for resale or part of a Keiret su-like scenario. But I see the financial action. \nSocios have to vote on becoming S.A.F.'s with various rules in their voting process they are fre e to do\, thus the vote from the socio members becomes financially huge. I f the majority do not vote in favor the socio remains but if the majority vote in favor the rules voted on simultaneously heavily influence the S.A. F. born from the socio.\nAnd if the votes are in favor then the socio isn' t destroyed\, it remains and a S.A.F. takes all of the socios assets and g ets none of the socios debt.\nThe S.A.F. given a favorable tax burden for the first five years as well as the ability of members or others to buy bo nds for the debt/actions of the club.\nThe S.A.F. has to have a community investment program which is loosely described in the law.\nWhile the socio retains all the debt. The S.A.F. has to contribute to payments of the deb t.\nTwo methods to pay for the debt exist Centralized Enforcement Regime \ , Judicial reorganization.\nIn the end Vasco proves Santos was wise to wai t. While I know many clubs \, like Bahia or Botafogo jumped at the chance to S.A.F. I think Santos and any Socio that waits is wiser. New financial environments historically have mostly bad returns for most early entrants. yes\, the minority of early entrants become glorified in magazines like F orbes but the reality is\, the majority of early entrants is the truth and I can see that a wise socio look at what others are doing\, what is going on wrong\, what is going well and then go forward with the experience of neighbors to dictate. yes\, it will make these years tough with potential relegation and bigger budget teams about but it will also allow for wiser financial choices. \nBahia wants circa 23\,000 USA dollars circa 120\,000 Brasilian Real to convert a socio to an S.A.F. \nThe Carioca want 94\,000 US dollars or 500\,000 Real\nPaulista want nothing for conversion. \nThe t hree capitals of Brasil before Brasilia show a different tact. Sao Paulo i s inviting Socios to modulate. Rio is being most resistant\, not enough to stop international sharks but enough to stop little socios. Bahia is invi ting Brasilian as well as foreign investors. \nNo socio going into S.A.F. in brasil has consider an initial public offering stock options but I thin k the realm of more collective shareholder values is interesting. Textor and the 777's of the world\, are looking to own\, the king's without crown s. But\, through futures or bonds a socio can go into S.A.F. inviting inve stment but still retaining control by members.\nWhat about a socio agreein g to become an S.A.F. based on a futures exchange\, where each share of th e club\, each membership becomes a futures contract\, and then the exchang e is where the contracts can be traded. The future contracts can be based on a combination of (revenue streams in accumulated value substracted by w ages-utilities-upkeep) multiplied by athletic achievement as a percentage. \nFor example\nlets say the following are \nrevenue streams: shirt sponso r\, stadium sponsor\, tickets\, share of media payment for league\, local media payment\, transfer money income \nexpenses : wages\,stadium upkeep\, transfer fees\,youth development cost Note: S.A.F.'s start debtless\nathl etic achievement in competitions entered so if not in one of the following not related: state championship\, brasilierao\,copa do brasil\, libertado res\, intercontinental cup\, club world cup. Example : lets say a club is in the state champions\, brasilerao\, copa do brasil so it is in three c ompetitions: winning each is 100% so winning all three is 300% now the max imum result is 300% so outcome over maximum in the example case gives you 1 so the revenue minus expenses is the result of the contract. But lets sa y you get 2nd in the state\, round of 16 in copa\, 8th in brasilerao\, you will have 90% 75% 66% \, now I argue you can add weights for each tournam ent\, but keeping this simple for the example\, you will circa 250% so ove r 300% means 5/6th of the value of (revenue - expenses) for the future con tract. So athletic success influences the returns more potently than the a cquisition of sponsors or et cetera. \nThe original socio can become the spot market\, thus it doesn't gain debt and is only a place of immediate exchange\, with small transactions fees going to the socio to pay off its debt. The spot market has rules like the athletic achievement combined or in part reach 30% relates to automatic revenue deliveries so giving invest ors back a percentage of what they invested. And since S.A.F.'s start debt free. The socio when it voted to make a S.A.F. needed a debt relief bond\ , where people give money for potential debt relief to receive the money b ack in five seasons. This bond money is vital for the SAF to have capitol to spur the futures market. \nThus in this way\, while the S.A.F. doesn't have a rigid owner\, it has futures contracts \, that can be traded and a coverage by the socio for debts to allow for a level of feasible risk who also acts as the clearing house between the S.A.F. and investors. Lastly\, to grow the quantity of contracts\, each new contract for the S.A.F. exch ange demands the maker of the contract to pay for a bond in the socio spot market. Yes\, an investor is thus paying for their own risk aversion. But the point of that is to clear out wild investors but also keep debt of th e S.A.F. to zero by the financial agreements. Finally\, while the transact ions of the socio spot market each have a small fee to help to pay the soc ios debts\, the transactions of the S.A.F. futures market each have a smal l fee as revenue to the S.A.F. which can be used to automatically make mor e contracts and bonds or go into a savings account for a rainy day accumul ating over time. Which can be a bond market for the S.A.F. that can be tra ded. Now outside the yearly mentioned above\, who can not vote on the peop le in the organization\, the voting powers should be to those who hold ge nerational futures contracts[ 20 years ] can vote on various people. Thus the socios who originally voted each have one generational contract throug h their 20 year futures contract. And this is another venue for outside in vestors\, others can buy 20 year futures contracts but they have to pay fo r 20 year bonds in the spot market. Each time someone buys a 20 year futur es contract they increase the value of the futures contracts already prese nt. \nI think what I suggest while it doesn't provide the financial inject ions that being sold to billionaire does\, I think it provides \,with obv ious algorithmic tweaking or specificity\, long term longevity and profit making capability\, not merely on new investors but really the management of the club. \nSo for example if you are a textor type\, and you want to c ontrol the club \, you can buy a set of 20 years futures contracts in the S.A.F. and parallel 20 year bonds in the socio spot market\, thus giving y ou through the quantity of 20 years futures contracts more votes than anyo ne\, but this doesn't bar others from doing just like you did. Rules in th e original vote can make it where voting for ceo's and others doesn't occu r till the end of a season so no chaos in administration. but\, many can b uy investment in the yearlies which are gambles still but have a level of security in that you have to buy a bond to support the security\, so it is n't a random house. \nThe goal in my mind of S.A.F. for any socio is how t o get what the germans have in the 30% rule but even better. \nThe New Yo rk City 1980s was a time for sharks. what are sharks really? sharks are th ose who buy or sell firms. Nothing wrong with that. Buying and selling fir ms in whole or part allows for resources to be distributed\, debts to be s lowed\, financial activity to be contained. What don't sharks do? they don 't actually run businesses. \nIf I own a film studio and we had ten years of success\, 90% of our films made 300% profit or better in the first mon th of coming out\, a shark can look to buy the film studio and the buyers will buy over price\, paying me the former owner and other shareholders a lot of money and we can go on and do other things. While the new owners ca n try and maintain\, maybe they succeed and maybe they fail. \nIf I own a music label and we had ten years of falling sales and undesired output aft er thirty years of industry dominance\, a shark can come in and buy my lab el \, getting more money for the parts people may want\, like the catalog but the parts people don't want can be split/divested and sold to another or just ended. The new owners to parts of my firm and try to regain the be tter years.\nBut\, the sharks don't actually manage the running of the fir ms. The sharks only function is the financial industries\, but not the act ual running of various firms. \n\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n S.A.F. info \n\n\n\n Sociedade Anônima do Futebol info\nWhat is SAF? Understand the f ormat that changed Brazilian football\n\nHow does it work and what are the differences between association and company? What are the advantages and disadvantages? And the obligations? Get to know this specific type of comp any created in 2021\n\nBy Rodrigo Capelo\n\n02/09/2022 16h35 Up-to-date a year ago\n\nWhat is SAF? The Sociedade Anônima do Futebol (SAF) is a spe cific type of company\, created by Congress on August 6\, 2021\, through L aw 14.193/2021. The legislation encourages football clubs to migrate from the non-profit civil association to the business one. The SAF Law\, as it became known\, encourages the change to this club-company format\, which h as governance\, control and specific means of financing for the activity o f football.\n\nHow can the club open a SAF?\n\nClubs can be founded direct ly with this structure\, they can be converted from a civil association to a SAF or they can spin off their football department\, with the transfer of all assets related to football activity to the company.\n\nOnce the com pany is incorporated\, it is possible to sell a majority\, minority\, or a ll of its capital to a new owner. John Textor\, Ronaldo and 777 Partners w ere the first cases of great repercussion\, respectively with Botafogo\, C ruzeiro and Vasco.\n\nWhat is the main change?\n\nHistorically\, most foot ball clubs in Brazil have been structured as civil associations\, a privat e\, non-profit organization formed by the union of members. These people e lect representatives to the Deliberative and Fiscal Councils\, in addition to a president.\n\nThe association cannot be sold to investors. Unlike wh at happens in much of Europe\, where clubs are companies and can be bought and sold by third parties\, associations are managed solely by the member ship.\n\nThe SAF opened the possibility of partial or total sale of footba ll to new owners. They can be entrepreneurs\, investment funds and even th e IPO on the Stock Exchange – an option not yet tried by any Brazilian c lub\, but common in other countries.\n\nWhat is the difference between pre sident and owner?\n\nIn football\, the civil association usually has a str ucture similar to that of the government. Members elect representatives to the Deliberative Council\, a kind of Legislative\, and to the board of di rectors\, which resembles the Executive. The president is the head of the ticket.\n\nThe chairman of the board is given a term of office\, usually b etween two and four years\, with or without the right to re-election\, and is joined by statutory vice presidents. In Brazilian football\, these fig ures are not paid and are only in charge temporarily.\n\nIn the case of a STC\, the owner has decision-making power definitively. Whoever buys part or all of a club-company will only leave the business\, except on extraord inary occasions\, on the day they sell their stake in the company to anoth er person\, company or fund.\n\nHow does SAF management work?\n\nThe club- company has a professional structure hired by its owner\, usually composed of specialists in the main areas:\n\nCEO (chief executive officer)\n\nChi ef Financial Officer (CFO)\n\nCLO (chief legal officer)\n\nCMO (chief mark eting officer)\n\nDirector of football\n\nAll these professionals are hire d\, directed and fired by the owners – whether it is a single person or a composition of partners. These\, in turn\, are usually organized into a Board of Directors\, in which the main decisions are made.\n\nCivil associ ations can also organize themselves in the same way\, internally. In theor y\, the main difference is that\, as these entities frequently alternate p residents\, there is a constant complaint of instability in Brazilian foot ball\, with each change of president.\n\nCan associations resume football? \n\nIt depends on each negotiation. In the cases of Botafogo\, Cruzeiro an d Vasco\, the associations sold a majority stake in the capital of SAF to John Textor\, Ronaldo and 777 Partners. In this process\, each club establ ished contracts that dictate rights and duties for each party. If there is a violation of this agreement\, it is possible that clauses provide for e xits.\n\nCan SAF be resold?\n\nThe club-company is an asset\, just like a conventional company\, and can be bought and sold freely. An entrepreneur who owns 90% of a SAF can resell any percentage under his ownership\, incl uding everything\, according to his commercial interests.\n\nWhy buy a SAF ?\n\nThe entrepreneur can have a return on this investment through:\n\nRes ale of part or all of the club-company for an amount greater than that inv ested since his arrival\;\n\nReceiving dividends\, that is\, profits obtai ned by the operation of the club-company – a less frequent option.\n\nIn tegration of the football club into a chain of other businesses\, so that they are directly benefited\n\nWhat are the advantages of SAF?\n\n1. Tax r egime\n\nCivil associations are exempt from various taxes\, such as Corpor ate Income Tax (IRPJ) and Social Contribution on Net Income (CSLL). There was resistance from managers to opt for conventional models of companies\, as corporations and limited liability companies have a higher tax burden\ , so the STC has a special regime\, in replacement.\n\nIn the first five y ears after incorporation\, the SAF is subject to the monthly payment of a unified tax\, limited to 5% on monthly revenues\, except for athlete trans fers. From the sixth year onwards\, the rate drops to 4%\, but is levied o n all the company’s revenues\, including sales of economic rights of pla yers.\n\n2. Football debentures\n\nThe SAF can issue football debentures\, a debt security. Fans can invest money in the purchase of these bonds\, w ith remuneration not less than the savings account\, and redeem the invest ment after two years. The money contributed can be used to pay expenses\, expenses or debts of the club-company by its administrators.\n\nWhat are t he disadvantages of SAF?\n\nSociedade Anônima do Futebol is committed to the creation of an Educational and Social Development Program\, in which\, in agreement with a public educational institution\, it will promote meas ures to develop education through soccer. Girls should also be contemplate d\, with equal right of access to sport.\n\nThe STC can invest in:\n\na) r enovate or build a public school\, as well as a court or field for the pra ctice of soccer\;\n\nb) to institute a transportation system for students\ ;\n\nc) feeding students during periods of recreation and training\;\n\nd) to train former players to minister and conduct activities\;\n\ne) hire a uxiliary professionals\, such as physical trainers\, nutritionists and psy chologists\;\n\nf) acquire equipment\, materials and accessories necessary for the practice of soccer within the scope of the project.\n\nWhat happe ns to debt?\n\nDebts remain with the civil association\, that is\, they ar e not transferred to the newly created company. The STC becomes responsibl e for contributing to the payment of these obligations\, within the limits established by law.\n\nSince the association loses almost all of its oper ating revenues – as football has been transferred to the management of t he club-company – there are two options to deal with the debt:\n\n1. Cen tralized Enforcement Regime\n\nThe SAF Law created a mechanism called the Centralized Enforcement Regime\, which works as a queue for creditors of a civil and labor nature. The company assumes the responsibility of contrib uting to the payment of this queue\, with 20% of its current monthly reven ues.\n\nIn principle\, clubs that adhere to this regime have a period of s ix years to pay their debts. If at least 60% of the debt is paid off in th is period\, an extension of another four years is granted to pay off the r emainder. Therefore\, the deadline to pay is up to ten years.\n\nThe Centr alized Enforcement Regime also opens the possibility of reducing debts by at least 30%\, through discounts.\n\nTo define the order of payment of cre ditors\, priority is given to older credits and also to profiles:\n\na) el derly\;\n\nb) people with serious illnesses\;\n\nc) people with credits le ss than 60 minimum wages\;\n\nd) pregnant woman\;\n\ne) victims of work ac cidents in soccer.\n\n2. Judicial reorganization\n\nJudicial – or extraj udicial – reorganization is usually used by companies that are almost ba nkrupt\, but which have economic relevance to society. In summary\, these companies can renegotiate civil and labor debts with the mediation of the government\, so that the credits are written off by discounts and paid in a new term.\n\nThe role of the SAF Law\, in this case\, was to guarantee a ccess to this tool for clubs that become companies. The legislation also a nticipates that bilateral contracts and contracts with players can be tran sferred from the civil association to the club-company\, without being inv olved in the agreement to be negotiated during the judicial reorganization .\n\nHow is tradition protected?\n\nAs long as the civil association that gave rise to the club has at least one class A common share\, regardless o f the percentage of the interest\, this entity will have veto power over t he following items:\n\na) change of name\;\n\nb) change of symbol\, coat o f arms\, brand\, nickname\, anthem and color\;\n\nc) change of headquarter s to another municipality.\n\nWho created the SAF?\n\nThe intellectual men tors of the Sociedade Anônima do Futebol are lawyers Rodrigo Monteiro de Castro and José Francisco Manssur. They have dedicated themselves to the study of business structures in football since at least 2015\, when they p ublished the book “Football\, Market and State”\, in which they pointe d out foreign proposals and references.\n\nSubsequently\, the content of t his study was presented in the National Congress by Senator Rodrigo Pachec o (PSD-MG)\, in 2019. Bill 5\,519/2019\, which culminated in the creation of the SAF Law\, was drafted by Senator Carlos Portinho (PL-RJ). The first companies in Brazilian football\, under this unprecedented format\, appea red in a few months.\n\nArticle Referral\n\nhttps://ge.globo.com/negocios- do-esporte/noticia/2022/09/02/o-que-e-saf-entenda-o-formato-de-clube-empre sa-que-mudou-o-futebol-brasileiro.ghtml\n\nWhat is left to the original as sociation when the SAF has an owner?\n\nExperiences from other countries t each a lot about the risks to which Brazilian clubs have exposed themselve s for not having developed the necessary mechanisms for their own protecti on\n\nRio de Janeiro\n\n03/28/2024 03:06 AM Up-to-date a year ago\n\nIn h is first press conference since taking over the presidency of Vasco da Gam a\, former player Pedrinho raised several questions about the limit of the original association in the direction of Vasco SAF\, the company that man ages the club’s professional football and which is now controlled by the North American group 777 Partners.\n\n“Unfortunately I am not part of t he process. But I’m always willing to help Vasco\, above any goal (…) Sportingly\, I think I could collaborate”\, said the president of Vasco about the little space that the association has in the current SAF. “I t’s their choice\, period. There is no crying\, lamentation\,” he adde d.\n\nPedrinho’s complaint is especially due to having been invited\, be fore leaving as a candidate\, to give opinions on the club’s sports plan ning. Once at the head of the association\, the treatment changed drastica lly. As president of the club\, Pedrinho is no longer seen as an ally for the SAF.\n\n“I have no interest in taking the 777. I’m interested in g iving a new direction\, a new direction to Vasco. The SAF was created to p rofessionalize football. We expect transparency\, sports performance ( …)”\, justified Pedrinho\, still showing himself willing to deal amica bly with the employees of 777 Partners.\n\nHowever\, the Vasco idol also m ade clear his disagreement with the SAF model: “The model that was creat ed in a contract\, then yes\, is no longer very much to my liking. It is a relationship in which I am a partner and I have functions such as supervi sing and collecting. This cannot be a nuisance to anyone.”\n\n“Chargin g\, inspecting is a natural process of a [business] society. I don’t kno w if the behavior of the previous administration created a different habit \, but this is not a pattern”\, reinforced Pedrinho.\n\nThere are severa l interesting points in these speeches\, which today stand out in Vasco’ s SAF because of the low sports performance and the errors in the decision -making of the management of the SAF – which has already changed CEO\, d irector of football or coach in just over a year –\; but that should be discussed by all other SAFs where the original clubs have become a decorat ive piece.\n\nBasically\, all SAFs were structured in the same way: the as sociative club holds few seats on the Board of Directors and on the Fiscal Council\, reducing its participation to access to confidential documents\ , contracts and financial data and the sporadic moment of transmitting som e dissatisfaction at shareholders’ meetings. Which is rarely done in pub lic.\n\nIn clubs that have 30% (Vasco)\, 25% (Atlético) or 10% (Bahia\, C oritiba\, Cruzeiro and Botafogo)\, the position is always secondary\, with out enough power. The position of the association in each of them will var y\, of course\, according to what was discussed in the election of the ass ociation. It is where Pedrinho’s press conference matters most.\n\nVasco lives this distancing because it was the first club to hold elections wit hout swearing in a group fully aligned with the management that operationa lized the sale of SAF. In the other cases\, until then\, the association ’s command has remained the same or with figures close to the administra tions that sold the SAF.\n\nAs long as the friendship relationship between the association and SAF lasts\, we will hardly see situations similar to Vasco’s come to light\, even in the worst of sporting scenarios. In the case of Coritiba\, for example\, the elections scheduled for last December were postponed and have not yet been rescheduled. In the midst of this\, there was a vexatious demotion and a lot of contestation from the members to the business model\, but the association’s management never manifeste d itself frontally.\n\nThe situation of cornering of the associations is n ot surprising\, because it has always been the objective of those who prom oted the SAFs as a panacea for Brazilian football.\n\nThere are understand able reasons for so much repulsion to the original club – for being clos ed (with the exception of a few cases)\, for the history of the top hats w ho have controlled it previously\, for the state in which the institution was at the time of sale – but this whole process of demonization of the associations should be expensive.\n\nAfter all\, the association will be t he last instance of salvation for the club\, if everything goes wrong in t he SAF. There is no safe choice in extirpating association from decision-m aking\, because at some point it will be necessary.\n\nIn addition\, at th e same time that the SAFs have been structured in such a way as to prevent the participation of the association\, the business models seem tailor-ma de to empty these century-old organizations. What is the ideal scenario fo r those who buy a SAF: not having to be accountable to anyone or\, at most \, having to communicate with a dying association\, without strength and r epresentativeness.\n\nIf at first this was desired to guarantee the work a utonomy of the “qualified professionals hired by investors”\, perhaps the occasional sellers have eliminated important escape routes that will b e missed at the necessary time.\n\nToday it is too early to visualize some thing catastrophic in this sense\, but experiences from other countries sh ould begin to be better studied so that the risks that clubs run for not h aving developed the necessary mechanisms for their own protection can be p erceived.\n\nIn the current scenario\, it is not possible to speculate on the nature or scruples of the groups that took over the SAFs\, but it is n ot just a purely moral issue either. There are a number of possible situat ions that can drastically alter the pretensions of these “investors” w ith “their SAFs”\, and in the end everything is business: will profess ional football pass from hand to hand – from buyer to buyer – or will it be allowed to conceive the resumption of its control by the original as sociation? This alternative already seems eliminated from the scenario.\n\ nA bad early sporting phase for what was expected from the investments of the SAFs has already put Vasco in a situation of worrying distancing. The controllers of the SAF are not obliged to listen to the original club. The original club does not see the tools at its disposal to act positively.\n \nIn a few years\, it will not only be sports results that will be the fac tors of dissatisfaction and distance between clubs and SAFs. The history o f club-companies around the world tells controversial\, highly complex sit uations that are still little visible in the Brazilian scenario. It will b e up to the fans to keep the association alive and strong\, because it wil l be through it that things will pass at the necessary time.\n\n- Irlan Si mões (@irlansimoes) is the author of the book “The Club’s Production: power\, business and community in football” (2023) \n\nhttps://morula.c om.br/produto/clube/\n\nand organizer of the work “Clube Empresa: global critical approaches to corporations in football” (2020).\n\nARTICLE URL \n\nhttps://ge.globo.com/blogs/blog-do-irlan-simoes/post/2024/03/28/o-que- resta-a-associacao-original-quando-a-saf-tem-dono.ghtml\n\nHow much does i t cost to become SAF? Fees charged by Federations range from R$ 30 thousan d to R$ 500 thousand\; see list\n\nThe Federation of Rio de Janeiro is the one that charges the most expensive\, followed by those of Pernambuco and Minas Gerais\; Paulista\, on the other hand\, is the only one among the t op ten that still does not charge for the change\n\nBy João de Andrade Ne to — Recife\n\n01/19/2024 03:17 PM Up-to-date a year ago\n\nSince it wa s created by the National Congress in August 2021\, the Sociedade Anônima do Futebol (SAF) has become a recurring subject in Brazilian football\, w ith many clubs already adhering to the format and many others preparing to make the change from the associative model to club-company.\n\nMigration that\, to be official\, needs to be registered by the state federations\, which have been authorized by the CBF\, since 2022\, to charge the so-call ed “conversion fee”. Charge that\, depending on each state\, varies fr om R$ 30 thousand to R$ 500 thousand.\n\nThe ge verified in documents made available on the official websites of the entities and in contact with th e advisories the amounts charged by the ten best-placed federations in the CBF ranking: São Paulo\, Rio de Janeiro\, Minas Gerais\, Rio Grande do S ul\, Paraná\, Ceará\, Goiás\, Santa Catarina\, Bahia and Pernambuco.\n\ nThe federation with the most expensive rate is Rio de Janeiro. According to the values released by the entity\, a club that is in the state’s A1 Series will have to pay R$ 500 thousand to migrate to SAF. The charge is n ow R$ 300 thousand and R$ 200 thousand for clubs that compete in the A2 an d A3 Series of the State\, respectively.\n\nThese amounts started to be ch arged last year\, and are still valid\, according to Ferj’s press office . It is worth remembering that Botafogo and Vasco sold their shares in 202 2.\n\nPernambuco and Ceará on opposite paths\n\nThe second federation to charge the most is Pernambucana\, which readjusted the fee from R$ 120 tho usand to R$ 400 thousand as of this year. An increase of 233%. None of the big three in the state have become SAF so far\, but they work for it.\n\n Who has more advanced talks is Náutico\, which already has an offer from a group of investors that can reach\, between investment plan and guarante ed costs\, R$ 980 million over ten years for the purchase of 90% of the sh ares.\n\nSport\, on the other hand\, is in the process of reformulating it s statute with a view to adhering to the SAF model\, while Santa Cruz\, wh ich even had advanced talks with investors\, according to the board that l eft the club at the end of last year\, is again at square one. But the tra nsformation to the SAF is considered a priority by the current president\, Bruno Rodrigues.\n\nThe Ceará Federation\, on the other hand\, took the opposite path by reducing the value of the fee\, from R$ 400 thousand char ged until last year to R$ 120 thousand from 2024.\n\nIn the state\, Fortal eza approved in September the change to Sociedade Anônima do Futebol\, bu t without share sales for now\, a unique model in Brazilian football so fa r. In December\, the club’s then-president Marcelo Paz resigned to take over as CEO of Fortaleza EC SAF.\n\nCeará\, on the other hand\, does not treat adherence to the Corporations model as a priority.\n\nBahia\, Goiás and Minas\n\nThe Goiana and Bahia federations also charge R$ 120 thousand for the conversion into SAF.\n\nIn Goiás\, the three main clubs\, Goiás \, Atlético-GO and Vila Nova\, are in the process of moving. Bahia\, on t he other hand\, since March last year\, has 90% of football shares control led by the City Group. Vitória\, for now\, has not yet taken direction in this direction\n\nIn Minas Gerais\, where the big three have already adhe red to the SAF model\, with Cruzeiro being the first club in Brazil\, stil l in 2021\, the Minas Gerais Federation currently charges R$ 250 thousand for the change. Third saltier rate\, behind only Rio de Janeiro and Pernam buco.\n\nNo charge in São Paulo and “bargain” in the South\n\nLeader of the CBF ranking among federations\, São Paulo is the only one among th e top 10 not to charge the “conversion fee” for the SAF model\, accord ing to the resolution published in July last year. The state is the one wi th the most clubs that have already become a corporation\, with 10. One mo re than Minas Gerais\, according to the Academic League of Corporate Law o f the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro.\n\nThe three federations in th e South Region of the country charge the lowest amounts\, with Catarinense being the cheapest: only R$ 30 thousand. The state has among its affiliat es four clubs that have already joined the SAF model\, including Figueiren se.\n\nIn the Paranaense and Gaucho Federations\, this amount is R$ 60 tho usand\, and in Rio Grande do Sul this fee will be charged as of this year. Paraná is the third state in the country with the most SAFS\, eight in a ll.\n\nThe amounts charged by the federations\n\nSão Paulo Federation - D oes not charge a fee\n\nRio de Janeiro Federation - 500 thousand*\n\nPerna mbuco Federation - R$ 400 thousand\n\nMinas Gerais Federation - R$ 250 tho usand\n\nCeará Federation - R$ 120 thousand\n\nGoiás Federation - R$ 120 thousand\n\nBahia Federation - R$ 120 thousand\n\nFederação Gaúcha - R $ 60 thousand**\n\nParanaense Federation - R$ 60 thousand\n\nSanta Catarin a Federation - R$ 30 thousand\n\n*Clubs that are in the A2 Series of the S tate pay R$ 300 thousand and those in the A3 Series\, R$ 200 thousand\n\n* * Charges for the first time in 2024\n\nARTICLE URL\n\nhttps://ge.globo.co m/pe/futebol/noticia/2024/01/19/quanto-custa-para-virar-saf-taxas-cobradas -por-federacoes-variam-de-r-30-mil-a-r-500-mil-veja-lista.ghtml\n\nJudicia l and extrajudicial reorganization\, bankruptcy and civil insolvency: a gu ide to understanding what can happen to indebted clubs\n\nLeaders\, politi cians and lawyers are beginning to speak publicly about mechanisms that ca n save associations mistreated by decades of mismanagement. And the fans d eserve to understand them\n\nSão Paulo\n\n06/02/2020 06h00 Up-to-date 5 years ago\n\nBy Rodrigo Capelo\n\nJudicial reorganization\, extrajudicial reorganization\, bankruptcy and civil insolvency. As soccer clubs collapse financially\, officials\, politicians and lawyers are beginning to spread these terms as possible solutions to reverse decades of mismanagement in associations.\n\nThe terms have already entered the vocabulary of the Cruz eirense. Vittorio Medioli\, a businessman who briefly participated in the provisional administration of Cruzeiro\, publicly defended that the club e nter into judicial reorganization to undo the damage caused by the Wagner Pires de Sá and Gilvan de Pinho Tavares administrations.\n\nThe subject m atters to practically every indebted club\, however. In the face of the cr itical situations in Brazilian football\, behind the scenes there are peop le interested in resorting to these mechanisms to clean up the indebtednes s of the associations. In some cases\, this would help improve the chances of migrating to a business structure.\n\nDue to the high degree of comple xity and high relevance for the future of Brazilian football\, the blog re corded a podcast to explain the mechanisms with the participation of Marce lo Sacramone\,\n\nhttps://interativos.ge.globo.com/podcasts/programa/dinhe iro-em-jogo/episodio/dinheiro-em-jogo-39-clube-de-futebol-pode-falir-enten da-as-opcoes-para-salvar-os-times-endividados/\n\n judge of the 2nd Court of Bankruptcy and Judicial Reorganization of São Paulo. This text serves as a support to understand each of the ways out for those in debt.\n\nJudi cial reorganization\n\nWhat is it for?\n\nTo recover a company that is rel evant to society\, especially for the jobs it generates\, which is going t hrough an economic crisis.\n\nWhat are the requirements?\n\nPerform busine ss activity for at least two years. In other words\, in order to enter int o a judicial reorganization process\, the legal entity must be a company – a corporation\, limited liability company or other similar corporate structure.\n\nNon-profit civil associations – like most football clubs i n Brazil – cannot enter into judicial reorganization\, unless they migra te to the business structure and wait two years or there is a change in th e legislation.\n\nWhat is the procedure?\n\nFirst\, the company submits th e request for judicial reorganization to the Court\, with justifications t o obtain the benefit of renegotiating its debts under the supervision of t he government.\n\nIf the Court allows the proceeding\, the company (debtor ) will have 60 days (two months) to present a plan for payment to the grou p of people with whom it has accumulated debts (creditors).\n\nWhen the re organization plan is presented\, the creditors will decide whether to acce pt or reject the proposal. If they accept\, creditors will receive the amo unts according to the conditions set out in this agreement. If they do not accept\, the company will be declared bankrupt.\n\nAfter the agreement\, the Court still monitors compliance with this reorganization for two years to ensure that the debtor follows the plan.\n\nWhat are the benefits?\n\n Creditors are allowed to receive the amounts that were outstanding\, albei t with discounts and in installments. In another hypothesis\, they could r eceive nothing. Judicial reorganization also requires that the agreement b e collective\, that is\, no creditor can take advantage of another with th e seizure of revenues\, for example.\n\nTo the company (debtor)\, the judi cial reorganization allows it to reduce its indebtedness and preserve its activity. Additionally\, all blockades and seizures suffered by this compa ny are suspended for 180 days (six months). This happens precisely so that no creditor gets ahead of another when it comes to obtaining the money fr om a lien.\n\n“Why will everything be suspended? To prevent a more sophi sticated\, faster lender from being able to take an asset and harm everyth ing else. The law says: during these 180 days\, everything will be suspend ed against the debtor. The problem with this is that case law has extended this period. Here in the State of São Paulo\, this period has taken two years on average. It is very different from the 180 days. It is alleged th at creditors are negotiating\, so it is better to maintain this suspension than to let someone run outside to pledge a certain asset”\, explains M arcelo Sacramone.\n\nWhat does the negotiation depend on?\n\nGenerally\, t wo factors:\n\n1.Of the assets that can be sold to raise money. This goes for everything that has some value for the company. In the case of clubs\, they would be real estate (social and administrative headquarters\, train ing centers and stadiums)\, player contracts and brand (shield)\n\n2.From the revenue forecast in the new business plan. If the company understands that its financial recovery will allow investments and make it raise more money\, part of these resources can be redirected to pay creditors\n\nTaki ng these factors into account\, the probability of a good deal for both pa rties will be determined. In the case of a company that has no assets to s ell and/or does not have the potential to increase its revenue\, creditors will have problems obtaining good values.\n\nDoes recovery involve debt f orgiveness?\n\nMost of the time. The debtor would not have the money to pa y all the debts under normal conditions. So he usually bases the recovery plan on extending the payment deadline and negotiating discounts on the am ounts due.\n\nLenders may understand that it is better to receive some mon ey than none at all. Therefore\, they agree to forgive part of the amounts due in exchange for the scheduled payment. This only happens if the absol ute majority of creditors agree with the proposed conditions.\n\n“In an average plan\, the debtor will pay in 11 years and with half of what he ow ed. This is an average plan. 30% of the plans involve selling something to make cash to satisfy that plan. Then the creditors will be called to a Ge neral Meeting in which they will meet to deliberate if that is the best pr oposal\, if the debtor could not propose something better\, make some sugg estion\, and it is up to the debtor to understand whether or not he will m aintain the original proposal”\, says Marcelo Sacramone.\n\nAre there ru les for the formulation of the plan?\n\nLabor debts (with former employees ) must be paid within a period of less than one year\, from the moment the debtor’s proposal is accepted by the creditors. The limitation of labor debts concerns the term\, but not the discount. As long as the creditors agree to forgive part of the debt\, the debtor can reduce this amount.\n\n This is a huge potential problem for football clubs. The labor debts of as sociations – with players\, coaches and employees of other departments – are usually much higher than in conventional companies. Especially in the case of the most traditional and most indebted clubs in Brazilian foo tball.\n\nOut-of-court reorganization\n\nWhat is it for?\n\nExtrajudicial reorganization has similar mechanics to judicial reorganization\, but the negotiation phase between debtor and creditors is done out of court. The a greement needs to be taken to a judge\, however\, so that he can verify th e conditions and ratify the decision.\n\nThe negotiation does not have to happen with all creditors at the same time. For example\, the company can renegotiate only debts with financial institutions (bank debts).\n\nIn out -of-court reorganization\, the negotiation also does not need the approval of an absolute majority to be confirmed. If the debtor obtains the approv al of 60% of the creditors\, the other 40% are obliged to accept the condi tions of the reorganization plan.\n\nBankruptcy\n\nWhat is it for?\n\nIt i s the consequence of a judicial reorganization that did not work out – t hat is\, in which the creditors did not accept the proposal made by the de btor and decided that the best way would be to file for bankruptcy. It is also possible to have direct bankruptcy\, but this is a rare case.\n\nIn t he event of bankruptcy\, the debtor loses all power over the assets and th e power to manage them. He is removed immediately. The court appoints a tr ustee\, and this trustee sells all assets to raise money. Real estate\, br ands\, contracts\, everything that is possible to sell on the market\, com es into play to pay creditors.\n\nWhat are the requirements?\n\nOnly compa nies can go bankrupt. Non-profit civil associations\, like most football c lubs in Brazil\, cannot go through this process without some change in leg islation.\n\nWho can file for bankruptcy of a company?\n\nDebtors or credi tors. In practice\, no one asks.\n\nThe debtor usually understands that it is better to continue activity and try to pay off debts\, while creditors avoid the risk of receiving nothing if there are not enough assets to sel l.\n\nIn football\, filing for bankruptcy of a club would have an addition al effect: social pressure on creditors or directors (responsible for the debtor) who filed for bankruptcy of a traditional club.\n\nWhat are the be nefits?\n\nIf the liquidation of all assets generates money to pay off at least 50% of the debts\, the company cannot be charged for the other 50%.\ n\n“Bankruptcy is a prize for the entrepreneur who has had a failure. If I liquidate all the assets and with that amount I manage to pay half of t he creditors\, he is free the next day to return to his activity. There is an extinction of his debts. Problems with this: bankruptcy lasts an avera ge of 12 years\, that is\, the process never ends. If the process does not end and he is unable to pay this 50%\, he will stay another five years af ter the closure still linked to these obligations”\, explains Marcelo Sa cramone.\n\nCivil Insolvency\n\nWhat is it?\n\nIt is a form of liquidation of all assets and payment of creditors. There is no possibility of collec tive bargaining. The club would need to enter into an agreement individual ly with all creditors.\n\nWhat are the requirements?\n\nCivil insolvency a pplies to non-profit civil associations. Football clubs can go through thi s procedure at any time.\n\nWho can apply for the insolvency of an associa tion?\n\nDebtors or creditors. In practice\, no one asks.\n\nThe debtor do es not ask because it would cease to exist and would not be able to preser ve its activity\, and creditors do not usually ask because they would hard ly be able to receive the amounts.\n\nIn addition\, as the negotiations ar e individual\, some creditors could outsmart others by taking advantage of the resources obtained from the sale of assets such as stadiums\, venues and players.\n\nWhat is the difference between bankruptcy and insolvency?\ n\nIn a civil insolvency process\, even if the sale of all the association ’s assets pays more than 50% of the debts\, the association will continu e to be linked to the rest of the debts until they expire. The statute of limitations can be from five to ten years\, depending on whether there has been a crime. In practically all cases\, it is not worth it.\n\n@rodrigoc apelo\n\nARTICLE URL\n\nhttps://ge.globo.com/blogs/blog-do-rodrigo-capelo/ post/2020/02/06/recuperacao-judicial-extrajudicial-falencia-e-insolvencia- civil-um-guia-para-entender-o-que-pode-acontecer-com-clubes-endividados.gh tml\n\nBill No. 5516\, of 2019\n\nSee also: VET 43/2021\n\nAuthorship: Sen ator Rodrigo Pacheco (DEM/MG)\n\nNo. in the Chamber of Deputies: PL 5516/2 019\n\nGenerated Rule: Law No. 14\,193 of 08/06/2021\n\nSubject: Economy a nd Development >\; Taxes\, Social Policy >\; Sports and Leisure\n\nSum mary: Creates the Brazilian Football System\, through the typification of the Football Corporation\, establishment of governance\, control and trans parency rules\, institution of means of financing football activity and pr ovision of a transitory tax system.\n\nExplanation of the Summary: Creates the figure of the Sociedade Anônima do Futebol\, whose main activity con sists of the practice of soccer in professional competitions\, defines its financing\, administration\, governance and control\; and establishes a s pecial regime for the calculation of federal taxes applicable to the speci es.\n\nPROPOSITIONS\n\nIdentification:\n\nPL 5516/2019\n\nAuthor:\n\nSenat or Rodrigo Pacheco (DEM/MG)\n\nDate:\n\n10/10/2019\n\nDescription/Syllabus \n\nCreates the Brazilian Football System\, through the typification of th e Football Corporation\, establishment of governance\, control and transpa rency rules\, institution of means of financing football activity and prov ision of a transitory tax system.\n\nLocal:\n\nPlenary of the Federal Sena te\n\nhttps://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8023943&\;t s=1721927154468&\;disposition=inline\n\nIdentification:\n\nInitial sing le article\n\nAuthor:\n\nFederal Senate\n\nDate:\n\n15/10/2019\n\nDescript ion/Syllabus\n\n-\n\nLocal:\n\nPlenary of the Federal Senate\n\nLegislativ e Action:\n\nForwarded for publication. To the CAE and EC\, the latter bei ng responsible for the final decision. (This processed contains twenty (20 ) numbered sheets.) | See the procedure\n\nhttps://legis.senado.leg.br/sd leg-getter/documento?dm=8025061&\;ts=1721927154503&\;disposition=inl ine\n\nOPINIONS\n\nIdentification:\n\nLegislative Report\n\nAuthor:\n\nSen ator Carlos Portinho (PL/RJ)\n\nDate:\n\n08/06/2021\n\nDescription/Syllabu s\n\nSeem\n\nLocal:\n\nPlenary of the Federal Senate\n\nLegislative Action :\n\nThe report and the attachments forwarded by the Rapporteur\, Senator Carlos Portinho\, were received. | See the procedure\n\nhttps://legis.sen ado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8977839&\;ts=1721927154807&\;di sposition=inline\n\nIdentification:\n\nLegislative Report\n\nAuthor:\n\nSe nator Carlos Portinho (PL/RJ)\n\nDate:\n\n10/06/2021\n\nDescription/Syllab us\n\nSeem\n\nLocal:\n\nPlenary of the Federal Senate\n\nLegislative Actio n:\n\nReceived the Report of Senator Carlos Portinho. | See the procedure \n\nhttps://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978839&\;ts= 1721927155441&\;disposition=inline\n\nIdentification:\n\nP.S 129/2021 - PLEN\n\nAuthor:\n\nSenator Carlos Portinho (PL/RJ)\n\nDate:\n\n10/06/2021 \n\nDescription/Syllabus\n\nOpinion No. 129/2021-PLEN/SF - Presentation of Substitute - Amendment No. 32-PLEN.\n\nLocal:\n\nPlenary of the Federal S enate\n\nLegislative Action:\n\n(Remote Deliberative Session held on 06/10 /2021) Opinion No. 129/2021-PLEN/SF was delivered by Senator Carlos Portin ho\, concluding by the approval of the bill\, by the full acceptance of Am endments Nos. 3\, 4\, 8\, 10\, 12\, 13\, 23\, 28 and 31-… | See the pro cedure\n\nhttps://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8979014&am p\;ts=1721927155406&\;disposition=inline\n\nAMENDMENTS\n\nIdentificatio n:\n\nAMENDMENT 1 - PL 5516/2019\n\nAuthor:\n\nSenator Leila Barros (PSB/D F)\n\nDate:\n\n25/05/2020\n\nLocal:\n\nCommittee on Economic Affairs\n\nLe gislative Action:\n\nAmendment sent to the rapporteur\, Senator Marcos Rog ério\, for analysis. | See the procedure\n\nhttps://legis.senado.leg.br/ sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8114738&\;ts=1721927154615&\;disposition=i nline\n\nIdentification:\n\nAMENDMENT 2 PLEN - PL 5516/2019\n\nAuthor:\n\n Senator Paulo Paim (PT/RS)\, Senator Rogério Carvalho (PT/SE)\n\nDate:\n\ n07/06/2021\n\nDescription/Syllabus\n\nAmendment 2 to PL 5516\n\nLocal:\n\ nPlenary of the Federal Senate\n\nLegislative Action:\n\nReceived Amendmen ts Nos. 2 and 3\, from Senator Paulo Paim. | See the procedure\n\nhttps:/ /legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8977023&\;ts=17219271551 75&\;disposition=inline\n\nIdentification:\n\nAMENDMENT 3 PLEN - PL 551 6/2019\n\nAuthor:\n\nSenator Paulo Paim (PT/RS)\n\nDate:\n\n07/06/2021\n\n Description/Syllabus\n\nPL 5516 of 2019\n\nLocal:\n\nPlenary of the Federa l Senate\n\nLegislative Action:\n\nReceived Amendments Nos. 2 and 3\, from Senator Paulo Paim. | See the procedure\n\nhttps://legis.senado.leg.br/s dleg-getter/documento?dm=8977026&\;ts=1721927155205&\;disposition=in line\n\nIdentification:\n\nAMENDMENT 4 PLEN - PL 5516/2019\n\nAuthor:\n\nS enator Jayme Campos (DEM/MT)\n\nDate:\n\n08/06/2021\n\nDescription/Syllabu s\n\nAmendment to PL 5516\, of 2019\n\nLocal:\n\nPlenary of the Federal Se nate\n\nLegislative Action:\n\nReceived Amendment No. 4\, from Senator Jay me Campos. | See the procedure\n\nhttps://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-gette r/documento?dm=8977819&\;ts=1721927154770&\;disposition=inline\n\nId entification:\n\nAMENDMENT 5 PLEN - PL 5516/2019\n\nAuthor:\n\nSenator Ven eziano Vital do Rêgo (MDB/PB)\n\nDate:\n\n09/06/2021\n\nDescription/Sylla bus\n\nAmendment PL 5516/19\n\nLocal:\n\nPlenary of the Federal Senate\n\n Legislative Action:\n\nReceived Amendments Nos. - 5\, from Senator Venezia no Vital do Rêgo\; - 6\, from Senator Weverton. | See the procedure\n\nh ttps://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8977963&\;ts=17219 27155530&\;disposition=inline\n\nIdentification:\n\nAMENDMENT 6 PLEN - PL 5516/2019\n\nAuthor:\n\nSenator Weverton (PDT/MA)\n\nDate:\n\n09/06/202 1\n\nDescription/Syllabus\n\nEMD 1 PL 5516\, of 2019\n\nLocal:\n\nPlenary of the Federal Senate\n\nLegislative Action:\n\nReceived Amendments Nos. - 5\, from Senator Veneziano Vital do Rêgo\; - 6\, from Senator Weverton. | See the procedure\n\nhttps://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento ?dm=8977992&\;ts=1721927155813&\;disposition=inline\n\nIdentificatio n:\n\nAMENDMENT 7 PLEN - PL 5516/2019\n\nAuthor:\n\nSenator Paulo Rocha (P T/PA)\n\nDate:\n\n09/06/2021\n\nDescription/Syllabus\n\nAmendment to PL 5\ ,516\, of 2019 - labor debts\n\nLocal:\n\nPlenary of the Federal Senate\n\ nLegislative Action:\n\nReceived Amendment No. 7\, from Senator Paulo Roch a. | See the procedure\n\nhttps://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/docume nto?dm=8978101&\;ts=1721927155882&\;disposition=inline\n\nIdentifica tion:\n\nAMENDMENT 8 PLEN - PL 5516/2019\n\nAuthor:\n\nSenator Wellington Fagundes (PL/MT)\n\nDate:\n\n09/06/2021\n\nDescription/Syllabus\n\nemenda_ Sistema of Brazilian Football\n\nLocal:\n\nPlenary of the Federal Senate\n \nLegislative Action:\n\nReceived Amendment No. 8\, from Senator Wellingto n Fagundes. | See the procedure\n\nhttps://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-gett er/documento?dm=8978120&\;ts=1721927154843&\;disposition=inline\n\nI dentification:\n\nAMENDMENT 9 PLEN - PL 5516/2019\n\nAuthor:\n\nSenator Ro se de Freitas (MDB/ES)\n\nDate:\n\n09/06/2021\n\nDescription/Syllabus\n\nA mendment to PL 5516/2019\n\nLocal:\n\nPlenary of the Federal Senate\n\nLeg islative Action:\n\nReceived Amendments Nos. 9 and 10\, from Senator Rose de Freitas. | See the procedure\n\nhttps://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-gett er/documento?dm=8978169&\;ts=1721927155913&\;disposition=inline\n\nI dentification:\n\nAMENDMENT 10 PLEN - PL 5516/2019\n\nAuthor:\n\nSenator R ose de Freitas (MDB/ES)\n\nDate:\n\n09/06/2021\n\nDescription/Syllabus\n\n Amendment to PL 5516/2019\n\nLocal:\n\nPlenary of the Federal Senate\n\nLe gislative Action:\n\nReceived Amendments Nos. 9 and 10\, from Senator Rose de Freitas. | See the procedure\n\nhttps://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-get ter/documento?dm=8978175&\;ts=1721927154653&\;disposition=inline\n\n Identification:\n\nAMENDMENT 11 PLEN - PL 5516/2019\n\nAuthor:\n\nSenator Paulo Rocha (PT/PA)\n\nDate:\n\n09/06/2021\n\nDescription/Syllabus\n\nAMEN DMENT to Bill No. 5516\, of 2019\n\nLocal:\n\nPlenary of the Federal Senat e\n\nLegislative Action:\n\nReceived Amendments Nos. 11\, by Senator Paulo Rocha\; and - 12\, by Senator Luiz do Carmo. | See the procedure\n\nhttp s://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978190&\;ts=17219271 55244&\;disposition=inline\n\nIdentification:\n\nAMENDMENT 12 PLEN - PL 5516/2019\n\nAuthor:\n\nSenator Luiz Carlos do Carmo (MDB/GO)\n\nDate:\n\ n09/06/2021\n\nDescription/Syllabus\n\nBill No. 5516\, of 2019\n\nLocal:\n \nPlenary of the Federal Senate\n\nLegislative Action:\n\nReceived Amendme nts Nos. 11\, by Senator Paulo Rocha\; and - 12\, by Senator Luiz do Carmo . | See the procedure\n\nhttps://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documen to?dm=8978196&\;ts=1721927156144&\;disposition=inline\n\nIdentificat ion:\n\nAMENDMENT 13 PLEN - PL 5516/2019\n\nAuthor:\n\nSenator Fabiano Con tarato (REDE/ES)\n\nDate:\n\n09/06/2021\n\nDescription/Syllabus\n\nensure that the PDES include students from public educational institutions\n\nLoc al:\n\nPlenary of the Federal Senate\n\nLegislative Action:\n\nReceived Am endments Nos. 13 and 14\, by Senator Fabiano Contarato\; - 15 and 16\, by Senator Weverton. | See the procedure\n\nhttps://legis.senado.leg.br/sdle g-getter/documento?dm=8978209&\;ts=1721927155976&\;disposition=inlin e\n\nIdentification:\n\nAMENDMENT 14 PLEN - PL 5516/2019\n\nAuthor:\n\nSen ator Fabiano Contarato (REDE/ES)\n\nDate:\n\n09/06/2021\n\nDescription/Syl labus\n\nIncrease the transparency of Football Corporations\n\nLocal:\n\nP lenary of the Federal Senate\n\nLegislative Action:\n\nReceived Amendments Nos. 13 and 14\, by Senator Fabiano Contarato\; - 15 and 16\, by Senator Weverton. | See the procedure\n\nhttps://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter /documento?dm=8978212&\;ts=1721927156006&\;disposition=inline\n\nIde ntification:\n\nAMENDMENT 15 PLEN - PL 5516/2019\n\nAuthor:\n\nSenator Wev erton (PDT/MA)\n\nDate:\n\n09/06/2021\n\nDescription/Syllabus\n\nEMD to PL 5516 of 2019\n\nLocal:\n\nPlenary of the Federal Senate\n\nLegislative Ac tion:\n\nReceived Amendments Nos. 13 and 14\, by Senator Fabiano Contarato \; - 15 and 16\, by Senator Weverton. | See the procedure\n\nhttps://legi s.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978215&\;ts=1721927155283&am p\;disposition=inline\n\nIdentification:\n\nAMENDMENT 16 PLEN - PL 5516/20 19\n\nAuthor:\n\nSenator Weverton (PDT/MA)\n\nDate:\n\n09/06/2021\n\nDescr iption/Syllabus\n\nEMD to PL 5516 of 2019\n\nLocal:\n\nPlenary of the Fede ral Senate\n\nLegislative Action:\n\nReceived Amendments Nos. 13 and 14\, by Senator Fabiano Contarato\; - 15 and 16\, by Senator Weverton. | See t he procedure\n\nhttps://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978 218&\;ts=1721927155315&\;disposition=inline\n\nIdentification:\n\nAM ENDMENT 17 PLEN - PL 5516/2019\n\nAuthor:\n\nSenator Weverton (PDT/MA)\n\n Date:\n\n09/06/2021\n\nDescription/Syllabus\n\nEMD to PL 5516 of 2019\n\nL ocal:\n\nPlenary of the Federal Senate\n\nLegislative Action:\n\nReceived Amendment No. 17\, from Senator Weverton. | See the procedure\n\nhttps:// legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978241&\;ts=172192715617 9&\;disposition=inline\n\nIdentification:\n\nAMENDMENT 18 PLEN - PL 551 6/2019\n\nAuthor:\n\nSenator Izalci Lucas (PSDB/DF)\n\nDate:\n\n09/06/2021 \n\nDescription/Syllabus\n\nAmendment 02 to PL 5516/2019\n\nLocal:\n\nPlen ary of the Federal Senate\n\nLegislative Action:\n\nReceived Amendments No s. 18 to 22\, from Senator Izalci Lucas. | See the procedure\n\nhttps://l egis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978259&\;ts=1721927154884 &\;disposition=inline\n\nIdentification:\n\nAMENDMENT 19 PLEN - PL 5516 /2019\n\nAuthor:\n\nSenator Izalci Lucas (PSDB/DF)\n\nDate:\n\n09/06/2021\ n\nDescription/Syllabus\n\nAmendment 01 PL 5516/2019\n\nLocal:\n\nPlenary of the Federal Senate\n\nLegislative Action:\n\nReceived Amendments Nos. 1 8 to 22\, from Senator Izalci Lucas. | See the procedure\n\nhttps://legis .senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978262&\;ts=1721927154916& \;disposition=inline\n\nIdentification:\n\nAMENDMENT 20 PLEN - PL 5516/201 9\n\nAuthor:\n\nSenator Izalci Lucas (PSDB/DF)\n\nDate:\n\n09/06/2021\n\nD escription/Syllabus\n\nAmendment 05 to PL 5516/2019\n\nLocal:\n\nPlenary o f the Federal Senate\n\nLegislative Action:\n\nReceived Amendments Nos. 18 to 22\, from Senator Izalci Lucas. | See the procedure\n\nhttps://legis. senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978267&\;ts=1721927154950&\ ;disposition=inline\n\nIdentification:\n\nAMENDMENT 21 PLEN - PL 5516/2019 \n\nAuthor:\n\nSenator Izalci Lucas (PSDB/DF)\n\nDate:\n\n09/06/2021\n\nDe scription/Syllabus\n\nAmendment 04 to PL 5516/2019\n\nLocal:\n\nPlenary of the Federal Senate\n\nLegislative Action:\n\nReceived Amendments Nos. 18 to 22\, from Senator Izalci Lucas. | See the procedure\n\nhttps://legis.s enado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978270&\;ts=1721927154981&\; disposition=inline\n\nIdentification:\n\nAMENDMENT 22 PLEN - PL 5516/2019\ n\nAuthor:\n\nSenator Izalci Lucas (PSDB/DF)\n\nDate:\n\n09/06/2021\n\nDes cription/Syllabus\n\nAmendment 03 PL 5516/2019\n\nLocal:\n\nPlenary of the Federal Senate\n\nLegislative Action:\n\nReceived Amendments Nos. 18 to 2 2\, from Senator Izalci Lucas. | See the procedure\n\nhttps://legis.senad o.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978273&\;ts=1721927155012&\;disp osition=inline\n\nIdentification:\n\nAMENDMENT 23 PLEN - PL 5516/2019\n\nA uthor:\n\nSenator Eduardo Braga (MDB/AM)\n\nDate:\n\n09/06/2021\n\nDescrip tion/Syllabus\n\nAmendment 1 - PL 5516/2019\n\nLocal:\n\nPlenary of the Fe deral Senate\n\nLegislative Action:\n\nReceived Amendments Nos. 23 and 24\ , by Senator Eduardo Braga. | See the procedure\n\nhttps://legis.senado.l eg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978279&\;ts=1721927155049&\;disposi tion=inline\n\nIdentification:\n\nAMENDMENT 24 PLEN - PL 5516/2019\n\nAuth or:\n\nSenator Eduardo Braga (MDB/AM)\n\nDate:\n\n09/06/2021\n\nDescriptio n/Syllabus\n\nAmendment 2 - PL 5516/2019\n\nLocal:\n\nPlenary of the Feder al Senate\n\nLegislative Action:\n\nReceived Amendments Nos. 23 and 24\, b y Senator Eduardo Braga. | See the procedure\n\nhttps://legis.senado.leg. br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978282&\;ts=1721927155079&\;dispositio n=inline\n\nIdentification:\n\nAMENDMENT 25 PLEN - PL 5516/2019\n\nAuthor: \n\nSenator Irajá (PSD/TO)\n\nDate:\n\n09/06/2021\n\nDescription/Syllabus \n\nAmendment to PL 5516/2019 - art 2\n\nLocal:\n\nPlenary of the Federal Senate\n\nLegislative Action:\n\nReceived Amendments Nos. 25 to 28 from Se nator Irajá\; and 29 to 31 from Senator Romário. | See the procedure\n\ nhttps://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978291&\;ts=172 1927155572&\;disposition=inline\n\nIdentification:\n\nAMENDMENT 26 PLEN - PL 5516/2019\n\nAuthor:\n\nSenator Irajá (PSD/TO)\n\nDate:\n\n09/06/20 21\n\nDescription/Syllabus\n\nAmendment to PL 5516/2019 - art 10\n\nLocal: \n\nPlenary of the Federal Senate\n\nLegislative Action:\n\nReceived Amend ments Nos. 25 to 28 from Senator Irajá\; and 29 to 31 from Senator Romár io. | See the procedure\n\nhttps://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/docum ento?dm=8978294&\;ts=1721927155603&\;disposition=inline\n\nIdentific ation:\n\nAMENDMENT 27 PLEN - PL 5516/2019\n\nAuthor:\n\nSenator Irajá (P SD/TO)\n\nDate:\n\n09/06/2021\n\nDescription/Syllabus\n\nAmendment to PL 5 516/2019 - art 15\n\nLocal:\n\nPlenary of the Federal Senate\n\nLegislativ e Action:\n\nReceived Amendments Nos. 25 to 28 from Senator Irajá\; and 2 9 to 31 from Senator Romário. | See the procedure\n\nhttps://legis.senad o.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978297&\;ts=1721927155637&\;disp osition=inline\n\nIdentification:\n\nAMENDMENT 28 PLEN - PL 5516/2019\n\nA uthor:\n\nSenator Irajá (PSD/TO)\n\nDate:\n\n09/06/2021\n\nDescription/Sy llabus\n\nAmendment to PL 5516/2019 - art 21\n\nLocal:\n\nPlenary of the F ederal Senate\n\nLegislative Action:\n\nReceived Amendments Nos. 25 to 28 from Senator Irajá\; and 29 to 31 from Senator Romário. | See the proce dure\n\nhttps://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978300&\ ;ts=1721927155669&\;disposition=inline\n\nIdentification:\n\nAMENDMENT 29 PLEN - PL 5516/2019\n\nAuthor:\n\nSenator Romário (PL/RJ)\n\nDate:\n\n 09/06/2021\n\nDescription/Syllabus\n\nAmendment to PL 5516/2019\n\nLocal:\ n\nPlenary of the Federal Senate\n\nLegislative Action:\n\nReceived Amendm ents Nos. 25 to 28 from Senator Irajá\; and 29 to 31 from Senator Romári o. | See the procedure\n\nhttps://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/docume nto?dm=8978305&\;ts=1721927155946&\;disposition=inline\n\nIdentifica tion:\n\nAMENDMENT 30 PLEN - PL 5516/2019\n\nAuthor:\n\nSenator Romário ( PL/RJ)\n\nDate:\n\n09/06/2021\n\nDescription/Syllabus\n\nAmendment to PL 5 516/2019\n\nLocal:\n\nPlenary of the Federal Senate\n\nLegislative Action: \n\nReceived Amendments Nos. 25 to 28 from Senator Irajá\; and 29 to 31 f rom Senator Romário. | See the procedure\n\nhttps://legis.senado.leg.br/ sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978309&\;ts=1721927155779&\;disposition=i nline\n\nIdentification:\n\nAMENDMENT 31 PLEN - PL 5516/2019\n\nAuthor:\n\ nSenator Romário (PL/RJ)\n\nDate:\n\n09/06/2021\n\nDescription/Syllabus\n \nAmendment to PL 5516/2019\n\nLocal:\n\nPlenary of the Federal Senate\n\n Legislative Action:\n\nReceived Amendments Nos. 25 to 28 from Senator Iraj á\; and 29 to 31 from Senator Romário. | See the procedure\n\nhttps://l egis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978313&\;ts=1721927156035 &\;disposition=inline\n\nIdentification:\n\nSeparate amendments\n\nAuth or:\n\nFederal Senate\n\nDate:\n\n09/06/2021\n\nDescription/Syllabus\n\n-\ n\nLocal:\n\nPlenary of the Federal Senate\n\nLegislative Action:\n\nThe d eadline for amending the matter ended at 2 pm on 06/09/2021. Amendments No s. 2 to 31 were received. | See the procedure\n\nhttps://legis.senado.leg .br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978336&\;ts=1721927155848&\;dispositi on=inline\n\nIdentification:\n\nSeparate amendments\n\nAuthor:\n\nFederal Senate\n\nDate:\n\n09/06/2021\n\nDescription/Syllabus\n\n-\n\nLocal:\n\nPl enary of the Federal Senate\n\nhttps://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/do cumento?dm=8978350&\;ts=1721927154679&\;disposition=inline\n\nLEGAL DOCUMENT URL- all content within \, which is more than listed\n\nhttps://w ww25.senado.leg.br/web/atividade/materias/-/materia/139338\n\n\n\n\n  \n\ n\n\n POST URL\n\n\n\n https://aalbc.com/tc/topic/12082-black-1-percent-ha ve-to-lead-by-example-in-uncomfortable-places-economic-corner/\n\n\n\n PRI OR EDITION\n\n\n\n https://aalbc.com/tc/events/event/600-economic-corner-2 8-11232025/\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n NEXT EDITION\n\n\n\n https://aalbc.com/tc/e vents/event/628-economic-corner-30-01202026/\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n COMMENTARI ES\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n @ProfD\n\n\n\n the problem with @Pioneer1 position is in the past of the usa the black 1% supported the underground\, the bl ack 1% were keys in the many Black DOSers going back to Africa through the ir own minimal means\, the black 1% helped financed the travel and activit ies of the civil rights movement leaders like mlk jr. \n\n\n\n The black 1% has always existed\, many black loyalists and some black rebels were bl ack 1% who owned businesses. So history disproves white power as having th e potency he suggest. Don't tell me black 1% were able to help black peopl e in the 1800s when black pregnant women were being hung for sport by whit es but now in 2025\, the great mind shackle exist. The future isn't about returning to the past\, but history does have value\, and I think the mode rn black 1% who have a better environment than any time before in usa or b ritish colonial history \, have no excuse to lead by positive + better exa mple. Black business owners circa 1865 in south carolina were willing to d efy white people by having black schools when white people\, pre KKK \, we re going from black town to black town burning them down to the ground. \ n\n\n\n Fellas\, they got to do better and in all earnest \, if they don't want to help\, I say\, call them out on it. I don't have a problem with w ealthy blacks not helping black folk if said black 1% can be honest about it\, tfi the 99% of black people can be honest about it. . Lets call it li ke it is\, a minority of our forebears were willing to help the white peop le fighting the englsih\, who were enslaving us. So it isn't odd that some black people are willing to help whites over black people in the usa.. Bu t... again\, call it like it is.\n\n DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20251130 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;INTERVAL=1 END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR