BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//InvisionCommunity Events 5.0.18//EN METHOD:PUBLISH CALSCALE:GREGORIAN REFRESH-INTERVAL:PT15M X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT15M X-WR-CALNAME:RMCommunityCalendar NAME:RMCommunityCalendar BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Europe/London TZURL:https://tzurl.org/zoneinfo/Europe/London X-LIC-LOCATION:Europe/London BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20260329T020000Z RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=3;BYDAY=-1SU END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20261025T020000Z RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=10;BYDAY=-1SU END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT SUMMARY:Economic Corner 34 02/20/2026 DTSTAMP:20260221T020912Z SEQUENCE:0 UID:657-7-c3fe8195a3dde498d013e477e2142422@aalbc.com ORGANIZER;CN="richardmurray":noreply@aalbc.com DESCRIPTION:\n PREFACE\n\n\n\n I had the content under the label ORIGINA L CONTENT before the supreme court decision 02/20/20206 .\n\n\n\n  You ca n read the entire text in the pdf or transcript\, but\, after an incomplet e reading\, the case is summed up as the following. Schrumpt used executiv e orders and threats to the usa to employ tariffs. Learning resources and others business model is based on products from overseas. They argued the usa wasn't under a national security threat that warranted the tariffs plu s that tax policy is the sole privy of the congress\, nor will I.E.E.P.A. law allow that. The supreme court based on precedence said they were corre ct. But the supreme court didn't limit the power of executive orders or em ergency status. \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n The following are truths.\n\n\n\n The USA at two hundred and fifty years old has the most protected individual liberty of any time in its history. To rephrase\, America\, the continent from canada to argentina\, or the united states of america was never a gre ater place for equality or individual liberty for all humans than it is to day. The USA at two hundred and fifty years old has:  the most multiracia l populace in its history or more multiracial populace than any other gove rnment in modern humanity.   The USA has never been more advantageous fo r one group of people in it than when said group\, those of white european descent\, had the power to take advantage of all others\, and no system o f multiracial equality in the united states of ameria will ever provide th e opportunities/possibilities/advantges for those of white european descen t in the united states of america of all financial ransk than the system o f white oppressions : jim crow \, o rearlier enslavement\, or earlier euro pean imperialism. All non white european descent populaces in the united s tates of america exist with many individuals who injure the cllective good in their populace. \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n What are the problems? \n\n\n\n Immigration needs to be handled. But many people outside the united states of america live in countries lacking opportunity or organization \, thus they want to immigrate away. The United States of America has never had a multiracial unity at the grassroots\, because the various races have alway s had uneven relationships with one having criminal advantage over another . The United States of America has a large populace\, mostly of white euro pean descent\,  that wants to undo the financial or intergovernmental glo bal order that the united states of america is at the center of. The Unite d States of America has a large populace \, highly multiracial\,  that wa nts said global order to be maintained even when it fails miserably.\n\n\n \n  \n\n\n\n What is the future of the United States of America at 250?  \n\n\n\n From the birth of the USA a multiracial group has always supporte d the idea of a country of individuals united only in their humanity. But\ , that belief isn't enough to unify agendas of all the peoples in the usa. Unified agendas to all peoples in the usa will requires a new culture. An d the USA doesn't have the leaders or willing populaces to make a new cult ure possible. The financial reality of modernity in humanity is the world of the rich is unbounded to any government\, but the world of the poor sti ll requires governments\, and technology is owned by fiscal capitalistic a gents who will never allow their profitability to be dismissed. So\, the g lobal economy is bound to greater failures in the future and the only insu lation will be the countries least reliant on it. \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n But there were dissents\, I place the openings of the two dissenters. \n\n\n \n  \n\n\n\n JUSTICE THOMAS\, dissenting. I join JUSTICE KAVANAUGH’s pr incipal dissent in full. As he explains\, the Court’s decision today can not be justified as a matter of statutory interpretation. Congress author ized the President to “regulate . . . importation.” 50 U. S. C. §1702 (a)(1)(B). Throughout American history\, the author ity to “regulate imp ortation” has been understood to include the authority to impose duties on imports. Post\, at 9–13\, 22–29 (KAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting). The meaning of that phrase was beyond doubt by the time that Congress enacted this statute\, shortly after President Nixon’s highly publi cized duties on imports were upheld based on identical lan guage. Post\, at 14–22. T he statute that the President relied on therefore authorized him to impose the duties on imports at issue in these cases. JUSTICE KAVANAUGH makes c lear that the Court errs in concluding otherwise. I write separately to ex plain why the statute at issue here is consistent with the separation of p owers as an original matter. The Constitution’s separation of powers for bids Congress from delegating core legislative power to the Pres ident. Th is principle\, known as the nondelegation doctrine\, is rooted in the Cons titution’s Legislative Vesting Clause and Due Process Clause. Art. I\, §1\; Amdt. 5. Both Clauses forbid Congress from delegating core legislati ve power\, which is the power to make substantive rules setting the condit ions for deprivations of life\, liberty\, or property. Nei ther Clause pro hibits Congress from delegating other kinds of power. Because the Constitu tion assigns Congress many powers that do not implicate the nondelegation doctrine\, Congress may delegate the exercise of many powers to the Presid ent. Congress has done so repeatedly since the founding\, with this Cour t’s blessing. The power to impose duties on imports can be delegated.1 At the founding\, that power was regarded as one of many powers over fore ign commerce that could be delegated to the President. Power over foreign commerce was not within the core legislative power\, and engaging in forei gn com merce was regarded as a privilege rather than a right. Early Congre sses often delegated to the President power to regulate foreign commerce\, including through duties on im ports. As I suggested over a decade ago\, the nondelegation doctrine does not apply to “a delegation of power to m ake rules governing private conduct in the area of foreign trade\,” incl uding rules imposing duties on imports. Depart ment of Transportation v. A ssociation of American Rail roads\, 575 U. S. 43\, 80–81\, n. 5 (2015) ( opinion concurring in judgment). Therefore\, to the extent that the Court relies on “‘separation of powers principles’” to rule against the President\, ante\, at 8 (opinion of ROBERTS\, C. J.)\, it is mis taken.\n\ n\n\n  \n\n\n\n JUSTICE KAVANAUGH\, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS and JUSTICE ALITO join\, dissenting. Acting pursuant to his statutory authority to “ regulate . . . importation” under the 1977 International Emergency Econo mic Powers Act\, or IEEPA\, the President has imposed tariffs on imports o f foreign goods from various countries. The tariffs have generated vigorou s policy debates. Those policy debates are not for the Federal Judiciary t o resolve. Rather\, the Judiciary’s more limited role is to neutrally in terpret and apply the law. The sole legal question here is whether\, under IEEPA\, tariffs are a means to “regulate . . . importation.” Statutor y text\, history\, and precedent demonstrate that the answer is clearly ye s: Like quotas and embargoes\, tariffs are a traditional and common tool t o regulate importation. Since early in U. S. history\, Congress has regul arly authorized the President to impose tariffs on imports of foreign good s. Presidents have often used that authority to obtain leverage with forei gn nations\, help American manufacturers and workers compete on a more lev el playing field\, and generate revenue for the United States. Numerous la ws such as the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and the Trade Act of 1974 conti nue to authorize the President to place tariffs on foreign imports in a va riety of circumstances\, and Presidents have often done so. In recent year s\, Presidents George W. Bush\, Obama\, and Biden have all imposed tariffs on foreign imports under those statutory authorities. President Trump has similarly imposed tariffs\, and has done so here under IEEPA. During decl ared national emergencies\, IEEPA broadly authorizes the President to regu late international economic transactions. Most relevant for this case\, du ring those national emergencies\, IEEPA grants the President the power to “regulate . . . importation” of foreign goods.\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n 02/2 0/2026 decision\n\n\n\n https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-128 7_4gcj.pdf\n\n\n\n TEXT TRANSCRIPT\n\n\n\n (Slip Opinion) \nOCTOBER TERM\, 2025 \nSyllabus \nNOTE: Where it is feasible\, a syllabus (headnote) will be released\, as is \nbeing done in connection with this case\, at the ti me the opinion is issued. \nThe syllabus constitutes no part of the opinio n of the Court but has been \nprepared by the Reporter of Decisions for th e convenience of the reader. \nSee United States v. Detroit Timber &\; Lumber Co.\, 200 U. S. 321\, 337. \n1 \nSUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES \nSyllabus \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC.\, ET AL. v. TRUMP\, \nPRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES\, ET AL. \nCERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED STA TES \nCOURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT \nNo. 24–128 7. Argued November 5\, 2025—Decided February 20\, 2026* \nThe question p resented is whether the International Emergency Eco\nnomic Powers Act (IEE PA) authorizes the President to impose tariffs.\nSee 91 Stat. 1626. Short ly after taking office\, President Trump sought\nto address two foreign th reats: the influx of illegal drugs from Canada\, \nMexico\, and China\, Pr esidential Proclamation No. 10886\, 90 Fed. Reg.\n8327\; Exec. Order No. 1 4193\, 90 Fed. Reg. 9113\; Exec. Order No. \n14194\, 90 Fed. Reg. 9117\; E xec. Order No. 14195\, 90 Fed. Reg. 9121\, \nand “large and persistent ” trade deficits\, Exec. Order No. 14257\, 90 \nFed. Reg. 15041. The Pr esident determined that the drug influx had \n“created a public health c risis\,” 90 Fed. Reg. 9113\, and that the trade \ndeficits had “led to the hollowing out” of the American manufacturing\nbase and “undermine d critical supply chains\,” id.\, at 15041. The Pres\nident declared a national emergency as to both threats\, deeming them \n“unusual and extr aordinary\,” and invoked his authority under IEEPA \nto respond.\nHe imp osed tariffs to deal with each threat. As to the drug traffick\ning tarif fs\, the President imposed a 25% duty on most Canadian and \nMexican impor ts and a 10% duty on most Chinese imports. Id.\, at \n9114\, 9118\, 9122 –9123. As to the trade deficit (“reciprocal”) tariffs\, the\nPresid ent imposed a duty “on all imports from all trading partne rs” of \n—————— \n*Together with No. 25–250\, Trump\, Pres ident of the United States\, et \nal. v. V.O.S. Selections\, Inc.\, et al. \, on certiorari to the United States \nCourt of Appeals for the Federal C ircuit. \n2 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nSyllabus \nat least 10% \, with dozens of nations facing higher rates. Id.\, at 15045\, \n15049. Since imposing each set of tariffs\, the President has issued sev\neral in creases\, reductions\, and other modifications.\n Petitioners in Learning Resources and respondents in V.O.S. Selec\ntions filed suit\, alleging th at IEEPA does not authorize the reciprocal \nor drug trafficking tariffs. The Learning Resources plaintiffs—two \nsmall businesses—sued in the U nited States District Court for the Dis\ntrict of Columbia. That court de nied the Government’s motion to \ntransfer the case to the United States Court of International Trade \n(CIT) and granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction\, \nconcluding that IEEPA did not grant the President the power to im\npose tariffs. The V.O.S. Selections plaintiff s—five small businesses \nand 12 States—sued in the CIT. That court g ranted summary judg\nment for the plaintiffs. And the Federal Circuit\, s itting en banc\, af\nfirmed in relevant part\, concluding that IEEPA’s g rant of authority to\n“regulate . . . importation” did not authorize t he challenged tariffs\, \nwhich “are unbounded in scope\, amount\, and d uration.” 149 F. 4th \n1312\, 1338. The Government filed a petition fo r certiorari in V.O.S. \nSelections\, and the Learning Resources plaintiff s filed a petition for \ncertiorari before judgment. The Court granted the petitions and con\nsolidated the cases. \nHeld: IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs. The \njudgment in No. 24–1287 is vacat ed\, and the case is remanded with \ninstructions to dismiss for lack of j urisdiction\; the judgment in No. 25\n250 is affirmed. \nNo. 24–1287\, 7 84 F. Supp. 3d 209\, vacated and remanded\; No. 25–250\, \n149 F. 4th 13 12\, affirmed. \nTHE CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the Court wit h respect \nto Parts I and II–A–1: \nArticle I\, Section 8\, of the Co nstitution specifies that “The Congress \nshall have Power To lay and co llect Taxes\, Duties\, Imposts and Ex\ncises.” The Framers recognized th e unique importance of this taxing \npower—a power which “very clear [ly]” includes the power to impose \ntariffs. Gibbons v. Ogden\, 9 Wheat . 1\, 201. And they gave Congress \n“alone . . . access to the pockets of the people.” The Federalist No. 48\, \np. 310 (J. Madison). The Fra mers did not vest any part of the taxing\npower in the Executive Branch. See Nicol v. Ames\, 173 U. S. 509\, 515. \nThe Government thus concedes th at the President enjoys no inher\nent authority to impose tariffs during p eacetime. It instead relies ex\nclusively on IEEPA to defend the challeng ed tariffs. It reads the words \n“regulate” and “importation” to effect a sweeping delegation of Con\ngress’s power to set tariff polic y—authorizing the President to impose\ntariffs of unlimited amount and d uration\, on any product from any \nCite as: 607 U. S. ___ (2026) \nSyllab us \ncountry. 50 U. S. C. §1702(a)(1)(B). Pp. 5–7.\n3 \nTHE CHIEF JUS TICE\, joined by JUSTICE GORSUCH and JUSTICE \nBARRETT\, concluded in Part II–A–2: \nThe Court has long expressed “reluctan[ce] to read into ambiguous\nstatutory text” extraordinary delegations of Congress’s po wers. West \nVirginia v. EPA\, 597 U. S. 697\, 723 (quoting Utility Air Re gulatory \nGroup v. EPA\, 573 U. S. 302\, 324). In several cases describe d as in\nvolving “major questions\,” the Court has reasoned that “bo th separa\ntion of powers principles and a practical understanding of legi slative \nintent” suggest Congress would not have delegated “highly co nsequen\ntial power” through ambiguous language. Id.\, at 723–724. Th ese con\nsiderations apply with particular force where\, as here\, the pur ported \ndelegation involves the core congressional power of the purse. Co n\ngressional practice confirms as much. When Congress has delegated \nit s tariff powers\, it has done so in explicit terms and subject to strict \ nlimits. \nAgainst that backdrop of clear and limited delegations\, the Go vern\nment reads IEEPA to give the President power to unilaterally impose\ nunbounded tariffs and change them at will. That view would represent\na transformative expansion of the President’s authority over tariff pol\ni cy. It is also telling that in IEEPA’s half century of existence\, no Pr es\nident has invoked the statute to impose any tariffs\, let alone tariff s of \nthis magnitude and scope. That “ ‘lack of historical precede nt\,’ coupled \nwith the breadth of authority” that the President now claims\, suggests \nthat the tariffs extend beyond the President’s “le gitimate reach.” Na\ntional Federation of Independent Business v. OSHA\ , 595 U. S. 109\, 119 \n(quoting Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Ac counting Over\nsight Bd.\, 561 U. S. 477\, 505). The “ ‘economic and political signifi\ncance’ ” of the authority the President has asserte d likewise “provide[s] \na ‘reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress’ meant to confer\nsuch authority.” West Virginia\, 597 U. S.\ , at 721 (quoting FDA v. \nBrown &\; Williamson Tobacco Corp.\, 529 U. S. 120\, 159–160). The \nstakes here dwarf those of other major questio ns cases. And as in those \ncases\, “a reasonable interpreter would [no t] expect” Congress to \n“pawn[]” such a “big-time policy call[] . . . off to another branch.” Biden \nv. Nebraska\, 600 U. S. 477\, 515 ( BARRETT\, J.\, concurring).\nThere is no exception to the major questions doctrine for emergency \nstatutes. Nor does the fact that tariffs implicat e foreign affairs render\nthe doctrine inapplicable. The Framers gave “ Congress alone” the\npower to impose tariffs during peacetime. Merritt v. Welsh\, 104 U. S. \n694\, 700. And the foreign affairs implications of tariffs do not make it\nany more likely that Congress would relinquish its tariff power\nthrough vague language\, or without careful limits. Accord ingly\, the\nPresident must “point to clear congressional authorizatio n” to justify \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n4 LEARNING R ESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nSyllabus \nhis extraordinary assertion of that power. Nebraska\, 600 U. S.\, at 506 \n(internal quotation marks omitted). He cannot. Pp. 7–13.\nTHE CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the Court with respect\nto Part II–B\, concluding: \n(a) IEEPA authorizes t he President to “investigate\, block during the \npendency of an investi gation\, regulate\, direct and compel\, nullify\, void\, \nprevent or proh ibit . . . importation or exportation.” §1702(a)(1)(B). \nAbsent from this lengthy list of specific powers is any mention of tariffs\nor duties. Had Congress intended to convey the distinct and extraor\ndinary power t o impose tariffs\, it would have done so expressly\, as it\nconsistently h as in other tariff statutes.\nThe power to “regulate . . . importation ” does not fill that void. The \nterm “regulate\,” as ordinarily us ed\, means to “fix\, establish\, or control\; \nto adjust by rule\, meth od\, or established mode\; to direct by rule or re\nstriction\; to subject to governing principles or laws.” Black’s Law Dic\ntionary 1156. Th e facial breadth of this definition places in stark relief \nwhat ”regul ate” is not usually thought to include: taxation. Many stat\nutes grant the Executive the power to “regulate.” Yet the Government \ncannot i dentify any statute in which the power to regulate includes the \npower to tax. The Court is therefore skeptical that in IEEPA—and\nIEEPA alone— Congress hid a delegation of its birth-right power to tax\nwithin the quot idian power to “regulate.” \nWhile taxes may accomplish regulatory end s\, it does not follow that \nthe power to regulate includes the power to tax as a means of regula\ntion. Indeed\, when Congress addresses both the power to regulate and\nthe power to tax\, it does so separately and expres sly. That it did not \ndo so here is strong evidence that “regulate” in IEEPA does not include\ntaxation. \nA contrary reading would render IEE PA partly unconstitutional. \nIEEPA authorizes the President to “regulat e . . . importation or expor\ntation.” §1702(a)(1)(B). But taxing expo rts is expressly forbidden by \nthe Constitution. Art. I\, §9\, cl. 5. \nThe “neighboring words” with which “regulate” “is associated ” also\nsuggest that Congress did not intend for “regulate” to inclu de the rev\nenue-raising power. United States v. Williams\, 553 U. S. 285\ , 294. \nEach of the nine verbs in §1702(a)(1)(B) authorizes a distinct a ction a\nPresident might take in sanctioning foreign actors or controlling do\nmestic actors engaged in foreign commerce\, as Presidential practice \nconfirms. And none of the listed authorities includes the distinct and \nextraordinary power to raise revenue—a power which no President has \n ever found in IEEPA. Pp. 14–16.\n(b) Several arguments marshaled in res ponse are unpersuasive.\nFirst\, the contention that IEEPA confers the pow er to impose tariffs \nbecause early commentators and the Court’s cases discuss tariffs in \nCite as: 607 U. S. ___ (2026) \nSyllabus \n5 \nthe co ntext of the Commerce Clause answers the wrong question. The \nquestion i s not whether tariffs can ever be a means of regulating com\nmerce. It is instead whether Congress\, when conferring the power to \n“regulate . . . importation\,” gave the President the power to impose tar\niffs at hi s sole discretion. And Congress’s pattern of usage is plain: \nWhen Con gress grants the power to impose tariffs\, it does so clearly \nand with c areful constraints. It did neither in IEEPA. \nSecond\, the argument that “regulate” naturally includes tariffs be\ncause the term lies between two poles in IEEPA—“compel” on the af\nfirmative end and “prohi bit” on the negative end—is unavailing. Alt\nhough tariffs may be les s extreme than an outright compulsion or\nprohibition\, it does not follow that tariffs lie on the spectrum between \nthose poles\; they are differe nt in kind\, not degree\, from the other au\nthorities in IEEPA. Tariffs o perate directly on domestic importers to \nraise revenue for the Treasury and are “very clear[ly] . . . a branch of \nthe taxing power.” Gibbon s\, 9 Wheat.\, at 201. Thus\, they fall outside \nthe spectrum entirely. \nThird\, the argument based on IEEPA’s predecessor\, the Trading \nwit h the Enemy Act (TWEA)\, and the Court of Customs and Patent \nAppeals’ decision in United States v. Yoshida Int’l\, Inc.\, 526 F. 2d 560\, \nca nnot bear the weight placed on it. A single\, expressly limited opinion\nf rom a specialized intermediate appellate court does not establish a \nwell -settled meaning that the Court can assume Congress incorpo\nrated into IE EPA. \nFourth\, the historical argument based on the Court’s wartime pr ec\nedents fails. Those precedents are facially inapposite\, as all agree the\nPresident lacks inherent peacetime authority to impose tariffs. And \nthe attenuated chain of inferences from wartime precedents through\nmult iple iterations of TWEA to IEEPA cannot support—much less\nclearly suppo rt—a reading of IEEPA that includes the distinct power \nto impose tarif fs. \nFinally\, arguments relying on this Court’s precedents lack merit. \nFederal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG\, Inc.\, 426 U. S. 548\, \nbears little on the meaning of IEEPA. Section 232(b) of the Trade Ex\n pansion Act of 1962 contains sweeping\, discretion-conferring language\nth at IEEPA does not contain\, and the explicit reference to duties in\nSecti on 232(a) renders it natural for Section 232(b) itself to authorize \nduti es. Nor does Dames &\; Moore v. Regan\, 453 U. S. 654\, offer support \ nbecause that case was exceedingly narrow\, did not address the Presi\nden t’s power to “regulate\,” and did not involve tariffs at all. Pp. 1 6\n20. \nJUSTICE KAGAN\, joined by JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR and JUSTICE \nJACKSON \, agreed that IEEPA does not authorize the President to im\npose tariffs\ , but concluded that the Court need not invoke the major \n6 \nLEARNING RE SOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nSyllabus \nquestions doctrine because the ordina ry tools of statutory interpreta\ntion amply support that result. Pp. 1 –7.\nJUSTICE JACKSON would also consult legislative history—in particu \nlar\, the House and Senate Reports that accompanied IEEPA and its\nprede cessor statute\, TWEA—to determine that Congress did not in\ntend for IE EPA to authorize the Executive to impose tariffs. Pp. 1–5. \nROBERTS\, C. J.\, announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the \nopinion of the Court with respect to Parts I\, II–A–1\, and II–B\, in which \n SOTOMAYOR\, KAGAN\, GORSUCH\, BARRETT\, and JACKSON\, JJ.\, joined\, and \ nan opinion with respect to Parts II–A–2 and III\, in which GORSUCH an d \nBARRETT\, JJ.\, joined. GORSUCH\, J.\, and BARRETT\, J.\, filed concur ring \nopinions. KAGAN\, J.\, filed an opinion concurring in part and conc urring\nin the judgment\, in which SOTOMAYOR and JACKSON\, JJ.\, joined.\n JACKSON\, J.\, filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the \ njudgment. THOMAS\, J.\, filed a dissenting opinion. KAVANAUGH\, J.\, fi led \na dissenting opinion\, in which THOMAS and ALITO\, JJ.\, joined. \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of the Court \nNOTICE: This opini on is subject to formal revision before publication in the \nUnited States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of \nDecisions\, Su preme Court of the United States\, Washington\, D. C. 20543\, \npio@suprem ecourt.gov\, of any typographical or other formal errors. \n1 \nSUPREME CO URT OF THE UNITED STATES \n_________________ \nNos. 24–1287 and 25–250 \n_________________ \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC.\, ET AL.\, PETITIONERS \n 24–1287 \nv. \nDONALD J. TRUMP\, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED \nSTATES\, ET A L. \nON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED \nSTATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA \nCIRCUIT \nDONALD J. TRUMP\, PRESID ENT OF THE UNITED \nSTATES\, ET AL.\, PETITIONERS \n25–250 \nv. \nV.O.S. SELECTIONS\, INC.\, ET AL. \nON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES C OURT OF \nAPPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT \n[February 20\, 2026]\n CHIEF J USTICE ROBERTS announced the judgment of the\nCourt and delivered the opin ion of the Court\, except as to\nParts II–A–2 and III.* \nWe decide wh ether the International Emergency Eco\nnomic Powers Act (IEEPA) authorizes the President to im\npose tariffs. \n—————— \n*JUSTICE SOTOMA YOR\, JUSTICE KAGAN\, and JUSTICE JACKSON join only \nParts I\, II–A–1 \, and II–B of this opinion. \n2 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \n Opinion of the Court \nI \nA \nShortly after taking office\, President Tru mp sought to ad\ndress two foreign threats. The first was the influx of il legal\ndrugs from Canada\, Mexico\, and China. Presidential Proc\nlamation No. 10886\, 90 Fed. Reg. 8327 (2025)\; Exec. Order\nNo. 14193\, 90 Fed. R eg. 9113 (2025)\; Exec. Order No. 14194\,\n90 Fed. Reg. 9117 (2025)\; Exec . Order No. 14195\, 90 Fed.\nReg. 9121 (2025). The second was “large an d persistent” \ntrade deficits. Exec. Order No. 14257\, 90 Fed. Reg. 15 041 \n(2025). The President determined that the first threat had \n“crea ted a public health crisis\,” 90 Fed. Reg. 9113\, and that \nthe second had “led to the hollowing out” of the American \nmanufacturing base and “undermined critical supply\nchains\,” id.\, at 15041. He invoked his authority under\nIEEPA to respond. \nEnacted in 1977\, IEEPA gives the President economic\ntools to address significant foreign threats. 91 Sta t. 1626. \nWhen acting under IEEPA\, the President must identify an\n“un usual and extraordinary threat” to American national\nsecurity\, foreign policy\, or the economy\, originating primar\nily “outside the United S tates.” 50 U. S. C. §1701(a). And \nhe must “declare[] a national em ergency” under the Na\ntional Emergencies Act. Ibid.\; see 90 Stat. 1255 . He may \nthen\, “by means of instructions\, licenses\, or otherwise \,”\ntake the following actions to “deal with” the threat: “inves\ ntigate\, block during the pendency of an investigation\, regu\nlate\, dir ect and compel\, nullify\, void\, prevent or prohibit\, \nany acquisition\ , holding\, withholding\, use\, transfer\, with\ndrawal\, transportation\, importation or exportation of\, or\ndealing in\, or exercising any right\ , power\, or privilege with \nrespect to\, or transactions involving\, any property in which\nany foreign country or a national thereof has any inte rest.”\n§§1701(a)\, 1702(a)(1)(B). \nPresident Trump declared a nation al emergency as to\nboth the drug trafficking and the trade deficits\, whi ch he \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of the Court \n3 \ndeeme d “unusual and extraordinary” threats. He then im\nposed tariffs to de al with each threat. As to the drug traf\nficking tariffs\, the President imposed a 25% duty on most\nCanadian and Mexican imports and a 10% duty o n most\nChinese imports. 90 Fed. Reg. 9114\, 9118\, 9122–9123. As \nto the trade deficit (or “reciprocal”) tariffs\, the President im\nposed a duty “on all imports from all trading partners” of at \nleast 10%. Id.\, at 15045. Dozens of nations faced higher \nrates. Id.\, at 15049. A nd these tariffs applied notwith\nstanding any extant trade agreements. I d.\, at 15045. \nSince imposing each set of tariffs\, the President has is \nsued several increases\, reductions\, and other modifications. \nOne mon th after imposing the 10% drug trafficking tariffs\non Chinese goods\, he increased the rate to 20%. See Exec. \nOrder No. 14228\, 90 Fed. Reg. 114 63 (2025). One month \nlater\, he removed a statutory exemption for Chine se goods \nunder $800. Exec. Order No. 14256\, 90 Fed. Reg. 14899 \n(2025) . Less than a week after imposing the reciprocal tar\niffs\, the President increased the rate on Chinese goods from\n34% to 84%. Exec. Order No. 142 59\, 90 Fed. Reg. 15509 \n(2025). The very next day\, he increased the rat e further\nstill\, to 125%. Exec. Order No. 14266\, 90 Fed. Reg. 15625\, \ n15626 (2025). This brought the total effective tariff rate on\nmost Chin ese goods to 145%. The President has also shifted \nsets of goods into and out of the reciprocal tariff framework.\nSee\, e.g.\, Exec. Order No. 143 60\, 90 Fed. Reg. 54091 (2025) \n(exempting from reciprocal tariffs beef\, fruits\, coffee\, tea\,\nspices\, and some fertilizers)\; Exec. Order No. 14346\, 90 Fed.\nReg. 43737 (2025). And he has issued a variety of other ad\njustments. See\, e.g.\, Exec. Order No. 14358\, 90 Fed. Reg.\n50729\, 50730 (2025) (extending “the suspension of height\nened reciprocal tari ffs” on Chinese imports). \nB \nPetitioners in Learning Resources and re spondents in \nV.O.S. Selections filed suit\, alleging that IEEPA does not \n4 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nOpinion of the Court \nauthori ze the reciprocal or drug trafficking tariffs. The \nLearning Resources p laintiffs—two small businesses—sued \nin the United States District Co urt for the District of Co\nlumbia. The V.O.S. Selections plaintiffs—fiv e small busi\nnesses and 12 States—sued in the United States Court of \n International Trade (CIT).\nThe Government moved to transfer the Learning Re\nsources case to the CIT. It argued that the District Court\nlacked ju risdiction under 28 U. S. C. §1581(i)(1)\, which\ngives the CIT “exclus ive jurisdiction of any civil action com\nmenced against” the Governme nt “that arises out of any \nlaw of the United States providing for . . . tariffs” or their \n“administration and enforcement.” The Distric t Court de\nnied that motion and granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a \n preliminary injunction\, concluding that IEEPA did not\ngrant the Presiden t the power to impose tariffs. 784 \nF. Supp. 3d 209 (DC 2025). \n In the V.O.S. Selections case\, the CIT granted the plain\ntiffs’ motion for s ummary judgment. 772 F. Supp. 3d 1350 \n(2025). The Federal Circuit\, sit ting en banc\, affirmed in\nrelevant part. 149 F. 4th 1312 (2025). It fir st concluded \nthat the CIT had exclusive jurisdiction because the plain\n tiffs’ claims arose out of modifications to the Harmonized \nTariff Sche dule of the United States (HTSUS). Id.\, at 1329. \nOn the merits\, it ag reed with the CIT that IEEPA’s grant \nof authority to “regulate . . . importation” did not authorize \nthe challenged tariffs\, which “are unbounded in scope\,\namount\, and duration.” Id.\, at 1338. Judge Cun ningham\nconcurred (for four judges)\, reasoning that IEEPA did not \nauth orize the President to impose any tariffs. Id.\, at 1340. \nJudge Taranto dissented (for four judges)\, concluding that\nIEEPA authorized the challe nged tariffs. Id.\, at 1348. \nThe Government filed a motion to expedite a nd a petition\nfor certiorari in V.O.S. Selections\, and the Learning Re\n sources plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari before \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of the Court \n5 \njudgment. We granted the mo tion and petitions and con\nsolidated the cases. 606 U. S. 1050 (2025).1 \ nII \nBased on two words separated by 16 others in Section\n1702(a)(1)(B) of IEEPA—“regulate” and “importation”—the \nPresident asserts the independent power to impose tariffs \non imports from any country\, of any product\, at any rate\,\nfor any amount of time. Those words cannot b ear such \nweight. \nA \n1 \nArticle I\, Section 8\, of the Constitution s ets forth the pow\ners of the Legislative Branch. The first Clause of tha t pro\nvision specifies that “The Congress shall have Power To lay\nand collect Taxes\, Duties\, Imposts and Excises.” It is no \naccident that this power appears first. The power to tax\nwas\, Alexander Hamilton expla ined\, “the most important of\nthe authorities proposed to be conferred upon the Union.” \nThe Federalist No. 33\, pp. 202–203 (C. Rossiter ed . 1961).\nIt is both a “power to destroy\,” McCulloch v. Maryland\, 4 \nWheat. 316\, 431 (1819)\, and a power “necessary to the ex\nistence an d prosperity of a nation”—“the one great power \nupon which the whol e national fabric is based.” Nicol v. \nAmes\, 173 U. S. 509\, 515 (189 9). \n—————— \n1We agree with the Federal Circuit that the V.O .S. Selections case falls \nwithin the exclusive jurisdiction of the CIT. The plaintiffs’ challenges\n“arise[] out of ” modifications to the HTSUS. 28 U. S. C. §1581(i)(1).\nWhere\, as here\, such modifications are made under an “Act[] affecting \nimport treatment\,” 19 U. S. C. §24 83\, they are “considered to be statu\ntory provisions of law for all pu rposes\,” §3004(c)(1)(C). Thus\, the plain\ntiffs’ challenges “ari se[] out of [a] law of the United States providing for \n. . . tariffs.” 28 U. S. C. §1581(i)(1). For the same reasons\, the United \nStates Dis trict Court for the District of Columbia lacked jurisdiction in \nthe Lear ning Resources case. \n6 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nOpinion of the Court \nThe power to impose tariffs is “very clear[ly] . . . a bran ch \nof the taxing power.” Gibbons v. Ogden\, 9 Wheat. 1\, 201 \n(1824 ). “A tariff\,” after all\, “is a tax levied on imported \ngoods and services.” \nCongressional Research Service \n(CRS)\, C. Casey\, U. S. Tariff Policy: Overview 1 (2025). And \ntariffs “raise[] revenue\,” We st Lynn Creamery\, Inc. v. Healy\, \n512 U. S. 186\, 193 (1994)—the defi ning feature of a tax\, \nUnited States v. Kahriger\, 345 U. S. 22\, 28\, and n. 4 (1953)\; \nSonzinsky v. United States\, 300 U. S. 506\, 514 (1937 ). In\ndeed\, the Framers expected that the Government would for\n“a lo ng time depend . . . chiefly on” tariffs for revenue. The \nFederalist No. 12\, at 93 (A. Hamilton). Little wonder\, then\, \nthat the First Con gress’s first exercise of its taxing power\n(and its second enacted law\ , right after the one providing\nfor the new officials to take an oath) wa s a tariff law. See \nAct of July 4\, 1789\, ch. 2\, 1 Stat. 24. \nRecogni zing the taxing power’s unique importance\, and \nhaving just fought a r evolution motivated in large part by\n“taxation without representation \,” the Framers gave Con\ngress “alone . . . access to the pockets of the people.” The \nFederalist No. 48\, at 310 (J. Madison)\; see also De claration \nof Independence ¶19. They required “All Bills for raising\n Revenue [to] originate in the House of Representatives.” \nU. S. Const.\ , Art. I\, §7\, cl. 1. And in doing so\, they ensured \nthat only the Ho use could “propose the supplies requisite\nfor the support of government \,” thereby reducing “all the \novergrown prerogatives of the other br anches.” The Feder\nalist No. 58\, at 359 (J. Madison). They did not v est any part\nof the taxing power in the Executive Branch. See Nicol\, 173 \nU. S.\, at 515 (“[T]he whole power of taxation rests with Con\ngres s”).\nThe Government thus concedes\, as it must\, that the Pres\nident e njoys no inherent authority to impose tariffs during\npeacetime. Tr. of Or al Arg. 70–71. And it does not defend \nthe challenged tariffs as an ex ercise of the President’s \nwarmaking powers. The United States\, after all\, is not at \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of ROBERTS\, C. J. \n7 \nwar with every nation in the world. The Government in\nstead relies exclusively on IEEPA. It reads the words “reg\nulate” and “i mportation” to effect a sweeping delegation of\nCongress’s power to se t tariff policy—authorizing the Pres\nident to impose tariffs of unlimit ed amount and duration\, \non any product from any country. \n50 U. S. C. \n§1702(a)(1)(B). \n2 \nWe have long expressed “reluctan[ce] to read in to ambig\nuous statutory text” extraordinary delegations of Con\ngress ’s powers. West Virginia v. EPA\, 597 U. S. 697\, 723 \n(2022) (quoting Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA\, 573 \nU. S. 302\, 324 (2014)). In Bi den v. Nebraska\, 600 U. S. 477 \n(2023)\, for example\, we declined to re ad authorization to \n“waive or modify” statutory or regulatory provis ions appli\ncable to financial assistance programs as a delegation of\npow er to cancel $430 billion in student loan debt. Id.\, at \n494 (quoting 2 0 U. S. C. §1098bb(a)(1)). In West Virginia v. \nEPA\, we declined to re ad authorization to determine the \n“best system of emission reduction ” as a delegation of power \nto force a nationwide transition away from the use of coal. \n597 U. S.\, at 732 (quoting 42 U. S. C. §7411(a)(1)). And in \nNational Federation of Independent Business v. OSHA\, 595 \nU. S . 109 (2022) (per curiam)\, we declined to read authori\nzation to ensure “safe and healthful working conditions” as\na delegation of power to i mpose a vaccine mandate on 84\nmillion Americans. Id.\, at 114\, 117 (quo ting 29 U. S. C. \n§651(b))\; see also\, e.g.\, Alabama Assn. of Realtors v. Depart\nment of Health and Human Servs.\, 594 U. S. 758\, 764–765 \n (2021) (per curiam)\; King v. Burwell\, 576 U. S. 473\, 485– \n486 (2015 )\; Utility Air\, 573 U. S.\, at 324. \nWe have described several of these cases as “major ques\ntions” cases. Nebraska\, 600 U. S.\, at 505\; W est Virginia\, \n597 U. S.\, at 732\; see also FDA v. Brown &\; William son To\nbacco Corp.\, 529 U. S. 120\, 159 (2000) (citing S. Breyer\, \n8 \ nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nOpinion of ROBERTS\, C. J. \nJudicia l Review of Questions of Law and Policy\, 38 Admin.\nL. Rev. 363\, 370 (19 86)). In each\, the Government claimed \nbroad\, expansive power on an un certain statutory basis.\nAnd in each\, the statutory text might “[a]s a matter of defi\nnitional possibilities” have been read to delegate the as\nserted power. West Virginia\, 597 U. S.\, at 732 (internal \nquotation marks omitted). But “context” counseled “skepti\ncism.” Id.\, at 721\, 732. That context included not just other\nlanguage within the statu te\, but “constitutional structure” \nand “common sense.” Nebraska \, 600 U. S.\, at 512\, 515 \n(BARRETT\, J.\, concurring). “[B]oth sepa ration of powers\nprinciples and a practical understanding of legislative in\ntent” suggested Congress would not have delegated “highly \nconseq uential power” through ambiguous language. West \nVirginia\, 597 U. S.\ , at 723–724. \nThese considerations apply with particular force where\, \nas here\, the purported delegation involves the core congres\nsional pow er of the purse. “Congress would likely . . . in\ntend[] for itself ” the “basic and consequential tradeoffs\,” \nid.\, at 730\, inherent i n uses of this “most complete and ef\nfectual weapon\,” The Federalist No. 58\, at 359. And if Con\ngress were to relinquish that weapon to anot her branch\, a \n“reasonable interpreter” would expect it to do so “‘clearly.’” \nNebraska\, 600 U. S.\, at 514–515 (BARRETT\, J. \, concurring) \n(quoting Utility Air\, 573 U. S.\, at 324). \nWhat common sense suggests\, congressional practice con\nfirms. When Congress has del egated its tariff powers\, it \nhas done so in explicit terms\, and subjec t to strict limits.\nCongress has consistently used words like “duty” in stat\nutes delegating authority to impose tariffs. (A customs\n“du ty” is simply “the federal tax levied on goods shipped\ninto the Unite d States.” Black’s Law Dictionary 638 (12th \ned. 2024).) See\, e.g.\, 19 U. S. C. §1338(d) (“rates of duty”)\;\n§2132(a) (“temporary im port surcharge . . . in the form of \nduties”)\; §2253(a)(3)(A) (“dut y on the imported article”)\;\n§2411(c)(1)(B) (“duties or other impor t restrictions”). It has \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of ROBERTS\, C. J. \n9 \ncapped the amount and duration of tariffs. See\, e. g.\, \n§1338(d) (50% cap)\; §2132(a) (15% cap\, 150-day time limit)\;\n §2253(e) (50% cap\, phasedown requirement after one year).\nAnd it has co nditioned exercise of the tariff power on de\nmanding procedural prerequis ites. See\, e.g.\, §2252 (inves\ntigation by the United States Internatio nal Trade Commis\nsion\, public hearings\, report of findings and \nrecomm endation)\; §§2411–2414 (investigation by the \nUnited States Trade Re presentative\, consultation with rel\nevant country and interested parties \, publication of find\nings).2 \nAgainst this backdrop of clear and limit ed delegations\, \nthe Government reads IEEPA to give the President power\ nto unilaterally impose unbounded tariffs. On this reading\,\nmoreover\, the President is unconstrained by the significant \nprocedural limitations in other tariff statutes and free to \nissue a dizzying array of modifica tions at will. See supra\, \nat 3. All it takes to unlock that extraordin ary power is a \nPresidential declaration of emergency\, which the Govern\ nment asserts is unreviewable. Brief for Federal Parties 42. \nAnd the onl y way of restraining the exercise of that power\nis a veto-proof majority in Congress. See 50 U. S. C. \n§1622(a)(1) (requiring a “joint resolut ion” “enacted into law” \nto terminate a national emergency). That view\, if credited\, \nwould “represent[] a ‘transformative expans ion’” of the \nPresident’s authority over tariff policy\, West Virgi nia\, 597 \n—————— \n2The same is true of Section 232 of the T rade Expansion Act of 1962\, \n76 Stat. 877\, which we have held authorize s sector-specific import “li\ncense fee[s].” Federal Energy Administra tion v. Algonquin SNG\, Inc.\, \n426 U. S. 548\, 571 (1976). Section 232( a) expressly references “duties.” \n19 U. S. C. §1862(a)\; see infra\ , at 19. And Section 232(c) authorizes the\nPresident to “adjust the imp orts” of an “article\,” §1862(c)\, but only after\nthe Secretary of Commerce\, in consultation with the Secretary of De\nfense\, conducts an investigation and prepares a report finding that the\n“article is being imported into the United States in such quantities or \nunder such circums tances as to threaten to impair the national security\,”\n§1862(b). \n1 0 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nOpinion of ROBERTS\, C. J. \nU. S .\, at 724 (quoting Utility Air\, 573 U. S.\, at 324)\, and in\ndeed—as demonstrated by the exercise of that authority in\nthis case—over the br oader economy as well. See Congres\nsional Budget Office\, CBO’s Curren t View of the Economy \nFrom 2025 to 2028\, p. 5 (Sept. 2025)\; Brief for Federal Par\nties 2–3. It would replace the longstanding executive-legis \nlative collaboration over trade policy with unchecked Pres\nidential pol icymaking. \nSee CRS\, Trade Promotion \nAuthority (TPA) and the Role of C ongress in Trade Policy \n(2015). Congress seldom effects such sea changes through \n“vague language.” West Virginia\, 597 U. S.\, at 724. \nIt is also telling that in IEEPA’s “half century of exist\nence\,” no P resident has invoked the statute to impose any\ntariffs—let alone tariff s of this magnitude and scope. Na\ntional Federation of Independent Busin ess\, 595 U. S.\, at \n119.3 Presidents have\, by contrast\, regularly in voked \nIEEPA for other purposes. CRS\, C. Casey\, J. Elsea\, &\; L. \ nRosen\, The International Emergency Economic Powers Act:\nOrigins\, Evolu tion\, and Use 18–21 (2025). At the same \ntime\, they have invoked oth er statutes—but never \nIEEPA—to impose tariffs\, on products ranging from car \ntires to washing machines. See\, e.g.\, Presidential Procla\nm ation No. 8414\, 3 CFR 115 (2009 Comp.)\; Presidential \n————— — \n3Indeed\, even before IEEPA was enacted\, only one President relied on \nits predecessor\, the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA)\, ch. 106\, 4 0\nStat. 411\, to impose tariffs—and then only as a post hoc defense to a legal \nchallenge. See Presidential Proclamation No. 4074\, 36 Fed. Reg . 15724 \n(1971) (initially invoking the Tariff Act of 1930 and Trade Expa nsion Act\nof 1962)\; United States v. Yoshida Int’l\, Inc.\, 526 F. 2d 560\, 572 (CCPA \n1975). Those tariffs were also of limited amount\, dura tion\, and scope. \nSee id.\, at 568–569\, 577–578 (noting that the 10 -percent surcharge was\ndescribed by President Nixon as “ ‘a temporary measure\,’ ” was in effect \nless than five months\, applied only t o “articles which had been the sub\nject of prior tariff concessions\, ” and was capped at congressionally au\nthorized rates)\; Economic Repor t of the President 70 (1972) (“When all \nexceptions to the 10-percent r ule were taken into account\, the effective \nrate of surcharge came down to 4.8 percent”). \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of ROBERTS \, C. J. \n11 \nProclamation No. 9694\, 83 Fed. Reg. 3553 (2018). And \nt hose tariffs did not “even beg[in] to approach the size or\nscope” of the IEEPA tariffs at issue here. Nebraska\, 600 \nU. S.\, at 502 (quoting Alabama Assn.\, 594 U. S.\, at 765).\nThe “‘lack of historical pre cedent’” for the IEEPA tariffs\,\n“coupled with the breadth of aut hority” that the President\nnow claims\, “is a ‘telling indicati on’” that the tariffs extend\nbeyond the President’s “legitimate reach.” National Feder\nation of Independent Business\, 595 U. S.\, at 119 (quoting \nFree Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Over\nsi ght Bd.\, 561 U. S. 477\, 505 (2010)).\nThe “‘economic and political s ignificance’” of the author\nity the President has asserted likewise “provide[s] a ‘reason \nto hesitate before concluding that Congress ’ meant to confer \nsuch authority.” West Virginia\, 597 U. S.\, at 72 1 (quoting \nBrown &\; Williamson\, 529 U. S.\, at 159–160). The Pre si\ndent’s assertion here of broad “statutory power over the na\ntiona l economy” is “extravagant” by any measure. Utility \nAir\, 573 U. S.\, at 324. And as the Government admits— \nindeed\, boasts—the econ omic and political consequences of \nthe IEEPA tariffs are astonishing. Th e Government points\nto projections that the tariffs will reduce the natio nal deficit \nby $4 trillion\, and that international agreements reached i n \nreliance on the tariffs could be worth $15 trillion. Brief for \nFeder al Parties 3\, 11. In the President’s view\, whether “we \nare a rich nation” or a “poor” one hangs in the balance. Id.\, \nat 2. These s takes dwarf those of other major questions \ncases. See\, e.g.\, Nebraska\ , 600 U. S.\, at 483 ($430 billion)\; \nAlabama Assn.\, 594 U. S.\, at 764 (nearly $50 billion)\; West \nVirginia\, 597 U. S.\, at 714 (“billions of dollars in compliance \ncosts”). As in those cases\, “a reasonable interpreter would \n[not] expect” Congress to “pawn[]” such a “big -time policy \ncall[] . . . off to another branch.” Nebraska\, 600 U. S .\, at \n515 (BARRETT\, J.\, concurring). \n12 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nOpinion of ROBERTS\, C. J. \nThe Government and the principal dissent attempt to \navoid application of the major questions doctrine on several \ngrounds. None is convincing.\nThe Government argues first that t he doctrine should not \napply to emergency statutes. Brief for Federal P arties 35– \n36. But this argument is nearly identical to one it already \nadvanced in Nebraska. There\, the Government contended \nthat a differe nt emergency statute should be interpreted \nbroadly because its “whole point” was to provide “substan\ntial discretion to . . . respond to un foreseen emergencies.”\n600 U. S.\, at 500 (internal quotation marks omi tted). We \nrejected that argument in Nebraska\, and we reject it here\na s well. “Emergency powers\,” after all\, “tend to kindle \nemergen cies.” Youngstown Sheet &\; Tube Co. v. Sawyer\, 343 \nU. S. 579\, 65 0 (1952) (Jackson\, J.\, concurring). Dozens of \nIEEPA emergencies remai n ongoing today\, including the\nfirst—declared over four decades ago in response to the Ira\nnian hostage crisis. CRS\, Casey\, International Eme rgency\nEconomic Powers Act\, at 20. And as the Framers under\nstood\, em ergencies can “afford a ready pretext for usurpa\ntion” of congression al power. Youngstown\, 343 U. S.\, at 650 \n(Jackson\, J.\, concurring). Where Congress has reason to be\nworried about its powers “slipping thro ugh its fingers\,” id.\, \nat 654\, we in turn have every reason to expe ct Congress to\nuse clear language to effectuate unbounded delegations—\ nparticularly of its “one great power\,” Nicol\, 173 U. S.\, at \n515. \nThe Government’s and the principal dissent’s proposed \nforeign aff airs exception fares no better. Brief for Federal \nParties 34–35\; pos t\, at 45–57 (opinion of KAVANAUGH\, J.).\nAs a general matter\, the Pre sident of course enjoys some \n“independent constitutional power[s]” o ver foreign affairs \n“even without congressional authorization.” FCC v. Con\nsumers’ Research\, 606 U. S. 656\, 707 (2025) (KAVANAUGH\, \nJ. \, concurring). And Congress certainly may intend to “give\nthe Presiden t substantial authority and flexibility” in many \n Cite as: 607 U. S. _ ___ (2026) \nOpinion of ROBERTS\, C. J. \n13 \nforeign affairs or national security contexts. Post\, at 48 \n(opinion of KAVANAUGH\, J.) (quoting Co nsumers’ Research\, \n606 U. S.\, at 706 (KAVANAUGH\, J.\, concurring)). But \n“flip[ping]” the “presumption” under the major questions \n doctrine\, Brief for Federal Parties 34\, makes little sense \nwhen it com es to tariffs. As the Government admits\, the \nPresident and Congress do not “enjoy concurrent constitu\ntional authority” to impose tariffs du ring peacetime. Ibid.\; \nTr. of Oral Arg. 70–71. The Framers gave that power to\n“Congress alone”—notwithstanding the obvious foreign af\n fairs implications of tariffs. Merritt v. Welsh\, 104 U. S. 694\, \n700 ( 1882). And whatever may be said of other powers that \nimplicate foreign affairs\, we would not expect Congress to\nrelinquish its tariff power thr ough vague language\, or with\nout careful limits. \nThe central thrust of the Government’s and the principal\ndissent’s proposed exceptions app ears to be that ambiguous \ndelegations in statutes addressing “the most major of major \nquestions” should necessarily be construed broadly. B rief \nfor Federal Parties 35. But it simply does not follow from\nthe fac t that a statute deals with major problems that it \nshould be read to del egate all major powers for which there \nmay be a “colorable textual bas is.” West Virginia\, 597 U. S.\, \nat 722. It is in precisely such case s that we should be alert \nto claims that sweeping delegations—particul arly delega\ntions of core congressional powers—“lurk[]” in “ambig uous \nstatutory text.” Id.\, at 723 (internal quotation marks omit\nted ). There is no major questions exception to the major \nquestions doctrin e.\nAccordingly\, the President must “point to clear congres\nsional aut horization” to justify his extraordinary assertion\nof the power to impo se tariffs. Nebraska\, 600 U. S.\, at 506 \n(internal quotation marks omi tted). He cannot. \n14 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nOpinion of t he Court \nB \nTo begin\, IEEPA authorizes the President to “investigate \,\nblock during the pendency of an investigation\, regulate\, di\nrect an d compel\, nullify\, void\, prevent or prohibit . . . impor\ntation or exp ortation.” 50 U. S. C. §1702(a)(1)(B). Absent \nfrom this lengthy lis t of powers is any mention of tariffs or \nduties. That omission is notabl e in light of the significant \nbut specific powers Congress did go to the trouble of nam\ning. It stands to reason that had Congress intended to co n\nvey the distinct and extraordinary power to impose tariffs\, \nit would have done so expressly—as it consistently has in\nother tariff statutes . See supra\, at 8\; accord\, post\, at 11\, 26– \n27 (opinion of KAVAN AUGH\, J.).\nThe power to “regulate . . . importation” does not fill t hat\nvoid. “Regulate\,” as that term is ordinarily used\, means to\n “fix\, establish\, or control\; to adjust by rule\, method\, or es\ntabl ished mode\; to direct by rule or restriction\; to subject to\ngoverning p rinciples or laws.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1156 \n(5th ed. 1979)\; se e also Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas\, 596 \nU. S. 685\, 697 (2022). Thi s definition captures much of \nwhat a government does on a day-to-day bas is. Indeed\, if \n“regulate” is as broad as the principal dissent sug gests\, \npost\, at 10–11\, then the other eight verbs in §1702(a)(1)(B )\nare simply wasted ink. But the facial breadth of “regulate”\nplace s in stark relief what the term is not usually thought \nto include: taxat ion. The U. S. Code is replete with statutes\ngranting the Executive the a uthority to “regulate” someone \nor something. Yet the Government cann ot identify any \nstatute in which the power to regulate includes the powe r \nto tax. The Government concedes\, for example\, that the Se\ncurities and Exchange Commission cannot tax the trading \nof securities\, even thou gh it is expressly authorized to “reg\nulate the trading of . . . securi ties.” 15 U. S. C. §78i(h)(1)\; \nsee Brief for Federal Parties 31–32 . We are therefore skep\ntical that in IEEPA—and IEEPA alone—Congress hid a \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of the Court \n15 \ndel egation of its birth-right power to tax within the quotid\nian power to “regulate.”\nTaxes\, to be sure\, may accomplish regulatory ends. See \nSonzinsky\, 300 U. S.\, at 513\; Gibbons\, 9 Wheat.\, at 201– \n202. But it does not follow that the power to regulate some\nthing includes the power to tax it as a means of regulation. \nCongressional practice sugge sts as much. When Congress \naddresses both the power to regulate and the power to tax\,\nit does so separately and expressly. See\, e.g.\, 16 U. S. C. \n§460bbb–9(a) (distinguishing between the power to “tax \nperson s\, franchise\, or private property” on lands and the \npower “to regu late the private lands”)\; 2 U. S. C. \n§622(8)(B)(i) (“government-sp onsored enterprise” does not \nhave the “power to tax or to regulate i nterstate commerce”).\nThat is unsurprising\, as the “power to regulat e commerce”\nis “entirely distinct from the right to levy taxes.” G ibbons\, \n9 Wheat.\, at 201. That Congress did not grant those au\nthorit ies separately here is strong evidence that “regulate”\nin IEEPA does not include taxation. \nA contrary reading would render IEEPA partly uncon sti\ntutional. IEEPA authorizes the President to “regulate . . . \nimpor tation or exportation.” 50 U. S. C. §1702(a)(1)(B) (em\nphasis added). Taxing exports\, however\, is expressly for\nbidden by the Constitution. Art. I\, §9\, cl. 5.\nThe “neighboring words” with which “regul ate” “is asso\nciated” also suggest that Congress did not intend f or “regu\nlate” to include the revenue-raising power. United States v. \nWilliams\, 553 U. S. 285\, 294 (2008). “Regulate” is one of\nnine verbs listed in §1702(a)(1)(B). Each authorizes a dis\ntinct action a Pr esident might take in sanctioning foreign\nactors or controlling domestic actors engaged in foreign \ncommerce—blocking imports\, for example\, or prohibiting \ntransactions. Presidential practice under IEEPA demon\nstr ates as much. See CRS\, Casey\, International Emergency\nEconomic Powers A ct\, at 79–106 (Table A–3)\; see\, e.g.\, Exec. \nOrder No. 13194\, 3 CFR 741 (2001 Comp.) (blocking \n16 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \ nOpinion of the Court \nimportation of diamonds from insurgent regime in S ierra \nLeone)\; Exec. Order No. 12947\, 3 CFR 319 (1995 Comp.) \n(prohibi ting transactions with those “who threaten to dis\nrupt the Middle East peace process”). None of IEEPA’s au\nthorities includes the distinct and extraordinary power to\nraise revenue. And the fact that no President has ever \nfound such power in IEEPA is strong evidence that it does\nnot exist. See supra\, at 10\; FTC v. Bunte Brothers\, Inc.\, 312 \nU. S. 349\ , 351–352 (1941).\nWe do not attempt to set forth the metes and bounds o f\nthe President’s authority to “regulate . . . importation” un\nder IEEPA. That “interpretive question” is “not at issue” in\nthis ca se\, and any answer would be “plain dicta.” West Vir\nginia\, 597 U. S.\, at 734–735\, and n. 5. Our task today is to\ndecide only whether t he power to “regulate . . . importa\ntion\,” as granted to the Preside nt in IEEPA\, embraces the \npower to impose tariffs. It does not.4 \nThe Government\, echoed point-for-point by the principal\ndissent\, marshals s everal arguments in response. First\, it \ncontends that IEEPA confers th e power to impose tariffs be\ncause early commentators and this Court’s cases discuss \ntariffs in the context of the Constitution’s Commerce \n Clause. See Brief for Federal Parties 24–25\; post\, at 12–13 \n(opini on of KAVANAUGH\, J.). But that answers the wrong \nquestion. The question is not\, as the Government would \nhave it\, whether tariffs can ever be a means of regulating \ncommerce. It is instead whether Congress\, when co nferring \nthe power to “regulate . . . importation\,” gave the Presid ent \nthe power to impose tariffs at his sole discretion. And \n—————— \n4The principal dissent surmises that the President could impose “most\nif not all” of the tariffs at issue under statutes other than IEEPA. Post\, \nat 62 (opinion of KAVANAUGH\, J.). The cited s tatutes contain various com\nbinations of procedural prerequisites\, requi red agency determinations\,\nand limits on the duration\, amount\, and sco pe of the tariffs they author\nize. See supra\, at 8–9\; post\, at 62– 63. We do not speculate on hypothet\nical cases not before us. \n Cite as : 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of the Court \n17 \nCongress’s pattern of usage is most relevant to answering \nthat question. That pattern is p lain: When Congress grants\nthe power to impose tariffs\, it does so clear ly and with care\nful constraints. It did neither here. \nThe Government r aises another contextual argument.\nBecause “regulate” “lies betwe en” two “poles” in IEEPA—\n“compel” on the affirmative end and “prohibit” on the nega\ntive end—the term naturally includes the “less extreme\, \nmore flexible” tool of tariffs. Reply Brief 9 (i nternal quota\ntion marks omitted)\; see post\, at 29–30 (opinion of \nK AVANAUGH\, J.) (making a greater-includes-the-lesser ar\ngument). But tari ffs\, as discussed above\, are different in \nkind\, not degree\, from the other authorities in IEEPA. Un\nlike those authorities\, tariffs operate directly on domestic\nimporters to raise revenue for the Treasury. See 1 9 U. S. C. \n§1505(a)\; 19 CFR §141.1(b) (2025). Even though a tariff i s\,\nin some sense\, “less extreme” than an outright compulsion\nor pr ohibition\, it does not follow that tariffs lie on the spec\ntrum between those poles. They are instead “very clear[ly] \n. . . a branch of the t axing power\,” Gibbons\, 9 Wheat.\, at \n201\, and fall outside the spec trum entirely.\nFinding no support in the statute the President invoked\, \nthe Government turns to one he did not: IEEPA’s predeces\nsor\, TWEA. Ch. 106\, 40 Stat. 411. In 1975\, the Court of \nCustoms and Patent Appea ls held that the authority to \n“regulate . . . importation” in TWEA a uthorized President\nNixon to impose limited tariffs. United States v. Yo shida \nInt’l\, Inc.\, 526 F. 2d 560\, 572\, 577–578. When Congress e n\nacted IEEPA two years later\, the Government contends\, it \nconveyed t hat same authority (except without the limits). \nSee also post\, at 14– 17 (opinion of KAVANAUGH\, J.).\n This argument cannot bear the weight the Government\nplaces on it. While this Court sometimes assumes that Con\ng ress incorporates judicial definitions into legislation\, we do\nso “onl y when [the] term’s meaning was ‘well-settled’” be\nfore the adopt ion. Kemp v. United States\, 596 U. S. 528\, \n18 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, I NC. v. TRUMP \nOpinion of the Court \n539 (2022) (quoting Neder v. United States\, 527 U. S. 1\, 22 \n(1999))\; see also United States v. Kwai Fun W ong\, 575 U. S. \n402\, 412–415 (2015). A single\, expressly limited opi nion \nfrom a specialized intermediate appellate court does not\nclear tha t hurdle.5 See BP p.l.c. v. Mayor and City Council \nof Baltimore\, 593 U. S. 230\, 244 (2021). The tariff authority\nasserted by President Nixon\, moreover\, was “far removed”\nfrom TWEA’s “original purposes” o f sanctioning foreign bel\nligerents. Cohen\, Fundamentals of U. S. Foreig n Trade Pol\nicy\, at 178–179. We are therefore skeptical that Congress \nenacted IEEPA with an eye toward granting that novel \npower.\nThe Gover nment has another historical argument based \non this Court’s wartime pr ecedents. See generally Brief for\nProfessor Aditya Bamzai as Amicus Curi ae\; Reply Brief 9– \n11\, 18. According to the Government\, those prece dents \nacknowledge an inherent Presidential power to impose tar\niffs dur ing armed conflict. And\, the argument goes\, Con\ngress in TWEA\, and the n in IEEPA\, codified those prece\ndents. But this argument fails at both steps. Insofar as the \nGovernment relies on our wartime cases themselves \, they\nare facially inapposite. Regardless of what they might\nmean for the President’s inherent wartime authority\, all \n—————— \n 5The Government\, citing the IEEPA House Committee Report\, con\ntends tha t Congress “indisputably knew of ” Yoshida’s interpretation of \nTWE A. Brief for Federal Parties 26\; see also post\, at 15–16\, and n. 11 \ n(opinion of KAVANAUGH\, J.). But even taking the Report at face value\, i t \nhardly helps the Government. The Report explains that “[s]uccessive \nPresidents have seized upon the open-endedness of [TWEA] section 5(b)\n to turn that section\, through usage\, into something quite different from \nwhat was envisioned in 1917.” H. R. Rep. No. 95–459\, pp. 8–9 (1 977)\; \naccord\, S. Cohen\, R. Blecker\, &\; P. Whitney\, Fundamentals of U. S. For\neign Trade Policy 178–179 (2d ed. 2003). That is not exa ctly a stamp of \napproval on the action Yoshida guardedly endorsed. And in any event\, \nthe Government’s “knew of ” standard falls well sho rt of the “broad and \nunquestioned” “judicial consensus” we have required to conclude that\nCongress incorporated a judicial definition int o a statutory term. Jama \nv. Immigration and Customs Enforcement\, 543 U . S. 335\, 349 (2005). \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of the Court \n19 \nagree that the President has no inherent peacetime author\nit y to impose tariffs.\nNor are we persuaded that the dots connect from our war\ntime precedents\, through multiple iterations of TWEA\, to\nIEEPA\, s uch that IEEPA should be interpreted to grant the\nPresident an expansive peacetime tariff power. This argu\nment relies extensively on a series of inferences drawn from\nscant legislative history. Such an attenuated chain cannot \nsupport—much less “clearly” support—a reading of IEEPA \ nthat includes the distinct power to impose tariffs. Alabama \nAssn.\, 59 4 U. S.\, at 764. \nTurning to this Court’s precedents\, the Government first\nrelies on Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG\, \nInc.\, 426 U. S. 548 (1976). There\, we held that Section \n232(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962\, which allows the\nPresident to “adjust the impo rts” of particular goods to pro\ntect national security\, includes the p ower to impose “license\nfees.” Id.\, at 561. But that holding bears l ittle on the mean\ning of IEEPA. As a textual matter\, Section 232(b) auth or\nizes the President not only to “adjust . . . imports\,” but (as \n the Government emphasized in Algonquin) to “take such ac\ntion . . . as he deems necessary” to adjust the imports of a \ngood. Brief for Petitio ners 26 (emphasis in original) and Tr.\nof Oral Arg. 6–7\, in Federal En ergy Administration v. Al\ngonquin SNG\, Inc.\, O. T. 1975\, No. 75–382. IEEPA does not \ncontain such sweeping\, discretion-conferring language. As \nfor context\, Section 232(a) states that “[n]o action shall be\nt aken” to “decrease or eliminate” an existing “duty or other \nimpo rt restriction” if doing so would threaten national se\ncurity. 19 U. S . C. §1862(a) (1970 ed.). This explicit refer\nence to duties preceding Section 232(b) renders it natural\nfor Section 232(b) itself to authorize duties. Thus\, we de\ncline to extend Algonquin’s expressly “limite d” holding any \nfurther. 426 U. S.\, at 571. \nFinally\, the Government invokes Dames &\; Moore v. Re\ngan\, 453 U. S. 654 (1981)\, but that c ase offers no support. \n20 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nOpinion of ROBERTS\, C. J. \nDames &\; Moore was exceedingly narrow\,6 did not address \nthe President’s power to “regulate\,” and did not involve tar\niffs at all. If anything\, that case highlights the importance\nof c lose attention to IEEPA’s text. “The terms of . . . \nIEEPA\,” we h eld\, “do not authorize” the suspension of \nclaims. Id.\, at 675. So too here\; the terms of IEEPA do not \nauthorize tariffs. \nIII \nThe Pre sident asserts the extraordinary power to unilat\nerally impose tariffs of unlimited amount\, duration\, and \nscope. In light of the breadth\, hist ory\, and constitutional \ncontext of that asserted authority\, he must id entify clear\ncongressional authorization to exercise it.\nIEEPA’s grant of authority to “regulate . . . importation”\nfalls short. IEEPA cont ains no reference to tariffs or duties. \nThe Government points to no stat ute in which Congress\nused the word “regulate” to authorize taxation. And until \nnow no President has read IEEPA to confer such power.\nWe cl aim no special competence in matters of economics \nor foreign affairs. We claim only\, as we must\, the limited\nrole assigned to us by Article III of the Constitution. Ful\nfilling that role\, we hold that IEEPA does no t authorize the \nPresident to impose tariffs. \n—————— \n6See \, e.g.\, 453 U. S.\, at 660 (“We are confined to a resolution of the \n dispute presented to us”)\; ibid. (We are “acutely aware of the necess ity\nto rest decision on the narrowest possible ground capable of deciding the \ncase”)\; id.\, at 661 (“We attempt to lay down no general ‘gu idelines’ cover\ning other situations not involved here\, and attempt to confine the opinion \nonly to the very questions necessary to decision of the case”)\; ibid. (“[T]he\ndecisions of the Court in this area have been rare\, episodic\, and afford\nlittle precedential value for subsequen t cases”)\; id.\, at 688 (“[W]e re-em\nphasize the narrowness of our d ecision”). This is not quite “no\, no\, a \nthousand times no\,” bu t should have sufficed to dissuade the principal \ndissent from invoking t he case\, see post\, at 55–56\, with respect to the \nquite distinct leg al and factual issues present here. \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOp inion of the Court \n21 \nThe judgment of the United States Court of Appea ls for \nthe Federal Circuit in case No. 25–250 is affirmed. The \njudg ment of the United States District Court for the Dis\ntrict of Columbia in case No. 24–1287 is vacated\, and the \ncase is remanded with instructi ons to dismiss for lack of ju\nrisdiction. \nIt is so ordered. \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nGORSUCH\, J.\, concurring \n1 \nSUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES \n_________________ \nNos. 24–1287 and 25–250 \n____ _____________ \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC.\, ET AL.\, PETITIONERS \n24–12 87 \nv. \nDONALD J. TRUMP\, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED \nSTATES\, ET AL. \nON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED \nSTATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA \nCIRCUIT \nDONALD J. TRUMP\, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED \nSTATES\, ET AL.\, PETITIONERS \n25–250 \nv. \nV.O.S. SELECT IONS\, INC.\, ET AL. \nON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF \nAPPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT \n[February 20\, 2026]\n JUSTICE GORSUC H\, concurring. \nThe President claims that Congress delegated to him an\n extraordinary power in the International Emergency Eco\nnomic Powers Act ( IEEPA)—the power to impose tariffs on\npractically any products he wants \, from any countries he\nchooses\, in any amounts he selects. Applying t he major \nquestions doctrine\, the principal opinion rejects that argu\nm ent. I join in full. The Constitution lodges the Nation’s \nlawmaking p owers in Congress alone\, and the major ques\ntions doctrine safeguards th at assignment against execu\ntive encroachment. Under the doctrine’s ter ms\, the Presi\ndent must identify clear statutory authority for the \next raordinary delegated power he claims. And\, as the prin\ncipal opinion ex plains\, that is a standard he cannot meet. \n2 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC . v. TRUMP \nGORSUCH\, J.\, concurring \nWhatever else might be said about Congress’s work in\nIEEPA\, it did not clearly surrender to the Preside nt the \nsweeping tariff power he seeks to wield. \nNot everyone sees it t his way. Past critics of the major\nquestions doctrine do not object to it s application in this\ncase\, and they even join much of today’s princip al opinion.\nBut\, they insist\, they can reach the same result by employ\ ning only routine tools of statutory interpretation. Post\, at 1 \n(KAGAN \, J.\, joined by SOTOMAYOR and JACKSON\, JJ.\, con\ncurring in part and c oncurring in judgment). Meanwhile\, \none colleague who joins the principa l opinion in full sug\ngests the major questions doctrine is nothing more than\nroutine statutory interpretation. Post\, at 1 (BARRETT\, J.\, \nconc urring). Still others who have joined major questions\ndecisions in the pa st dissent from today’s application of the \ndoctrine. Post\, at 1 (KAVA NAUGH\, J.\, joined by THOMAS and \nALITO\, JJ.\, dissenting). Finally\, seeking to sidestep the ma\njor questions doctrine altogether\, one collea gue submits \nthat Congress may hand over to the President most of its \np owers\, including the tariff power\, without limit. Post\, at \n1–2 (TH OMAS\, J.\, dissenting). It is an interesting turn of \nevents. Each camp warrants a visit. \nI \nStart with the critics. In the past\, they have cr iticized\nthe major questions doctrine for two main reasons. The doc\ntrin e\, they have suggested\, is a novelty without basis in \nlaw. West Virgin ia v. EPA\, 597 U. S. 697\, 779 (2022)\n(KAGAN\, J.\, joined by\, inter al ios\, SOTOMAYOR\, J.\, dissent\ning) (calling the doctrine a “special ca no[n]” that has “mag\nically appear[ed]”). And\, they have argued\, the doctrine is \nrooted in an “anti-administrative-state stance” tha t pre\nvents Congress from employing executive agency officials to \n“d[ o] important work.” Id.\, at 780. Today\, the critics pro\nceed differe ntly. They join a section of the principal opinion \nthat applies the majo r questions doctrine. Ante\, at 14–20. \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nGORSUCH\, J.\, concurring \n3 \nAnd rather than critique the doctrine\, they say only that it \nis “unnecessary” in this case “because ordi nary principles of \nstatutory interpretation lead to the same result.” Post\, at \n2–3 (opinion of KAGAN\, J.). \nA \nUnpack that last claim fi rst. My concurring colleagues \ncontend that\, as a matter of “straight -up statutory construc\ntion\,” IEEPA does not grant the President the p ower to im\npose tariffs. Post\, at 7. In doing so\, they make thoughtful \npoints about the statute’s text and context. But their ap\nproach to day is difficult to square with how they have in\nterpreted other statutes . Dissenting in past major ques\ntions cases\, they have argued that broa d statutory language \ngranting powers to executive officials should be re ad for all\nit is worth. Yet\, now\, when it comes to IEEPA’s similarly\ nbroad language granting powers to the President\, they take\na more const rained approach. \nConsider some examples of how they have proceeded in \n the past. Dissenting in National Federation of Independent \nBusiness v. O SHA\, 595 U. S. 109 (2022) (per curiam)\n(NFIB)\, two of my concurring col leagues confronted a stat\nute charging the Occupational Safety and Health Admin\nistration with promoting “safe and healthful working con\ndition s.” \nId.\, at 127\, 132 (joint opinion of Breyer\,\nSOTOMAYOR\, and KAG AN\, JJ.) (internal quotation marks\nomitted). They read that language as authorizing the\nagency to impose a vaccine mandate on 84 million Ameri\nc ans. Id.\, at 132\; id.\, at 120 (per curiam). In support of\ntheir readin g\, my colleagues stressed the statute’s “expan\nsive language\,” an other provision authorizing the agency to \nissue temporary “emergency s tandards\,” and “the scope of \nthe crisis” the agency was trying to address. Id.\, at 132\, 135 \n(joint dissent) (internal quotation marks omitted). \n Dissenting in Alabama Assn. of Realtors v. Department of \nHe alth and Human Servs.\, 594 U. S. 758 (2021) \n4 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, IN C. v. TRUMP \nGORSUCH\, J.\, concurring \n(per curiam)\, my colleagues add ressed a statute permitting\nthe Centers for Disease Control and Preventio n to issue reg\nulations “necessary to prevent the . . . transmission . . . of \ncommunicable diseases.” Id.\, at 768 (opinion of Breyer\, J.\, \njoined by SOTOMAYOR and KAGAN\, JJ.) (internal quotation\nmarks omitted ). As they saw it\, those terms granted the\nagency the power to regulate landlord-tenant relations na\ntionwide during COVID–19. Ibid. In reachi ng this conclu\nsion\, my colleagues again highlighted the statute’s “ broad”\nlanguage and suggested that it permitted the agency to im\npose even “greater restrictions” than the ones at issue in the \ncase. Id.\ , at 769. \n Dissenting in West Virginia\, my colleagues faced a stat\nute allowing the Environmental Protection Agency to en\nsure power plants emp loy the “best system of emission re\nduction.” 597 U. S.\, at 758 (opi nion of KAGAN\, J.) (internal \nquotation marks omitted). They read that provision as au\nthorizing the agency to effectively close many power plan ts \nand transform the electricity industry from coast to coast.\nSee id.\ , at 754–755. In support\, they once more argued that\nthe statutory la nguage was “broad” and “expansive\,” with\n“no ifs\, ands\, or buts.” Id.\, at 756–758. They stressed\, too\, \nthat the relevant st atutory terms appeared in “major legis\nlation” intended to address “big problems\,” and that the \nstatute authorized actions in the ag ency’s “traditional lane”\nor “wheelhouse.” Id.\, at 756–757\, 765. \nFinally\, dissenting in Biden v. Nebraska\, 600 U. S. 477 \n(2023) \, my colleagues took up a statute permitting the Sec\nretary of Education to “waive or modify any statutory or \nregulatory provision applying to [a federal] student-loan \nprogram” during a national emergency. Id.\, at 533 (opinion\nof KAGAN\, J.\, joined by SOTOMAYOR and JACKSON\, JJ.) ( in\nternal quotation marks omitted). They said that language\nallowed the Secretary to cancel $430 billion in federal stu\ndent-loan debt because of COVID–19. See ibid.\; id.\, at 501 \n(majority opinion). Once again\, t hey argued that the \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nGORSUCH\, J.\, con curring \n5 \nstatutory terms were “broad\,” “expansive\,” “ca pacious\,” and\ndesigned to afford the Secretary a “poten[t]” power to re\nspond to “national emergencies” that were “major in scope.” \nId.\, at 533–542 (KAGAN\, J.\, dissenting). \nNow compare all that to how my colleagues proceed here.\nThis case\, they say\, is “nearly the opposite.” Post\, at 3. \nWhile straight-up statutory interpretation gr anted execu\ntive officials all the power they sought in all those other \ ncases\, my colleagues insist this one is different because \nIEEPA simply does not “give the President the power he\nwants.” Ibid. \nThat’s a striking turn given the statutory terms before \nus. When the President d eclares a national emergency “to\ndeal with any unusual and extraordinar y threat . . . to the \nnational security\, foreign policy\, or economy of the United\nStates\,” 50 U. S. C. §1701(a)\, IEEPA permits him to “r egu\nlate . . . importation . . . of . . . any property in which any \nfor eign country or a national thereof has any interest\,” \n§1702(a)(1)(B) . \nSurely\, the authority granted here is \n“broad” and “expansiv e.” See West Virginia\, 597 U. S.\, at \n758–759 (KAGAN\, J.\, dissen ting). It has “no ifs\, ands\, or \nbuts” either. Id.\, at 756. As a matter of ordinary meaning\,\nthe term “regulate” means to “fix\, es tablish or control\,” “ad\njust by rule\, method\, or established mo de\,” “direct by rule\nor restriction\,” or “subject to governing principles or laws.” \nBlack’s Law Dictionary 1156 (5th ed. 1979)\; se e also post\, at \n4. And tariffs do just that—they fix rules that cont rol\, ad\njust\, or govern imports of “property in which any foreign \nc ountry or a national thereof has any interest.” \n§1702(a)(1)(B).\nWith out question IEEPA is also “major legislation” de\nsigned to address “big problems” and “crises\,” West Vir\nginia\, 597 U. S.\, at 754\, 756–758 (KAGAN\, J.\, dissenting)\n(internal quotation marks omitt ed)\, along with “emergen\ncies” that are “major in scope\,” Nebra ska\, 600 U. S.\, at 542 \n(KAGAN\, J.\, dissenting). By its terms\, the s tatute applies \n6 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nGORSUCH\, J.\, c oncurring \nonly during declared national emergencies involving\n“threat [s]” to the “national security\, foreign policy\, or econ\nomy of the United States.” §1701(a). And it tasks the Pres\nident personally with responding to those emergencies\, a \nresponsibility surely more in his “lane” or “wheelhouse” \nthan that of any other executive officia l. See West Virginia\, \n597 U. S.\, at 765 (KAGAN\, J.\, dissenting). No tably\, too\,\nIEEPA grants the President the power to impose even\n“gre ater restrictions” than tariffs\, Alabama Assn. of Real\ntors\, 594 U. S .\, at 769 (Breyer\, J.\, dissenting)\, because the \nstatute also permits him to “nullify\,” “prevent\,” and “void” \nimports\, §1702( a)(1)(B)\; see also Nebraska\, 600 U. S.\, at 539 \n(KAGAN\, J.\, dissenti ng). \nWhy do my concurring colleagues read IEEPA so much\nmore narrowly t han they have other broad statutory terms\nfound in other major legislatio n addressing other emergen\ncies? They say contextual clues justify a narr owing con\nstruction here. See post\, at 3–7. But what the concurrence \ ncalls “context” looks remarkably like the major questions\ndoctrine ’s rule that\, when executive branch officials claim \nCongress has gran ted them an extraordinary power\, they\nmust identify clear statutory auth ority for it. See ante\, at \n13 (reciting the rule).\nTake some examples . The concurrence points to the “un\nparalleled authority” the Presid ent asserts “to impose a tar\niff of any amount\, for any time\, on only his own say-so.” \nPost\, at 6. In other words\, the President claims a n \n“[e]xtraordinary” power. West Virginia\, 597 U. S.\, at 723 \n(maj ority opinion). The concurrence observes that no “Pres\nident until now understood IEEPA to authorize imposing\ntariffs.” Post\, at 6. In other words\, the power is an “unher\nalded” one. West Virginia\, 597 U. S.\ , at 722 (internal quo\ntation marks omitted). Along the way\, the concurr ence also \nadds “a modicum of common sense about how Congress typ\nical ly delegates” and “consideration of whether Congress \never has before \, or likely would\, delegate the power the \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (20 26) \nGORSUCH\, J.\, concurring \n7 \nExecutive asserts.” Post\, at 2 (i nternal quotation marks \nomitted). In other words\, the statutory text mu st be read\nin light of “separation of powers principles.” West Virgi nia\, \n597 U. S.\, at 723. \nHaving borrowed all those concepts from the major ques\ntions doctrine\, the concurrence then turns to the key statu\n tory terms before us—“regulate . . . importation”—and ob\nserves t hat they “sa[y] nothing” (at least not expressly)\n“about imposing t ariffs.” Post\, at 3. And why is that fatal \nto the President’s case ? Because the President is attempt\ning to exercise the “‘core congre ssional power’” over taxes \nand tariffs\, a power Article I of the Co nstitution vests in\nCongress alone. Post\, at 5 (quoting ante\, at 8)\; s ee also West \nVirginia\, 597 U. S.\, at 737 (GORSUCH\, J.\, concurring) ( ex\nplaining that the major questions doctrine “protect[s] the \nConstit ution’s separation of powers\,” and particularly Arti\ncle I\, which v ests “all federal legislative . . . [p]owers in . . . \nCongress” (int ernal quotation marks and alteration omit\nted)).\nIf my colleagues all bu t apply the major questions doc\ntrine today\, maybe they are simply recog nizing what they\nhave in other separation of powers cases involving the d el\negation of legislative power: that “[t]he guidance needed is\ngrea ter” when the executive branch seeks to take “action[s]\n[that] will a ffect the entire national economy.” FCC v. Con\nsumers’ Research\, 60 6 U. S. 656\, 673 (2025) (opinion for the \nCourt by KAGAN\, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted). Or \nmaybe my colleagues believe the power the President as\nserts here outstrips even those powers executive officials\n asserted in our past major questions cases. But whatever \nthe case\, my c oncurring colleagues’ course today suggests\nthat skeptics owe the major questions doctrine a second \nlook. \nAll of which leads me to take up th e challenges they have\nposed to it in the past. Is the doctrine really so me “special \ncano[n]” that has only recently “magically appear[ed ]”? \n8 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nGORSUCH\, J.\, concurring \nWest Virginia\, 597 U. S.\, at 779 (KAGAN\, J.\, dissenting). \nAnd is it really grounded in an “anti-administrative-state \nstance” that pre vents Congress from using executive \nbranch officials to perform “impor tant work”? Id.\, at 780. \nB \nThe major questions doctrine teaches th at\, to sustain a\nclaim that Congress has granted them an extraordinary\n power\, executive officials must identify clear authority for\nthat power. Far from a novelty\, much the same principle\nhas long applied to those w ho claim extraordinary dele\ngated authority\, whether in private or publi c law. \n1 \nExamples stretch across many fields. Consider first the \nco mmon law of corporations. In early modern England\, cor\nporations could be formed only with “an explicit\, ex ante\nand direct authorization.” R. Harris\, Industrializing Eng\nlish Law: Entrepreneurship and Business Organization\,\n1720–1844\, p. 17 (2000). That authorization could be gi ven \nby the Crown\, an Act of Parliament\, or a combination of the \ntwo. Ibid.\; see also id.\, at 19. Some of these corporations \nexercised regu latory functions not unlike those performed\nby modern administrative agen cies. M. Bilder\, The Corpo\nrate Origins of Judicial Review\, 116 Yale L . J. 502\, 516\n517\, 519–520 (2006). Indeed\, the “[i]nitial settleme nts in\nVirginia and Massachusetts Bay\, among others\, were struc\ntured as corporations.” Id.\, at 535. \nEnglish law treated these corporation s as having author\nity to issue bylaws. But that authority was subject to re\nstrictions\, one of which was that corporations could not reg\nulate on major subjects without express authorization. \nTake Kirk v. Nowill\, 1 T. R. 118\, 99 Eng. Rep. 1006 (K. B. \n1786). That case involved the Comp any of Cutlers\, a corpo\nration for makers of knives and other cutlery. See id.\, at \n118–119\, 99 Eng. Rep.\, at 1006. An Act of Parliament g ave \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nGORSUCH\, J.\, concurring \n9 \nth e company broad authority to regulate its members. Id.\, \nat 118–121\, 99 Eng. Rep.\, at 1006–1007. The company used\nthat authority to adopt a bylaw allowing its officials to enter \nits members’ “workshops and w arehouses” and search for \n“deceitful and unworkmanly” cutlery. Id .\, at 121–122\, 99 \nEng. Rep.\, at 1007. After the company seized sup posedly\nunworkmanly forks\, the aggrieved owner challenged the \ncompan y’s actions in court\, arguing that the bylaw under \nwhich it acted w as “bad in point of law” because the power \nto incur a forfeiture was not “expressly given to [the com\npany] by Act of Parliament.” Id.\, at 118\, 122–123\, 99 Eng. \nRep.\, at 1008. Applying a clear-statemen t rule\, the King’s \nBench declared the bylaw\, and therefore the seizu re\, un\nlawful. Lord Mansfield explained that the “power of mak\ning by e-laws to incur a forfeiture” was an “extraordinary\npower” over and above the default powers of corporations\n“created by charter.” Id.\, at 124\, 99 Eng. Rep.\, at 1009. For \nthis reason\, the power needed to be “expressly given” by the\ncompany’s progenitor\, Parliament. Ibi d. Since no such \npower had been clearly conferred\, the seizure was unla wful. \nSee ibid. \nThe same principle applied in American law. In In re \nElection of Directors of Long Island R. Co.\, 19 Wend. 37\, 40 \n(N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1837)\, a New York court addressed a case\ninvolving 2\,700 share s of stock in the Long Island Railroad \nCompany that the company had decl ared forfeited. Ibid. \nAll agreed that the company had broad power to re gulate \nits shares. See id.\, at 41–42. Still\, the court called the f or\nfeiture an “extraordinary penalty\,” and held that no such \npower had been “expressly conferred” on the corporation by\nits charter. Ib id. In fact\, the court borrowed the clear\nstatement rule from Nowill: I f “extraordinary authority . . . \nis intended to be given\, it must be by express words to that \neffect.” Id.\, at 43 (describing Nowill in de tail).\nThe court in Ex parte Burnett\, 30 Ala. 461 (1857)\, pro\nceeded s imilarly. That case involved the incorporated town \n10 \nLEARNING RESOURC ES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nGORSUCH\, J.\, concurring \nof Cahaba\, Alabama. See id.\, at 464. The town set the price\nof a liquor license at $1\,000\, fin ed James Burnett for failing \nto obtain one\, and eventually imprisoned h im for not paying \nthe fine. See ibid. Burnett sought a writ of habeas c orpus\nand argued that Cahaba had acted beyond the scope of its\ncorporate authority. Ibid. \nWithout a clear-statement rule\, Burnett’s argument \nwould have stood little chance. That’s because the town’s \ncharter granted it the authority “to make and establish all \nsuch rules\, by-la ws\, and ordinances\, respecting the streets\, \nmarkets\, buildings\, . . . and police of said town\, that shall\nappear to them requisite and nece ssary for the security\,\nwelfare\, and convenience of said town\, or for preserving\nhealth\, peace\, order\, and good government within the \nsame .” Id.\, at 467 (internal quotation marks omitted). The \ncharter even s pecifically gave the town the “privileg[e] of \ngranting licenses for re tailing of spirituous and other liq\nuors.” Ibid. (internal quotation ma rks omitted). Semanti\ncally\, the town’s power was broad indeed and en compassed\nliquor licensing. But the court sided with Burnett anyway. \nRe asoning that the town’s exorbitant licensing fee effec\ntively banned th e sale of liquor\, the court held that Cahaba \ndid not enjoy such extraor dinary “prohibitory” power be\ncause it was “not authorized by any e xpress grant of power” \nin the town’s charter. Id.\, at 469\; see als o id.\, at 466. \nThese cases are not outliers. Treatises confirm that th e \nextraordinary power principle was fundamental to munici\npal corporati ons. A statute could “not by implication invest\n[a] body with any extr aordinary authority.” J. Willcock\, \nThe Law of Municipal Corporation s ¶226\, p. 99 (1827). Ex\ntraordinary powers required “express words to that effect.” \nIbid. And “[a]ny fair\, reasonable doubt concernin g the ex\nistence of power [was] resolved by the courts against the \ncorp oration\, and the power [was] denied.” 1 J. Dillon\, Com\nmentaries on t he Law of Municipal Corporations 145 (4th \ned. 1890). \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nGORSUCH\, J.\, concurring \n11 \nThe takeaway is simple e nough. Early corporations often\nfunctioned much like today’s executive branch\, exercising\ndelegated regulatory authority. And\, when interpret ing the \nscope of that authority\, the common law had a clear-state\nment rule that looked strikingly like the major questions\ndoctrine. \nHistori cally\, a similar precept applied in agency law. As \nthe leading early A merican treatise put it\, instruments con\nferring powers of attorney were “ordinarily subjected to a\nstrict interpretation.” J. Story\, Comme ntaries on the Law \nof Agency 80–81 (2d ed. 1844). So\, for example\, in Attwood \nv. Munnings\, 7 Barn. &\; Cress. 278\, 108 Eng. Rep. 727 ( K.\nB. 1827)\, a principal had delegated broad power to an agent \nto act “generally for him and in his name\,” including in all \nthings “as should be requisite\, expedient\, and advisable to\nbe done in . . . his a ffairs and concerns\, and as he might or \ncould do if personally acting t herein.” Id.\, at 279–280\, 108 \nEng. Rep.\, at 728 (internal quotat ion marks omitted). The \nagent then accepted certain debts on behalf of the principal. \nId.\, at 280\, 108 Eng. Rep.\, at 728. The question for the court \nwas whether this action was within the scope of the agent’s \nauthority. Id.\, at 281\, 108 Eng. Rep.\, at 728. The court said \nno. Powers of attorney are “instruments to be construed\nstrictly.” Id.\, at 283\, 108 Eng. Rep.\, at 729. And the power\nof attorney contained “no express power” to accept debts\, so \nno such power had been given . Ibid. \nOther examples abound. A power to sell casks of whiskey \ndid n ot include the “unusual and extraordinary” power to\noffer a warranty against future seizures of the casks\, unless \ngranted by “express auth ority.” Palmer v. Hatch\, 46 Mo. \n585\, 587 (1870). Under a power of a ttorney\, authority to \nenter contracts for a principal was subject to “strict inter\npretation” and generally did not authorize “contracts of an\nextraordinary character” outside those “connected with [the \n principal’s] ordinary business.” Reynolds v. Rowley\, 4 La. \nAnn. 396 \, 398–399 (1849). And a power to manage a mine \n12 \nLEARNING RESOURC ES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nGORSUCH\, J.\, concurring \ndid not authorize an agen t to borrow money for the mine’s\noperations on the principal’s credit because there was no\n“express authority” for such a departure from the “usual \nmanner” of running a mine. Hawtayne v. Bourne\, 7 M. &a mp\; \nW. 595\, 599\, 151 Eng. Rep. 905\, 906 (Ex. 1841). This was \ntrue even “in cases of necessity\,” id.\, at 599\, 151 Eng. Rep.\, \nat 90 7\, where the manager borrowed funds to address an \n“emergency suddenly arising\,” id.\, at 600\, 151 Eng. Rep.\, at \n907. \nMuch the same pri nciple applied to executive officials.\nOften\, “[t]he legality of an ex ecutive action depended on the \nrelationship between the size of the asse rted power and the \nclarity of the underlying legal authority.” T. Arv ind &\; C. \nBurset\, Partisan Legal Traditions in the Age of Camden \n and Mansfield\, 44 Oxford J. Legal Studies 376\, 388 (2024). \nEntick v. C arrington\, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (C. P. 1765)\, of\nfers an illustration. There\, as part of an investigation for \nseditious libel\, the English S ecretary of State claimed au\nthority to issue a warrant for the seizure o f an author’s pa\npers. Lord Camden declared the seizure unlawful\, reas on\ning that power asserted by the executive “ought to be as\nclear as i t is extensive.” T. Arvind &\; C. Burset\, A New Re\nport of Entick v. Carrington (1765)\, 110 Ky. L. J. 265\, 324 \n(2022) (Arvind &\; Bur set). Or\, as another reporter described \nCamden’s decision\, “one s hould naturally expect that the \nlaw to warrant [the exercise of power] s hould be clear in \nproportion as the power is exorbitant.” 19 How. St. Tr.\, at \n1065–1066. The seizure represented an extraordinary ex\nercis e of power\, Lord Camden found\, and no legal authority \nclearly authoriz ed it. See Arvind &\; Burset 324. Accord\ningly\, the warrant was unlaw ful and the seizure could not \nstand. Id.\, at 332. \n2 \nPerhaps unsurpr isingly given this history\, American\ncourts applied the extraordinary po wer principle when \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nGORSUCH\, J.\, conc urring \n13 \nCongress and the States started delegating new regulatory\np owers to executive agencies in the late 19th century. Take \nrailroad com missions. After the Civil War\, governments\nworried about the increasing power of railroad companies\nresponded by creating new agencies and imbuin g them with \nbroad regulatory authority. These bodies were among the\nfi rst modern administrative agencies. See West Virginia\, \n597 U. S.\, at 7 40 (GORSUCH\, J.\, concurring). And when they \nclaimed some extraordinar y delegated power\, both state \nand federal courts enforced a clear-state ment rule. See\, \ne.g.\, Siler v. Louisville &\; Nashville R. Co.\, 21 3 U. S. 175\, \n193–194 (1909) (declaring\, in the course of interpretin g a \nstate statute\, that an “enormous power” “must be conferred \n in plain language” “free from doubt”)\; Board of R. Comm’rs \nof O re. v. Oregon R. &\; Navigation Co.\, 17 Ore. 65\, 77\, 19 P. \n702\, 7 07–708 (1888) (When an agency exercises “powers\ndelegated to [it] by the legislature” to carry out “important \nfunctions\,” the text m ust “define and specify the authority \ngiven it so clearly that no doub t can reasonably arise”)\; ICC \nv. Cincinnati\, N. O. &\; T. P. R. C o.\, 167 U. S. 479\, 505 (1897)\n(holding a delegation of legislative powe r of “supreme deli\ncacy and importance” must be “clear and direct ”)\; Gulf &\; \nShip Island R. Co. v. Railroad Comm’n\, 94 Miss. 12 4\, 134– \n135\, 49 So. 118 (1908) (“It is universally held that a rai lroad \ncommission . . . must be able to point to its grant of power \n. . . in clear and express terms\, and nothing will be had by \ninference”) .\nThe railroad commissions may have been the first\, but \nthey were not the last. Whether executive officials claimed \nthe power to criminally pu nish noncompliance with regula\ntions\, force employers to retain employee s regardless of \ntheir unlawful conduct\, or regulate intrastate candy sa les\,\nthis Court held them to much the same standard. Because \ntheir cl aimed powers were so substantial\, executive officials \nhad to identify a “distinc[t]” authority for them\, United \nStates v. Eaton\, 144 U. S . 677\, 688 (1892)\, a “clear \n14 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nGORSUCH\, J.\, concurring \nlegislative basis\,” United States v. Geor ge\, 228 U. S. 14\, 22 \n(1913)\, a “definite and unmistakable expressio n\,” NLRB v. \nFansteel Metallurgical Corp.\, 306 U. S. 240\, 255 (1939) \, or \na “clea[r] mandate\,” FTC v. Bunte Brothers\, Inc.\, 312 U. S. \n349\, 351\, 355 (1941). Cf. Industrial Union Dept.\, AFL–CIO \nv. Ame rican Petroleum Institute\, 448 U. S. 607\, 645 (1980) \n(plurality opinio n) (“In the absence of a clear mandate . . . \nit is unreasonable to ass ume that Congress intended to give \nthe Secretary [of Labor] the unpreced ented power over\nAmerican industry” he claimed). \nIt is no mystery why the Court proceeded this way when\ninterpreting legislative directions to the executive branch.\nArticle I of the Constitution vests all federal le gislative\npower in Congress\, and Article II charges the executive\nbranc h with seeing that Congress’s laws are faithfully exe\ncuted. In a very real sense\, then\, when it comes to legisla\ntive power\, Congress is the principal and executive officials \nare the agents. See generally G. Law son &\; G. Seidman\, “A \nGreat Power of Attorney”: Understanding t he Fiduciary \nConstitution (2017).\nSo what is the basis for the charge t hat the major ques\ntions doctrine represents some “magica[l]” innovat ion? See \nWest Virginia\, 597 U. S.\, at 779 (KAGAN\, J.\, dissenting). \nPart of the answer may have to do with the fact that\, in the\nlatter ha lf of the 20th century\, this Court began experi\nmenting with a very diff erent approach. The Court pushed \naside its long-held skepticism of clai ms to extraordinary \ndelegated powers and began affirmatively encouraging \nthem. Chevron deference is just one example of this phe\nnomenon\, tho ugh a stark one. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. \nNatural Resources Defense Council\, Inc.\, 467 U. S. 837 \n(1984). That case established a presumpti on that was \nnearly the opposite of the major questions doctrine: When \ nCongress failed to speak clearly\, courts put a thumb on the\nscale in fa vor of delegated power. Id.\, at 843–844. Given \nthat development\, th e longstanding principles animating \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nGO RSUCH\, J.\, concurring \n15 \nthe major questions doctrine may have reced ed from view\nfor a time. After all\, the two doctrines often applied in t he \nsame places and counseled opposite results. But with Chev\nron gone\, so is the conflict. This Court’s application of the \nmajor questions doctrine is not invention so much as return\nto form. \nC \nNow turn to my concurring colleagues’ other charge: that \nthe major questions doctrin e is premised on an “anti-admin\nistrative-state stance.” West Virgin ia\, 597 U. S.\, at 780 \n(KAGAN\, J.\, dissenting). It is important\, th ey argue\, to al\nlow Congress to delegate expansive powers. Members of \n Congress unfortunately “often don’t know enough—and\nknow they don ’t know enough—to regulate sensibly on an \nissue.” Id.\, at 781. No r can Congress easily “anticipate\nchanging circumstances.” Ibid. For these reasons\, Mem\nbers of Congress must rely on more adept and less con \nstrained “people . . . found in agencies.” Ibid. Indeed\, my\ncoll eagues say\, “administrative delegations . . . have helped\nto build a m odern Nation.” Id.\, at 782. And the major ques\ntions doctrine\, they w orry\, could jeopardize all that “aston\nish[ing] . . . progress.” Ib id. \nThis policy complaint\, of course\, is no reason to disregard \nour precedents or longstanding legal principles. But\, even \ntaken on its ow n terms\, it is a bit perplexing. The major\nquestions doctrine is not “anti-administrative state.” It is \npro-Congress. Common-law courts understood that few \nwritten instruments can anticipate every eventuality \, and \nthat principals sometimes draft broad delegation language \nto ac count for this. At the same time\, courts appreciated\nthe corresponding risk that delegees could easily exploit\nloose language in their commissio ns for their own benefit \nand to the detriment of those they purported to serve. So \ncommon-law courts often strictly construed delegated \n16 \n LEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nGORSUCH\, J.\, concurring \npowers\, not because they were anti-delegee\, but because\nthey were pro-principal. \nThe major questions doctrine performs a similar function.\nArticle I ves ts all federal legislative power in Congress. But \nlike any written inst rument\, federal legislation cannot an\nticipate every eventuality\, a poi nt my concurring colleagues \nhave observed in the past. Id.\, at 781–78 2. And highly re\nsourceful members of the executive branch have strong in \ncentives to exploit any doubt in Congress’s past work to as\nsume new power for themselves. The major questions\ndoctrine helps prevent that ki nd of exploitation. Our found\ners understood that men are not angels\, a nd we disregard \nthat insight at our peril when we allow the few (or the one)\nto aggrandize their power based on loose or uncertain au\nthority. W e delude ourselves\, too\, if we think that power \nwill accumulate safely and only in the hands of dispassion\nate “people . . . found in agencie s.” Id.\, at 781. Even if un\nelected agency officials were uniquely imm une to the desire\nfor more power (an unserious assumption)\, they report to\nelected Presidents who can claim no such modesty. See My\ners v. Unit ed States\, 272 U. S. 52 (1926). \nAnother feature of our separation of po wers makes the\nmajor questions doctrine especially salient. When a priva te\nagent oversteps\, a principal may fix that problem prospec\ntively by withdrawing the agent’s authority. Under our \nConstitution\, the remed y is not so simple. Once this Court \nreads a doubtful statute as grantin g the executive branch a\ngiven power\, that power may prove almost imposs ible for \nCongress to retrieve. Any President keen on his own au\nthority (and\, again\, what President isn’t?) will have a \nstrong incentive to veto legislation aimed at returning the \npower to Congress. Perhaps Con gress can use other tools\, \nincluding its appropriation authority\, to i nfluence how the\nPresident exercises his new power. Maybe Congress can\ns ometimes even leverage those tools to induce the President \nto withhold a veto. But retrieving a lost power is no easy \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nGORSUCH\, J.\, concurring \n17 \nbusiness in our constitutional o rder. And without doctrines \nlike major questions\, our system of separa ted powers and\nchecks-and-balances threatens to give way to the continual \nand permanent accretion of power in the hands of one man.\nThat is no re cipe for a republic.\nThis case offers an example of the problem. Article I \ngrants Congress\, not the President\, the power to impose \ntariffs. S till\, the President claims\, Congress passed that\npower on to him in IEE PA\, permitting him to impose tariffs \non nearly any goods he wishes\, in any amount he wishes\, \nbased on emergencies he himself has declared. H e insists\, \nas well\, that his emergency declarations are unreviewable. \nA ruling for him here\, the President acknowledges\, would\nafford futur e Presidents the same latitude he asserts for \nhimself. See Tr. of Oral A rg. 69. So another President \nmight impose tariffs on gas-powered automo biles to re\nspond to climate change. Ibid. Or\, really\, on virtually any \nimports for any emergency any President might perceive. \nAnd all of th ese emergency declarations would be unreview\nable. Just ask yourself: Wh at President would willingly \ngive up that kind of power?\nI recognize th e concerns about the major questions doc\ntrine. But it is not so novel as some have supposed. And it \nserves Article I values we all share. My c oncurring col\nleagues all but endorse it today. I hope past skeptics wil l\ngive it another look. \nII \nTurn now to the second camp. If some have criticized the \nmajor questions doctrine\, others have responded by seek ing\nto soften its blow. Though joining today’s principal opinion \nhol ding that “clear” statutory authority is required to sus\ntain the exe rcise of an “extraordinary” power\, ante\, at 13\, \n20\, JUSTICE BARR ETT has suggested that the major ques\ntions doctrine might be reconceived . On her view\, the doc\ntrine need not be understood as a “substantive canon \n18 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nGORSUCH\, J.\, concurri ng \ndesigned to enforce Article I’s Vesting Clause”—a “valu[e] \n external to a statute.” Nebraska\, 600 U. S.\, at 508\, 510 \n(concurri ng opinion). \n Instead\, the doctrine might be\nthought of as a “common sense principl[e] of communica\ntion” that counsels “skepticism” whe n executive officials \nclaim extraordinary powers derived from Congress. Id.\, at \n514\, 516\; see also post\, at 1–4 (concurring opinion). \nI t is a thoughtful effort\, but I harbor doubts. For one \nthing\, there is no need to reconceive our doctrine\; past crit\nics all but apply the doc trine today and their previous criti\ncisms fall flat. See Part I\, supra . For another\, this gloss on\nour major questions doctrine presents probl ems. Com\nmonsense principles of communication do not explain many \nof ou r major questions cases—this one included. And if \ncommon sense really does go so far as to embrace a rule \ncounseling “skepticism” of claim s by executive officials that \nCongress has granted them extraordinary po wers\, that is\ncommon sense in name only. The reason for such skepti\nci sm must be Article I\, a “substantive” source “external” to \nany statute. \nA \nIntroducing her view that “commonsense principles of \nco mmunication” can sometimes help resolve disputes over \nthe meaning of s tatutory terms\, JUSTICE BARRETT points to \nan old chestnut. Nebraska\, 6 00 U. S.\, at 512\, 514 (concur\nring opinion). Suppose a legislature used the phrase “who\never drew blood in the streets” in a criminal statut e impos\ning punishment. As a matter of “common sense\,” JUSTICE \nBAR RETT says\, it would “‘g[o] without saying’” that the law \ndoes n’t apply to a surgeon accessing a patient’s vein to save \nhis life. Ibid. That is because the phrase “drew blood” is \nsusceptible to two conventional idiomatic meanings: one \n“applicable to violent encounter s with man or beast” and \nthe other “to medical procedures\,” A. Sc alia &\; B. Garner\, \nReading Law 357 (2012) (Scalia &\; Garner). A nd any \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nGORSUCH\, J.\, concurring \n19 \nordinary person faced with that phrase in a penal law would \nfind it ob vious which meaning applies. Ibid.\; see also Ne\nbraska\, 600 U. S.\, at 512 (BARRETT\, J.\, concurring).\nThe difficulty is\, our major questions cases are different. \nOften\, little about them “‘goes without s aying.’” Ibid. Take \nFDA v. Brown &\; Williamson Tobacco Corp.\, 529 U. S. 120 \n(2000). There\, the question was whether the FDA could \n regulate tobacco products. Id.\, at 125. Looking only to com\nmon sense\ , the answer would have been yes. Congress au\nthorized the FDA to regula te “drugs\,” which Congress de\nfined expressly and broadly as “‘a rticles (other than food) \nintended to affect the structure or any functi on of the \nbody.’” Id.\, at 126. As a matter of common sense\, nicot ine \nqualifies as a “drug” based on this statutory definition\, as it \nmight even as a matter of everyday speech. West Virginia\, \n597 U. S.\ , at 721–722 (noting the “colorable textual basis” \nfor the executi ve branch’s interpretation in Brown &\; Wil\nliamson). Still\, we hel d the FDA could not regulate tobacco \nproducts. Brown &\; Williamson\, 529 U. S.\, at 159–160. \nOther cases follow suit. We have ruled that the term “air \npollutant” does not include greenhouse gases\, even th ough\ngreenhouse gases pollute the air. Utility Air Regulatory \nGroup v. EPA\, 573 U. S. 302\, 316\, 323–324 (2014). We have \nheld that the phr ase “‘[r]egulations . . . necessary to pre\nvent the . . . spread of c ommunicable diseases’” does not in\nclude eviction moratoriums\, even without questioning that\neviction moratoriums were necessary to prevent t he spread\nof COVID–19\, a communicable disease. Alabama Assn. of \nReal tors\, 594 U. S.\, at 761\, 764. And we have said that clos\ning coal pow er plants is not the “‘best system of emission \nreduction\,’” eve n while acknowledging that closing them \nwould reduce emissions. West Vi rginia\, 597 U. S.\, at 721\, \n732–735. \nNone of these cases can be re adily explained by “com\nmonsense principles of communication.” Nebras ka\, 600 \nU. S.\, at 514 (BARRETT\, J.\, concurring). None involved a \n2 0 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nGORSUCH\, J.\, concurring \nphras e like “drew blood” susceptible to two conventional id\niomatic meanin gs\, one of which any English speaker faced \nwith the law at issue might quickly rule out. Quite the op\nposite\; in each case the agency had a st rong argument that\nthe statutory language\, commonsensically read\, grant ed \nthe power it claimed. Meanwhile\, all our major questions\ncases can be easily explained by reference to a rule requir\ning the executive branc h to identify clear statutory author\nity when it claims Congress has gran ted it an extraordinary \npower. And that is a “dice-loading” rule\, p lain and simple\,\none designed to protect Article I\, a “[s]ubstantive . . . valu[e]\nexternal” to the statutory terms at hand. Id.\, at 508. \nCommon sense not only fails to explain many of our major \nquestions cas es. It doesn’t explain even some of the cases \nJUSTICE BARRETT has hel d up as examples of commonsense \ncases. In Bond v. United States\, 572 U. S. 844 (2014)\, for \nexample\, the Court confronted a statute that defin ed\n“chemical weapon” to include “‘any chemical which through\nits chemical action on life processes can cause death\, tem\nporary incapacit ation or permanent harm to humans or an\nimals.’” Id.\, at 851\; see a lso Nebraska\, 600 U. S.\, at 512– \n513 (BARRETT\, J.\, concurring) (di scussing Bond). Despite\nthat broad definition\, the Court held that “an arsenic-based \ncompound” didn’t fit the bill. Bond\, 572 U. S.\, at 852\, 866. \nTo reach that result\, we did not use common sense alone. \n How could we have? It hardly goes without saying that ar\nsenic doesn’t qualify as a “chemical” which can cause “‘per\nmanent harm to hum ans or animals.’” Id.\, at 851\; see also \nid.\, at 867 (Scalia\, J. \, concurring in judgment) (calling it \n“beyond doubt” that the ordin ary meaning of the relevant \nstatutory terms embraced the chemicals at is sue). Instead\, \nwe relied on a clear-statement rule grounded in the sub \nstance of the Constitution—namely\, the federalism canon. \nId.\, at 8 60 (majority opinion) (“[W]e can insist on a clear \nindication that Con gress meant to reach purely local\ncrimes\, before interpreting the statut e’s expansive \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nGORSUCH\, J.\, concurr ing \n21 \nlanguage in a way that intrudes on the police power of the\nSta tes”). So Bond may well be like our major questions\ncases\, but that is only because it applied a clear-statement \nrule grounded in another subs tantive feature of the Consti\ntution. \nConsider as well the babysitter h ypothetical JUSTICE \nBARRETT has posed. Imagine a parent of young childr en \nwho hands a babysitter a credit card and says\, “‘[m]ake \nsure t he kids have fun.’” Nebraska\, 600 U. S.\, at 513 (con\ncurring opinio n). Now suppose the babysitter takes the\nkids on a road trip to an amuse ment park\, “where they\nspend two days on rollercoasters and one night in a hotel.” \nIbid. “Was the babysitter’s trip consistent with the parent’s\ninstruction?” Ibid. JUSTICE BARRETT believes the answer \nis likely “no” as a matter of common sense. See id.\, at 513– \n514. \ nReally\, though\, unless one is to believe children do not \n“have fu n” on rollercoasters and at hotels\, the babysitter \nhypothetical can b e explained only with reference to some \n“external” and “substant ive” norm. Id.\, at 508\, 513. And\, \nin fact\, just such a norm is b aked into the babysitter hypo\nthetical—one we encountered in Part I–B \, supra. The \nbabysitter is exercising authority the parents have dele\n gated to her. She is acting as their agent. As a result\, one \nmight expe ct a clear statement from the parents before the \nbabysitter may do somet hing extraordinary\, like take the\nkids on a road trip.\nThis substantive norm about delegated powers not only\nlurks beneath the surface of the ba bysitter hypothetical\, it\n“‘loads the dice’” against her. Nebras ka\, 600 U. S.\, at 510 \n(BARRETT\, J.\, concurring). Doubtless\, she wou ld see it that \nway. The babysitter would argue that a trip to an amuse\n ment park is “fun.” And she would be right under a com\nmonsense under standing of the word. But because the \nbabysitter is exercising delegated authority\, she cannot \n22 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nGORSUC H\, J.\, concurring \nexercise such an extraordinary power without clear a uthor\nization for it. \nNotice\, too\, the same outcome is no longer guar anteed\nwhen we remove the delegated power feature. If one parent\nleaves the children with the other parent\, the trip to the \namusement park mig ht well be fine. No other contextual \nclues are needed. See id.\, at 51 6 (agreeing with this). So if \nthe answer to the babysitter hypothetical seems a matter of \ncommon sense to many Americans\, that is only because the \nsubstantive norms associated with parental delegations to \nbabysit ter agents are so deeply rooted in our society. Say \nthe same instructio n were given to a babysitter in a com\nmunity where children are raised co llectively\, like a kib\nbutz. Same answer? Hardly obvious.1 \nB \nTo be s ure\, in places JUSTICE BARRETT concedes that her \ngloss on the major que stions doctrine requires resort to \nsomething more than “common sense ” instincts about what \nwould “‘g[o] without saying’” to an ord inary English \nspeaker. Nebraska\, 600 U. S.\, at 512 (concurring opinion )\; \nsee also post\, at 2. Sometimes\, she suggests\, common sense \ndoe sn’t just help illuminate the “most natural” meaning of\nan idiomati c term like “drew blood” based on its presence in \na penal law. 600 U . S.\, at 508. Sometimes\, she says\, “com\nmonsense principles of comm unication” go much further. \nId.\, at 514. So much so that they wind up dictating a rule \n—————— \n1Today\, JUSTICE BARRETT protests that the foregoing discussion “takes \ndown a straw man.” Post\, at 1 (concurring opinion). But it was JUSTICE \nBARRETT who previously wrote that the major questions doctrine “grows \nout of . . . commonsense pri nciples of communication.” Biden v. Ne\nbraska\, 600 U. S. 477\, 514 (2 023) (same). And it was JUSTICE BARRETT \nwho used the various illustrati ons recounted above to suggest that our \nmajor questions decisions can be explained by reference to the kind of \n“common sense . . . that ‘goe s without saying.’ ” Id.\, at 512. If JUSTICE \nBARRETT now means to put all that to the flame\, the major questions doc\ntrine is better for i t. \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nGORSUCH\, J.\, concurring \n23 \nco unseling “skepticism” of executive claims to extraordi\nnary delegated powers. Id.\, at 516. Why? Because\, \nJUSTICE BARRETT says\, a “reas onable observer” consults\n“our constitutional structure.” Id.\, at 515\, 520. But if that’s \ntrue\, this version of common sense does re quire us to ac\ncount for “values” entirely “external to a statute \,” including \nspecifically the “substan[ce]” of Article I. Id.\, at 508. And \nin so doing\, this expanded version of common sense just be\ ncomes the substantive major questions doctrine by another \nname. \nToday ’s decision illustrates the point. The principal opin\nion gestures a t “common sense.” Ante\, at 8. But through\nout\, this “common sen se” is linked to “‘constitutional struc\nture’” and “‘separa tion of powers principles.’” Ibid. The \nprincipal opinion begins wi th the Constitution\, observing\nthat Article I vests the tariff power in Congress\, not the ex\necutive branch. Ante\, at 5–6. The principal opin ion re\ncounts the President’s claim that Congress has “delegated” \nan “extraordinary” amount of its tariff power to him in\nIEEPA. Ant e\, at 8–9. And from there\, the principal opinion\nproceeds to apply a clear-statement rule. It acknowledges \nthat the ordinary meaning of the key statutory term in\nIEEPA—the word “regulate”—is capacious\, so much so that \nit could be understood to “captur[e] much of what a gove rn\nment does.” Ante\, at 14. Still\, the principal opinion rea\nsons\, that is not enough to sustain the President’s claim be\ncause the statut e does not “clear[ly]” grant him the \n“extraordinary” delegated p ower he seeks. Ante\, at 13\, 20. \nWhen it comes down to it\, common sens e serves as little \nmore than a segue to Article I’s Vesting Clause.\nT hat is as it must be. The statutory terms contain no\nambiguity we could u se (or need) “commonsense principles \nof communication” to resolve. N ebraska\, 600 U. S.\, at 514 \n(BARRETT\, J.\, concurring). This case is n othing like the \n“‘drew blood’” illustration\, where it might “‘g[o] without \nsaying’” that any ordinary person would immediat ely \n24 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nGORSUCH\, J.\, concurring \nunderstand which of two idiomatic meanings a penal stat\nute employed. I d.\, at 512. Indeed\, today’s principal opinion\ndoes not even “attemp t to set forth the metes and bounds” \nof IEEPA’s key phrase “‘reg ulate . . . importation\,’” ante\, at \n16\, much less find the “b est” or “most natural” meaning of \nthose words\, Nebraska\, 600 U. S.\, at 508\, 521 (BARRETT\, J.\, \nconcurring)\; post\, at 1. Instead\, w e need go no further than\nto recognize that IEEPA fails to “clear[ly] ” authorize tariffs. \nAnte\, at 13\, 20. And the only reason we can sto p there is \nbecause Article I—a “[s]ubstantive . . . valu[e] external to a\nstatute\,” 600 U. S.\, at 508 (BARRETT\, J.\, concurring)—im\np oses a clear-statement rule when executive officials claim\nCongress has a fforded them an extraordinary authority.\nThere’s another problem too. T he equivocation on \nwhether “commonsense principles of communication” in\nclude only those things that might “go without saying\,” or\nalso include “external” and “substantive” Article I “values\,” \nl eads to a further equivocation on how much “skepticism”\ncommon sense might dictate when assessing an executive\nofficial’s claim to an extrao rdinary delegated power. Com\nmon sense\, we are told\, does not impose a “‘clarity tax\,’” but \nit does add an “expectation of clarit y.” Id.\, at 508\, 514. \nCommon sense does not “‘loa[d] the dic e\,’” but it does coun\nsel “skepticism.” Id.\, at 510–511\, 516 . Common sense \nmeans never “forgo[ing] the most natural reading of a s tat\nute\,” post\, at 3\, but it always means “expect[ing that] Con\ng ress [will] make the big-time policy calls\,” post\, at 2 (inter\nnal qu otation marks omitted). I am uncertain what to make \nof this\, except th at it seems to toggle between a clear-state\nment rule and nothing at all. 2 \n—————— \n2To the extent JUSTICE BARRETT suggests any ske pticism “com\nmonsense principles of communication” might (or might no t) advise de\nrives from a “ ‘practical understanding of legislative i ntent\,’ ” rather than\n“external” and “substantive” Artic le I “values\,” that poses still further \n(and familiar) problems. N ebraska\, 600 U. S.\, at 508\, 515 (concurring \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nGORSUCH\, J.\, concurring \n25 \nI am certain of one thing: Our c ases hold a clear state\nment is required to support a claim to an extraor dinary del\negated power. We required Congress to “speak clearly” in \ nUtility Air\, 573 U. S.\, at 324. We demanded “clear congres\nsional a uthorization” in NFIB\, 595 U. S.\, at 118. We did the \nsame in Nebras ka\, 600 U. S.\, at 506\, and in West Virginia\, \n597 U. S.\, at 732\, an d we do so again today\, ante\, at 13. Nor \ndo I see cause for being quit e so reluctant about acknowl\nedging this. The common law recognized many clear-state\nment rules. See\, e.g.\, Part I–B\, supra. Our own cases h ave \napplied a host of Constitution-enforcing clear-statement\nrules as w ell. We just encountered the federalism clear\nstatement rule in Bond. Add to the list clear-statement \nrules against laws that might apply retroac tively\, waive or\nabrogate sovereign immunity\, or create enforceable rig hts\nunder the Taxing Clause—to name just a few. See\, e.g.\, \nLandgra f v. USI Film Products\, 511 U. S. 244\, 265–268 \n(1994)\; Financial Ov ersight and Management Bd. for P. R. \nv. Centro De Periodismo Investigati vo\, Inc.\, 598 U. S. 339\, \n346–347 (2023)\; Medina v. Planned Parenth ood South At\nlantic\, 606 U. S. 357\, 383–384\, n. 8 (2025). Maybe all these \nrules could be recast as “common sense”—at least if com\nmo n sense means taking account of the “external” and \n————— — \nopinion) (quoting West Virginia v. EPA\, 597 U. S. 697\, 723 (2022)) . Down \nthat road lies all the pitfalls associated with reliance on legi slative his\ntory and those associated with conflating unenacted legislati ve intent \nwith the law. Scalia &\; Garner 397\; post\, p. 1 (JACKSON\ , J.\, concurring in \npart and concurring in judgment). Similar problems attend the notion \nthat the appropriate degree of skepticism due a deleg ation might turn on \nwhat people “expect.” Nebraska\, 600 U. S.\, at 514\, 520 (BARRETT\, J.\, con\ncurring)\; see also post\, at 2 (same). JU STICE BARRETT has offered no evi\ndence about what people “expect” whe n confronted with different con\ngressional delegations. \nAnd to the exte nt she believes their \n“expectations” would reflect an appropriate co nsideration of the whole \n“‘corpus juris\,’ including the Constit ution\,” post\, at 2\, n. 1\, that just cir\ncles us right back to the “external” and “substantive” Article I “values” \nshe strives so hard to sideline\, see Nebraska\, 600 U. S.\, at 508 (BARRETT\, \nJ.\, concurring). \n26 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nGORSUCH\, J.\, c oncurring \n“substantive” “values” found in “our constitutional struc\nture.” Nebraska\, 600 U. S.\, at 508\, 515 (BARRETT\, J.\, con\nc urring). But whatever the label\, it hardly requires some \n“judicial fl ex\,” post\, at 4\, to recognize that the “external” \nconstitutio nal “values” at stake in our major questions \ncases are no less weigh ty than those at play in other set\ntings where we routinely apply a clear -statement rule.3 \nIII \nThat brings us to the third camp. My dissenting col\nleagues have defended the major questions doctrine in the \npast\, a nd they do so again today. Post\, at 31–33 (opinion of \nKAVANAUGH\, J.) . They agree that the doctrine is grounded\nin the Constitution. Post\, at 32. They agree that the doc\ntrine requires us to deviate from “‘ro utine’” statutory inter\npretation principles and instead place a “t humb on the\nscale\,” one requiring executive officials to identify “‘clear’” \ncongressional authorization when they seek to exercise \nsome “major” power. Post\, at 33. But\, my colleagues say\,\nIEEPA provides the clear statement needed to sustain the\nPresident’s tariffs. Post\, at 38–45. Alternatively\, they sub\nmit\, we shouldn’t apply the major questions doctrine to any\nstatute\, like IEEPA\, that implicate s “foreign affairs.” Post\, \nat 45–49. And this exception\, they ad d\, is particularly war\nranted here because Congress has historically gra nted the \n—————— \n3Notably\, past critics of the major quest ions doctrine have not hesi\ntated to apply many of these clear-statement rules. See Financial Over\nsight and Management Bd. for P. R. v. Centro D e Periodismo Investiga\ntivo\, Inc.\, 598 U. S. 339\, 346–347 (2023) (op inion for the Court by KAGAN\, \nJ.)\; Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimond o\, 603 U. S. 369\, 455–456\, n. 1 \n(2024) (KAGAN\, J.\, dissenting) (c ollecting examples)\; West Virginia\, 597 \nU. S.\, at 751\, n. 7 (GORSUCH \, J.\, concurring) (same). Nor have they hesi\ntated to adopt and apply other clear-statement rules with far less \ngrounding in the Constitution than the major questions doctrine. See\, \ne.g.\, Bowe v. United States\, 607 U. S. ___\, ___–___ (2026) (slip op.\, at 9– \n10)\; id.\, at __ _–___ (GORSUCH\, J.\, dissenting) (slip op.\, at 12–15)\; Boechler \nv . Commissioner\, 596 U. S. 199\, 208 (2022). \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2 026) \nGORSUCH\, J.\, concurring \n27 \nPresident large discretion in sett ing tariffs. Post\, at 49–53. \nOnce again\, the points are thoughtful a nd merit careful con\nsideration. \nA \nMy dissenting colleagues begin by taking the major ques\ntions doctrine as they find it. They accept that t he Presi\ndent’s challenged actions are “of major economic and politi\ ncal significance.” Post\, at 33. They accept as well that he\nmust iden tify “clear” congressional authorization to sustain \nthose actions. I bid. Still\, the dissent maintains\, IEEPA \nclearly grants the President the tariff power he asserts. \nTo arrive at that conclusion\, the dissent consults four \nclues we have sometimes employed in our major questions \n cases to help assess whether a statute clearly authorizes an \nasserted po wer. See West Virginia\, 597 U. S.\, at 746 \n(GORSUCH\, J.\, concurring). The dissent formulates these \nclues largely as I would. See post\, at 3 5–38. But\, to my\neyes\, the dissent engages in a little grade inflatio n when \napplying them. \nFirst\, is the President seeking to exercise an “unher\nalded” or “newfound” power based on a “long-extant” st at\nute? Post\, at 39 (internal quotation marks omitted). The \ndissent in sists that is not the case here because President \nNixon imposed a 10 per cent tariff on most imports in 1971\,\nand then defended that action in lo wer courts under a pre\ndecessor to IEEPA\, the Trading with the Enemy Act \n(TWEA). Ibid. But the words “regulate . . . importation”\nwere add ed to TWEA in 1941. §301(1)(B)\, 55 Stat. 839.\nCongress used the same la nguage in IEEPA in 1977. \n§203(a)(1)(B)\, 91 Stat. 1626. And in the 85 y ears of TWEA’s \nexistence with that language (and the 49 years of IEE PA’s)\, \nthat is the only time either statute has been invoked to im\np ose tariffs. Ante\, at 10–11\, 17–18. A single time\, and one \nnever tested in this Court. Nor are these statutes seldom \nused. \n“Each ye ar since 1990\, Presidents have issued \n28 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nGORSUCH\, J.\, concurring \nroughly 4.5 executive orders . . . an d declared 1.5 new na\ntional emergencies citing IEEPA.” Congressional R esearch\nService\, The International Emergency Economics Powers \nAct: Ori gins\, Evolution\, and Use 20 (Sept. 1\, 2025). That is \npretty strong e vidence the President here seeks to “deploy \nan old statute” in a nov el way. West Virginia\, 597 U. S.\, at \n747 (GORSUCH\, J.\, concurring).\ nSecond\, how has the executive branch interpreted IEEPA \nin the past? P ost\, at 40–41. The dissent says Presidents\nhave long understood IEEPA to permit them to impose tar\niffs. Ibid. But for support\, the dissent a gain relies on iso\nlated evidence about other statutes. It points to the mone\ntary exactions President Ford ordered under the Trade\nExpansion Ac t of 1962. Post\, at 17\, 40. And\, once more\, it \npoints to President Nixon’s invocation of TWEA to support\nhis 1971 tariffs during lower co urt proceedings (though the\ndissent brushes aside the fact that President Nixon initially\nrejected the idea of relying on TWEA\, see Brief for Car la\nHills et al. as Amici Curiae 12–14). Whatever one makes of \nthis h istory\, it hardly reveals the kind of contemporaneous \nand consistent ex ecutive interpretation that might advance\nthe dissent’s cause. See West Virginia\, 597 U. S.\, at 747 \n(GORSUCH\, J.\, concurring). To the cont rary\, the fact that no\nPresident until now has invoked IEEPA to impose a duty—\neven one percent on one product from one country—is tell\ning. Id.\, at 748. \nThird\, is there a “mismatch” between the action the exec\nutive official seeks to take and his expertise? Post\, at 41. \nOn this one\, I agree with the dissent. If tariffs fall in any\nexecutive off icial’s “wheelhouse” (and not Congress’s)\, it’s \nthe Preside nt’s. Ibid.\; see also supra\, at 6. \nFourth\, is the President “rely ing on oblique\, elliptical\, or \ncryptic language”? Post\, at 41–42. The dissent says no be\ncause “[t]his case does not involve elephants i n mouse\nholes.” Post\, at 41 (internal quotation marks omitted). Put \ nanother way\, the dissent insists\, the provisions of IEEPA \n Cite as: 6 07 U. S. ____ (2026) \nGORSUCH\, J.\, concurring \n29 \nbefore us are not “ancillary” ones\, but are designed to con\nvey significant powers. Po st\, at 43 (internal quotation \nmarks omitted). It’s a fair enough poin t as far as it goes.\nBut our cases ask not just whether a provision is a “mouse\nhole” or “ancillary.” They also caution against reading ex \ntraordinary powers into “broad or general” statutory lan\nguage. Wes t Virginia\, 597 U. S.\, at 746 (GORSUCH\, J.\, \nconcurring) (internal qu otation marks omitted)\; see also \nSossamon v. Texas\, 563 U. S. 277\, 29 1 (2011) (“[C]lear \nstatement rules ensure Congress does not\, by broad or gen\neral language\, legislate on a sensitive topic inadvertently or\n without due deliberation” (internal quotation marks omit\nted)). Indeed\ , and as we have seen\, many of our major ques\ntions cases have found bro ad or general terms in significant \nstatutes insufficient to support a cl aim to an extraordinary\nor unusual power. See Part I–A\, supra. And her e\, the word \n“regulate” is broad as can be. So broad that it could be read \nto “captur[e] much of what a government does.” Ante\, at 14 . \nAs I see it\, then\, three of the four clues the dissent relies \non c ut against it. It is important to add\, as well\, that as\nhelpful as the se clues can be in helping courts spot when a\nclaimed power is not suppor ted by clear statutory authority\,\nthey do not represent some exhaustive checklist\, nor does \nsatisfying one guarantee a claim will succeed. So\, for ex\nample\, even if an asserted power is in the agency’s “wheel\n house\,” we might rule (and have ruled) against the agency \nif the powe r is “unheralded” because the statute has stood\nfor decades without b eing interpreted to convey the power\nclaimed. See\, e.g.\, Brown &\; W illiamson\, 529 U. S.\, at 144\, \n159–160. \nUltimately\, the central q uestion in any major questions\ncase remains whether the executive branc h’s claim to an \nextraordinary power is supported by clear statutory au thor\nity. And\, as the principal opinion explains at length\, many \naddi tional clues beyond those the dissent addresses confirm\nthat the Presiden t cannot meet that standard in this case. \n30 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nGORSUCH\, J.\, concurring \nThese additional clues include the way the key statutory \nterm “regulate” is used elsewhere in the U. S . Code\, how \nCongress has delegated tariff authority in the past\, and\n other neighboring language in IEEPA itself. Ante\, at 14– \n15. \nContra ry to the dissent’s charge\, too\, the principal opin\nion’s applicati on of the major questions doctrine today in no \nway amounts to a “magic -words test.” Post\, at 44. Of \ncourse\, if IEEPA included terms like “tariff ” or “duty\,” that\nwould have sufficed. But\, to borrow a phrase from the dis\nsent\, “monetary exactions on foreign imports” would have\nworked just as well. Post\, at 17. Same goes for “tax on i m\nported goods.” Or any similarly clear term or phrase. But \nIEEPA i ncludes no such language\, just a broad term that\ncould cover almost anyt hing a government does. And re\nquiring specific rather than general lang uage is just how\nclear-statement rules work. See\, e.g.\, Sossamon\, 563 U. S.\, \nat 291. \nB \nIf the President’s claim fails under our usual m ajor ques\ntions test\, the dissent says we should respond by carving \nou t an exception to it for cases (like this one) touching on\n“foreign aff airs.” Post\, at 45. \nOn this score\, I share a limited point of agreem ent with \nthe dissent. Like the nondelegation doctrine\, the major\nquest ions doctrine protects Article I’s Vesting Clause and\, \nfor that reaso n\, the doctrine does not apply where the Pres\nident is exercising only h is own inherent Article II powers.\nLike the nondelegation doctrine\, too\ , the major questions\ndoctrine may speak with less force where the Presid ent and\nCongress enjoy “overlap[ping] . . . authority.” See Gundy v. \nUnited States\, 588 U. S. 128\, 159 (2019) (GORSUCH\, J.\, dis\nsenting) \; see also C. Bradley &\; J. Goldsmith\, Foreign Af\nfairs\, Nondelega tion\, and the Major Questions Doctrine\,\n172 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743\, 1747 (2004) (Bradley &\; Goldsmith) \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nGORS UCH\, J.\, concurring \n31 \n(explaining the “supposed foreign affairs e xception” to the\nnondelegation doctrine “is better understood as a qu alifica\ntion that concerns situations in which a statutory authori\nzatio n relates to an independent presidential power”).\nDoubtless\, cases imp licating overlapping powers can \narise in the field of foreign affairs. T he Constitution\, for \nexample\, vests in Congress the power to raise and regulate\narmies\, but it also vests in the President the commander\nin-c hief power. Compare Art. I\, §8\, cls. 12–14\, with Art. II\, \n§2\, c l. 1. Similarly\, Congress enjoys the power to regulate\nforeign commerce \, but the President has power to negotiate \ntreaties and nominate ambass adors. Compare Art. I\, §8\, \ncl. 3\, with Art. II\, §2\, cl. 2. The P resident may even enjoy \nsome “residual” powers pertaining to foreign affairs under \nArticle II’s Vesting Clause endowing him with the “ex ecu\ntive Power.” See S. Prakash &\; M. Ramsey\, The Executive \nPowe r Over Foreign Affairs\, 111 Yale L. J. 231\, 234 (2001) \n(Prakash &\; Ramsey)\; but see C. Bradley &\; M. Flaherty\, Ex\necutive Power Essen tialism and Foreign Affairs\, 102 Mich. \nL. Rev. 545\, 551–552 (2004). Given all this\, it is easy\nenough to imagine statutes and disputes unde r them that \nimplicate both congressional and presidential powers \nwhere we might have reason to question whether the major\nquestions doctrine ap plies with its usual force.\nThe problem for the dissent is that none of t his is relevant\nhere. Before us\, the President concedes that he does not \nenjoy independent Article II authority to impose tariffs in \npeacetime . Ante\, at 18–19. Nor does the President claim \n“‘concurrent’ ” constitutional authority to issue his tariffs. \nAnte\, at 13 (citing Tr. of Oral Arg. 70–71). Instead\, and to \nhis credit\, the President admits the power to authorize tar\niffs in peacetime is constitutionally v ested in “Congress \nalone.” Ante\, at 13 (internal quotation marks om itted). \nTherefore\, the President relies entirely on power derived \nfro m Congress\, and that means the major questions doc\ntrine applies in the normal way. See Bradley &\; Goldsmith \n32 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nGORSUCH\, J.\, concurring \n1796 (“IEEPA [is] not [an] autho rizatio[n] that obviously \nconnect[s] to independent presidential power i n ways that\nwould warrant the independent powers qualification”). \nBec ause of this problem\, the dissent must argue for a \nmuch broader “fore ign affairs” qualification to the major\nquestions doctrine. Rather tha n ask whether an independ\nent\, constitutionally vested presidential powe r is impli\ncated\, the dissent would have us ask instead whether the \nPr esident seeks to use the statute in question for a foreign \naffairs purpo se—for example\, as a “too[l]” to “incentivize a \nchange in behav ior by allies . . . or enemies.” Post\, at 50. \nWhen he does\, the diss ent submits\, the major questions doc\ntrine should not apply. And that ’s true\, the dissent contin\nues\, even if the power the President asse rts has “significant\ndomestic ramifications.” Post\, at 51. \nThis n ew exception to the major questions doctrine would\nhave (enormous) conseq uences hard to reconcile with the\nConstitution. Article I\, §8\, vests i n Congress many powers\nthat touch on “foreign affairs.” Some of thos e powers were\nexpected to be (and are) the “principal objects of federa l leg\nislation.” The Federalist No. 53\, p. 333 (C. Rossiter ed. \n1961 ) (J. Madison). They include not only the power to im\npose tariffs\, cl. 1\, but also the power to establish uniform \nrules of naturalization\, cl . 4\, appropriate money for armies\, \ncl. 12\, and define and punish offe nses against the law of na\ntions\, cl. 10. Under the dissent’s view\, a ll these legislative\npowers and more could be passed wholesale to the exe cutive\nbranch in a few loose statutory terms\, no matter what do\nmestic ramifications might follow. And\, as we have seen\, \nCongress would ofte n find these powers nearly impossible \nto retrieve. See Part I–C\, supr a. \nConsider an example. Imagine Congress adopted a law \nthat arguably c ould be read to let the President borrow and\nspend money during peacetime as he sees fit. A law like \nthat would represent an extraordinary deleg ation of Con\ngress’s power both to borrow “on the credit of the Unite d \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nGORSUCH\, J.\, concurring \n33 \nSta tes\,” Art. I\, §8\, cl. 2\, and to spend money in support of \nthe “ general Welfare\,” §8\, cl. 1\, and would carry with it “sig\nnifican t domestic ramifications\,” post\, at 51. But if an en\nterprising execu tive could also use the law as a “tool” for \naffecting the behavior of “allies . . . or enemies\,” the dissent \nseemingly would have us exempt it from scrutiny under the \nmajor questions doctrine.\nThe dissent ’s exception is so broad it’s hard not to wonder \nhow it fits with so me of our existing major questions prece\ndents. In West Virginia\, the Co urt applied the major ques\ntions doctrine over a dissent expressing conce rn that doing \nso would deny the EPA (and therefore the President) the \n power to respond to “the most pressing environmental chal\nlenge of our time”—“[c]limate chang[e].” 597 U. S.\, at 753 \n(KAGAN\, J.\, di ssenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).\nA challenge\, the dissent c ontinued\, that threatened conse\nquences global in scope\, including “m ass migration events[\,] \npolitical crises\, civil unrest\, and even stat e failure.” Id.\, at \n754 (internal quotation marks omitted). Was Wes t Virginia \na “foreign affairs” case? How about our major questions\n cases addressing efforts to combat the global pandemic that \nwas COVID– 19? See\, e.g.\, NFIB\, 595 U. S.\, at 114.4 \n—————— \n4The d issent suggests that trying to identify when an independent Ar\nticle II a uthority is in play would prove “jurisprudentially chaotic.” Post\, \ nat 53\, n. 23. But as the foregoing discussion illustrates\, the dissent ’s al\nternative “foreign affairs” test poses its own challenges. A nd it seems to \nme only one is firmly rooted in the text of the Constitut ion. See Bradley\n&\; Goldsmith 1747\; see also Prakash &\; Ramsey 2 33 (“[O]ne would think\nthat the Constitution’s text ought to play the preeminent role in discern\ning the Constitution’s allocation of foreig n affairs powers”). In this case\, \ntoo\, only one test promises any m anner of “chao[s]” because all parties\nbefore us readily agree that t he Constitution affords the President no \nindependent power to impose pea cetime tariffs. See H. Powell\, The Pres\nident’s Authority Over Foreig n Affairs: An Executive Branch Perspec\ntive\, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 527\, 549 (1999) (“The President has no inde\npendent power directly to regul ate [or] tax . . . foreign commerce”). \n34 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nGORSUCH\, J.\, concurring \nSeeking support for its sweeping ne w exception\, the dis\nsent points to three main precedents. Post\, at 46 –48\, 53– \n57. I do not see how any of them might sustain its view. \ nThe first\, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld\, 542 U. S. 507 (2004)\, con\ncerned the 20 01 Authorization for Use of Military Force\n(AUMF)\, legislation which aut horized the President to use \n“all necessary and appropriate force agai nst those nations\,\norganizations\, or persons” responsible for the Sep tember \n11\, 2001\, attacks. Id.\, at 510 (internal quotation marks\nomit ted). The dissent highlights the principal opinion’s\nconclusion that th e AUMF allowed the President to detain \nenemy combatants even though the law did not mention \nthat power expressly. Id.\, at 510\, 516–517 (opin ion of \nO’Connor\, J.). And from this\, the dissent draws the infer\ne nce that any statute addressing foreign affairs should be\nexempt from scr utiny under the major questions doctrine. \nPost\, at 54–55. But the di ssent overlooks the fact that the \nprincipal opinion reached the conclusi on it did only because\nit found detention of enemy combatants to be a tra ditional\n“incident to war.” 542 U. S.\, at 518. And once Congress\nd eclares war (or\, likewise\, authorizes the use of military\nforce abroad) \, that implicates the President’s commander\nin-chief powers. Put simpl y\, Hamdi was a case of overlap\nping powers. Ours is not. \nSecond\, the dissent invokes Dames &\; Moore v. Regan\, 453 \nU. S. 654 (1981). Se e post\, at 55–56. At its heart\, that case \ninvolved an executive orde r by President Reagan suspend\ning certain claims by U. S. citizens agains t Iran as part of a\nsettlement involving the release of American hostages held\nthere. 453 U. S.\, at 675. Just as we do today\, Dames &\; \nMo ore held that the “terms of the IEEPA . . . d[id] not au\nthorize” the President’s actions. Ibid. Even so\, the Court \nproceeded to uphold t hose actions anyway\, and did so based \nin part on its view (right or wro ng) that the President en\njoyed some “‘independent’” power to “ enter into executive\nagreements” suspending certain claims. Id.\, at 6 78\, 682– \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nGORSUCH\, J.\, concurring \n35 \n683. So unlike our case\, Dames &\; Moore again involved\noverla pping powers. Along the way\, too\, the Court empha\nsized (repeatedly) th e “narrowness” of its decision and that\nit should not be taken to “ lay down” any “general ‘guide\nlines’ covering other situations no t involved here.” Id.\, at \n661\; see also id.\, at 660\, 688. To der ive from Dames &\; \nMoore a new general guideline exempting “foreign affairs” \ncases from the major questions doctrine’s reach would thus \nrequire us to disregard its own cautionary direction.\nThird\, the disse nt cites United States v. Curtiss-Wright \nExport Corp.\, 299 U. S. 304 (1 936). See post\, at 46–48. \nThere\, the Court did suggest that nondele gation rules in the\nfield of “domestic or internal affairs” should di ffer from \nthose in the realm of “foreign or external affairs.” Curt iss\nWright\, 299 U. S.\, at 315. But what should we make of that \nlangu age? If it means that the nondelegation doctrine (and\nperhaps\, by extens ion\, the major questions doctrine) must\naccount for the President’s in dependent Article II powers\, I \nagree.\nBut I would hesitate to read mor e into the decision than \nthat. Consider what was really at issue there. A statute \npermitted the President to ban the transfer of one class of \ ngoods (armaments). Id.\, at 312. It did so with respect to\ntwo countries then engaged in a war (Bolivia and Para\nguay). Ibid. The President’s authority was conditioned on \na finding that a ban “‘may contribute t o the reestablish\nment of peace between those countries.’” Ibid. Bef ore mak\ning that finding\, too\, Congress directed him to consult \n“ ‘with the governments of other American Republics.’” \nIbid. All to ld\, then\, the statute set forth the policy for the \nPresident to pursue . It bounded his authority by limiting \nhis options with respect to a lim ited class of goods and coun\ntries. The statute further conditioned his e xercise of those \noptions on a factual finding reached after consultation with \nother nations. So whatever else might be said about \nCurtiss-Wrig ht\, one thing is apparent: In upholding the \n36 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, I NC. v. TRUMP \nGORSUCH\, J.\, concurring \nPresident’s actions under the law in question\, the Court \nhardly allowed Congress to hand off all of its enumerated \npowers touching on foreign affairs to the President\, the tar\niff power included.5 \nC \nIf its effort to secure a broad foreign a ffairs exception to\nthe major questions doctrine won’t work\, the disse nt hints \nat a more limited one specific to tariffs. Such an exception \ nmakes sense\, the dissent says\, because “Presidents have \nlong been g ranted substantial discretion over tariffs.” Post\, \nat 52 (internal q uotation marks omitted). Indeed\, the dis\nsent contends\, this tradition traces “back to near the Found\ning.” Post\, at 59. If the dissent w ere right about that\, one \nmight hesitate before accepting the President ’s concession\nthat this case does not implicate any inherent Article II au\nthority. But\, at least as I read it\, history offers the dissent \nl ittle to work with. \nAmericans fought the Revolution in no small part be\ ncause they believed that only their elected representatives \n(not the Ki ng\, not even Parliament) possessed authority to \ntax them. Declaration o f Independence ¶19. And\, they be\nlieved\, that held true not just for d irect taxes like those in \nthe Stamp Act\, but also for many duties on im ports\, like \nthose found in the Sugar Act. E. Morgan &\; H. Morgan\, The\nStamp Act Crisis: Prologue to Revolution 72–74 (1995 ed.)\;\nsee 1 E. Stanwood\, American Tariff Controversies in the \nNineteenth Century 6 0 (1903) (Stanwood)\; C. Van Tyne\, \n—————— \n5In places\, th e dissent also argues that the President’s inherent Article \nII authori ty includes a wartime tariff power. See post\, at 22–24\; see also \nBri ef for Professor Aditya Bamzai as Amicus Curiae 3. But this only \nhighlig hts the dissent’s bind. Whatever the full scope of the President’s \n Article II war powers may be (and the briefs before us reveal a healthy \n debate whether they include the power to impose tariffs)\, those powers\na re not implicated here. IEEPA is not a wartime statute\, nor does the \nP resident claim we are at war with the countries whose goods are subject \n to the tariffs. \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nGORSUCH\, J.\, concurr ing \n37 \nThe Causes of the War of Independence 126–136 (1922)\; J.\nOt is\, The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and \nProved (1764)\, in The Collected Political Writings of James\nOtis 119\, 161–162 (2015)\; s ee also id.\, at xii (Introduction). \nAmericans later codified these beli efs in the Constitution. \nUnder the Articles of Confederation\, the natio nal govern\nment was laden with debt and enjoyed few ways to repay it. \nT o address that problem\, the framers afforded the federal \ngovernment new taxing powers in the Constitution. Art. I\, \n§8\, cl. 1. Many thought these powers among “the most im\nportant” features of the new federal charter. See\, e.g.\, The \nFederalist No. 33\, at 202–203 (A. Hamilton) . But\, con\nsistent with their view that only the people’s elected rep re\nsentatives could constitutionally tax them\, the framers \ngave Congre ss alone “access to the pockets of the people.” \nId.\, No. 48\, at 31 0 (J. Madison). And to cement that role\, \nthe Constitution required tha t “All Bills for raising Reve\nnue shall originate in the House of Repre sentatives\,” the\nbody most responsive to the people. Art. I\, §7\, c l. 1.\nFor much of the Nation’s history\, this taxing power was\nessenti ally a tariff power. The framers even considered \n(and eventually reject ed) the possibility of giving the fed\neral government the power to tax on ly through tariffs. The \nFederalist No. 35\, at 211 (A. Hamilton). No s urprise\, then\,\nthat Congress’s first exercise of its taxing power was a tariff \nlaw. P. Ashley\, Modern Tariff History 170–171 (2d ed. \n191 0). And until the 20th century\, tariffs “accounted for\nbetween 50 and 90 percent” of the federal government’s rev\nenue. J. Dobson\, Two Cen turies of Tariffs: The Background\nand Emergence of the United States Inte rnational Trade\nCommission 1 (1976).\nHow did Congress exercise its all-i mportant tariff power?\nIt debated every detail of the first tariff Act. S tanwood 39– \n71. Ultimately\, Congress said\, imported malt would incur \na charge of 10 cents a bushel. Brown sugar one cent. Loaf \nsugar thr ee cents. And so on. Id.\, at 59. The first tariff Act \n38 \nLEARNING RES OURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nGORSUCH\, J.\, concurring \nwas set to last for s even years. Id.\, at 72. It lasted barely \none. Ibid. Soon\, Congress w as at it again\, laying out an\nother exacting schedule of duties. Id.\, a t 75–76. Through\nout much of the 19th century\, Congress proceeded sim i\nlarly\, enacting highly detailed tariff schedules one after \nanother. See F. Taussig\, The Tariff History of the United \nStates 68–170 (8th e d. 1931).\nAn early debate over executive involvement in setting \ntariffs demonstrates just how strongly Congress felt that \ntariffs were a legisl ative business. In December 1791\, Pres\nident Washington told Congress t hat General St. Clair had\nbeen defeated in the Northwest Indian War\, and the coun\ntry would have to increase the size of the army. Stanwood \n10 4. That meant the government needed more money. In \nresponse\, a resolut ion was offered in the House of Repre\nsentatives to solicit advice from t he Secretary of the Treas\nury\, Alexander Hamilton\, on the best way to r aise the addi\ntional revenue—including through new tariffs. 3 Annals o f \nCongress 437 (1792)\; Stanwood 105–106. Ultimately\, Ham\nilton’s advice was sought\, but only after a debate over the\nconstitutionality of even asking a member of the executive\nbranch for advice on raising reven ue. Ibid.\; 3 Annals of \nCongress 447.\nTo be sure\, on later occasions C ongress turned to the ex\necutive branch for more help still. But it usual ly did so to\naddress changing trade practices in foreign countries. And \nin doing so\, Congress set the important policies\, with the \nexecutive branch responsible for finding facts—like what \nother countries’ tra de policies were at any given moment—\nor filling in the details. So\, f or example\, Congress passed a\nstatute in 1815 to repeal any “discrimin ating duty of ton\nnage . . . whenever the President” was “satisfied ” that other \ncountries’ “discriminating or countervailing duti es” had\n“been abolished.” Act of Mar. 3\, 1815\, ch. 77\, 3 Stat. 2 24\; \nsee also\, e.g.\, Act of Jan. 7\, 1824\, 4 Stat. 2–3. \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nGORSUCH\, J.\, concurring \n39 \nGiven this histo ry\, it’s no surprise that the dissent relies \nmostly on statutes and c ases after 1890. Post\, at 59. But \neven they do little to support its cl aim. J. W. Hampton\, Jr.\, \n&\; Co. v. United States\, 276 U. S. 394 (1928)\, for example\, \ninvolved a law instructing the President to “in vestigat[e]” \nthe costs of production for American firms and their fore ign \ncounterparts and issue tariffs to “equalize” those costs. Id.\, \nat 401\, 409 (internal quotation marks omitted). The statute \nthe Cour t faced in Marshall Field &\; Co. v. Clark\, 143 U. S. \n649\, 681 (189 2)\, spoke similarly. Even when Federal En\nergy Administration v. Algonqu in SNG\, Inc.\, 426 U. S. 548\, \ncame along in 1976\, the Court upheld Pr esident Ford’s im\nposition of monetary exactions on a single class of p roducts \nunder a statute that provided at least some guidance about\nhow he should implement the law. Id.\, at 559. And whether \ncorrectly decide d or not\, that case lies a far step from this \none. \nBefore us\, the Pr esident insists he may use IEEPA to\nequalize foreign and domestic dutie s—or not. He may use \nit to negotiate with foreign countries—or not. He may set \ntariffs at 1 percent or 1\,000\,000 percent. He may target one \nnation and one product or every nation and nearly every \nproduct. And he may change his mind at any time for\nnearly any reason. At least as I see it\, history dating “back \nto near the Founding\,” post\, at 59\, does not support the no\ntion that Presidents have traditionally enj oyed so much \npower. More nearly\, history refutes it.6 \n——— ——— \n6Beyond the major questions hurdle\, the dissent faces another \, related \none: the nondelegation doctrine. There the problems are just as acute. \nIn recent decades\, this Court has employed a relatively lax “intelligible\nprinciple” test to police delegations. See FCC v. Cons umers’ Research\, \n606 U. S. 656\, 673 (2025)\; cf. Gundy v. United Sta tes\, 588 U. S. 128\, 157– \n159 (2019) (GORSUCH\, J.\, dissenting) (arg uing for a more traditional test).\nBut recognizing that even the intellig ible principle test poses challenges \nfor it\, the dissent contends for a n even laxer test yet in cases involving \n“foreign affairs” and tarif fs. Post\, at 57–61. It’s an effort that fails for \n40 \nLEARNING RE SOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nGORSUCH\, J.\, concurring \nIV \nThat leaves one final camp to consider. JUSTICE THOMAS \nsuggests that Congress may hand over most of its constitu\ntionally vested powers to the President comple tely and for\never. Post\, at 2–3 (dissenting opinion). On his view\, th e \nonly powers Congress may not delegate are those that in\nvolve “rule s setting the conditions for deprivations of life\, \nliberty\, or propert y.” Ibid. From this rule\, it follows that \nCongress may give all its tariff powers to the President be\ncause “[i]mporting is a matter of pri vilege.” Post\, at 10–11. \nAnd\, as a result\, this case does not im plicate any “‘“separa\ntion of powers”’” concerns at all. Post \, at 3 (quoting ante\, \nat 8).\nIt’s a sweeping theory. One that would require us to\nreimagine much of our case law addressing Article I’s Ve st\ning Clause. And one that presents difficulties of its own. \nFirst\, I do not see how JUSTICE THOMAS’s theory resolves\nall “‘“separatio n of powers”’” concerns in this case. Post\, at \n3 (quoting ante\, at 8). Suppose for argument’s sake that\nCongress can delegate its tarif f powers to the President as \ncompletely as JUSTICE THOMAS suggests. Eve n then\, the \nquestion remains whether Congress has given the Presi\ndent the tariff authority he claims in this case—or whether \nthe President is seeking to exploit questionable statutory\nlanguage to aggrandize his o wn power. See Part I–C\, su\npra. Put another way\, JUSTICE THOMAS’s nondelegation so\nlution does not automatically solve the major questions \nproblem. As we have seen\, when an executive official \nclaims Congress has delegated to him some extraordinary\npower\, the major questions doctr ine requires him to identify\nclear statutory authority for its exercise —a standard he \n—————— \nreasons we have just seen. Even if the nondelegation doctrine should \napply differently when congressional legislation and executive actions \nimplicate inherent Article II powers\, Gundy\, 588 U. S.\, at 159\, none of \nthat means it should do so where ( as here) the President derives what\never authority he has only from Congr ess. \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nGORSUCH\, J.\, concurring \n41 \n must satisfy even if Congress is free to pass to him the \npower he seeks. Post\, at 2–3. In fact\, this Court has previ\nously applied\, with ou r colleague’s assent\, the major ques\ntions doctrine in a case that app ears\, under his present\nview\, to involve a power that Congress could de legate \nwholesale to the President. See Nebraska\, 600 U. S.\, at \n486 –488 (involving the power to cancel federal student loan \ndebts\, which on JUSTICE THOMAS’s account presumably\nqualifies as a benefit or privi lege\, not a right to life\, liberty\, \nor property). And\, just as the major questions doctrine pre\ncluded the executive branch’s assertion of power in that \ncase\, it does so here. \nSecond\, even when it comes to the nondelegation doc\ntrine\, JUSTICE THOMAS’s theory raises many quest ions. I \nappreciate that the doctrine may apply with less force in \ncer tain areas\, such as when Congress legislates in a way\nthat implicates on e of the President’s inherent powers. See \nPart III–B\, supra\; Gund y\, 588 U. S.\, at 159 (GORSUCH\, J.\, \ndissenting). But JUSTICE THOMAS w ould go much further.\nOn his telling\, the doctrine applies only to Congr ess’s true \nlegislative powers\, which he says include only those power s \naddressing the deprivation of life\, liberty\, or property. As \nit t urns out\, only a small subset of Congress’s enumerated \npowers in Arti cle I\, §8\, fit that bill. See post\, at 5–6 (listing\nthe powers to punish counterfeiters\, tax “internal[ly]\,” and \nregulate interstate commerce). Only those few powers are\nexclusively vested in Congress and subject to review of any \nkind under the nondelegation doctrine. All “o ther kinds of \npower[s]” enumerated in Article I\, §8—including the pow\ners to borrow and spend money\, declare war\, and regulate \nforeign trade—are not truly legislative and may be dele\ngated at will. Post\, a t 2. So Congress may hand them off to\nthe President completely and he ha s no need to worry about \nlegal challenges under even this Court’s (rel atively lax)\nnondelegation doctrine. No matter\, too\, that Congress \n42 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nGORSUCH\, J.\, concurring \nmight find itself permanently unable to retrieve these pow\ners. See Part I–C\ , supra. \nBut if all that’s true\, what do we make of the Constitu\nt ion’s text? Section 1 of Article I vests “[a]ll legislative Pow\ners h erein granted” in Congress and no one else. Section 8 \nproceeds to lis t those powers in detail and without differen\ntiation. Neither provision speaks of some divide between\ntrue legislative powers touching on “life \, liberty\, or prop\nerty” that are permanently vested in Congress alon e and \n“other kinds of power[s]” that may be given away and pos\nsibl y lost forever to the President. Post\, at 2. \nWhat do we make\, too\, of what the founders said about \nArticle I both before and after the Consti tution’s ratifica\ntion? They regularly referred to powers in Article I\ , §8—\neven those that do not touch on life\, liberty\, or property—\ nas legislative in nature. At the Constitutional Convention\, \nearly draf ts described the powers to regulate “foreign” com\nmerce\, “raise ar mies\,” “equip Fleets\,” “coi[n] . . . money\,”\nand “establis h post-offices” as “legislative powers.” 2 The \nRecords of the Fed eral Convention of 1787\, pp. 142–144 (M. \nFarrand ed. 1966) (Farrand). James Madison wrote to Con\ngress in 1817 that “[t]he legislative powe rs vested in Con\ngress are specified and enumerated in the eighth section of\nthe first article of the Constitution.” 8 The Writings of\nJames M adison 386 (G. Hunt ed. 1908)\; see also 1 id.\, at \n112\, 133\, 381 (not ing\, before the Constitutional Convention\, \nthe “legislative power ov er captures\,” and arguing borrow\ning money is an “exclusive power of Legislation”). \nAlexander Hamilton spoke similarly. 3 The Works of Al \nexander Hamilton 479 (H. Lodge ed. 1904) (Lodge) (discuss\ning “[t]he legislative power of borrowing money”)\; 6 id.\, at \n182 (describing “the legislative power of regulating trade\nwith foreign nations”)\; 2 id.\, at 197\, 198 (calling of “the leg\nislative kind” and “of a l egislative nature” the powers to \nraise money and troops\, “establish rules in all cases of cap\nture by sea or land\,” “regulate the alloy and value of coin\,” \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nGORSUCH\, J.\, concurring \n43 \nand “make all laws for the government of the army and \nnavy”). So did James Wilson. 1 Collected Works of James \nWilson 26 8 (K. Hall &\; D. Hall eds. 2007) (describing all the \nSenate’s powe rs as “legislative powers\,” with the exception\nof the powers to try impeachments\, concur in treaties\, and\nconsent to the appointment of off icers\, matters addressed\noutside Art. I\, §8).\nWhat do we make as well of early congressional debates? \nIn the Second Congress\, for example\, the House of Repre\nsentatives rejected on nondelegation grounds a proposa l to\ngive the President a largely unfettered power to establish \npostal routes\, even though doing so hardly would have\ntouched on life\, liberty \, or property. 3 Annals of Congress \n229–242. In the Fifth Congress\, four Representatives like\nwise objected on nondelegation grounds to a bil l that au\nthorized the President to raise an army of up to 10\,000 men.\n 8 id.\, at 1525–1527\, 1532\, 1535 (remarks of Reps. Nicholas\,\nGallati n\, Baldwin\, and McDowell). Though the bill ulti\nmately passed\, see Ac t of May 28\, 1798\, 1 Stat. 558\, it did \nso apparently because it was d eemed not to violate Article \nI’s nondelegation principle—no Member o f Congress re\nsponded that the principle was wholly inapplicable because \nthe delegated power was not one that involved setting con\nditions for d eprivations of life\, liberty\, or property. See 8 \nAnnals of Congress 1 525–1542.\nWhat are we to do\, too\, with this Court’s nondelegation\n precedents\, which have never turned on JUSTICE THOMAS’s \nview of life\ , liberty\, or property? See J. W. Hampton\, Jr.\, &\; \nCo.\, 276 U. S.\, at 403\, 409 (scrutinizing a delegation to ex\necutive officials to s et customs duties)\; Panama Refining \nCo. v. Ryan\, 293 U. S. 388\, 405 –406\, 422\, 433 (1935) (hold\ning unconstitutional a delegation to exec utive officials to\nprohibit the transportation of petroleum products in i nter\nstate and foreign commerce)\; National Broadcasting Co. v. \nUnited States\, 319 U. S. 190\, 196\, 214–215\, 225–226 (1943) \n(scrutinizin g the delegation of authority to regulate the \n44 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nGORSUCH\, J.\, concurring \ngranting of broadcasting licen ses)\; see also Sessions v. Di\nmaya\, 584 U. S. 148\, 217 (2018) (THOMAS\ , J.\, dissenting) \n(“[I]mpermissible delegations of legislative power violate\n[the nondelegation] principle\, not just delegations that de\npri ve individuals of ‘life\, liberty\, or property’”).\nThird\, even if a distinction between true legislative pow\ners and “other kinds of pow er[s]” were proper\, post\, at 2\, I \ndo not see why the tariff power w ould fall in the latter cat\negory and thus be something Congress could de legate away \nwholesale\, without scrutiny\, and forever. JUSTICE THOMAS \nsuggests all that is possible because\, at the founding\, the \ntariff p ower was considered a “‘prerogative right’” of the \nBritish King. Post\, at 11 (quoting N. Gras\, Early English \nCustoms System 21 (1918)) .\nThat seems doubtful. Tariffs may have been among the\nKing’s prerogat ive powers during the reign of Edward I.\nSee id.\, at 20–21\; see also post\, at 11\, n. 3 (citing P. Einzig\,\nThe Control of the Purse: Progres s and Decline of Parlia\nment’s Financial Control 65 (1959) (discussing the practices \n“during the Middle Ages”)). But even before the year 1400\,\nParliament had achieved some “victory over the King in the\nmatt er of imposing import duties.” Id.\, at 108–109. And \nafter the Glor ious Revolution of 1688\, as this Court has put \nit\, Parliament “secur ed supremacy in fiscal matters.” Con\nsumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Community Finan\ncial Services Assn. of America\, Ltd.\, 601 U. S. 416 \, 428 \n(2024) (citing 1 W. Blackstone\, Commentaries on the Laws\nof Eng land 306\, 333 (1771)). “By the time of the American\nRevolution\, trade regulation was thus a prime topic of leg\nislative concern” in Britain. M. McConnell\, The President \nWho Would Not Be King 217 (2020) (emphasi s added)\; see\nalso J. Chitty\, Law of the Prerogatives of the Crown 163 \n(1820) (“[T]he King does not possess any general common\nlaw prerogati ve with respect to foreign commerce”).\nMore importantly still\, whateve r the views in Britain \nmay have been\, American revolutionaries hardly s hared \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nGORSUCH\, J.\, concurring \n45 \ nsome universal conviction that all manner of tariffs were a \nmatter of t he King’s prerogative\, or even something Parlia\nment\, lacking colonia l representatives\, could freely impose\non them. Though in the mid-1760s some colonists distin\nguished between “‘internal’” and “‘ex ternal’ taxation” and \n“conceded [Parliament’s] right to raise re venue through du\nties on trade\,” “the inadequacy of [that] much over strained \ndistinction” soon “became obvious.” B. Bailyn\, The Ideo log\nical Origins of the American Revolution 212–213\, 215 \n(1967). Ill ustrative of the point\, John Dickinson came to \n“repudiat[e]” the di stinction “flatly and formally” in his Let\nters from a Farmer in Penn sylvania\, id.\, at 215\, contending \ninstead that laws aimed at raising revenue\, but enacted \nwithout representation\, were objectionable withou t “dis\ntinction . . . between internal and external taxes\,” Letters \nFrom a Farmer in Pennsylvania 39 (1774). See also supra\, \nat 36–37 ( recounting colonial objections to the Sugar Act)\;\nH. Unger\, American Te mpest 101 (2011) (observing that the \n“import duties” in the Townshen d Acts helped “incite Amer\nicans to rebel”). And\, of course\, it wa s duties on foreign tea\nthat triggered the Boston Tea Party. J. Ellis\, T he Cause \n17–18 (2021). Are we really to believe that the patriots that \nnight in Boston Harbor considered the whole of the tariff \npower some k ingly prerogative?\nAs we have already seen\, too\, the growing American c on\nviction that the peacetime tariff power is legislative and be\nlongs o nly to the people’s elected representatives was later\nreflected in both the Constitution and early congressional\npractice. See Part III–C\, su pra. To that discussion\, I would \nadd just this. The Articles of Confed eration granted the \nConfederation Congress authority to make commercial \ntreaties\, but no authority to restrain “the legislative power\nof the respective states” to impose “imposts and duties on \nforeigners.” Art. IX (emphasis added). At the Constitu\ntional Convention that follow ed\, where the tariff power was \ntransferred to the federal government\, delegates likewise \n46 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nGORSUCH\, J .\, concurring \nreferred to it as a “legislative power.” See\, e.g.\, 3 Farrand \n615\; 2 id.\, at 142–143. And\, during debates over the Jay \nTreaty\, Hamilton explained that he held no doubt that reg\nulating for eign trade and raising money from it was a “leg\nislative power\,” if one that could be constrained by treaty.\n6 Lodge 182\, 189–190\, 196. Reflecting the same sentiment\nthat helped fuel the Revolution\, he asked: “[W]hat legisla\ntive power can be more sacred?” Id.\, at 196. \n* \nFor those who think it important for the Nation to impose\nmore tariffs\ , I understand that today’s decision will be dis\nappointing. All I can offer them is that most major deci\nsions affecting the rights and respons ibilities of the Ameri\ncan people (including the duty to pay taxes and ta riffs) are\nfunneled through the legislative process for a reason. Yes\, \nlegislating can be hard and take time. And\, yes\, it can be\ntempting to bypass Congress when some pressing problem \narises. But the deliberati ve nature of the legislative process \nwas the whole point of its design. Through that process\, the \nNation can tap the combined wisdom of the pe ople’s elected \nrepresentatives\, not just that of one faction or man. There\, \ndeliberation tempers impulse\, and compromise hammers\ndisagree ments into workable solutions. And because laws \nmust earn such broad su pport to survive the legislative pro\ncess\, they tend to endure\, allowin g ordinary people to plan\ntheir lives in ways they cannot when the rules shift from\nday to day. In all\, the legislative process helps ensure each \nof us has a stake in the laws that govern us and in the Na\ntion’s fu ture. For some today\, the weight of those virtues is \napparent. For oth ers\, it may not seem so obvious. But if \nhistory is any guide\, the tab les will turn and the day will\ncome when those disappointed by today’s result will appre\nciate the legislative process for the bulwark of libert y it is. \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nBARRETT\, J.\, concurring \n1 \nSUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES \n_________________ \nNos. 24–1287 and 25–250 \n_________________ \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC.\, ET AL.\, P ETITIONERS \n24–1287 \nv. \nDONALD J. TRUMP\, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED \n STATES\, ET AL. \nON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED \nST ATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA \nCIRCUIT \nDONALD J. T RUMP\, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED \nSTATES\, ET AL.\, PETITIONERS \n25–250 \nv. \nV.O.S. SELECTIONS\, INC.\, ET AL. \nON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF \nAPPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT \n[February 20\, 20 26]\n JUSTICE BARRETT\, concurring. \nAs the principal opinion demonstrate s\, the most natural\nreading of the International Emergency Economic Powe rs\nAct does not encompass the power to impose tariffs. I write \nonly to address JUSTICE GORSUCH’s concurrence regarding \nthe major questions d octrine.\nTo the extent that JUSTICE GORSUCH attacks the view \nthat “co mmon sense” alone can explain all our major ques\ntions decisions\, ante \, at 18–22\, he takes down a straw man. \nI have never espoused that vi ew. Rather\, as I explained in\nmy concurrence in Biden v. Nebraska\, 600 U. S. 477\, 507 \n(2023)\, the major questions doctrine “situates text in con\ntext” and is therefore best understood as an ordinary appli\ncat ion of textualism. Id.\, at 511. Textualists—like all those \n2 \nLEARN ING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nBARRETT\, J.\, concurring \nwho use langua ge to communicate—do not interpret words\nin a vacuum. Instead\, we use context\, including “[b]ack\nground legal conventions\,” “common s ense\,” and “constitu\ntional structure\,” to ascertain a text’s “most natural mean\ning.” Id.\, at 511–512\, 515\, 509. \nPart of t his context\, as I have explained\, is Article I of the\nConstitution\, wh ich vests Congress with “‘[a]ll legislative \nPowers.’” Id.\, at 515 (quoting Art. I\, §1). Obviously\, the\nConstitution bears on the mea ning of a statute enacted pur\nsuant to it. Because Article I grants all l egislative powers \nto Congress\, the reasonable interpreter would expect Con\ngress “to make the big-time policy calls itself\, rather than\npawn ing them off to another branch.” Nebraska\, 600 U. S.\, \nat 515 (BARRE TT\, J.\, concurring).1 \nTo the extent that JUSTICE GORSUCH also thinks t hat \nbackground legal conventions and constitutional structure\ninform th e most natural reading of a statute\, then we may \nnot be very far apart. See ante\, at 8–12\, 14 (concurring \nopinion). Our only disagreement m ay be over the level of \nclarity required before a particular interpretat ion can be \ndeemed the most natural one. I understand JUSTICE \nGORSUCH t o require Congress always to speak precisely to \nany major power that it intends to give away. See ante\, at \n12–14\, 25–26 (concurring opini on). As I have said before\, I \nthink that other\, “less obvious” clu es can do the trick. See \nNebraska\, 600 U. S.\, at 514 (BARRETT\, J.\, concurring). I do \nnot see any such clues here\; in fact\, as the Court explains\,\nthe clues we have point in the opposite direction. See\, e.g. \, \nante\, at 8–9 (opinion of ROBERTS\, C. J.) (detailing h ow \n—————— \n1Contrary to JUSTICE GORSUCH’s suggestion\, th is approach to the ma\njor questions doctrine does not risk “conflating unenacted legislative in\ntent with the law.” Ante\, at 24\, n.2 (concu rring opinion). Rather\, like \ntextualism more generally\, it looks for “a sort of ‘objectified’ intent—the\nintent that a reasonable pers on would gather from the text of the law\, \nplaced alongside the remainde r of the corpus juris\,” including the Con\nstitution. A. Scalia\, A Ma tter of Interpretation 17 (1997). \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nBARR ETT\, J.\, concurring \n3 \nCongress has elsewhere delegated the power to impose tar\niffs)\; ante\, at 14–15 (majority opinion) (stressing that t he \nGovernment “cannot identify any statute in which the \npower to reg ulate includes the power to tax”).\nAt times\, though\, JUSTICE GORSUCH suggests that the\npurpose of the major questions doctrine is something ot her\nthan to ascertain the most natural reading of a statute. For \nexamp le\, he writes that the doctrine serves to prevent\n“highly resourceful members of the executive branch” from\n“assum[ing] new power for thems elves” because “men are\nnot angels.” Ante\, at 16 (concurring opini on)\; see West Vir\nginia v. EPA\, 597 U. S. 697\, 735 (2022) (GORSUCH\, J .\, con\ncurring) (describing doctrine as a “clear-statement rul[e]”\n that “operates to protect foundational constitutional guar\nantees”)\; National Federation of Independent Business v. \nOSHA\, 595 U. S. 109\, 1 24–126 (2022) (GORSUCH\, J.\, con\ncurring) (similar). But if the Const itution permits Congress \nto give the Executive a particular power\, who are we to get\nin the way? Does the Judiciary really protect the Constitu\ ntion by impeding the constitutional action of another\nbranch? If JUSTICE GORSUCH thinks that we should forgo\nthe most natural reading of a statut e because it is prefera\nble for Congress\, rather than the President\, to make big de\ncisions\, that way lies “a lot of trouble” for the textu alist. A. \nScalia\, A Matter of Interpretation 28 (1997) (Scalia).\nStro ng-form substantive canons—canons instructing a \njudge to adopt “an i nferior-but-tenable reading”—veer be\nyond interpretation and into pol icymaking. Nebraska\, 600 \nU. S.\, at 509 (BARRETT\, J.\, concurring). A nd while the pol\nicy may be desirable or even constitutionally inspired\, \njudges should hesitate to impose disciplining rules on Con\ngress. See ibid.\, n. 2 (explaining that such “prophylactic \nconstraints” are “in tension with the Constitution’s struc\nture”). As Justice Scalia lamented\, “whether these dice\nloading rules are bad or good\, there i s also the question of \nwhere the courts get the authority to impose them . Can we \n4 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nBARRETT\, J.\, concur ring \nreally just decree that we will interpret the laws that Con\ngress passes to mean less or more than what they fairly\nsay?” Scalia 28–29. \nGranted\, strong-form canons exist elsewhere in the law.\nSee Nebraska\ , 600 U. S.\, at 508–509 (BARRETT\, J.\, concur\nring). I do not propose to abandon these canons\, nor have I\ntaken the position that adopting th em necessarily exceeds \nthe judicial power. Id.\, at 509\, n. 2. But I a m skeptical\nabout adding new ones to the mix. Ibid. And while the \nmajor questions doctrine has an impressive pedigree as an \ninterpretive princi ple\, this Court has not (yet\, anyway) em\nbraced it as a strong-form rul e that imposes a “‘clarity tax’” \non Congress. Id.\, at 508. \nJU STICE GORSUCH seems to disagree\, pointing to a few \nlate 19th- and early 20th-century cases.2 See ante\, at 12– \n14 (concurring opinion). But t hese cases\, like our modern \nones\, are consistent with my context-based approach: They\nfocus on ascertaining\, not shaping\, what the statute in dis\npute communicates. See\, e.g.\, ICC v. Cincinnati\, N. O. &\; T. \nP. R. Co.\, 167 U. S. 479\, 511 (1897) (concluding that Con\ngress “di d not intend” to give interstate commission power\nto set railroad rates )\; Siler v. Louisville &\; Nashville R. Co.\, \n213 U. S. 175\, 196 (1 909) (reasoning that “the legislature \nnever intended to and did not in fact” give a state commis\nsion power to set maximum railroad rates). I would not \ntreat this evidence as precedent for a judicial flex. JUSTIC E \nGORSUCH proposes to do something new. The innovation is \nin signific ant tension with textualism\, so I do not support \nthe projec t. \n—————— \n2He also points to state cases and longstanding corporate law princi\nples. Ante\, at 8–13 (concurring opinion). While t hose sources support\nthe existence of a background legal convention that informs a statute’s\nmost natural meaning\, they are not evidence that t his Court—which is\nbound by the constraints of Article III—has adopte d a true clear-state\nment rule. \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpini on of KAGAN\, J. \n1 \nSUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES \n______________ ___ \nNos. 24–1287 and 25–250 \n_________________ \nLEARNING RESOURCES \, INC.\, ET AL.\, PETITIONERS \n24–1287 \nv. \nDONALD J. TRUMP\, PRESID ENT OF THE UNITED \nSTATES\, ET AL. \nON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF \nAPPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT \nDONALD J. TRUMP\, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED \nSTATES\, ET AL.\, PETITIONERS \n25–25 0 \nv. \nV.O.S. SELECTIONS\, INC.\, ET AL. \nON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF \nAPPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT \n[February 20\, 2026]\n JUSTICE KAGAN\, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR and \nJUSTICE JACKSON join\, concurring in part and concurring in \nthe judgment. \nThe Court ho lds today that the International Emergency \nEconomic Powers Act (IEEPA) d oes not authorize the Pres\nident to impose tariffs. I agree with that con clusion\, as I do \nwith the bulk of the principal opinion’s reasoning. But be\ncause I think the ordinary tools of statutory interpretation\namp ly support today’s result\, I do not join the part of that\nopinion invo king the so-called major-questions doctrine. \nThe question that part asks \, similar to the one posed in \nother “‘major questions’ cases\,” is whether the President \ncan identify “clear congressional authorizat ion” for his ac\ntion—here\, to impose tariffs under IEEPA. Ante\, at 7\, 13\, \n20. The demand is for a clear statement—something more \n2 \ nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nOpinion of KAGAN\, J. \nexplicit or specific than the statutory basis that would ordi\nnarily suffice to suppo rt executive action. See\, e.g.\, West \nVirginia v. EPA\, 597 U. S. 697\ , 721–724\, 732 (2022)\; Biden \nv. Nebraska\, 600 U. S. 477\, 505–506 (2023). The reason for \nthat requirement\, according to today’s opini on\, is that the \nExecutive has claimed an “extraordinary” power—on e \nnever asserted before and having large-scale “economic and\npolitica l significance.” Ante\, at 7\, 11\; see ante\, at 7–11. \nI objected\, in the principal cases cited\, to the demand for\na special brand of legi slative clarity. See West Virginia\, 597 \nU. S.\, at 764–784 (KAGAN\, J.\, dissenting)\; Nebraska\, 600 \nU. S.\, at 542–550 (KAGAN\, J.\, dis senting). In my view\, the\nCourt used its clear-authorization rule in th ose cases to ne\ngate expansive delegations Congress had approved. I ex\np lained there that the proper way to interpret a delegation\nprovision is t hrough the standard rules of statutory con\nstruction. See West Virginia\, 597 U. S.\, at 765–766 (KAGAN\, \nJ.\, dissenting). That means\, most c oncisely stated\, reading \ntext in context. More expansively put\, it me ans examining\na delegation provision’s language\, assessing that provi\ nsion’s place in the broader statutory scheme\, and applying \na “modi cum of common sense” about how Congress typically \ndelegates. Id.\, at 764 (KAGAN\, J.\, dissenting)\; see FDA v. \nBrown &\; Williamson Tobac co Corp.\, 529 U. S. 120\, 133 \n(2000). The last of those inquiries inclu des consideration of \nwhether Congress ever has before\, or likely would\ , delegate\nthe power the Executive asserts—a matter also of import in\n applying the major-questions doctrine. See ante\, at 8–10\; \nNebraska\ , 600 U. S.\, at 512–514\, 517–519 (BARRETT\, J.\, \nconcurring)\; id. \, at 546\, n. 3 (KAGAN\, J.\, dissenting). In the \npast\, though\, I ha ve thought that the Court used that doc\ntrine to override—rather than h elp discover—the best read\ning of delegation statutes. See West Virgin ia\, 597 U. S.\, at \n756 (KAGAN\, J.\, dissenting)\; Nebraska\, 600 U. S. \, at 543 \n(KAGAN\, J.\, dissenting). \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \ nOpinion of KAGAN\, J. \n3 \nThis case presents more nearly the opposite s ituation:\nThe use of a clear-statement rule here is unnecessary be\ncause ordinary principles of statutory interpretation lead to\nthe same result. 1 It is not just that the Government’s argu\nments fail to satisfy an e specially strict test\; it is that they\nfail to satisfy the normal one. E ven without a clear-state\nment rule in the picture\, the conclusion follo ws: IEEPA does \nnot authorize the President to impose tariffs. And indee d\, \nthe principal opinion’s reasoning well explains why. The \nrest o f this opinion draws on that analysis (I hope without \ntoo much rehashing ) to demonstrate what I view as the fun\ndamental point: Usual text-in-con text interpretation dooms\nthe tariffs the President has imposed. The cruc ial provision\nof IEEPA\, when viewed in light of the broader statutory \n scheme and with a practical awareness of how Congress\ndelegates tariff au thority\, does not give the President the\npower he wants.\nMost important \, IEEPA’s key phrase—the one the Gov\nernment relies on—says nothin g about imposing tariffs or \n—————— \n1 JUSTICE GORSUCH claim s not to understand this statement\, insisting\nthat I now must be applyin g the major-questions doctrine\, and his own \nversion of it to boot. See ante\, at 17 (concurring opinion) (“My concurring\ncolleagues all but e ndorse it today”)\; ante\, at 2\, 7\, 18 (similar). Given \nhow strong his apparent desire for converts\, see ante\, at 2–26\, I almost \nregre t to inform him that I am not one. But that is the fact of the matter. \n I proceed in this case just as I did in West Virginia and Nebraska: I con\ nsider a delegation provision’s language\, broaden the scope to take in the \nstatutory setting\, and apply some common sense about how Congress\n normally delegates. See West Virginia v. EPA\, 597 U. S. 697\, 756–766 \ n(2022) (KAGAN\, J.\, dissenting)\; Biden v. Nebraska\, 600 U. S. 477\, 53 4– \n542 (2023) (KAGAN\, J.\, dissenting). Contrary to JUSTICE GORSUC H’s sug\ngestion\, see ante\, at 3–7\, that conventional method of int erpretation will \nnot always favor (or always disfavor) executive officia ls\, given the variety\nof delegation schemes Congress adopts. I’ll let JUSTICE GORSUCH reliti\ngate on his own our old debates about other statu tes\, unrelated to the \none before us. What matters here is only that IE EPA’s delegation refutes \nthe Executive’s assertion of authority to l evy tariffs\, without any help \nfrom the major-questions doctrine. \n4 \n LEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nOpinion of KAGAN\, J. \ntaxes. That t ext authorizes the President\, upon finding a \nforeign threat and declari ng an emergency\, to “regulate” \nthe “importation” of foreign goo ds. \n50 U. S. C. \n§1702(a)(1)(B). And the meaning of “regulate\,” b oth in com\nmon parlance and as Congress uses the word\, does not en\ncomp ass taxing. See ante\, at 14–15. To “regulate\,” accord\ning to th e Government’s preferred definition\, means to “fix\,\nestablish or co ntrol\; to adjust by rule\, method\, or estab\nlished mode\; to direct by rule or restriction\; to subject to\ngoverning principles or laws.” Bri ef for Federal Parties 24 \n(quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1156 (5th ed . 1979)). Noth\ning in that definition naturally refers to levying taxes. Nor \ndoes Congress ever use the word “regulate” in that way.\nHundr eds of provisions in the U. S. Code give agencies the \nauthority to “re gulate” one thing or another. Yet the Gov\nernment cannot identify a si ngle one that is understood to \ngrant taxing power. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 30. When Con\ngress wants to delegate that power\, it uses a whole differ ent \nvocabulary—terms like “duty\,” “tariff\,” or “surcharg e\,”\nwhich do not appear in IEEPA. See ante\, at 8 (citing repre\nsent ative statutes)\; see also ante\, at 19 (discussing\, in par\nticular\, 19 U. S. C. §1862 (1970 ed.)). And likewise\, when \nCongress means to cove r both regulatory and taxing pow\ners\, it refers to each separately. See ante\, at 15 (also citing\nstatutes). Of course\, Congress knows that tax es can be used \nfor regulatory ends: They can be a means of controlling o r \nadjusting behavior. But Congress still follows the path this\nCourt lo ng ago marked out\, and the one most consonant \nwith ordinary meaning\, o f treating the power to “regulate”\ntrade as “entirely distinct” f rom the power to “levy taxes.” \nGibbons v. Ogden\, 9 Wheat. 1\, 201 –202 (1824)\; see ante\, at \n15. So in granting only the former\, IEEPA excludes the lat\nter: The President has the ability to regulate\, but no t to im\npose taxes on\, imports.\nThe surrounding statutory language conf irms the point.\nAs the principal opinion explains\, “regulate” is one of 9 \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of KAGAN\, J. \n5 \nverb s listed in IEEPA’s delegation provision. See ante\, at \n15. (The othe rs are “investigate\,” “block\,” “direct\,” “compel\ ,” \n“nullify\,” “void\,” “prevent\,” and “prohibit.” §1702(a)(1)(B).)\nThose verbs are followed by 11 objects\, each describin g a\ndistinct sort of transaction involving foreign property—not\njust “importation\,” but also “acquisition\,” “use\,” “transfe r\,”\nand so forth. Ibid. Combine the verbs and objects in all\npossibl e ways\, and the statute authorizes 99 actions a Pres\nident can take to a ddress a foreign threat. And exactly none \nof the other 98 involves rais ing revenues. Rather\, each en\nables the President to impose penalties\, restrictions\, or con\ntrols on foreign commerce. See ante\, at 15. So wh en the \nphrase “regulate . . . importation” is invoked to impose\nqua ntity or quality limits on bringing foreign goods into the \ncountry—for example\, by setting quotas or requiring quar\nantines—the phrase fits well with its 98 neighbors. Just \nlike the rest\, it provides a way to co nstrain or alter various\nforeign transactions. But when that phrase is i nvoked to \nimpose tariffs? Then it becomes the odd man out—the only\non e of 99 permission slips to involve “the core congressional\npower of th e purse.” Ante\, at 8\; see ante\, at 5–6. So even if \n(contra both c onventional and congressional usage) the\nword “regulate” might refer to taxation in some other (hith\nerto undiscovered) statutory context\, it would not do so in\nIEEPA.2\n Likewise\, Congress’s consistent practice in delegating \ntariff power refutes the Government’s position. As the \n—————— \n2The legislative history of IEEPA offers yet more proof that Congress\ndid not authorize taxation. The Senate Report\, in i ts description of the\nstatute\, reduces the 99 authorized actions to the following: the power “to\ncontrol or freeze property transactions where a foreign interest is in\nvolved.” S. Rep. No. 95–466\, p. 5 (1977). The House Report similarly\ndescribes the delegation provision as “auth oriz[ing] the President” to\n“regulate or freeze any property in which any foreign country or a na\ntional thereof has any interest.” H. R. R ep. No. 95–459\, p. 15 (1977). \nNeither of those descriptions at all su ggests that Congress intended to\ncede its taxing power. \n6 \nLEARNING RE SOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nOpinion of KAGAN\, J. \nprincipal opinion detail s\, Title 19 of the U. S. Code includes \nmultiple provisions granting the President authority to levy \ntariffs. See ante\, at 8–9. But in each and every instance\,\nCongress has not only used specific language (e.g.\, “duty” or \n“surcharge”)\, see supra\, at 4\, but also imposed ti ght re\nstraints on the power given. It has capped the tariff ’s rate \ n(e.g.\, 15%)\; or limited the tariff ’s duration (e.g.\, 150 days)\;\no r established strict procedural conditions before the tariff\ncan take eff ect (e.g.\, investigations\, public hearings\, and re\nports)\; or all of the above. See ante\, at 8–9. What Congress\nhas never done in a tarif f provision is what the Government \nclaims it did here—conferred power on the President to im\npose a tariff of any amount\, for any time\, on on ly his own \nsay-so. And construing IEEPA to give that unparalleled au\nth ority would effectively erase all the carefully confined tar\niff provisio ns in Title 19. For any President could then es\ncape the rigors of those laws—could put in place\, say\, a non\ntime-limited 100% tariff on all f oreign products—by the\nsimple expedient of identifying a foreign threat . That gut\nting of Title 19’s tariff scheme is not what Congress\, whe n\ndelegating power to “regulate” imports\, could have meant \nto acco mplish.\nNor has any President until now understood IEEPA to\nauthorize im posing tariffs. Between 1977 (when IEEPA \nwas enacted) and 2024\, eight P residents had the chance to \nmake use of IEEPA’s delegation of power. And all chose the \nsame course. They invoked the statute’s “regulate importa\ntion” provision for a variety of non-tariff purposes. See ante\ , \nat 10. But they looked elsewhere—to Title 19’s provisions—\nfor tariff authority. See ante\, at 10–11. In other words\, \neach Presiden t read the statutes as Congress wrote them\,\nwith IEEPA enabling him to r egulate imports and Title 19 \nenabling him—in confined situations—to tax those foreign \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of KAGAN\, J . \n7 \ngoods. None\, as far as anyone has suggested\, even consid\nered d oing otherwise.3 \nFor all those reasons\, straight-up statutory construct ion \nresolves this case for me\; I need no major-questions thumb \non the interpretive scales. IEEPA gives the President sig\nnificant authority o ver transactions involving foreign prop\nerty\, including the importation of goods. But in that gener\nous delegation\, one power is conspicuously missing.\nNothing in IEEPA’s text\, nor anything in its context\, ena\nb les the President to unilaterally impose tariffs. And need\nless to say\, without statutory authority\, the President’s tar\niffs cannot stand. Se e ante\, at 5–6. \n—————— \n3Presidents followed the same pr actice\, with one quasi-exception\, un\nder IEEPA’s predecessor statute\ , the Trading with the Enemy Act \n(TWEA). Beginning in 1941\, TWEA author ized the President\, as IEEPA\ndoes now\, to “regulate . . . importati on.” 12 U. S. C. §95a(1)(B) (1940 ed.\, \nSupp. I). During the next t hree decades\, six Presidents used that dele\ngation for only non-tariff e nds\, while relying on Title 19 to levy tariffs. \nIn 1971\, when Presiden t Nixon imposed tariffs in response to a balance\nof-payments deficit\, he continued in that tradition by invoking two stat\nutes (the Tariff Act of 1930 and Trade Expansion Act of 1962) found in \nTitle 19. See Presidenti al Proclamation No. 4074\, 3 CFR 60 (1971–1975 \nComp.). But in defendi ng his act against a legal challenge\, the Depart\nment of Justice argued that even if the two cited statutes did not author\nize the tariffs\, TWEA would do so. That after-the-fact claim of authority \nwas upheld in the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. See United \nStates v. Yoshida Int ’l\, Inc.\, 526 F. 2d 560\, 572\, 577–578 (CCPA 1975)\; \nante\, at 17 . The principal opinion well explains why that single lower \ncourt decisi on about TWEA has no bearing on IEEPA’s meaning. See \nante\, at 17–1 8\, and n. 5. \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of JACKSON\, J. \n1 \nSUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES \n_________________ \nNos. 24–1 287 and 25–250 \n_________________ \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC.\, ET AL.\ , PETITIONERS \n24–1287 \nv. \nDONALD J. TRUMP\, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED \nSTATES\, ET AL. \nON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED \ nSTATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA \nCIRCUIT \nDONALD J . TRUMP\, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED \nSTATES\, ET AL.\, PETITIONERS \n25–2 50 \nv. \nV.O.S. SELECTIONS\, INC.\, ET AL. \nON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF \nAPPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT \n[February 20\, 2026]\n JUSTICE JACKSON\, concurring in part and concurring in \nthe judg ment. \nI agree with the Court’s conclusion that the International\nEmer gency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not provide\nthe President with the power to tariff. Three of my col\nleagues have reached this result via t he major questions\ndoctrine\, see ante\, at 7–13 (opinion of ROBERTS\, C. J.)—a \nframing that asks\, in essence\, whether Congress “would \n likely have intended” to delegate the authority to tariff to\nthe Presid ent through IEEPA. West Virginia v. EPA\, 597 \nU. S. 697\, 730 (2022) (em phasis added)\; see also id.\, at 722– \n723. While probing Congress’s intent is the right inquiry\,\nmy colleagues speculate needlessly. In my view\, the Court \n2 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nOpinion of JAC KSON\, J. \ncan\, and should\, consult a statute’s legislative history t o de\ntermine what Congress actually intended the statute to do.\nAs Congr ess undertakes the legislative process\, congres\nsional committees in the Senate and House often generate \nofficial reports that describe Congress ’s aims for the legis\nlation. See R. Katzmann\, Judging Statutes 19–2 0 (2014)\n(Katzmann). Indeed\, there is evidence that lawmakers \nthemselv es pay more attention to these reports than a stat\nute’s text to unders tand the statute’s purpose and meaning. \nA. Gluck &\; L. Bressman\, Statutory Interpretation From the \nInside—An Empirical Study of Congres sional Drafting\,\nDelegation\, and the Canons: Part I\, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901\, \n965–966\, 968–969 (2013)\; see also Katzmann 37–38. Thus\, \nin contrast to the principal dissent’s rejection of Committee\nReports as a means of ascertaining a statute’s meaning\, \npost\, at 16\, n. 11 (opinion of KAVANAUGH\, J.)\, I think these \nSenate and House Reports ar e among the best evidence of \nwhat Congress sought to accomplish with its enactments. \nSee Gluck\, 65 Stan. L. Rev.\, at 965\, 977–978\, 989. \n In the cases now before us\, that evidence shows that Con\ngress did not i ntend for IEEPA to authorize the Executive\nto impose tariffs. Accord\, a nte\, at 5\, n. 2 (KAGAN\, J.\, con\ncurring in part and concurring in jud gment). Instead\, Con\ngress intended to delegate to the President the pow er to \nfreeze and control foreign property transactions. \nFour pieces of the relevant legislative record support this\nconclusion. The first two a re the House and Senate Reports\nthat accompanied the 1941 amendment to IE EPA’s prede\ncessor statute\, the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA).\nFi rst enacted in 1917\, TWEA authorized the President to \ncontrol foreign p roperty during wartime. But some of \nTWEA’s sections delegating this au thority had lapsed\, and \n“there [was] doubt as to the effectiveness of other sections.”\nH. R. Rep. No. 1507\, 77th Cong.\, 1st Sess.\, 2 (194 1). Accord\ningly\, Congress amended TWEA in 1941\, adding the sub\nsecti on that includes the “regulate . . . importation” \n Cite as: 607 U. S . ____ (2026) \nOpinion of JACKSON\, J. \n3 \nlanguage on which the Presid ent relies today. First War \nPowers Act\, 55 Stat. 839–840. The Repor ts explained Con\ngress’s primary purpose for the 1941 amendment: shorin g \nup the President’s ability to control foreign-owned property \nby ma intaining and strengthening the “existing system of \nforeign property c ontrol (commonly known as freezing con\ntrol).” H. R. Rep. No. 1507\, at 2–3\; see also S. Rep. No. 911\,\n77th Cong.\, 1st Sess.\, 2 (1941).1 \ nWhen Congress enacted IEEPA in 1977\, limiting the cir\ncumstances under which the President could exercise his \nemergency authorities\, it kept t he “regulate . . . importa\ntion” language from TWEA. §203(a)(1)(B)\, 91 Stat. 1626.\nThe other two relevant pieces of legislative history—th e\nSenate and House Reports that accompanied IEEPA—\ndemonstrate that Co ngress’s intent regarding the scope of\nthis statutory language remained the same. As the Senate \nReport explained\, Congress’s sole objective for the “regulate \n. . . importation” subsection was to grant the Pr esident the \nemergency authority “to control or freeze property transac \ntions where a foreign interest is involved.” S. Rep. No. 95– \n466\, p. 5 (1977). The House Report likewise described \nIEEPA as empowering t he President to “regulate or freeze \nany property in which any foreign country or a national \nthereof has any interest.” H. R. Rep. No. 95– 459\, p. 15 \n(1977).\nWith this evidence of Congress’s objective\, inte rpreting\nthe text of IEEPA becomes an easy task. Each of the listed \nve rbs—“investigate\, block during the pendency of an inves\ntigation\, r egulate\, direct and compel\, nullify\, void\, prevent \n————— — \n1In addition to maintaining the President’s “freezing control” author\nity\, Congress also sought to authorize the President to seize fo reign prop\nerty and use it to serve the interests of the United States. H. R. Rep. \nNo. 1507\, at 3. To this end\, the 1941 amendment provided t hat foreign\nowned property “shall vest . . . in such agency or person a s may be desig\nnated . . . by the President.” 55 Stat. 840. Congress did not include this \nvesting language in IEEPA. \n4 \nLEARNING RESOURCES \, INC. v. TRUMP \nOpinion of JACKSON\, J. \nor prohibit\,” 50 U. S. C. §1702(a)(1)(B)—provides a means\nby which the President can freeze or control foreign prop\nerty transactions. See ante\, at 4–5\, and n. 2 ( opinion of \nKAGAN\, J.). Tariffs are different in kind. They are a tax o n\nimports\; a means of generating revenue from transactions\nbetween priv ate parties. See ante\, at 6 (majority opinion).\nBecause tariffs are not a means by which the President can \nfreeze or control foreign assets\, in terpreting IEEPA to au\nthorize tariffs would require the Court to overrid e Con\ngress’s expressed purpose for including the “regulate . . . \ni mportation” language in the statute. \n*\n*\n* \n Like THE CHIEF JUSTI CE’s opinion\, the principal dissent\ndeclines the help of legislative h istory. See post\, at 16\, n. 11 \n(opinion of KAVANAUGH\, J.). The disse nt concludes that \nIEEPA and TWEA are “best understood” as authorizin g tar\niffs\, and that any other interpretation would “not make\nmuch se nse.” Post\, at 24–25\, 29.2 But why would it matter \nwhich interpre tation we think is “best” when Congress has \nalready told us? The leg islative history here plainly estab\nlishes that Congress understood and i ntended IEEPA and \nTWEA to authorize a wholly different type of power: th e \npower to freeze foreign-owned property. And the proper\nrole of the C ourt is to give effect to Congress’s intent\, not\nour own instincts. Se e United States v. American Trucking \nAssns.\, Inc.\, 310 U. S. 534\, 542 (1940). \nIn short\, in these cases\, the legislative history provides \n helpful evidence of “what Congress was trying to do” in\nIEEPA. Katzma nn 38. Given that evidence\, we need not \nspeculate or\, worse\, step in to Congress’s shoes and \n—————— \n2This reasoning appears t o follow the Court’s relatively recent practice\nof picking what it deem s the best reading of a statute without consider\nation of Congress’s in tent. See\, e.g.\, Stanley v. City of Sanford\, 606 U. S. \n46\, 51–54 (2025)\; accord\, id.\, at 96–97\, and n. 12 (JACKSON\, J.\, dissent\nin g). \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of JACKSON\, J. \n5 \nform ulate our own views about what powers would be best \nto delegate to the P resident for use during an emergency.\nSee ibid.\; J. Hurst\, Dealing With Statutes 33 (1982). When \nCongress tells us why it has included certain language in a\nstatute\, the limited role of the courts in our democratic sys\ntem of government—as interpreters\, not lawmakers—de\nmands that we give effect to the will of the people. \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (202 6) \nTHOMAS\, J.\, dissenting \n1 \nSUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES \n_ ________________ \nNos. 24–1287 and 25–250 \n_________________ \nLEARN ING RESOURCES\, INC.\, ET AL.\, PETITIONERS \n24–1287 \nv. \nDONALD J. T RUMP\, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED \nSTATES\, ET AL. \nON WRIT OF CERTIORARI T O THE UNITED STATES COURT OF \nAPPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUI T \nDONALD J. TRUMP\, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED \nSTATES\, ET AL.\, PETITION ERS \n25–250 \nv. \nV.O.S. SELECTIONS\, INC.\, ET AL. \nON WRIT OF CERTI ORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF \nAPPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT \n[F ebruary 20\, 2026]\n JUSTICE THOMAS\, dissenting. \nI join JUSTICE KAVANAU GH’s principal dissent in full. As \nhe explains\, the Court’s decisio n today cannot be justified \nas a matter of statutory interpretation. Co ngress author\nized the President to “regulate . . . importation.” 50 U. S. C. \n§1702(a)(1)(B). Throughout American history\, the author\nity to “regulate importation” has been understood to include \nthe authori ty to impose duties on imports. Post\, at 9–13\, \n22–29 (KAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting). The meaning of that\nphrase was beyond doubt by the ti me that Congress enacted \nthis statute\, shortly after President Nixon’ s highly publi\ncized duties on imports were upheld based on identical lan \nguage. Post\, at 14–22. The statute that the President relied \non th erefore authorized him to impose the duties on imports \n2 \nLEARNING RESO URCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nTHOMAS\, J.\, dissenting \nat issue in these cases . JUSTICE KAVANAUGH makes clear \nthat the Court errs in concluding otherw ise. \nI write separately to explain why the statute at issue here\nis con sistent with the separation of powers as an original \nmatter. The Constit ution’s separation of powers forbids \nCongress from delegating core leg islative power to the Pres\nident. This principle\, known as the nondelega tion doctrine\,\nis rooted in the Constitution’s Legislative Vesting Cla use \nand Due Process Clause. Art. I\, §1\; Amdt. 5. Both Clauses \nforb id Congress from delegating core legislative power\,\nwhich is the power t o make substantive rules setting the \nconditions for deprivations of life \, liberty\, or property. Nei\nther Clause prohibits Congress from delega ting other kinds\nof power. Because the Constitution assigns Congress many \npowers that do not implicate the nondelegation doctrine\,\nCongress may delegate the exercise of many powers to the\nPresident. Congress has done so repeatedly since the\nfounding\, with this Court’s blessing.\nThe pow er to impose duties on imports can be delegated.1 \nAt the founding\, that power was regarded as one of many \n—————— \n1I refer to char ges on imported goods as “duties\,” not “tariffs” or\n“taxes.” When the government charged money for importing goods\, that\ncharge was historically called a custom or impost\, each of which was a \nkind of “duty.” See N. Webster\, A Compendious Dictionary of the English\nLang uage 75\, 152 (1806)\; Art. I\, §10\, cl. 2. The word “tariff ” prim arily\nreferred to the schedule or table listing such duties\, not the dut ies them\nselves. Webster\, Compendious Dictionary\, at 305. The word “ tax\,” alt\nhough sometimes used loosely to refer to all kinds of moneta ry charges\, \nmore often “exclude[d]” duties on imports. R. Natelson \, What the Con\nstitution Means by “Duties\, Imposts\, and Excise s”—and “Taxes” (Direct \nor Otherwise)\, 66 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 2 97\, 306 (2015). \nIn fact\, although Colonial Americans “staunchly cont ested efforts by \nParliament to ‘tax’ them\,” they often “concede d the authority of the Brit\nish government to regulate commerce through f inancial exactions\,” in\ncluding “prohibitory tariffs.” Ibid. In th e most “widely read” and “uni\nversally approved” response to the Stamp Act\, E. Morgan &\; H. Morgan\, \nThe Stamp Act Crisis 71 (1953)\ , Daniel Dulany wrote: “A Right to impose\nan internal Tax on the Coloni es\, without their Consent for the single \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026 ) \nTHOMAS\, J.\, dissenting \n3 \npowers over foreign commerce that could be delegated to\nthe President. Power over foreign commerce was not withi n \nthe core legislative power\, and engaging in foreign com\nmerce was re garded as a privilege rather than a right.\nEarly Congresses often delegat ed to the President power to\nregulate foreign commerce\, including throug h duties on im\nports. As I suggested over a decade ago\, the nondelegatio n \ndoctrine does not apply to “a delegation of power to make\nrules gov erning private conduct in the area of foreign\ntrade\,” including rules imposing duties on imports. Depart\nment of Transportation v. Association of American Rail\nroads\, 575 U. S. 43\, 80–81\, n. 5 (2015) (opinion c oncurring \nin judgment). Therefore\, to the extent that the Court relies \non “‘separation of powers principles’” to rule against the\nPres ident\, ante\, at 8 (opinion of ROBERTS\, C. J.)\, it is mis\ntaken. \nI \ nThe nondelegation doctrine is rooted in both the Legisla\ntive Vesting Cl ause and the Due Process Clause. The doc\ntrine ensures that “[t]he Legi slative [Branch] cannot trans\nfer the Power of Making Laws to any other h ands.” J. \nLocke\, Two Treatises of Government §141\, p. 380 (P. Lasl ett \ned. 1964) (Locke) (emphasis deleted). \nImportantly\, \n —————— \nPurpose of Revenue\, is denied\; a Right to regulate their Trade without \ntheir Consent is admitted. The Imposition of a Duty \, may\, in some In\nstances\, be the proper Regulation.” Consideration s on the Propriety of\nImposing Taxes in the British Colonies 34 (2d ed. 1 765) (emphasis de\nleted). Likewise\, Benjamin Franklin famously conceded Britain’s “right \n‘of laying duties to regulate commerce\,’ ” b ut rejected its power to “ ‘lay \ninternal taxes.’ ” B. Bailyn\, The Ideological Origins of the American Rev\nolution 214 (1967)\; see also id.\, at 212 (explaining that colonists denied\nBritain “all right to t ax the colonies\,” but “conceded to it the right to raise\nrevenue thr ough duties on trade”)\; E. Nelson\, The Royalist Revolution\n32 (2014)\ ; C. Becker\, The Declaration of Independence: A Study in the \nHistory of Political Ideas 90 (1922). \n4 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nTHO MAS\, J.\, dissenting \nhowever\, the nondelegation doctrine applies only to Con\ngress’s core legislative power\, not to all of its powers. \nA \ nThe Legislative Vesting Clause grants Congress alone \nthe federal legisl ative power. It requires that “[a]ll legisla\ntive Powers” granted to the Federal Government “shall be \nvested in a Congress of the United St ates.” Art. I\, §1. It \nfollows that those federal legislative powers cannot be exer\ncised by anyone else\, including the President. See Associ a\ntion of American Railroads\, 575 U. S.\, at 74 (opinion of \nTHOMAS\, J .). \n“Legislative power” for purposes of the Vesting Clause\nmeans th e power to make substantive rules setting the con\nditions for deprivation s of life\, liberty\, or property. I have \ndescribed this power as the “core legislative power” to dis\ntinguish it from other powers that t he Constitution grants \nCongress. Id.\, at 80. Core legislative power inc ludes only \nthe power to make “law” in the “Blackstonian sense of g en\nerally applicable rules of private conduct\,” the violation of\nwhic h results in the deprivation of “core private rights.” Id.\, \nat 73\ , 76. These core private rights are the natural rights\nto life\, liberty\ , and property. See 1 W. Blackstone\, Com\nmentaries on the Laws of Engla nd 123–136 (1765) (Black\nstone)\; C. Nelson\, Adjudication in the Polit ical Branches\, \n107 Colum. L. Rev. 559\, 566–567 (2007). \nThe nondele gation doctrine is also rooted in the Due Pro\ncess Clause. That Clause pr ohibits the Federal Govern\nment from depriving any person of “life\, li berty\, or property\,\nwithout due process of law.” Amdt. 5. The Founde rs mod\neled it on chapter 39 of the Magna Carta\, which prohibited \nthe deprivation of a free man’s private rights “except by the \nlawful jud gment of his peers and by the law of the land.” A. \nHoward\, Magna Car ta: Text and Commentary 45 (rev. ed. \n1998)\; see Obergefell v. Hodges\, 576 U. S. 644\, 723 (2015) \n(THOMAS\, J.\, dissenting). By the founding\ , the Magna \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nTHOMAS\, J.\, dissenting \ n5 \nCarta was understood to mean that “no subject would be \ndeprived o f a private right—that is\, a right of life\, liberty\, \nor property— except in accordance with ‘the law of the land\,’ \nwhich consisted on ly of statutory and common law.” Asso\nciation of American Railroads\, 575 U. S.\, at 72 (opinion of \nTHOMAS\, J.) (citing N. Chapman &\; M. McConnell\, Due Pro\ncess as Separation of Powers\, 121 Yale L. J. 1672\, 1688 \n(2012)).\nA rule made by someone other than the legislature\, such\ nas the King\, was not “‘the law of the land.’” Association of \n American Railroads\, 575 U. S.\, at 72 (opinion of THOMAS\, \nJ.). Chief J ustice Coke famously held invalid the King’s\nproclamation prohibiting n ew buildings in London because \nthe King could not “create any offe nce” “without Parlia\nment.” Case of Proclamations\, 12 Co. Rep. 7 4\, 74–75\, 77\nEng. Rep. 1352\, 1353 (K. B. 1611)\; see Association of Amer\nican Railroads\, 575 U. S.\, at 72 (opinion of THOMAS\, J.) (ex\npla ining that this principle was associated with chapter 39\nof the Magna Car ta). When the Founders transplanted the\nsame principle into the Due Proce ss Clause\, they ensured \nthat when the government wanted to deprive peop le of the\nfamiliar core private rights of “life\, liberty\, and propert y\,” it\ncould not do so “on the basis of a rule (or a will) not enact ed \nby the legislature.” Id.\, at 75–76. \nB \nNeither the Legislativ e Vesting Clause nor the Due Pro\ncess Clause forbids Congress from delega ting its other pow\ners. As this Court put it two centuries ago\, although Con\ngress cannot delegate powers that are “strictly and\nexclusively l egislative\,” it can “certainly delegate” others. \nWayman v. Southa rd\, 10 Wheat. 1\, 42–43 (1825) (opinion\nfor the Court by Marshall\, C. J.). \nMany of Congress’s powers fall within the core legislative\npowe r subject to the nondelegation doctrine. For example\, \nthe Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate \n6 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. T RUMP \nTHOMAS\, J.\, dissenting \ncommerce among the States. Art. I\, §8\ , cl. 3. Congress can\nthus make substantive rules for interstate trade —such as \nby restricting drug shipments across state lines—punisha\nb le with fines or imprisonment. Cf. Gonzales v. Raich\, 545 \nU. S. 1\, 58 (2005) (THOMAS\, J.\, dissenting). Likewise\, the \nConstitution gives Co ngress many other powers that impli\ncate life\, liberty\, and property\, including the power to pro\nvide for the punishment of counterfeiting\, Ar t. I\, §8\, cl. 6\; \nthe power to provide for the punishment of treason\ , Art. III\, \n§3\, cl. 2\; and the power to impose internal taxes\, Art. I\, §8\, \ncl. 1\; Amdt. 16. These powers cannot be delegated\, as I hav e \nrepeatedly explained. See\, e.g.\, Association of American \nRailroads \, 575 U. S.\, at 77 (opinion of THOMAS\, J.)\; Whit\nman v. American Truc king Assns.\, Inc.\, 531 U. S. 457\, 487 \n(2001) (THOMAS\, J.\, concurrin g). They cannot be delegated\neven if Congress delegates them unambiguous ly. Cf. ante\, \nat 8 (opinion of ROBERTS\, C. J.).\nCongress also has man y powers that are not subject to\nthe nondelegation doctrine. “We now t hink of the powers \nlisted in Article I\, Section 8 as quintessentially l egislative \npowers\, but many of them were actual\, former\, or asserted \npowers of the Crown\, which the drafters decided to allocate\nto the leg islative branch.” M. McConnell\, The President \nWho Would Not Be King 2 74 (2020) (McConnell)\; accord\, \nZivotofsky v. Kerry\, 576 U. S. 1\, 36 (2015) (THOMAS\, J.\, con\ncurring in judgment in part and dissenting in p art). These \ninclude the powers to raise and support armies\, to fix the \nstandards of weights and measures\, to grant copyrights\, to \ndispose of federal property\, and\, as discussed below\, to reg\nulate foreign com merce. Art. I\, §8\; Art. IV\, §3. None of \nthese powers involves set ting the rules for the deprivation\nof core private rights. Blackstone cal led them “prerogative” \npowers\, and sometimes “executive.” See 1 Blackstone 242\, \n245\, 255–262\, 264–265\, 276\, 279\; 2 id.\, at 407\, 410 (1766)\;\n1 W. Crosskey\, Politics and the Constitution in the H istory \nof the United States 416\, 421–425 (1953)\; McConnell 274– \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nTHOMAS\, J.\, dissenting \n7 \n275. By o ne count\, 13 of the 29 powers given to Congress in \nArticle I were power s that “Blackstone described as ‘execu\ntive’ powers.” 1 Crosskey \, Politics and the Constitution\, at \n428. \nFor most of American histor y\, the nondelegation doctrine\nwas understood not to apply to these power s. Contra\, ante\, \nat 42–46 (GORSUCH\, J.\, concurring). “The earl y congresses\nfelt free to delegate certain powers to President Washington \nin broad terms.” McConnell 333. Thus\, the Constitution \ngives Congr ess the power to support armies\, Art. I\, §8\, cl.\n12\, but Congress in 1789 delegated to the President the \npower to establish regulations for benefits to veterans\nwounded in the Revolutionary War. See Act of Sept. 29\,\n1789\, ch. 24\, 1 Stat. 95. The Constitution gives Congress\nthe po wer to grant patents\, Art. I\, §8\, cl. 8\, but Congress in\n1790 delega ted to executive officials the power to grant pa\ntents in their discretio n. See Act of Apr. 10\, 1790\, ch. 7\, §1\, \n1 Stat. 109–110. The Co nstitution gives Congress the \npower to borrow money\, Art. I\, §8\, cl. 2\, but Congress in \n1790 delegated to the President the power to borrow up to \n$12 million on behalf of the United States in his discretion. \nS ee Act of Aug. 4\, 1790\, §2\, 1 Stat. 139. The Constitution \ngives Cong ress the power to raise armies\, Art. I\, §8\, cl. 12\, \nbut Congress in 1791 delegated to the President the power \nto raise an army of 2\,000 tr oops in his discretion. See Act \nof Mar. 3\, 1791\, §8\, 1 Stat. 223. An d\, as I explain further \nbelow\, see infra\, at 13–15\, the Constituti on gives Congress \nthe power to regulate foreign commerce\, Art. I\, §8\ , cl. 3\, but \nearly Congresses often delegated to the President the powe r \nto regulate foreign commerce. See\, e.g.\, Act of July 22\, 1790\,\nch . 33\, 1 Stat. 137\; Act of June 4\, 1794\, ch. 41\, 1 Stat. 372. \nThese early delegations had one thing in common: They\ndid not implicate the Leg islative Vesting Clause or the Due \nProcess Clause. “None of these stat utes disturbed natural \nrights or intruded into the core of the legislati ve power.” \nMcConnell 333\; cf. A. Bamzai\, Comment\, Delegation and \n 8 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nTHOMAS\, J.\, dissenting \nInterp retive Discretion: Gundy\, Kisor\, and the Formation \nand Future of Admin istrative Law\, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 164\, \n178 (2019). They therefore did n ot violate the nondelega\ntion doctrine. \nThe Constitutional Convention s eemed to agree with this \nunderstanding of delegation. \nContra\, ante\, at 42 \n(GORSUCH\, J.\, concurring). James Madison proposed an\namendment clarifying that the President had the power “‘to \nexecute such other powers’” as were “‘delegated by the na\ntional Legislature\,’ ” so long as the delegated powers were \n“‘“not Legislative nor Ju diciary in their nature.”’” 1 Rec\nords of the Federal Convention of 1787\, p. 67 (M. Farrand\ned. 1966). Thus\, in Madison’s view\, some of Congress’s pow\ners were “not Legislative” and could be “delega ted” to the\nPresident. Ibid. Madison’s proposal was rejected after ot h\ners argued that it was unnecessary. Ibid. Madison agreed \nthat the pu rpose of the proposed amendment was only to\n“prevent doubts and miscons tructions.” Ibid. Nobody dis\nputed that Madison stated the correct sc ope of the nondele\ngation doctrine. Ibid.\; see also McConnell 332 (“[ W]e can \ninfer [from Madison’s motion] that the framers understood \nth at Congress would be able to delegate its royal preroga\ntive powers back to the President”).2 \n—————— \n2Thus\, although many used the word “legislative” in the broader sense \nto describe powers that should initially belong to the legislature\, ante\, at \n42–43 (GORSUCH \, J.\, concurring)\, the Founders likely understood the \nLegislative Ves ting Clause to refer more narrowly to “core legislative \npower\,” Dep artment of Transportation v. Association of American Rail\nroads\, 575 U. S. 43\, 80 (2015) (THOMAS\, J.\, concurring in judgment). That \nundersta nding accorded with the views of separation-of-powers theorists \nof the t ime\, who distinguished the three core functions of government \nfrom the institutions that would exercise them in any given polity. S. \nPrakash & amp\; M. Ramsey\, Foreign Affairs and the Jeffersonian Executive\, \n89 Mi nn. L. Rev 1591\, 1612–1617 (2005)\; see 1 B. de Montesquieu\, The \nSpi rit of Laws 151–153 (T. Nugent transl.\, rev. ed. 1899). For nondele\ng ation purposes\, therefore\, “[t]he key is to distinguish between strict ly \nlegislative authority—the power to make rules binding on persons or \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nTHOMAS\, J.\, dissenting \nII \n9 \nA s a matter of original understanding\, historical practice\,\nand judicial precedent\, the power to impose duties on im\nports is not within the cor e legislative power. Congress can \ntherefore delegate the exercise of th is power to the Presi\ndent. \nA \nNeither of the two constitutional found ations for the non\ndelegation doctrine forbids Congress from delegating t o the \nPresident the power to impose duties on imports. \n1 \nThe Legisla tive Vesting Clause provides no basis for ap\nplying the nondelegation doc trine to the power to impose\nduties on imports.\n“The ‘power over ext ernal affairs [is] in origin and essen\ntial character different from that over internal affairs.’” \nHaaland v. Brackeen\, 599 U. S. 255\, 356 (2023) (THOMAS\, \nJ.\, dissenting) (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wri ght Ex\nport Corp.\, 299 U. S. 304\, 319 (1936)). Although internal\naffa irs are governed by the domestic law of one sovereign\, \nexternal affairs implicate the relationship between sover\neigns\, which is subject to the law of nations. See Locke \n§§145–148\, at 383–384\; 1 Blackstone 2 64\; 4 id.\, at 66–68 \n(1769)\; E. de Vattel\, The Law of Nations 161 –163\, 281–289\n(J. Chitty ed. 1852) (Vattel). External affairs\, the n\, are not \nsusceptible to being “directed by antecedent\, standing\, pos\nitive Laws” made by one nation. Locke §147\, at 384. When \na pe rson goes abroad\, he must resort to the political \nbranches (and ultimat ely the military)—rather than the ju\ndiciary—for protection\, can ind ebt the executive to foreign \nnations for his personal misconduct\, and c an trigger a for\neign conflict. See Vattel 161–163\, 281–289\; 2 F. Wharton\, \n—————— \nproperty within the nation—and other po wers assigned to Congress.” \nMcConnell 327. \n10 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nTHOMAS\, J.\, dissenting \nDigest of International Law § 222\, pp. 575–576 (2d ed.\n1887)\; see also id.\, §§189\, 213–221\, at 432–445\, 539–575. \nThe power to regulate external affairs was acc ordingly\nnot viewed as within the core legislative power at the found\nin g. See Zivotofsky\, 576 U. S.\, at 35–37 (opinion of THOMAS\, \nJ.). Bla ckstone described powers over “intercourse with for\neign nations” a s “prerogative” powers naturally belonging \nto the King. 1 Blackstone 245\; see id.\, at 232. Locke agreed\nthat this power “must be lodged ” with the “executive.” Zi\nvotofsky\, 576 U. S.\, at 35 (opinion o f THOMAS\, J.) (citing\nLocke §148). Baron de Montesquieu classified all powers\n“in respect to things dependent on the law of nations” as\npar t of “the executive power.” 1 The Spirit of Laws 151 (T. \nNugent tra nsl.\, rev. ed. 1899). The “legislative” power\, by\ncontrast\, “ap plied only within the realm.” McConnell 214. \nThe power to regulate ex ternal affairs included power\nover foreign commerce. At the founding\, th e “external ex\necutive power” included “‘the transactions of the state with \nany other independent state.’” Zivotofsky\, 576 U. S.\, at 36 \n(opinion of THOMAS\, J.). In Great Britain\, the King had no\nuni lateral legislative power\, McConnell 107\, but he had \nmuch unilateral p ower over foreign commerce. His power\nover foreign commerce included the power to “govern for\neign trade\,” id.\, at 216\, and to “prohibit any of his subjects\nfrom leaving the realm\,” 1 Blackstone 261\; accord \, East In\ndia Co. v. Sandys\, Skin. 223\, 223–224\, 90 Eng. Rep. 103 \ n(K. B. 1684) (describing the “inherent prerogative in the \nCrown\, tha t none should trade with foreigners without the \nKing’s licence”). Th omas Rutherforth’s Institutes of Natu\nral Law—“a treatise routinely cited by the Founders\,” Zivo\ntofsky\, 576 U. S.\, at 36 (opinion of T HOMAS\, J.)—explained \nthat the “external executive power” includ ed “the power of\nadjusting the rights of a nation in respect of . . . t rade.” 2 \nInstitutes of Natural Law 55–56 (1756)\; accord\, Locke §1 46\,\nat 383. The power to impose duties on imports was a con\nventional m ethod for governing foreign trade. It originated \n Cite as: 607 U. S. __ __ (2026) \nTHOMAS\, J.\, dissenting \n11 \nas a “prerogative right” o f the King\, N. Gras\, Early English\nCustoms System 21 (1918).3 \n2 \nThe Due Process Clause likewise provides no basis for ap\nplying the nondeleg ation doctrine to the power to impose\nduties on imports. The Due Process Clause protects \n“rights\,” not “privileges.” Gutierrez v. Saenz \, 606 U. S. 305\, \n331 (2025) (THOMAS\, J.\, dissenting). Importing is a matter \nof privilege.\nThe government can charge money for privileges w ithout\ndepriving a person of property for due-process purposes. \nThe gov ernment charges people money every day for a wide \nrange of activities\, such as to enter a government park\, mail\nan envelope\, apply for a copyr ight\, or file a lawsuit. Be\ncause a person has no core private right to engage in these\nactivities\, the government is not subject to due-proces s re\nstraints in setting such charges. The due-process question \nis not whether a government action “‘raise[s] revenue\,’” \nante\, at 6 (majority opinion)\, but whether it implicates core\nprivate rights. Supr a\, at 3–4. Thus\, when Congress dele\ngates power to make “regulati ons” on federal land\, the Sec\nretary of Agriculture can set a “cha rge” for the “privilege of \ngrazing sheep” on that land without t hereby “exercis[ing]\nthe legislative power.” United States v. Grimaud \, 220 U. S. \n506\, 522–523 (1911)\; see also Bamzai\, 133 Harv. L. Rev .\, at\n180–182\; contra\, ante\, at 8 (opinion of ROBERTS\, C. J.). Co n\ngress has\, consistent with due process\, delegated the power \nto set charges for a wide range of privileges. See 16 U. S. C. \n§6802 (delegati ng the power to set fees for entrance to and \n—————— \n3See a lso P. Einzig\, The Control of the Purse: Progress and Decline of\nParliam ent’s Financial Control 65 (1959) (“[T]he origin of the term ‘cus\ ntoms’ is that it had been the ancient customary practice of the Crown t o\nlevy charges on imports and exports on its own authority”). Parliame nt \ntook some of that prerogative power away\, but delegated it back in b road\nterms to the King\, see id.\, at 65–70\, who was still agreed to h ave no leg\nislative power\, McConnell 107–110. \n12 \nLEARNING RESOURCE S\, INC. v. TRUMP \nTHOMAS\, J.\, dissenting \nuse of federal recreation a reas)\; 17 U. S. C. §1316 (delegat\ning the power to “by regulation set reasonable fees” for ap\nplications)\; 39 U. S. C. §3622 (delegating t he power to set \npostal rates)\; 28 U. S. C. §1911 (“The Supreme Court may \nfix the fees to be charged by its clerk”). \nA person had no core private right to import goods at the \nfounding. On the Founders’ under standing\, statutes allow\ning “importation of goods from abroad were th ought to cre\nate mere privileges rather than core private rights.” Nel \nson\, 107 Colum. L. Rev.\, at 580. Foreign commerce was\ngoverned by the law of nations\, which is a law of “sover\neigns\,” not of “private individuals.” Vattel 285. “[A]ny at\ntempt to introduce foreign g oods” without the “expressed al\nlowances” of the sovereign was “a violation of its \nsovereignty.” Cross v. Harrison\, 16 How. 164\, 196 (1854).\n“Every state” had “a right to prohibit the entrance of for eign \nmerchandises\,” including through the imposition of duties \non i mports. Vattel §§90\, 99\, at 38\, 43. Because “no one had \na veste d right to import” any “goods from abroad\,” the im\nposition of “tariffs” as a condition for importing those goods\ndid not implicate the Due Process Clause any more than \nwhen the government charges money for other privileges. \nNelson\, 107 Colum. L. Rev.\, at 580. \n*\n*\n* \n The power to impose duties on imports thus does not im\nplicate either of the constitutional foundations for the non\ndelegation doctrine. Hence\, e ven the strongest critics of del\negation\, myself included\, have recogni zed that regulations\nof foreign commerce might not be subject to ordinary non\ndelegation limitations. See FCC v. Consumers’ Research\, \n606 U. S. 656\, 742\, n. 19 (2025) (GORSUCH\, J.\, dissenting) \n(“[I]t may be . . . that tariffs and domestic taxes present dif\nferent contexts when it comes to the problem of delega\ntion”)\; accord\, Association of Americ an Railroads\, 575 U. S.\, \nat 80\, and n. 5 (opinion of THOMAS\, J.). S o long as Congress \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nTHOMAS\, J.\, disse nting \n13 \ncomplies with other constitutional limitations\, it can dele\ ngate this power. \nB \nHistorical practice and precedent confirm that Con gress \ncan delegate the power to impose duties on imports. \n1 \nSince th e 1790s\, Congress has consistently delegated to\nthe President power over foreign commerce\, including the \npower to impose duties on imports. “‘Practically every vol\nume of the United States Statutes’” con tains broad delega\ntions to the President in the area of foreign commerce . Id.\, \nat 80\, n. 5 (quoting Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.\, 299 U. S.\, \nat 324).\nThe First Congress gave the President the power to “pre\nsc ribe” “rules and regulations” that would “gover[n]” any \nperson licensed to trade with Indians. 1 Stat. 137. Trade \nwith Indians was r egarded as “a matter of external rela\ntions.” McConnell 333. In dele gating this power\, Congress \ndid not specify or limit what kinds of regu lations the Presi\ndent could impose. Act of July 22\, 1790\, 1 Stat. 137 –138. \nPursuant to that broad delegation\, the President restricted \nt rading “[d]istilled [s]pirits\,” required each trader to “give\ninte lligence” to the Government\, and subdelegated to his \nsuperintendents the power to “assign the limits within \nwhich each trader shall trade .” 61 Timothy Pickering Pa\npers\, Massachusetts Historical Society 4 (A ug. 28\, 1790)\;\nsee also Letter from G. Washington to H. Knox (Aug. 13\, \n1790)\, in 6 Papers of George Washington 244–245 (D.\nTwohig ed. 1996) . Any person who violated the President’s\nregulations would owe $1\,00 0 “payable to the President.” 1 \nStat. 137.\n Succeeding early Congre sses delegated many more pow\ners over foreign commerce to the President. In 1794\, Con\ngress delegated to the President the power to “lay an \n1 4 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nTHOMAS\, J.\, dissenting \nembarg o on all ships and vessels in the ports of the United\nStates\,” includi ng ships belonging to Americans\, unless \nCongress was in session. Act o f June 4\, 1794\, 1 Stat. 372. \nIt authorized the President to make “su ch regulations as\nthe circumstances of the case may require” in exercis ing\nthat delegated power. Ibid. Congress allowed the Presi\ndent to impos e the embargo as “in his opinion\, the public \nsafety shall so requir e.” Ibid. In 1795\, Congress delegated \nto the President the power to “permit the exportation of\narms\, cannon and military stores\, the law prohibiting the \nexportation of the same to the contrary notwithstanding .”\nAct of Mar. 3\, 1795\, ch. 53\, 1 Stat. 444. In 1798\, Congress\nde legated to the President the power to discontinue “prohi\nbitions and re straints” on commerce with France. Act of \nJune 13\, 1798\, 1 Stat. 565–566\; see also\, e.g.\, Act of Mar. 3\, \n1817\, ch. 39\, 3 Stat. 361–362 (delegating to the President \nthe power to discontinue a ban on importation of plaster of \nParis). In 1799\, Congress delegated to the P resident the \nauthority to discontinue and to reimpose “restraints and\ nprohibitions” on commerce with France when he “deem[ed] \nit expedien t and consistent with the interest of the United\nStates.” Act of Feb. 9\, 1799\, 1 Stat. 615. And\, in 1800\, Con\ngress delegated to the Presi dent the power to remove a ban \non trade with France\, and to “re-estab lish” certain “re\nstraints and prohibitions” when he “deem[ed] it expedient.” \nAct of Feb. 27\, 1800\, 2 Stat. 9–10.4 \nCongress likew ise delegated to the President the power \nto set duties on imports. In 18 15\, Congress delegated to the \nPresident the power to lower reciprocal d uties when he was \n“satisfied” that other nations’ trade practices no longer op\nerated “to the disadvantage of the United States.” Act of \nMar. 3\, 1815\, ch. 77\, 3 Stat. 224. In 1824\, Congress \n—————— \n4 JUSTICE GORSUCH’s interpretation of two “ear ly congressional de\nbates\,” ante\, at 43 (concurring opinion)\, is thu s difficult to reconcile with\nwhat early Congresses actually did. \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nTHOMAS\, J.\, dissenting \n15 \ndelegated to the President the power to lower and to reim\npose duties in response to f oreign nations’ trade practices.\nSee Act of Jan. 7\, 1824\, 4 Stat. 2 –3. Throughout the early \ndecades of the Republic\, Congress continued to delegate to\nthe President similar powers over duties on imports on a \nregular basis. See\, e.g.\, Act of May 24\, 1828\, ch. 111\, 4 Stat.\n30 8\; Act of May 31\, 1830\, ch. 219\, 4 Stat. 425\; Act of July \n13\, 1832 \, ch. 207\, 4 Stat. 578–579. Presidents frequently\nchanged the rates of duties on imports as to various foreign\nnations pursuant to these dele gations.5 \n2 \nThis Court has consistently upheld Congress’s delegation \nof power over foreign commerce\, including the power to im\npose duties on imports. \nThe Court has long conveyed to Congress that it may “in\n vest the President with large discretion in matters arising\nout of the ex ecution of statutes relating to trade and com\nmerce with other nations. ” Marshall Field &\; Co. v. Clark\, \n143 U. S. 649\, 691 (1892). Si nce shortly after the founding\, \nthe Court has rejected challenges to de legations of power \nover foreign commerce. See Cargo of Brig Aurora v. Un ited \n—————— \n5See\, e.g.\, July 24\, 1818\, Proclamation of President J. Monroe\, in 2 \nMessages and Papers of the Presidents 606– 607 (J. Richardson ed. 1897)\n(eliminating duties on “goods\, wares\, an d merchandise imported into the\nUnited States” as to the Free Hanseatic city of Bremen)\; see also\, e.g.\, \nAug. 1\, 1818\, Proclamation of Pre sident J. Monroe\, in 2 id.\, at 607\; May \n4\, 1820\, Proclamation of Pr esident J. Monroe\, in 2 id.\, at 642\; Aug. 20\, \n1821\, Proclamation of President J. Monroe\, in 2 id.\, at 665–666\; Nov. 22\, \n1821\, Procla mation of President J. Monroe\, in 2 id.\, at 666–667\; June 7\, \n1827\ , Proclamation of President J. Quincy Adams\, in 2 id.\, at 942–943\; \n July 1\, 1828\, Proclamation of President J. Quincy Adams\, in 2 id.\, at \n970–971\; May 11\, 1829\, Proclamation of President A. Jackson\, in 3 id.\, \nat 1003\; June 3\, 1829\, Proclamation of President A. Jackson\, i n 3 id.\, at \n1004–1005\; Apr. 28\, 1835\, Proclamation of President A. Jackson\, in 3 id.\, \nat 1365–1366\; Sept. 1\, 1836\, Proclamation of President A. Jackson\, in 3 \nid.\, at 1452–1453\; June 14\, 1837\, Proc lamation of President M. Van Bu\nren\, in 4 id.\, at 1539. \n16 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nTHOMAS\, J.\, dissenting \nStates\, 7 Cranch 382\, 386\, 387–389 (1813). Even when a \n“challenged delegation\, if it were confined to internal af\nfairs\, would be invalid\,” the Court h as upheld the delega\ntion. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.\, 299 U. S.\, at 3 15\, 322. \nThere is a “fundamental” difference\, the Court has ex\npl ained\, between “foreign or external affairs” and “domestic\nor inte rnal affairs.” Id.\, at 315. Thus\, “Congress may of \ncourse delegate very large grants of its power over foreign \ncommerce to the President\, ” Chicago &\; Southern Air Lines\, \nInc. v. Waterman S. S. Corp.\, 3 33 U. S. 103\, 109 (1948)\, in\ncluding when it comes to imposing “dut ies” on imports\, \nCurtiss-Wright Export Corp.\, 299 U. S.\, at 325\, n . 2. \nWhen Congress has delegated to the President the power\nto impose d uties on imports\, this Court has upheld those \ndelegations. In Clark\, 1 43 U. S. 649\, the Court upheld Con\ngress’s delegation to the President of the power to impose \nduties on nations whose importation policies “ he may deem\nto be reciprocally unequal and unreasonable.” Id.\, at 680 . \nIt explained that Congress had “frequently\, from the organ\nization of the government to the present time\,” conferred\npowers over “trad e and commerce” to “the President.” Id.\, \nat 683. In J. W. Hampto n\, Jr.\, &\; Co. v. United States\, 276 \nU. S. 394 (1928)\, the Court upheld a delegation to the Pres\nident to impose duties as necessary up t o statutorily limited \nrates to make them reciprocal. Id.\, at 401\, 409. And\, in \nFederal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG\, Inc.\, 426 \n U. S. 548 (1976)\, the Court upheld a delegation of the power \nto impose a universal duty on imported oil. Id.\, at 555\, 558– \n560 .6 \n—————— \n6The Court has even suggested that the President has inherent peace\ntime authority to impose duties on imports. After th e Mexican-American \nWar ended\, executive officials imposed duties on imp orts at a California\nport within the United States before Congress had “passed an act to ex\ntend the collection of tonnage and import duties t o the ports of Califor\nnia.” Cross v. Harrison\, 16 How. 164\, 190 (18 54)\; see also id.\, at 192\, \n194–196. The executive officials unilat erally extended Congress’s earlier \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nT HOMAS\, J.\, dissenting \n17 \nAlthough these cases involved duties on imp orts\, the\nCourt nowhere suggested that a different nondelegation\nrule a pplied because the duty was a “tax” or “raise[d] reve\nnue.” Ante\ , at 6 (majority opinion) (internal quotation \nmarks omitted).7 \nIII \nC ongress’s delegation here was constitutional. The stat\nute at issue in these cases\, the International Emergency \nEconomic Powers Act\, delegat es to the President a wide\nrange of powers over foreign commerce. IEEPA gives the \nPresident\, on conditions satisfied here\, the power to “reg u\nlate” foreign commerce\, including “importation” of foreign \npro perty. 50 U. S. C. §1702(a)(1)(B). \nIEEPA’s delegation of power to imp ose duties on imports\ncomplies with the nondelegation doctrine. Congress dele\ngated to the President a version of the same power that it\nhas del egated to him in many statutes since the early days\nof the Republic. See supra\, at 13–17. Congress limited that \ndelegation to foreign commerc e. See §1702(a)(1)(B)\; see\nalso §1701. In delegating the power to imp ose duties on \nimports\, it gave the President no core legislative power to \nmake substantive rules setting the conditions for depriva\ntions of l ife\, liberty\, or property. Its delegation therefore\ncomplied with the c onstitutional separation of powers and \nis consistent with centuries of p ractice and precedent. It \ndid not need to exercise that power itself an d did not need \nto delegate it “unambiguously”—even though\, as JUS TICE \n—————— \nauthorized duties to new ports. Id.\, at 193. Although the Court’s rea\nsoning was somewhat opaque\, the Court uphel d the executive officials’ \nunilateral peacetime duties in part because nobody has a right to “intro\nduce foreign goods” except with the sov ereign’s “expressed allowances.” \nId.\, at 196–197. \n7In fact\, less than a year ago\, the Court explicitly rejected “a special\nnondele gation rule for revenue-raising legislation.” FCC v. Consumers’ \nRes earch\, 606 U. S. 656\, 674 (2025). \n18 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TR UMP \nTHOMAS\, J.\, dissenting \nKAVANAUGH explains\, it did. See post\, a t 38–45 (dissenting \nopinion).\nThe principal opinion bases its decisio n on the major\nquestions doctrine. Ante\, at 7–13 (opinion of ROBERTS\, \nC. J.). In some cases\, the Court has used the major ques\ntions doctri ne as a canon of statutory interpretation be\ncause delegations of major p owers are unlikely to be subtle.\nSee\, e.g.\, Whitman\, 531 U. S.\, at 46 8\; see ante\, at 8 (opinion\nof ROBERTS\, C. J.)\; see also Biden v. Nebr aska\, 600 U. S. \n477\, 501–503 (2023). In other cases\, the Court has used it \nto avoid what would have been originally understood as an\nunco nstitutional delegation of legislative power. See\, e.g.\, \nWest Virgini a v. EPA\, 597 U. S. 697\, 723 (2022)\; ante\, at 8 \n(opinion of ROBERTS\ , C. J.). In today’s cases\, neither the\nstatutory text nor the Consti tution provide a basis for rul\ning against the President. I respectfully dissent. \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \ n1 \nSUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES \n_________________ \nNos. 24–12 87 and 25–250 \n_________________ \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC.\, ET AL.\, PETITIONERS \n24–1287 \nv. \nDONALD J. TRUMP\, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED \nSTATES\, ET AL. \nON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF \n APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT \nDONALD J. TRUMP\, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED \nSTATES\, ET AL.\, PETITIONERS \n25–250 \nv. \nV.O.S. SE LECTIONS\, INC.\, ET AL. \nON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COUR T OF \nAPPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT \n[February 20\, 2026]\n JUSTICE KA VANAUGH\, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS and \nJUSTICE ALITO join\, dissenting. \nActing pursuant to his statutory authority to “regulate \n. . . import ation” under the 1977 International Emergency \nEconomic Powers Act\, or IEEPA\, the President has imposed \ntariffs on imports of foreign goods f rom various countries.\nThe tariffs have generated vigorous policy debates . Those \npolicy debates are not for the Federal Judiciary to resolve.\nR ather\, the Judiciary’s more limited role is to neutrally\ninterpret and apply the law. The sole legal question here is \nwhether\, under IEEPA\, tariffs are a means to “regulate . . . \nimportation.” \nStatutory te xt\, history\, and precedent\ndemonstrate that the answer is clearly yes: Like quotas\nand embargoes\, tariffs are a traditional and common tool to \nregulate importation. \n2 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nKAVANAU GH\, J.\, dissenting \nSince early in U. S. history\, Congress has regular ly \nauthorized the President to impose tariffs on imports of\nforeign goo ds. Presidents have often used that authority to\nobtain leverage with for eign nations\, help American \nmanufacturers and workers compete on a more level \nplaying field\, and generate revenue for the United States.\nNume rous laws such as the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 \nand the Trade Act of 1 974 continue to authorize the \nPresident to place tariffs on foreign impo rts in a variety of\ncircumstances\, and Presidents have often done so. In \nrecent years\, Presidents George W. Bush\, Obama\, and \nBiden have all imposed tariffs on foreign imports under\nthose statutory authorities.\nP resident Trump has similarly imposed tariffs\, and has \ndone so here unde r IEEPA. During declared national\nemergencies\, IEEPA broadly authorizes the President to \nregulate international economic transactions. \nMost \n relevant for this case\, during those national emergencies\, \nIEEPA grant s the President the power to “regulate . . . \nimportation” of foreign goods.\nIn early 2025\, President Trump declared two national \nemergenci es pursuant to the National Emergencies Act.\nSee 50 U. S. C. §1621(a). One emergency concerned drug \ntrafficking into the United States. The ot her emergency\ninvolved trade imbalances with foreign nations that have \n harmed American manufacturers and workers. \nTo help address those emergen cies\, the President drew \nupon his authority in IEEPA to “regulate . . . importation\,”\nand he imposed tariffs on imports from various countr ies.\nThe plaintiffs argue and the Court concludes that the\nPresident lac ks authority under IEEPA to impose tariffs. I \ndisagree. In accord with Judge Taranto’s careful and \npersuasive opinion in the Federal Circuit\ , I would conclude\nthat the President’s power under IEEPA to “regulat e . . . \nimportation” encompasses tariffs. As a matter of ordinary\nmea ning\, including dictionary definitions and historical \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \n3 \nusage\, the broad power to “regulate . . . importation”\nincludes the traditional and common means to do so—in \nparticular\, quotas\, embargoes\, and tariffs. \nHis tory and precedent confirm that conclusion. In 1971\, \nPresident Nixon i mposed 10 percent tariffs on almost all \nforeign imports. He levied the t ariffs under IEEPA’s \npredecessor statute\, the Trading with the Enemy Act\,\nwhich similarly authorized the President to “regulate\n. . . impo rtation.” The Nixon tariffs were upheld in court. \nMoreover\, in 1976\, a year before IEEPA was enacted\, this\nCourt unanimously ruled that a si milarly worded statute\nauthorizing the President to “adjust the impor ts” permitted\nPresident Ford to impose monetary exactions on foreign oi l \nimports. See Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin \nSNG\, Inc.\, 426 U. S. 548 (1976) (Algonquin).\nFor both the Nixon tariffs and the For d tariffs upheld by\nthis Court in Algonquin\, the relevant statutory prov isions\ndid not specifically refer to “tariffs” or “duties\,” but instead\nmore broadly authorized the President to “regulate . . . \nimpo rtation” or to “adjust the imports.” Therefore\, when \nIEEPA was e nacted in 1977 in the wake of the Nixon and \nFord tariffs and the Algonqu in decision\, Congress and the\npublic plainly would have understood that the power to\n“regulate . . . importation” included tariffs. If Congr ess\nwanted to exclude tariffs from IEEPA\, it surely would not \nhave ena cted the same broad “regulate . . . importation”\nlanguage that had ju st been used to justify major American\ntariffs on foreign imports.\nImpor tantly\, IEEPA’s authorization for the President to \nimpose tariffs did not grant the President any new \nsubstantive power. Since the Founding\, numerous statutes\nhave authorized—and still do authorize—the Preside nt to \nimpose tariffs and other foreign import restrictions. IEEPA \nmer ely allows the President to impose tariffs somewhat\nmore efficiently to d eal with foreign threats during national \nemergencies. \n4 \nLEARNING RES OURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \nContext and common sense buttress that interpretation\nof IEEPA. The plaintiffs and the Court acknowledge that \nIEEPA authorizes the President to impose quotas or\nem bargoes on foreign imports—meaning that a President \ncould completely b lock some or all imports. But they say\nthat IEEPA does not authorize the President to employ the \nlesser power of tariffs\, which simply conditio n imports on a \npayment. As they interpret the statute\, the President \n could\, for example\, block all imports from China but cannot \norder even a $1 tariff on goods imported from China.\nThat approach does not make mu ch sense. Properly read\,\nIEEPA does not draw such an odd distinction be tween \nquotas and embargoes on the one hand and tariffs on the \nother. \ nRather\, it empowers the President to regulate\nimports during national e mergencies with the tools \nPresidents have traditionally and commonly use d\, \nincluding quotas\, embargoes\, and tariffs. \nThe Court today noneth eless concludes otherwise and\nholds that IEEPA does not authorize the Pre sident to \nimpose tariffs to deal with the declared drug trafficking and\ ntrade deficit emergencies. But the Court’s decision is \nsplintered. I n today’s six-Justice majority\, three Justices \n(JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR\, J USTICE KAGAN\, and JUSTICE \nJACKSON) interpret IEEPA not to authorize tar iffs as a \nmatter of ordinary statutory interpretation. I disagree for\n the reasons noted above and elaborated on at length in this \nopinion.\nTh ree other Justices (THE CHIEF JUSTICE\, JUSTICE \nGORSUCH\, and JUSTICE BA RRETT) lean on the major\nquestions canon of statutory interpretation to r esolve this \ncase. That important canon requires “clear congressional\n authorization” for an executive action of major economic\nand political significance\, particularly when the Executive \nexercises an “unheral ded” power. West Virginia v. EPA\, \n597 U. S. 697\, 722–723 (2022) (q uotation marks omitted). \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nKAVANAUGH\, J .\, dissenting \n5 \nIn my view\, as I will explain\, the major questions canon\ndoes not control here for two alternative and independent \nreasons . \nFirst\, the statutory text\, history\, and precedent\nconstitute “cl ear congressional authorization” for the \nPresident to impose tariffs u nder IEEPA. In particular\,\nthroughout American history\, Presidents hav e commonly \nimposed tariffs as a means to “regulate . . . importation .” So \ntariffs were not an “unheralded” power when Congress\nenacte d IEEPA in 1977 and authorized the President to \n“regulate . . . import ation” of foreign goods. Therefore\, the \nmajor questions doctrine is satisfied here. Cf. Biden v. \nMissouri\, 595 U. S. 87 (2022) (per curiam) .\nSecond\, in any event\, the Court has never before applied\nthe major q uestions doctrine in the foreign affairs context\,\nincluding foreign trad e. Rather\, as Justice Robert Jackson \nsummarized and remains true\, thi s Court has always\nrecognized the “‘unwisdom of requiring Congress in this\nfield of governmental power to lay down narrowly definite \nstandar ds by which the President is to be governed.’” \nYoungstown Sheet &am p\; Tube Co. v. Sawyer\, 343 U. S. 579\, 636\, \nn. 2 (1952) (concurring o pinion) (quoting United States v. \nCurtiss-Wright Export Corp.\, 299 U. S . 304\, 321–322 \n(1936)). In foreign affairs cases\, courts read the st atute as\nwritten and do not employ the major questions doctrine as \na th umb on the scale against the President.\nAlthough I firmly disagree with t he Court’s holding\ntoday\, the decision might not substantially constra in a\nPresident’s ability to order tariffs going forward. That is \nbec ause numerous other federal statutes authorize the \nPresident to impose t ariffs and might justify most (if not \nall) of the tariffs at issue in th is case—albeit perhaps with \na few additional procedural steps that IEE PA\, as an\nemergency statute\, does not require. Those statutes \ninclud e\, for example\, the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 \n(Section 232)\; the Tr ade Act of 1974 (Sections 122\, 201\, and \n6 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \n301)\; and the Tariff Act of 1930 (Section 338). In essence\, \nthe Court today concludes that the Presiden t checked the \nwrong statutory box by relying on IEEPA rather than \nanot her statute to impose these tariffs.\nIn the meantime\, however\, the inte rim effects of the \nCourt’s decision could be substantial. The United States \nmay be required to refund billions of dollars to importers\nwho p aid the IEEPA tariffs\, even though some importers\nmay have already passe d on costs to consumers or others.\nAs was acknowledged at oral argument\, the refund process\nis likely to be a “mess.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 153 –155. In \naddition\, according to the Government\, the IEEPA tariffs \n have helped facilitate trade deals worth trillions of \ndollars—includin g with foreign nations from China to the \nUnited Kingdom to Japan\, and m ore. The Court’s decision \ncould generate uncertainty regarding those trade \narrangements.\nIn any event\, the only issue before the Court toda y is one \nof law. In light of the statutory text\, longstanding historic al\npractice\, and relevant Supreme Court precedents\, I would\nconclude t hat IEEPA authorizes the President to “regulate \n. . . importation” b y imposing tariffs on foreign imports \nduring declared national emergenci es. \nI therefore \nrespectfully dissent.1 \nI \nBefore turning to the spe cifics of IEEPA’s text\, history\,\nand precedent\, I briefly review sev eral fundamental\nconstitutional principles about the roles of the three\n branches of the U. S. Government with respect to this case. \nFirst\, the plaintiffs and their amici\, echoed by the Court\, \nrhetorically emphasiz e that Article I\, Section 8\, of the \nConstitution assigns Congress\, no t the President\, authority \n—————— \n1In this dissent\, when I refer to “THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s opinion\,” I am \nreferring to the parts of THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s opinion that speak for only\nthree Justic es—namely\, Parts II–A–2 and III. \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \n7 \nover tariffs. Ante\, at 5. That rheto ric is a red herring in \nthis case because no one disputes the point. Eve ryone\,\nincluding the President\, agrees that Congress possesses\nconstit utional authority over tariffs.\nThe important principle here\, as everyon e also \nacknowledges\, is that Congress may in turn authorize the\nPresid ent to impose tariffs. \nCf. FCC v. Consumers’ \nResearch\, 606 U. S. 65 6\, 673–675 (2025)\; J. W. Hampton\, \nJr.\, &\; Co. v. United States \, 276 U. S. 394\, 409–410 (1928). \nIndeed\, since the beginning of the Republic\, Congress has\nregularly empowered the President to order tarif fs and \nother foreign import restrictions under various \ncircumstances. As noted above\, many current federal laws \ncontinue to grant the Presid ent expansive tariff authority\,\nincluding the Trade Expansion Act of 196 2 (Section 232)\;\nthe Trade Act of 1974 (Sections 122\, 201\, and 301)\; and the \nTariff Act of 1930 (Section 338). Neither the plaintiffs nor\nt he Court has suggested that the numerous laws granting \ntariff power to t he President violate the Constitution’s \nseparation of powers. \nSecond \, and relatedly\, the President does not claim\nunilateral authority to i mpose IEEPA tariffs without \ncongressional authorization or over a congre ssional\nprohibition. On the contrary\, the President’s argument\nrecogn izes that\, in exercising his statutory tariff power \nunder IEEPA\, he mu st act within the scope of Congress’s \nauthorizations and abide by Cong ress’s limitations. And \nthe Executive has further acknowledged that t he Judiciary \nmaintains the final word in justiciable cases on whether \n Congress has authorized the President to impose those\ntariffs under IEEPA . See Trump v. CASA\, Inc.\, 606 U. S. \n831\, 859–860\, n. 18 (2025)\; cf. Marbury v. Madison\, 1 \nCranch 137\, 177–178 (1803). \nThe Preside nt here contends only that Congress\, by\nenacting IEEPA in 1977\, authori zed the President to \nimpose tariffs on foreign imports in declared natio nal \n8 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \nemergencies. To use the familiar vernacular of Justice \nRobert Jackson in Youngstown\, the President argues that \nthis case falls into category one\, where the President is\nacting “pursuant to an express or implied authorization of \nCongress.” Youngstown Sheet &\; Tube Co. v. Sawye r\, 343 \nU. S. 579\, 635 (1952) (concurring opinion). The President \nhas not here asserted authority to impose IEEPA tariffs in\na peacetime emerg ency in a Youngstown category two or \nthree scenario. Id.\, at 637–638. 2 \nThird\, Congress possesses a variety of tools to limit the\nPresiden t’s tariffs—directly via new legislation or\, perhaps\nmore readily\, by not approving annual appropriations \nnecessary for the Executive Branc h to continue to \nimplement the tariffs. See Biden v. Nebraska\, 600 U. S . \n477\, 505 (2023) (“Among Congress’s most important\nauthorities is its control of the purse”).\nImportantly\, the House\, the Senate\, and the President \nannually approve most appropriations. As a result\, each \nHouse of Congress and the President independently \npossesses \nde fact o veto power over particular \nappropriations.3 \nOf course\, many differe nt appropriations items are\nusually considered and packaged together\, so the \nnegotiations can be complex. But the point stands:\nCongress is not a helpless bystander when it comes to the\nPresident’s exercise of tari ff authority under IEEPA. Cf. \nIke Skelton National Defense Authorizatio n Act for Fiscal \nYear 2011\, 124 Stat. 4351–4352 (barring Executive fr om \n—————— \n2Category two applies when “the President acts in absence of either a \ncongressional grant or denial of authority.” Youngstown\, 343 U. S.\, at \n637 (Jackson\, J.\, concurring). Category t hree occurs when “the President\ntakes measures incompatible with the ex pressed or implied will of \nCongress.” Ibid. \n3Two technical points f or clarity: Given current Senate filibuster \nrules\, a determined minorit y of the Senate could block an appropriation. \nAlso\, even over a Preside ntial veto\, two-thirds of both Houses could \ntogether approve certain ap propriations. \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissent ing \n9 \nusing funds to transfer detainees from Guantanamo into\nUnited S tates)\; Boland Amendment\, 98 Stat. 1935–1936 \n(1984) (barring certain Executive Branch agencies from\nproviding aid to Contras in Nicaragua). \ nIn Congress\, moreover\, everything is related to \neverything else\, as the saying goes. \nMembers and \nCommittees of Congress possess substantia l tools of \nleverage over the Executive Branch. Cf. The Federalist No. \n 51\, p. 322 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison). Congress\ncould\, for ex ample\, wield its authority over oversight\, \nlegislation\, confirmations \, or appropriations to pressure the \nPresident to reduce or eliminate so me or all of the IEEPA \ntariffs. \nIn light of Congress’s appropriation s authority and its\nother robust powers\, it is not correct to suggest— as THE \nCHIEF JUSTICE’s opinion today elliptically does\, ante\, at 9 — \nthat two-thirds majorities of both Houses of Congress would\nneed to pass new legislation over a Presidential veto in \norder to limit these I EEPA tariffs or\, more generally\, to\nrestrict the President’s use of I EEPA to impose tariffs. \nII \nThis case presents one straightforward ques tion of \nstatutory interpretation: Does Congress’s explicit grant of \ nauthority in IEEPA for the President to “regulate . . . \nimportation ” of foreign goods in declared national \nemergencies authorize the Pres ident to impose tariffs? The \nanswer is a clear yes.4 \n————— — \n4The relevant statutory provision provides in full: \n“At the time s and to the extent specified in section 1701 of this title\, \nthe Presid ent may\, under such regulations as he may prescribe\, by means\nof instru ctions\, licenses\, or otherwise— \n.\n.\n.\n.\n. \n“(B) investigate\, block during the pendency of an investigation\, \nregulate\, direct and c ompel\, nullify\, void\, prevent or prohibit\, any \n10 \nLEARNING RESOURC ES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \nA \nI begin as always w ith the statutory text.\nIn 1941\, a few days after Pearl Harbor\, Congres s first \nenacted the relevant language\, “regulate . . . importation\ ,”\nin an amendment to the 1917 Trading with the Enemy Act\,\nknown as T WEA. 55 Stat. 839\; 40 Stat. 411. After that \n1941 amendment\, TWEA aut horized the President to \n“regulate . . . importation” both during wa rtime and during\npeacetime national emergencies.\nThen\, in 1977\, Congre ss split TWEA into two separate \nstatutes. As relevant here\, Congress am ended TWEA to \nauthorize the President to “regulate . . . importation ”\nduring wartime only. 91 Stat. 1625. And Congress enacted\na separat e statute\, IEEPA\, that granted the President the \npower to “regulate . . . importation” during peacetime\nnational emergencies. Id.\, at 162 6. \nThe relevant IEEPA text authorized the President to \n“regulate . . . importation” “by means of instructions\, \nlicenses\, or otherwis e.” \nIbid.\; 50 U. S. C. §1702(a)(1)\n(emphasis added). As the term “otherwise” indicates\, the \nbroadly worded statute did not exclude tariffs or dictate any \nspecific means of regulating importation.5 \nAt t he time of TWEA’s amendment in 1941 and IEEPA’s \nenactment in 1977\, the ordinary dictionary meaning of\n“regulate” was to “control\, ” to “adjust by rule\,” or to “subject \n—————— \nacqu isition\, holding\, withholding\, use\, transfer\, withdrawal\, \ntranspor tation\, importation or exportation of\, or dealing in\, or exercising\nan y right\, power\, or privilege with respect to\, or transactions involving \, \nany property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has a ny \ninterest by any person\, or with respect to any property\, subject to the \njurisdiction of the United States.” 50 U. S. C. §1702(a)(1) (em phasis \nadded). \n5Congress no doubt appreciated that quotas\, embargoes\ , tariffs\, and \nthe like can be powerful tools for regulating foreign co mmerce. Congress\ncalibrated the statute by exempting various categories of goods\, meaning \nthat those categories of goods are not subject to tar iffs under IEEPA. \n§1702(b). \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nKAVANAU GH\, J.\, dissenting \n11 \nto governing principles or laws.” Black’s Law Dictionary \n1156 (5th ed. 1979)\; see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1519 \n(3d ed. 1933) (same)\; Webster’s Third New International\nDiction ary 1913 (1976) (defining “regulate” as “to govern or\ndirect accord ing to rule” and “to bring under the control of \nlaw or constituted a uthority”)\; American Heritage\nDictionary 1096 (1969) (“[t]o control or direct according to a\nrule”\; “[t]o adjust in conformity to a spec ification or \nrequirement”).\nImposing tariffs on imports is clearly a way of controlling \nimports (Black’s)\; governing or directing imports according \nto rule (Webster’s\, American Heritage)\; adjusting imports \nby rule\, method\, or established mode (Black’s\, American \nHeritage) \; or more generally subjecting imports to \ngoverning principles or laws (Black’s). So the dictionary\ndefinitions amply demonstrate that tariff s are a means to\n“regulate . . . importation” of foreign imports.6 \n Consistent with those dictionary definitions and \nstatutory references\, tariffs historically have been—and\nstill are—a common means for the U nited States to \nregulate importation of foreign goods. See\, e.g.\, Sect ion 338 \nof the Tariff Act of 1930\, 46 Stat. 704–706 (19 U. S. C. \n§ 1338)\; Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962\, 76 \nStat. 877 (1 9 U. S. C. §1862)\; Title II of the Trade Act of \n1974\, 88 Stat. 2011 ( 19 U. S. C. §2251 et seq.)\; Title III of \nthe Trade Act of 1974\, 88 St at. 2041 (19 U. S. C. §2411 \net seq.).7 \n—————— \n6As other statutory authorities textually confirm\, moreover\, Congress \nhas long understood tariffs to be a tool for regulating imports. For \nexample\, Se ction 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930 refers to “duties and other \nimport restrictions.” 19 U. S. C. §§1351(a)(1)(B)\, (c). And Section 122 o f \nthe Trade Act of 1974 uses the phrase “restrict imports” to cover duties. \n§2132(a). Both statutes take it as a given\, therefore\, that tariffs are a \nmeans of regulating imports.\n7As the parties and the Cour t use the terms\, “tariffs” and “duties” are \nsynonymous. \n12 \n LEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \nIn dete rmining the ordinary meaning of “regulate \n. . . importation\,” the m eaning of the related phrase\n“regulate commerce” is also instructive. That phrase has\nlong been interpreted to encompass tariffs. Since the \nFounding\, the Constitution’s assignment to Congress of the \nbroad po wer to “regulate” foreign commerce has been\nunderstood to include tar iffs on foreign imports. See Art. I\, \n§8. \nAs Chief Justice Marshall e xplained\, the “right to \nregulate commerce\, even by the imposition of duties\, was not \ncontroverted.” Gibbons v. Ogden\, 9 Wheat. 1\, 202 (1824) \n(emphasis added). So too Justice Story: The “power to \nregulat e commerce includes the power of laying duties to \ncountervail the regula tions and restrictions of foreign\nnations.” 2 J. Story\, Commentaries o n the Constitution of\nthe United States 530 (1833) (emphasis added). And still \nmore Story: To “lay duties” is a “common means of \nexecutin g the power” to “regulate commerce.” Id.\, at 531 \n(emphasis added) . James Madison likewise stated that it \ncannot “be inferred” that the “power to regulate trade does \nnot involve a power to tax it.” Letter from J. Madison to J. \nCabell\, Sept. 18\, 1828\, in 9 Writings of James Madison 326 \n(G. Hunt ed. 1910) (emphasis added). \nMarshall\, Sto ry\, and Madison make for a formidable trio.\nAnd this Court has long echo ed the Marshall-Story\nMadison understanding that tariffs “regulate” f oreign \ncommerce. The “laying of a duty on imports\, although an \nexer cise of the taxing power\, is also an exercise of the power \nto regulate foreign commerce.” McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil \nCorp.\, 309 U. S. 414\, 428 (1940) (emphasis added). And \nagain: Even though “the taxing power is a distinct power \nand embraces the power to lay duties\, it does not foll ow that\nduties may not be imposed in the exercise of the power to \nregul ate commerce. The contrary is well established.” \n Cite as: 607 U. S. _ ___ (2026) \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \n13 \nBoard of Trustees of Univ. of Ill. v. United States\, 289 U. S. \n48\, 58 (1933) (emphasis added).8 \nThe plaintiffs and the Court today seize on the word \n“regulate” in isolation\, and say that it does not encompass \nthe power to tariff. Ant e\, at 14–16. But the relevant \nstatutory phrase is “regulate . . . importation.” And we \nmust look to the meaning of the phrase as a whole \, as our \nprecedents dictate. See FCC v. AT&\;T Inc.\, 562 U. S. 397 \, \n406 (2011) (“[T]wo words together may assume a more\nparticular mea ning than those words in isolation”). As I \nhave explained\, since the Founding\, tariffs on foreign\nimports have been a common means of regula ting foreign\ncommerce\, including imports. Notably\, under the Court’s \nreading of the word “regulate\,” Marshall\, Story\, and\nMadison all erred by concluding that the power to \n“regulate” foreign commerce i ncludes the power to impose \ntariffs on foreign imports. That seems dubio us. \nIf the Federal Government’s constitutional power to\n“regulate ” foreign commerce includes tariffs (as this Court \nhas repeatedly said )\, and if the power to “regulate . . . \nimportation” is the power to regulate foreign commerce\nwith respect to imports (as it plainly is)\, t hen IEEPA’s\nauthorization for the President to “regulate . . . \nimpo rtation” clearly encompasses tariffs. Historical usage \nand that textua l syllogism further buttress the dictionary\ndefinitions and help establis h that tariffs are a means to \nregulate importation.9 \n————— — \n8Importantly\, those historical sources also fully demonstrate that the \nForeign Commerce Clause\, not just the Taxing Clause\, authorizes ta riffs\non foreign imports. See Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill.\, 289 U . S.\, at \n58. \n9The plaintiffs and the Court offer a double-bankshot ar gument that \n“regulate . . . importation” cannot include monetary exa ctions because \nIEEPA also authorizes the President to “regulate . . . exportation\,” and\nimposing duties on exports would violate the Constit ution. Ante\, at 15. \nBut as the Government thoroughly explains\, when a statute contains a \n14 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nKAVANAUGH\ , J.\, dissenting \nB \nPerhaps even more significantly\, when IEEPA was\n enacted in 1977\, Congress and the public clearly would \nhave understood that the phrase “regulate . . . importation” \nencompassed tariffs. We know as much not only because of \nthe dictionary definitions and the tra ditional \nunderstanding of tariffs as a tool to regulate foreign \nimport s. We also know as much because of tariffs imposed\nby two Presidents and approved by federal courts\, including \nthe Supreme Court\, in the years shortly before IEEPA’s\n1977 enactment. \nFirst\, in 1971\, President Ni xon imposed 10 percent tariffs\nacross the board on virtually all imports from every country\nin the world. Presidential Proclamation No. 4074\, 3 C FR \n60–61 (1971–1975 Comp.). Those tariffs were justified \nunder I EEPA’s predecessor statute\, the Trading with the \nEnemy Act\, or TWEA. 10 Like IEEPA now\, TWEA at that \ntime authorized the President to “re gulate . . . importation”\nduring national emergencies\, as well as wart ime. And like \nIEEPA now\, TWEA did not specifically use the words\n“t ariff ” or “duty.” \n—————— \nlong string of verbs and n ouns\, each term should be understood in \ncontext. The relevant section of IEEPA contains 9 verbs and 11 objects\,\nfor a total of 99 combinations . We do not need to construe each word of \nthe statute to ensure that it is perfectly aligned in all 99 pairings. See \nReply Brief 17\; Robers v . United States\, 572 U. S. 639\, 643–644 (2014)\; \nDepartment of Agric ulture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v. \nKirtz\, 601 U. S. 42\, 61 (2024) (We may not “disregard the statute’s clear\nterms” simply because there may be “a valid constitutional defense” to\nsome applic ations). \n10President Nixon did not explicitly cite the “regulate . . . importation”\nlanguage of TWEA when imposing those worldwide tariffs. But that \nmerely reflected a diplomatic nicety given the title of the “ Trading with \nthe Enemy Act” and the desire to avoid publicly suggestin g that allies\nwere enemies. Once in court\, the President openly invoked the “regulate \n. . . importation” language of TWEA as justification f or the tariffs. See \nUnited States v. Yoshida Int’l\, Inc.\, 526 F. 2d 560\, 569–571 (CCPA 1975). \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nKAVANAUG H\, J.\, dissenting \n15 \nThe Nixon tariffs did not fly below the radar. On the \ncontrary\, President Nixon announced the worldwide 10\npercent t ariffs in a primetime address to the Nation on\nAugust 15\, 1971. He impo sed the tariffs as a tool “to make \ncertain that American products will not be at a \ndisadvantage” and that “the product of American labor w ill\nbe more competitive.” Public Papers of the Presidents\, \nRichard Nixon\, Aug. 15\, 1971\, p. 889. President Nixon \nsought to remove “th e unfair edge that some of our foreign\ncompetition has\,” and he declar ed that when “the unfair \ntreatment is ended\, the import tax will en d.” Ibid. \nThe Nixon tariffs applied to almost all imports of foreign\ ngoods into the United States. And the tariffs had no time \nlimit. To be sure\, they did not end up lasting forever. But \nPresident Nixon termina ted them only because the tariffs \n(as intended) induced major American t rading partners to \nnegotiate new agreements. Presidential Proclamation No. \n4098\, 3 CFR 94 (1971–1975 Comp.).\nThe Nixon tariffs garnered sub stantial national and\ninternational attention\, and were generally popula r in \nCongress. \nPredictably\, however\, the tariffs sparked\nlitigation challenges. In 1975\, the Court of Customs and \nPatent Appeals\, the pre decessor to the Federal Circuit\, \nupheld the Nixon tariffs as a lawful e xercise of the \nPresident’s authority to “regulate . . . importatio n” under\nTWEA. United States v. Yoshida Int’l\, Inc.\, 526 F. 2d 560\ , \n576\, 583–584. The losing plaintiffs did not seek further \nreview i n this Court. \nTwo years later in 1977\, when Congress divided TWEA \nint o two\, Congress retained that same “regulate . . . \nimportation” lan guage in both laws—in TWEA for wartime\nand in IEEPA for peacetime natio nal emergencies. In doing\nso\, Members of Congress were plainly aware—a fter all\, how \ncould they not be—that the “regulate . . . importat ion”\nlanguage had recently been invoked by the President and\ninterpret ed by the courts to encompass tariffs. Indeed\, the \n16 \nLEARNING RESOU RCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \nHouse Committee Repor t noted that the relevant “regulate \n. . . importation” provision in TWEA “came into play when\, \non August 15\, 1971\, President Nixon decl ared a national \nemergency with respect to the balance-of-payments crisis \nand under that emergency imposed a surcharge on \nimports.” H. R. Rep. No. 95–459\, p. 5 (1977). The Report\nfurther referenced the appeals c ourt’s holding in Yoshida \nthat TWEA “authorized imposition of duti es” because of \n“the existence of the national emergency.” H. R. R ep. No. \n95–459\, at 5.11 \nThe Nixon tariffs persuasively demonstrate that \nMembers of Congress and the public would have \nunderstood the phra se “regulate . . . importation” to include \ntariffs when IEEPA was en acted in 1977. If Congress\nwanted to exclude tariffs from IEEPA’s scop e\, why would it\nenact the exact statutory language from TWEA that had \n just been invoked by the President and interpreted by the\ncourts to cover tariffs? Neither the plaintiffs nor the Court \ntoday offers a good answ er to that question.\nUnderstandably so\, because there is no good answer. \nThe Court tries to dodge the force of the Nixon tariffs by\nobserving t hat one appeals court’s interpretation of \n“regulate . . . importat ion” to uphold President Nixon’s \ntariffs does not suffice to describ e that interpretation as \n“well-settled” when IEEPA was enacted in 19 77. Ante\, at \n17–18. Fair enough. But that is not the right question . The \nquestion is what Members of Congress and the public would \nhave understood “regulate . . . importation” to mean when\nCongress enacted IEEPA in 1977. See New Prime Inc. v. \nOliveira\, 586 U. S. 105\, 113 (20 19). Given the significant\nand well-known Nixon tariffs\, it is entirely implausible to \n—————— \n11I cite the Committee Report not fo r determining the meaning of \nIEEPA\, but rather to help show as an histo rical and factual matter that\nMembers of Congress were aware of both the Nixon tariffs and the \nappeals court decision upholding those tariffs as a tool to “regulate . . . \nimportation.” \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ ( 2026) \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \n17 \nthink that Congress’s 1977 re -enactment of the phrase \n“regulate . . . importation” in IEEPA was s omehow meant \nor understood to exclude tariffs.12 \nSecond\, if one holds any lingering doubts about \nCongress’s and the public’s understandin g of the power to\n“regulate . . . importation” as of 1977\, a second episode \nshortly before IEEPA’s enactment should answer them. \nIn 1975 \, President Ford imposed significant monetary \nexactions on foreign impo rts of oil.\n Presidential \nProclamation No. 4341\, 3 CFR 433 (1971–197 5 Comp.). He \nacted under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. \nLike TWEA and IEEPA\, the relevant provision of Section\n232 did not use the word “tariff ” or “duty.” Rather\, Section \n232 broadly aut horized the President to “adjust the \nimports” of a product\, 19 U. S . C. §1862(b) (1970 ed.)—\nlanguage akin to the “regulate . . . impor tation” language in \nIEEPA and TWEA. \nIn contrast to the Nixon tariffs \, the Ford tariffs on oil \nimports generated some pushback in Congress. And a \ngroup of utility companies and States quickly sued\, arguing \nth at the relevant statutory phrase “adjust the imports” did \nnot author ize monetary exactions such as tariffs.\nOver a dissent\, the D. C. Circui t agreed with the\nplaintiffs challenging the Ford tariffs. Much like the \nCourt’s decision today\, the D. C. Circuit in the Ford matter\nconclud ed that Congress must explicitly authorize \nmonetary exactions and that t he applicable statutory\nphrase\, “adjust the imports\,” did not do so . Algonquin SNG\, \n—————— \n12 THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s opinion also tries to dismiss President Nixon’s\ntariffs as being of “limited amount\, duration\, and scope.” Ante\, at 10\, n. \n3. That claim appe ars incorrect on all three points\, as Judge Taranto \ncarefully explained in his Federal Circuit opinion. 149 F. 4th 1312\, \n1367–1369 (2025) (d issenting opinion). President Nixon imposed 10\npercent tariffs on virtual ly all imports from every country in the world \nfor an unspecified durati on. See Presidential Proclamation No. 4074\, 3 \nCFR 60–61 (1971–1975 Comp.). \n18 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, diss enting \nInc. v. Federal Energy Admin.\, 518 F. 2d 1051\, 1055 (CADC \n197 5).\nIn 1976\, the Ford tariffs case came to the Supreme Court.\nIn this C ourt\, the plaintiffs pressed nearly identical \narguments (and rhetorical flourishes) as those advanced by\nthe plaintiffs and repeated by the Cour t in today’s case.\nThe plaintiffs argued that the Ford-imposed monetary \nexactions involved “the broadest exercise of the tariff power \nin th e history of the American Republic\,” reminiscent of \n“George III’s stamp tax.” Tr. of Oral Arg. in Federal Energy \nAdministration v. Algo nquin SNG\, Inc.\, O. T. 1975\, No. 75– \n382\, p. 26. They contended th at the statute’s authorization \nfor the President to “adjust the im ports” did not allow for\nsuch monetary exactions because the statute di d “not \nmention the tariff on its face.” Ibid. They asserted that th is\nCourt had “never implied a tax\, never in the history of this\nCourt from language which does not explicitly provide for \ntax\, and here ther e is no such language\, there is no \nlanguage that mentions a measure of tax nor a method of \ncalculation of tax. There is no such thing.” Id. \, at 33. They\nechoed the D. C. Circuit’s holding that reading the phr ase\n“adjust the imports” to encompass tariffs would be “an \nanomal ous departure” from “the consistently explicit\, well\ndefined manner in which Congress has delegated control\nover foreign trade and tariffs. ” Algonquin\, 518 F. 2d\, at \n1055. And they claimed that interpreting the statute to\ninclude fees “undermines the whole tariff structure of the \nUnited States.” Tr. of Oral Arg. in Algonquin\, at 26. \n Importan tly\, the Algonquin plaintiffs acknowledged (as\ndo the plaintiffs and the Court in today’s case) that the \nstatutory language “adjust the im ports” would allow the \nPresident to impose quotas and embargoes on for eign\nimports. See Brief for Respondents in Algonquin\, No. 75– \n382\, pp. 26–27\, and n. 30. So a President could completely \nblock all impo rts or limit their quantity. But according to\nthe plaintiffs\, Congres s’s “adjust the imports” language \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \n19 \nprecluded the President from exercisi ng the lesser power of \nimposing monetary exactions such as tariffs.\nThe Supreme Court decided the Ford tariffs case in 1976.\nThe Court unanimous ly reversed the D. C. Circuit and \nflatly rejected the plaintiffs’ argu ments. The Court held \nthat the statutory phrase “adjust the impor ts”—even\nthough it did not include terms such as “tariff\,” “tax\,”\n“duty\,” or “fee”—granted President Ford the autho rity to\nimpose not only quotas and embargoes\, but also monetary \nexacti ons on foreign imports. \nFederal Energy \nAdministration v. Algonquin SNG \, Inc.\, 426 U. S. 548\, 561 \n(1976).\nThe Court analyzed the statutory text and found “no\nsupport in the language of the statute” for the pl aintiffs’ \nargument that “adjust the imports” should “be read to \nencompass only quantitative methods—i.e.\, quotas—as\nopposed to mon etary methods—i.e.\, license fees—of \neffecting such adjustments.” Ibid. The Court further \nexplained: “Unless one assumes\, and we do no t\, that quotas\nwill always be a feasible method of dealing directly with \nnational security threats posed by the circumstances under \nwhich impo rts are entering the country\, limiting the\nPresident to the use of quota s would effectively and\nartificially prohibit him from directly dealing w ith some of \nthe very problems against which §232(b) is directed.” Id. \, \nat 561–562 (quotation marks omitted).\nIn short\, according to the unanimous Algonquin Court\, \nthe statutory text\, structure\, and logic o f Section 232 \ndefinitively established that the President’s authority to\n“adjust the imports” encompassed not only quotas and\nembargoes\, but also monetary exactions such as tariffs and \nfees. \nToday’s case s hould follow a fortiori from Algonquin. No \nmeaningful daylight exists be tween the statutory phrase \n“adjust the imports” in Section 232 at is sue in Algonquin\nand the phrase “regulate . . . importation” in IEEPA at \n20 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissentin g \nissue here. The plaintiffs and the Court in this case do not \neven tr y to distinguish “adjust the imports” from “regulate \n. . . impor tation.” Nor could they. Recall that the dictionary\ndefinition of “r egulate” includes “adjust by rule.” Black’s \nLaw Dictionary\, at 1156 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added). \nTo adjust imports is to regulate imports. Indeed\, if \nanything\, the phrase “regulate . . . importati on” is broader\nin scope than the phrase “adjust the imports.” \nSo if Section 232’s “adjust the imports” includes tariffs—\nas this C ourt unanimously concluded in Algonquin in 1976 \njust a year before IEEPA —how can IEEPA’s “regulate . . . \nimportation” not include tariff s? \nAlgonquin’s importance for today’s case rests not merely \non its status as a unanimous on-point Supreme Court\nstatutory precedent—altho ugh it is surely significant for \nthat reason as well. The case is espec ially consequential for \npresent purposes because it helps show the ordin ary public \nand congressional understanding of “regulate . . . \nimport ation” in 1977 when Congress enacted IEEPA.\nTo be clear\, the question here is not what individual \nMembers of Congress might have subjectively intended in \n1977. \nThe question is the ordinary meaning and \nunderstan ding of the words that Congress used. Given that \nthe phrase “adjust t he imports”—again\, in a statutory \nprovision that did not use specif ic words such as “tariff ” or \n“duty”—was unanimously held by t his Court in 1976 to \ninclude tariffs\, and given that President Nixon ha d\nsimilarly relied on his statutory authority to “regulate . . . \nimpo rtation” to impose 10 percent tariffs on virtually all \nimports from al l countries\, could a rational citizen or\nMember of Congress in 1977 have understood “regulate . . . \nimportation” in IEEPA not to encompass t ariffs? I think \nnot. Any citizens or Members of Congress in 1977 who \n somehow thought that the “regulate . . . importation”\nlanguage in IEE PA excluded tariffs would have had their\nheads in the sand. \n Cite as: 6 07 U. S. ____ (2026) \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \n21 \nThe Court today tries its best to distinguish Algonquin on \nthe ground that Section 232 i ncluded “sweeping” language \nauthorizing the President to take “suc h action” that “he\ndeems necessary\,” whereas IEEPA does not. Ante \, at 19. \nBut the Algonquin Court did not rely on that language and \nin stead focused on whether the phrase “adjust the imports”\nincluded mon etary exactions. See 426 U. S.\, at 561. \nMoreover\, IEEPA itself broadl y authorizes the President to \n“regulate . . . importation” “by mea ns of instructions\, \nlicenses\, or otherwise” in order to “deal wi th” an “unusual \nand extraordinary” foreign “threat” to the “ national \nsecurity\, foreign policy\, or economy of the United States.” \n50 U. S. C. §§1701(a)\, 1702(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). That \nlangu age is similarly expansive\, authorizing the President\nto employ various tools to “regulate . . . importation.” In \nshort\, just as the phra se “adjust the imports” includes \ntariffs\, as Algonquin held\, so to o the phrase “regulate . . . \nimportation” includes tariffs.13 \nThe Court also attempts to brush aside Algonquin by\nciting an entirely differ ent provision of the Trade \nExpansion Act—one that was not at issue in Algonquin— \nthat expressly refers to a “duty.” Ante\, at 19. But th e \nAlgonquin Court did not rely on—or even mention—that\nprovision wh en concluding that the statutory phrase\n“adjust the imports” includes tariffs. For good reason. That \nprovision\, which states that “[n]o action shall be taken” to\n“decrease or eliminate” an existing “du ty or other import\nrestriction\,” 19 U. S. C. §1862(a) (1970 ed.)\, co ncerns only \nthe power to reduce existing tariffs and plainly does not \n bear on a President’s power to impose tariffs under Section \n 232. \n—————— \n13In addition\, IEEPA expressly authorizes the President to require\nlicenses. And to obtain a license\, a business may need to pay license fees\nthat can be equivalent to tariffs. See §1702(a )(1). \n22 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissent ing \nTo sum up on the Nixon and Ford tariffs: When enacting\nIEEPA in 19 77\, Congress employed the exact language\nrecently invoked by President N ixon to justify 10 percent\nworldwide tariffs. And IEEPA came fast on the heels of this \nCourt’s unanimous 1976 decision in Algonquin\, which he ld \nthat substantially similar “adjust the imports” language\nauthori zed President Ford’s tariffs on oil imports.\nImportantly\, moreover\, t he statutory provisions \nauthorizing the Nixon and Ford tariffs did not u se specific \nwords such as “tariff ” or “duty.”\nThe Nixon and Fo rd tariffs\, this Court’s decision in \nAlgonquin\, and the ordinary and historical understanding \nof tariffs as a means of regulating imports to gether render\nit all but impossible to conclude that Congress in 1977 \ni mplicitly excluded tariffs when retaining TWEA’s \n“regulate . . . imp ortation” language in IEEPA. If Congress\nin 1977 wanted to exclude tari ffs from the President’s \nIEEPA toolkit\, either it would have not reta ined the phrase\n“regulate . . . importation\,” or it would otherwise have made\nclear in IEEPA that the power to impose tariffs was\nexcluded. Congress did neither. \nC \nTwo additional historical points strongly rein force that\nanalysis of text and precedent and further demonstrate \nthat “regulate . . . importation” in IEEPA encompasses\ntariffs. \nFirst\, U. S. history from the 1800s through IEEPA’s 1977\nenactment illustrates how the statute came to incorporate\nthe President’s long-recognized au thority to impose tariffs\nduring wartime and then also during peacetime n ational\nemergencies.\nLong before the initial 1917 enactment of the Tradi ng \nwith the Enemy Act\, which was IEEPA’s predecessor\, the \nPresiden t possessed inherent wartime authority to prohibit\ncommercial relations w ith enemy nations. That inherent \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nKAVA NAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \n23 \nauthority included the power to impose tari ffs on foreign \nimports.\nFor example\, during the Mexican-American War i n the\n1840s\, President Polk permitted only limited trade with \nMexico\, subject to tariffs. Some Members of Congress\npublicly questioned whether the President possessed that \ntariff authority. In response\, President Polk justified the \ntariffs on the ground that “the military right to e xclude\ncommerce altogether from the ports of the enemy in our\nmilitary o ccupation included the minor right of admitting it\nunder prescribed condi tions.” J. Polk\, To the House of \nRepresentatives of the United States (Jan. 2\, 1849)\, in 6 \nCompilation of the Messages and Papers of the Pr esidents\n2522\, 2523 (J. Richardson ed. 1897). \nIn 1854\, the Supreme Co urt agreed with President Polk’s \nview\, stating: “No one can doubt ” that the President\, as \n“commander-in-chief of our naval force\, ” possessed the\nauthority to “regulate import duties.” Cross v. Ha rrison\, 16 \nHow. 164\, 189–190. \nIn 1862\, President Lincoln partiall y lifted an existing \nblockade against the Confederate States during the Civil \nWar. Like President Polk\, he then permitted limited trade\, \nsub ject to a monetary fee. A group of cotton sellers later\nsued\, arguing th at the fee “was essentially a tax and not \nauthorized by any act of Con gress\, which alone had the\npower to impose taxes.” Hamilton v. Dillin \, 21 Wall. 73\, 81 \n(1875). \nThe Supreme Court rejected that argument\, \nholding that there was “no question” that requiring a \nmonetary fee to trade with the Confederate States was part\nof “the war power of the United States government.” Id.\, at \n86–87. The existence of war me ant “a suspension of \ncommercial intercourse between the opposing secti ons of\nthe country\,” so if “such a course of dealing were to be\nper mitted at all\, it would necessarily be upon such\nconditions as the gover nment chose to prescribe.” Id.\, at 87. \n24 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC . v. TRUMP \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \nAnd in 1898\, during the Spanis h-American War\, \nPresident McKinley imposed duties “upon the occupatio n of\nany forts and places in the Philippine Islands.” Lincoln v. \nUni ted States\, 197 U. S. 419\, 428 (1905) (quotation marks \nomitted). \nThi s Court subsequently recognized those \nMcKinley duties as a lawful wartim e measure. Id.\, at 427– \n428. \nWhy does that wartime history matter? Because when \nCongress first enacted the Trading with the Enemy Act in\n 1917 during World War I\, it statutorily codified some of the \nPresiden t’s longstanding inherent wartime powers over\nforeign trade\, which inc luded the power to tariff. See \nTrading with the Enemy Act\, ch. 106\, 4 0 Stat. 411\; see also \nBrief for Professor Aditya Bamzai as Amicus Curia e 16–19\, \n26–27. For the duration of World War I\, TWEA authorized \ nthe President\, when he found “the public safety so\nrequires\,” to m ake it unlawful “to import into the United \nStates” from any “nam ed” country certain goods “except at \nsuch time or times\, and under such regulations or orders\,\nand subject to such limitations and exceptio ns as the\nPresident shall prescribe.” §11\, 40 Stat. 422–423. \nIn 1 933\, during the Great Depression and five days after \nPresident Franklin Roosevelt took office\, Congress\nexpanded TWEA to apply not only in wart ime\, but also\nduring a “national emergency” declared by the Presiden t.\n48 Stat. 1. \nEight years later\, in 1941\, a few days after Pearl Har bor\,\nCongress again amended TWEA’s language by more\nsuccinctly provid ing that the President may “regulate”\ncertain transactions\, includ ing “importation\,” under TWEA\nduring war or “any other period of n ational emergency\ndeclared by the President.” 55 Stat. 839. \nSo as of 1941—and from then to 1977—TWEA expressly \nauthorized the Presiden t to “regulate . . . importation” both\nduring \nwartime and during pe acetime national \nemergencies. \nHistorically\, Presidents had regulated \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \n25 \nimp ortation by imposing tariffs\, as the Polk\, Lincoln\, and \nMcKinley tari ffs illustrated. So TWEA from 1941 to 1977 \nwas best understood to autho rize tariffs. See Brief for \nProfessor Aditya Bamzai as Amicus Curiae 2 7–28. \nDuring that period\, as I have discussed at length above\,\nPres ident Nixon in 1971 imposed 10 percent tariffs on\nalmost all imports of f oreign goods and relied on TWEA’s\n“regulate . . . importation” lang uage to justify them. Those \ntariffs were upheld in court. \nThen\, in 19 77\, Congress amended TWEA and divided it \ninto two statutes. TWEA retai ned the President’s power to \n“regulate . . . importation\,” but on ly during wartime. The \nnewly enacted second law\, IEEPA\, also retained the power\nto “regulate . . . importation\,” and it would apply during \nperiods of declared national emergencies. As this Court has \npreviously recognized\, IEEPA was “directly drawn” from \nTWEA\, and the relevan t authorities are essentially the \nsame. Dames &\; Moore v. Regan\, 45 3 U. S. 654\, 671\, 672– \n673 (1981).\nTherefore\, IEEPA’s specific l anguage—“regulate . . . \nimportation”—was not new statutory text when Congress\nenacted IEEPA in 1977. Far from it. Beginning in 1941\, \n TWEA had already authorized the President to “regulate \n. . . importati on” of foreign goods in wartime and national \nemergencies. And the earl ier Polk\, Lincoln\, and McKinley \nexamples\, as well as the later Nixon example\, \ndemonstrated that the power to “regulate . . . importation ”\nhistorically encompassed tariffs as well as quotas and\nembargoes.\nT he plaintiffs and the Court today assert that wartime\nprecedents do not g overn peacetime. But Congress modeled \nIEEPA on TWEA precisely so that t he President could\ncontinue to exercise certain wartime authorities such as \nquotas\, embargoes\, and tariffs during peacetime national\nemergenci es as well. Congress first explicitly extended that\nwartime power to nati onal emergencies in 1933\, during the \n26 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \nFranklin Roosevelt Administration. C f. New State Ice Co. \nv. Liebmann\, 285 U. S. 262\, 306 (1932) (Brandeis\ , J.\,\ndissenting) (The Great Depression was “an emergency more\nseriou s than war”). And Congress has continued to\nauthorize the President to exercise that power in both\nwartime and peacetime emergencies.\nIn short\ , Congress in 1977 enacted the same “regulate . . . \nimportation” lan guage that had long been understood to\nencompass tariffs. \nSecond\, cont rary to the tenor of the plaintiffs’ and the\nCourt’s arguments here\, it would not have been at all \nunusual or surprising for Congress\, when enacting IEEPA\nin 1977\, to authorize the President to impose tariffs. Since \nthe early days of the Republic\, Congress has regularly\ngranted t he President the power to regulate foreign trade\,\nincluding via tariffs. \nA few examples: In 1810\, Congress authorized the\nPresident to prohibit imports from Great Britain or France\nif either nation violated the neutr al commerce of the United \nStates. Cargo of Brig Aurora v. United States\ , 7 Cranch \n382\, 382–384\, 388 (1813)\; 2 Stat. 606. \nIn 1890\, Congr ess granted the President the power to\nimpose import duties in response t o duties imposed by other \ncountries on American exports. Marshall Field &\; Co. v. \nClark\, 143 U. S. 649\, 680–681 (1892)\; 26 Stat. 612. \ nIn 1922\, Congress empowered the President to levy \nimport duties under certain conditions. J. W. Hampton\, Jr.\, \n&\; Co. v. United States\, 276 U. S. 394\, 400–402 (1928)\; 42 \nStat. 941. \nIn 1930\, Congress en acted Section 338 of the Tariff Act\,\nwhich authorizes the President to i mpose tariffs when he \nfinds that “any foreign country places any burde n or\ndisadvantage upon the commerce of the United States.” 19 \nU. S. C. §1338(d)\; 46 Stat. 705.\nIn 1962\, Congress authorized the President in Section\n232 of the Trade Expansion Act to “adjust the imports” of a \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \n27 \nf oreign good that threatens to impair national security.\n§1862(c)(1)(A)\; 76 Stat. 877. \nIn 1974\, under Section 201 of the Trade Act\, Congress \ ngranted the President the power to “take all appropriate\nand feasible action within his power\,” including imposing a\n“duty” on imports t hat\, according to the U. S. International\nTrade Commission\, have caused or threatened “serious \ninjury” to a domestic industry. §§2251(a) \, 2253(a)(1)(A)\, \n(3)(A)\; 88 Stat. 2014–2015.\nSo too\, Section 301 authorizes the President to direct the \nU. S. Trade Representative to “ impose duties” on countries\nengaging in unfair trade practices. §§241 1(a)\, (c)(1)(B)\; 88 \nStat. 2041–2042. \nAnd Section 122 of the Act gr ants the President the power \nto impose a “temporary import surcharge ” to “deal with \nlarge and serious United States balance-of-payment\n deficits.” §2132(a)(1)(A)\; 88 Stat. 1987–1988. \nThose many statutes definitively establish that Congress\,\nsince near the Founding\, has del egated to the President \nbroad power to impose tariffs on foreign imports . See also \nante\, at 13–15 (THOMAS\, J.\, dissenting). So it would h ardly\nhave been unusual or surprising for Congress to have\ngranted tarif f power to the President during wartime and\npeacetime national emergencie s\, as it did in TWEA and \nIEEPA. \nTo be sure\, given those other statut es that authorize the \nPresident to impose tariffs on foreign imports\, o ne might\nreasonably ask: Why did the President need distinct tariff \nau thority under IEEPA during peacetime emergencies—or\, \nfor that matter\ , under TWEA during wartime? \nThe basic answer is that IEEPA is an emerge ncy statute \nthat allows the President to impose tariffs somewhat more\nq uickly\, as would be expected in a declared national \nemergency. Similarl y\, in wartime\, TWEA allows the \nPresident to impose tariffs more rapidl y. \n28 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \nBut critically\, TWEA and IEEPA do not authorize the \nPresident to exe rcise some new substantive power. Rather\, \nthey authorize the President to exercise a commonly\ngranted power—tariffs—more efficiently than u nder the \nmany ordinary tariff statutes.\nThe plaintiffs and the Court as sert that interpreting\nIEEPA to authorize tariffs would in effect evade s pecific\nlimits on tariffs in certain other tariff statutes. But as \nJud ge Taranto explained in the Federal Circuit\, Congress\nin IEEPA understan dably afforded the President more\nflexibility to act during declared emer gencies\, just as\nCongress had done in TWEA for wartime since 1917. See \n149 F. 4th 1312\, 1363–1366 (2025) (dissenting opinion).\nMoreover\, I EEPA is not a blank check. IEEPA contains \nits own limits\, including the requirement that the tariffs\ndeal with an unusual and extraordinary fore ign threat\, 50\nU. S. C. §1701(b)\; a default 1-year limit on emergencie s\,\n§1622(d)\; an enumerated list of exceptions\, §1702(b)\; and \ncomp rehensive congressional reporting requirements\, \n§1703. And as noted ab ove\, each House of Congress \npossesses a variety of tools to revoke\, li mit\, or influence a \nPresident’s IEEPA or TWEA tariffs. \nRelatedly\, it is also not surprising that the many ordinary \ntariff statutes express ly refer to “tariffs\,” “duties\,” and the\nlike\, while IEEPA and TWEA do not. As Judge Taranto\nastutely explained\, “Congress in those statutes was \noverwhelmingly focused on tariff issues\,” whereas \n“C ongress in IEEPA (as in TWEA) was focused on the \nsubject of emergencies and giving plainly broad emergency \nauthority regarding foreign property. ” 149 F. 4th\, at 1364 \n(dissenting opinion).\nIn sum\, in authorizing the President to “regulate . . . \nimportation\,” IEEPA embodies an “eyes-open congressional \ngrant of broad emergency authority in this f oreign-affairs \nrealm\, which unsurprisingly extends beyond authorities \ navailable under non-emergency laws\, and Congress \n Cite as: 607 U. S. _ ___ (2026) \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \n29 \nconfirmed the understood b readth by tying IEEPA’s\nauthority\n to particularly\n demanding procedu ral \nrequirements for keeping Congress informed.” Id.\, at 1348. \nD \ nFinally\, all of that text\, history\, and precedent is further\nreinforc ed by two compelling pieces of context. \nFirst\, interpreting IEEPA to ex clude tariffs creates\nnonsensical textual and practical anomalies. The p laintiffs\nand the Court do not dispute that the President can act in\ndec lared emergencies under IEEPA to impose quotas or \neven total embargoes o n all imports from a given country. \nBut the President supposedly cannot take the far more\nmodest step of conditioning those imports on payment of a \ntariff or duty. \nTextually\, however\, if quotas and embargoes are a means\nto regulate importation\, how are tariffs not a means to \nregulat e importation? Nothing in the text supports such an \nillogical distinctio n. \nAnd it does not make much sense to think that IEEPA \nallows the Pres ident in a declared national emergency to\,\nfor example\, shut off all or most imports from China\, but \nnot to impose even a $1 tariff on imports from China. As \nJudge Taranto forcefully pointed out in the Federal Circ uit\, \ntariffs are “just a less extreme\, more flexible tool for \npurs uing the same objective of controlling the amount or \nprice of imports th at\, after all\, could be barred altogether.”\n149 F. 4th\, at 1363 (dis senting opinion). All of that explains \nwhy this Court in Algonquin defi nitively rejected such a\nstrange slice-and-dice approach to the President ’s statutory \npower to “adjust” imports. If quotas and embargoes a re\nauthorized\, so are tariffs. \nIn short\, whether through prohibiting imports via\nembargoes or regulating the quantity of imports through \nquo tas or regulating the price of imports with tariffs\,\nCongress granted th e President flexibility in declared \n30 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TR UMP \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \nnational emergencies to take various a ctions affecting\nimports of foreign goods. The plaintiffs and the Court h ave \nno coherent textual or commonsensical explanation for why \na ration al Congress would\, in such a momentous and \ncarefully considered statute as IEEPA\, grant the President \nthe power to impose quotas and embargoes \, but not tariffs\, \non foreign imports during emergencies. \nSecond\, I EEPA was not debated and passed in a vacuum\nin 1977—it was enacted arou nd the same time that \nCongress significantly constrained executive power in\nmultiple ways in the wake of Watergate and Vietnam. The \nlist of ma jor new statutory restrictions on Presidential \npower enacted in the 1970 s is long and extraordinary\, with\nlasting effects to the present day.14 \nAnd Congress\, during that comprehensive examination\nand recalibration of government power\, did not overlook \nTWEA and the President’s emerge ncy authorities. Led by \nSenators Church and Mathias\, Congress carefully studied\nthe President’s emergency authorities\, including TWEA.\nThen\ , in 1976 and 1977\, Congress enacted a variety of \nlegislation to tighte n up the President’s emergency powers\,\nincluding by passing a new Nati onal Emergencies Act that\ncabined the President’s authority to declare emergencies by \nsetting forth various procedural requirements. \nYet when enacting IEEPA in 1977\, Congress continued to\ngrant the President the p ower to “regulate . . . importation” \n—————— \n14See\, e. g.\, Ethics in Government Act of 1978\, 92 Stat. 1824\, reenacted \nat 5 U . S. C. §13101 et seq.\; Inspector General Act of 1978\, 92 Stat. 1101\, \nreenacted at 5 U. S. C. §401 et seq.\; Presidential Records Act of 1978 \, 92 \nStat. 2523\, as amended\, 44 U. S. C. §2201 et seq.\; Federal Adv isory \nCommittee Act\, 86 Stat. 770\, as amended\, 5 U. S. C. §1001 et s eq.\; \nForeign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978\, 92 Stat. 1783\, as amended\,\n50 U. S. C. §1801 et seq.\; Congressional Budget and Impoundm ent \nControl Act of 1974\, 88 Stat. 297\, as amended\, 2 U. S. C. §621 e t seq.\; \n1974 Amendments to the Freedom of Information Act\, 88 Stat. 15 61\, as \namended\, 5 U. S. C. §552\; War Powers Resolution\, 87 Stat. 55 5\, 50 \nU. S. C. §1541 et seq. \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nKAVAN AUGH\, J.\, dissenting \n31 \nin declared national emergencies—a power t hat the \nPresident had possessed since 1941 under TWEA and that \nhad rec ently been invoked by President Nixon to justify his\n1971 tariffs. In IEE PA (and TWEA) in 1977\, Congress\nconsciously balanced concerns about expa nsive exercises of\nemergency powers against the necessity of equipping th e\nPresident with tools to address exigencies that are difficult \nif not impossible to foresee. That broader congressional\ncontext—general skept icism and scaling back of executive\npower combined with re-enactment of t he familiar “regulate \n. . . importation” language in IEEPA—strongl y indicates \nthat Congress said what it meant and meant what it said \nwh en it enacted IEEPA and continued to authorize the \nPresident to “regul ate . . . importation” during national \nemergencies. \nIII \nIn an ordi nary statutory interpretation case\, I am\nconfident that a majority of th is Court would flatly reject\nthe plaintiffs’ exceedingly weak statutory arguments and \nwould hold that IEEPA’s authorization for the President to \n“regulate . . . importation” during national emergencies\ninclud es the power to impose tariffs.\nNotably\, the Court today does not claim that the phrase\n“regulate . . . importation” on its own excludes tari ffs as a \nmatter of ordinary statutory meaning. Only three Members \nof t he Court\, JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR\, JUSTICE KAGAN\, and \nJUSTICE JACKSON\, do so. \nTHE CHIEF JUSTICE’s opinion in Part II–A–2\, which is \njoined only by JUSTICE GORSUCH and JUSTICE BARRETT\, \ninstead relies on the maj or questions doctrine. The major\nquestions doctrine is an important canon of statutory\ninterpretation that the Court has applied in a number of \n significant cases over the last 45 years. See Industrial \nUnion Dept.\, A FL–CIO v. American Petroleum Institute\, \n448 U. S. 607\, 645 (1980) (p lurality opinion). \n32 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \nJustice Scalia articulated the canonical statement of t he \nmajor questions doctrine: “We expect Congress to speak \nclearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast \n‘economic and poli tical significance.’” \nUtility Air \nRegulatory Group v. EPA\, 573 U . S. 302\, 324 (2014) \n(quoting FDA v. Brown &\; Williamson Tobacco Co rp.\, 529 \nU. S. 120\, 160 (2000))\; see also Alabama Assn. of Realtors \ nv. Department of Health and Human Servs.\, 594 U. S. 758\, \n764 (2021) ( per curiam)\; National Federation of \nIndependent Business v. OSHA\, 595 U. S. 109\, 117 (2022) \n(per curiam)\; Biden v. Nebraska\, 600 U. S. 477\ , 507 (2023)\; \ncf. West Virginia v. EPA\, 597 U. S. 697\, 723 (2022). \n Stated otherwise\, in cases where the Executive Branch \ntakes an action o f major economic and political significance\,\nit must “point to ‘clea r congressional authorization’ for the \npower it claims.” Ibid. (quo ting Utility Air\, 573 U. S.\, at \n324).\nThe requirement of “clear con gressional authorization” \nfor executive actions of major economic and political\nsignificance is “grounded in two overlapping and \nreinforcin g presumptions: (i) a separation of powers-based\npresumption against the delegation of major lawmaking \nauthority from Congress to the Executive B ranch\, and (ii) a\npresumption that Congress intends to make major policy \ndecisions itself\, not leave those decisions to agencies.” \nUnited S tates Telecom Assn. v. FCC\, 855 F. 3d 381\, 419 \n(CADC 2017) (Kavanaugh\ , J.\, dissenting from denial of \nrehearing en banc) (citation omitted). As this Court later \nrecounted in West Virginia\, “both separation of p owers\nprinciples and a practical understanding of legislative\nintent mak e us reluctant to read into ambiguous statutory \ntext the delegation clai med to be lurking there.” 597 U. S.\, \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \n33 \nat 723 (quotation marks omitted).15 The doctrine guards\n“against unintentional\, oblique\, or otherwise unl ikely\ndelegations of the legislative power.” NFIB\, 595 U. S.\, at \n1 25 (GORSUCH\, J.\, concurring).16 \nI agree that this case involves an exe cutive action of\nmajor economic and political significance—which is \nt ypically the trigger for requiring “clear congressional\nauthorization .” But in my respectful view\, THE CHIEF \nJUSTICE’s opinion’s appli cation of the major questions\ndoctrine in this case is incorrect for two alternative and \nindependent reasons. First\, the statutory text\, histo ry\, and\nprecedent constitute “clear congressional authorization” for \nthe President to impose tariffs as a means to “regulate . . . \nimpor tation.” Second\, and in the alternative\, the major\nquestions doctrine does not apply in the foreign affairs \ncontext. In the foreign affairs r ealm\, courts recognize that\nCongress often deliberately grants flexibili ty and discretion \nto the President to pursue America’s interests. In that \ncontext\, courts therefore engage in “routine” textualist \nsta tutory interpretation—reading the text as written—and\ndo not employ t he major questions doctrine as a thumb on\nthe scale against the President . West Virginia\, 597 U. S.\, \nat 724. \n—————— \n15The majo r questions doctrine has also been analogized to\, among \nother things\, the mischief rule\, the absurdity doctrine\, common sense\, \nand context. See\, e.g.\, S. Bray\, The Mischief Rule\, 109 Geo. L. J. 967\,\n1011 (20 21) (doctrine “has an essential similarity with the mischief \nrule”)\ ; Biden v. Nebraska\, 600 U. S. 477\, 511 (2023) (BARRETT\, J.\, \nconcurr ing) (context\, common sense). \n16I have long been\, and fully remain\, a strong proponent of the major \nquestions doctrine. See United States Tel ecom\, 855 F. 3d\, at 418–426 \n(opinion of Kavanaugh\, J.)\; Loving v. IRS\, 742 F. 3d 1013\, 1021 (CADC \n2014)\; Coalition for Responsible Regu lation\, Inc. v. EPA\, No. 9–1322 \n(CADC\, Dec. 20\, 2012)\, pp. 9–10 (Kavanaugh\, J.\, dissenting from denial \nof rehearing en banc). \n34 \n LEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \nA \n1 \ nBecause the major questions doctrine demands “clear\ncongressional auth orization\,” this Court has repeatedly\nrecognized that the doctrine i s “distinct” from “routine \nstatutory interpretation.” West Virg inia\, 597 U. S.\, at 724 \n(quotation marks omitted). Importantly\, ther efore\, the\ndoctrine applies—and makes a meaningful difference—only\n in cases where the Executive’s “reading of a statute” \n“would\, u nder more ordinary circumstances\, be upheld.” \nIbid. (quotation marks omitted)\; see also id.\, at 740\, 742\, \nn. 3 (GORSUCH\, J.\, concurring )\; M. Sohoni\, The Major\nQuestions Quartet\, 136 Harv. L. Rev. 262\, 272 –276 (2022). \nTo properly set up the inquiry: A major questions issue \narises when: (i) the Executive relies on the text of a \ngenerally worde d statute to exercise a specific power of\nmajor economic and political si gnificance\; (ii) the generally \nworded statute does not explicitly menti on the specific\nmajor power\, but (iii) the asserted major power falls wi thin\nthe generally worded text of the statute such that the \nExecutive ’s assertion of that power “would\, under more\nordinary circumstances \, be upheld\,” West Virginia\, 597 \nU. S.\, at 724 (majority opinion) (quotation marks omitted).17 \nThe question then is whether the generally worded \nstatute supplies “clear congressional authorization” for the \nExecutive to exercise that specific—but not explicitly\nmentioned—ma jor power. Here\, for example\, does the \ngenerally worded statutory aut horization for the President \nto “regulate . . . importation” clearly authorize the \nPresident to impose tariffs? \n—————— \n17Of course\, if the major power does not fall within the generally \nworded te xt as a matter of ordinary statutory interpretation\, the major\nquestions doctrine is not implicated or necessary to apply because the \nGovernment ’s statutory argument fails to begin with. \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2 026) \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \n35 \nThe requirement of “clear cong ressional authorization” is \neasy enough to state. But how do we apply it? How do we \ndecide in a particular case whether a generally worded \n statute actually constitutes “clear congressional \nauthorization” for a major power that otherwise falls within \nthe general terms?\nFor start ers\, and critically\, the Court has repeatedly\nemphasized that the major questions doctrine is not a\nmagic words requirement. In other words\, t he doctrine does \nnot require an explicit reference to the specific major power\nitself. As the Court’s cases amply demonstrate\, the major\nques tions doctrine does not “forc[e] Congress to delegate in\nhighly specifi c terms.” Biden v. Nebraska\, 600 U. S.\, at 516 \n(BARRETT\, J.\, concu rring) (quotation marks omitted). \nRather than require magic words (such as the words \n“tariff ” or “duty” here)\, the Court’s cases hav e focused on \nfour somewhat overlapping factors or considerations in\nord er to assess whether a generally worded statute\nconstitutes “clear cong ressional authorization” for the\nspecific major power.18 \nFirst\, the major questions doctrine’s most prominent\nwork has been to ensure that the Executive cannot \nsuddenly seize on an old and generally worded statu te to \nexercise a power of great economic and political significance\nwhe n that power would not reasonably have been \nunderstood at the time of en actment to fall within that \ngenerally worded statute. See West Virginia\ , 597 U. S.\, at \n720–735\; Brown &\; Williamson\, 529 U. S.\, at 159–161. As \nthe Court has said: “When an agency claims to discover in\na long-extant statute an unheralded power to regulate a \n —————— \n18Both JUSTICE GORSUCH and JUSTICE BARRETT have likew ise read the \nCourt’s precedents to identify those same four factors\, as they explained \nin their incisive separate opinions in West Virginia v . EPA and Biden v. \nNebraska\, respectively. See 597 U. S. 697\, 746–7 49 (2022) (GORSUCH\, J.\, \nconcurring) (referring to the four “telling clues”)\; 600 U. S.\, at 517–520\n(BARRETT\, J.\, concurring)\; see al so ante\, at 27 (GORSUCH\, J.\, concurring). \n36 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, I NC. v. TRUMP \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \nsignificant portion of the Am erican economy\, we typically\ngreet its announcement with a measure of sk epticism.” \nUtility Air\, 573 U. S.\, at 324 (citation and quotation ma rks \nomitted)\; West Virginia\, 597 U. S.\, at 748 (GORSUCH\, J.\, \nconc urring).\nThe doctrine thus precludes an agency’s attempt to\neffectua te “a fundamental revision of the statute.” MCI \nTelecommunications C orp. v. American Telephone &\; \nTelegraph Co.\, 512 U. S. 218\, 231 (1 994). Stated otherwise\, \nan “agency’s attempt to deploy an old stat ute focused on one \nproblem to solve a new and different problem” may b e “a \nwarning sign that it is acting without clear congressional \nauth ority.” West Virginia\, 597 U. S.\, at 747 (GORSUCH\, J.\, \nconcurring) . The Court’s skepticism about major executive \naction in those scenar ios has been heightened when\nCongress has “conspicuously and repeatedly declined to\nenact” legislation that would have authorized the executiv e \naction in question. Id.\, at 724 (majority opinion). \nA prototypical example occurred when OSHA\, in order to \njustify a nationwide COVID–19 vaccine mandate for \nworkers\, relied “on a statutory provision that w as adopted \n40 years before the pandemic and that focused on\nconditions specific to the workplace.” Id.\, at 747 (GORSUCH\, \nJ.\, concurring). Another example arose when EPA invoked \n“newfound authority to regula te” emissions from “millions\nof small sources—including retail stor es\, offices\, apartment\nbuildings\, shopping centers\, schools\, and chu rches.” Utility \nAir\, 573 U. S.\, at 328. Yet another happened when the CDC \ntried to impose an eviction moratorium for rental housing \nthro ugh an “unprecedented” assertion of its authority to\nregulate public health. Alabama Assn. of Realtors\, 594 \nU. S.\, at 765. \nSecond\, \ncou rts examine the “agency’s past \ninterpretations of the relevant sta tute.” West Virginia\, 597 \nU. S.\, at 747 (GORSUCH\, J.\, concurring) . The Executive’s \n“track record can be particularly probative” in the major \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \n37 \nquestions context. Biden v. Nebraska\, 600 U. S.\, at 519 \n(BARR ETT\, J.\, concurring). \nA “contemporaneous and long-held Executive Bra nch\ninterpretation of a statute is entitled to some weight.” West \nVi rginia\, 597 U. S.\, at 747 (GORSUCH\, J.\, concurring) \n(quotation marks omitted). Just “as established practice\nmay shed light on the extent o f power conveyed by general \nstatutory language\, so the want of assertio n of power by \nthose who presumably would be alert to exercise it\, is\ne qually significant in determining whether such power was\nactually conferr ed.” \nId.\, at 725 (majority opinion) \n(quotation marks omitted).\nThe NFIB Court therefore found it critical that “OSHA\, \nin its half centu ry of existence\, has never before adopted a\nbroad public health regulati on of this kind” under the \nstatute that the agency sought to invoke as authority for \nthe vaccine mandate. 595 U. S.\, at 119. Likewise\, in Brown \n&\; Williamson\, the FDA had “repeatedly and consistently\nas sert[ed] that it lacks jurisdiction under the FDCA to\nregulate tobacco pr oducts.” 529 U. S.\, at 156. And in West \nVirginia\, EPA had not “pr eviously interpreted the relevant \nprovision to confer on it such vast au thority” to transform \nAmerican industry. 597 U. S.\, at 749 (GORSUCH\, J.\, \nconcurring). \nThird\, courts assess whether “there is a mismatc h \nbetween an agency’s challenged action and its \ncongressionally assi gned mission and expertise\,” id.\, at 748 \n(GORSUCH\, J.\, concurrin g)—in other words\, whether an\nagency is trying to regulate “outside its wheelhouse\,” Biden \nv. Nebraska\, 600 U. S.\, at 518 (BARRETT\, J. \, concurring).\n In the NFIB case\, OSHA\, which is empowered to “set \ nworkplace safety standards\, not broad public health\nmeasures\,” manda ted COVID–19 vaccines. 595 U. S.\, at \n117. In Alabama Assn. of Realto rs\, the CDC—a public \nhealth agency—attempted to regulate housing. 594 U. S.\, \nat 763–765. In Gonzales v. Oregon\, the Attorney General \ n38 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \ns ought to assert authority over the drugs used in physician\nassisted suici de. 546 U. S. 243\, 267–268 (2006).\nAll of those cases involved serious mismatches between \nthe agency’s usual regulatory activities and its a sserted\nmajor power. \nFourth\, the Court looks at whether the relevant s tatutory \nlanguage used to justify the Executive’s exercise of a major\ npower is “oblique\,” “elliptical\,” or “cryptic.” West Virgi nia\, \n597 U. S.\, at 746–747 (GORSUCH\, J.\, concurring) \n(alteration s and quotation marks omitted). As the Court \nhas often said\, Congress does not “hide elephants” in\nstatutory “mouseholes.” Whitman v. American Trucking \nAssns.\, Inc.\, 531 U. S. 457\, 468 (2001). \nIn MCI T elecommunications Corp.\, for example\, the\nCourt refused to allow the FC C to eliminate rate regulation\nand fundamentally overhaul the telecommuni cations \nindustry based on a “subtle” provision that merely\npermitte d the FCC to “modify” rate-filing requirements. \n512 U. S.\, at 231 ( quotation marks omitted). In Brown &\; \nWilliamson\, the Court reject ed the FDA’s attempt to\nregulate the tobacco industry based on a “cry ptic” statutory\nprovision that referred to “safety.” 529 U. S.\, at 160 \n(quotation marks omitted). In Gonzales\, the Court said that \nCon gress would not have granted the Attorney General the \npower to regulate physician-assisted suicide through \n“oblique” statutory language. 54 6 U. S.\, at 267. And in \nWest Virginia\, the Court found it unlikely th at Congress \nwould have granted major power to reshape the energy \nindus try in a “previously little-used backwater” of the \nstatute. 597 U. S .\, at 730. \n2 \nSo in this case we must apply those four factors in orde r\nto determine whether Congress\, when it afforded the \nPresident the po wer to “regulate . . . importation\,” clearly\nauthorized the Presiden t to impose tariffs. As I see it\, those \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026 ) \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \n39 \nfactors show that Congress clearly authorized tariffs in \nIEEPA when it empowered the President to “regula te . . . \nimportation.” \nFirst\, unlike the OSHA vaccine mandate in NF IB or the \ngreenhouse gas regulation in Utility Air\, for example\, the\n President here is not exercising an “unheralded” or\n“newfound aut hority” based on a “long-extant” statute— \nthat is\, exercising a power that was unanticipated or\nunforeseen when Congress enacted IEEPA ’s “regulate . . . \nimportation” language in 1977.\nOn the contrary \, as was fully explained above\, the tariff\nauthority exercised here is not remotely “unheralded.” To \nrecap: Any citizen or Member of Congr ess who paid the \nleast bit of attention in 1977 would have readily under stood \nthat the President’s authority to “regulate . . . importatio n”\nencompassed the power to tariff. There are the dictionary \ndefinit ions and the historical usage and practice. And \namong other things\, jus t a few years before IEEPA\, that\n“regulate . . . importation” langua ge was invoked by\nPresident Nixon and judicially approved to sustain his 10 \npercent worldwide tariffs. \nPresident Ford then \nimplemented signif icant tariffs using substantially similar \n“adjust the imports” statu tory language\, and this Court \nunanimously upheld President Ford’s tar iffs in Algonquin. \nSo IEEPA’s grant of authority to the President to i mpose \ntariffs in order to regulate importation is not “unheralded” \ nor “newfound.” That authority was plain as day in 1977.19 \n—————— \n19The Court downplays the significance of the prom inent Nixon and \nFord tariffs. Ante\, at 17–19 (majority opinion)\; ant e\, at 27–28\, 39 \n(GORSUCH\, J.\, concurring). But the Nixon and Ford examples\, as well as \nAlgonquin\, are critical for a proper and full un derstanding of the \nmeaning of “regulate . . . importation” when Cong ress enacted IEEPA in\n1977. We cannot ignore or diminish that history. T HE CHIEF JUSTICE’s \nopinion and JUSTICE GORSUCH’s concurrence also sa y that no President \nsince 1977 has invoked IEEPA to impose tariffs. Ant e\, at 10 (opinion of \nROBERTS\, C. J.)\; ante\, at 27–28 (GORSUCH\, J. \, concurring). But since \n40 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nKAV ANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \nSecond\, the President is not interpreting the “regulate . . . \nimportation” language in IEEPA differently from how past\nPresidents have interpreted it. At least as far as the \nbriefing an d arguments in this case have disclosed\, no \nPresidential Administration since the enactment of the \n“regulate . . . importation” language in TWEA in 1941 or \nsince its re-enactment in IEEPA in 1977 has interpreted \nthe statute to exclude the power to impose tariffs.\nMoreover\, before IEEPA’s enactment\, President Nixon \nimposed tariffs based on the sam e “regulate . . . \nimportation” language. And in 1975\, President For d \ninvoked authority to “adjust the imports” in order to \nsimilarly impose monetary exactions. In addition—if more \nis needed—Marshall\, Story\, Madison\, and this Court have\nall long recognized that the power to regulate foreign \ncommerce includes tariffs. \nThe current Presiden t’s reading of IEEPA follows from\nand is entirely consistent with those past interpretations—\nmaking his position nothing like\, for example\, FDA’s when \nit changed its longstanding position that it lacked the \n authority to regulate cigarettes\, Brown &\; Williamson\, 529 \nU. S.\, at 159–160\, or OSHA’s when it implemented a\nvaccine requirement eve n though it had “never before\nadopted a broad public health regulation of this kind\,” \nNFIB\, 595 U. S.\, at 119. \nWhen\, as here\, “estab lished practice\,” West Virginia\, 597 \nU. S.\, at 725 (quotation marks omitted)\, and the Executive’s\n“track record\,” Biden v. Nebraska\ , 600 U. S.\, at 519 \n—————— \n1977\, Presidents have imposed numerous tariffs under non-emergency\ntariff statutes—including Section 232\, which like IEEPA also does not\nexplicitly reference tariffs or tax es. The fact that recent Presidents have \nnot often had occasion under th e National Emergencies Act to declare\nnational emergencies in which tarif fs would help “deal with” the specific\nemergency at issue does not me an that Presidents have now lost the\nauthority exercised by President Nix on to impose tariffs. IEEPA was not \ndesigned as a use-it-or-lose-it sou rce of emergency authority. \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nKAVANAUGH\ , J.\, dissenting \n41 \n(BARRETT\, J.\, concurring)\, convincingly show t hat the \ngeneral statutory language has long been understood to \ncover t he specific power asserted by the Executive\, that \nrecord should all but resolve the matter for major questions \npurposes. \nThird\, there is no mismatch: The power to tariff falls \nsquarely within the President’s w heelhouse. From the \nFounding\, as THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s opinion today\na cknowledges\, numerous other statutes have afforded—\nand still do aff ord—the President broad power to impose\ntariffs. \nAnte\, at 8–9. Th is case is entirely different\,\ntherefore\, from our prior major question s cases\, where\, for \nexample\, the CDC attempted to impose an eviction \nmoratorium\, Alabama Assn. of Realtors\, 594 U. S.\, at 763– \n765\; O SHA sought to implement a nationwide vaccine \nmandate\, NFIB\, 595 U. S.\ , at 117–120\; the FDA tried to \nregulate cigarettes\, Brown &\; Wil liamson\, 529 U. S.\, at 159– \n161\; and the Attorney General attempted to regulate \nphysician-assisted suicide\, Gonzales\, 546 U. S.\, at 26 7–268. \nPresidents imposing tariffs—whether pursuant to \ninherent wa rtime authority\, pursuant to TWEA and \nIEEPA’s “regulate . . . impor tation” language\, pursuant to \nSection 232’s “adjust the imports ” text\, or pursuant to the\nmany other tariff statutory authorities—i s hardly an\nunusual occurrence in our Nation’s history or in recent \nt imes. For example\, Presidents George W. Bush\, Obama\,\nand Biden all imp osed tariffs pursuant to congressional \nauthorization. There is no mismat ch between the tariff \npower and the President’s “mission and exper tise.” West \nVirginia\, 597 U. S.\, at 748 (GORSUCH\, J.\, concurring) . \nFourth\, the President is not relying on oblique\, elliptical\, \nor c ryptic language. This case does not involve “elephants\nin mouseholes .” Whitman\, 531 U. S.\, at 468. This case \ninstead involves an eleph ant (tariffs) in a statutory\nelephant hole (the power to “regulate . . . importation” to\ndeal with foreign threats in national emergencies). IEEPA \n42 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissent ing \nwas a major and thoroughly studied statute carefully\ncrafted to gra nt the President a suite of powerful tools\,\nincluding to “regulate . . . importation\,” and thereby allow \nhim to respond swiftly to national emergencies and to help \nAmerica respond to crises. Since its enactment\ , Presidents \nhave invoked IEEPA more than 70 times to deal with \nemerge ncies and threats from the September 11\, 2001\, al \nQaeda attacks to Ira n to North Korea\, and many others.\nSee Congressional Research Service\, The International\nEmergency Economic Powers Act: Origins\, Evolution\, an d \nUse 18–32 (2025).\nBy 1977\, moreover\, it was well-known that tarif fs on \nforeign imports—along with even more powerful tools such\nas quo tas and embargoes—were a common way to “regulate \n. . . importation .” IEEPA thus bears zero resemblance to \nthe paradigmatic “previously little-used backwater” \nstatutory provision that cannot support signif icant\nexecutive actions. West Virginia\, 597 U. S.\, at 730. \nAll of tha t makes this case dramatically different from—\nreally\, the opposite of—the major questions cases where the\nCourt has ruled against the Gove rnment. The text\, the \nhistory\, the context\, and the precedent all poi nt strongly to\nthe conclusion that as of 1977\, tariffs were a well\nreco gnized means of regulating importation\, like quotas\nand embargoes.\nAs J udge Taranto persuasively summarized\, this case\nbears none of the hallma rks of past major questions cases \nwhere the Court found a lack of clear congressional\nauthorization for the Government’s asserted major power.\ nIEEPA’s “facial breadth in an emergency context makes the\nstraightfo rward application of the statute’s words hardly \nunheralded\, and if a more specific herald is needed\, it is \npresent in the [Nixon] 1971 procl amation\, Yoshida CCPA\, \nand subsequent congressional adoption of the re levant \nlanguage in 1977.” 149 F. 4th 1312\, 1376 (CA Fed. 2025) \n(dis senting opinion) (citations omitted). IEEPA seeks “to \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \n43 \nprovide flexibility i n the tools available to the President to\naddress the unusual and extraor dinary threats specified in \na declared national emergency. This is not a n ‘ancillary\,’\n‘little used backwater’ provision\, or a delegati on outside the \nrecipient’s wheelhouse.” Ibid. (citation omitted).\nT his Court’s recent decision in Biden v. Missouri\, 595 \nU. S. 87 (2022) (per curiam)\, strongly supports the \nPresident’s position here. That case involved a challenge to \nPresident Biden’s COVID–19 vaccine req uirement for \nmillions of healthcare workers. The executive action there \, \ntoo\, was undoubtedly major. But the Court upheld the \nGovernment’ s vaccine mandate based on a general \nstatutory authorization for HHS to impose safety \nrequirements for healthcare facilities—notwithstanding \ nthe lack of explicit statutory reference to vaccines. Id.\, at \n90–96 . In doing so\, the Court emphasized that state\nvaccination requirements were common for healthcare\nworkers and that the Federal Government regula rly\nrequired healthcare workers to take various safety\nprecautions. Id.\ , at 94–95. Notably\, the Court upheld the \nvaccine mandate even though (as the dissenters pointed \nout) the Federal Government had not traditio nally imposed \nsuch vaccine requirements on healthcare workers. See id.\ , \nat 104 (THOMAS\, J.\, dissenting). \nThe clarity of the congressional authorization in today’s\ncase is far stronger than in Biden v. Missouri . The Nixon \nand Ford tariffs\, the Algonquin decision\, and the \nPresid ent’s longstanding authority to regulate trade and\nimpose tariffs estab lish—much more comprehensively and\nclearly than in Biden v. Missouri— that the President is not \nclaiming some “unheralded power” that repr esents a \n“transformative expansion” of his authority. Utility Air\, \n573 U. S.\, at 324. \nBecause the Court upheld the Executive’s exerci se of a \nmajor power in Biden v. Missouri\, it follows that the Court \n4 4 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \ntod ay should likewise uphold the President’s assertion of a\nmajor power he re. Like cases should be treated alike. \nIn response to all of that\, THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s opinion\nclings to its primary argument in this case— that a statute \nmust use the word “tariff ” or “duty” or “tax ” or the like to \nauthorize tariffs on foreign imports. But this Court has \nrepeatedly emphasized that the major questions doctrine is \nnot a magic words requirement. THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s \nopinion identifies no ca se that has demanded such \nspecificity. And in Algonquin\, this Court una nimously and \nsquarely rejected the same argument that the statutory\npro vision must specifically mention “tariffs” or “duties” or \n“t axes” for the President to impose tariffs on foreign \nimports. Under TH E CHIEF JUSTICE’s opinion\, the Nixon\nand Ford tariffs would also have been unlawful. So too \nmight other tariffs imposed under the longstandin g Section \n232 tariff statute\, which broadly authorizes the President \n to “adjust the imports” of a foreign good without mentioning\n“tar iffs” or “taxes.” \nAnd so would tariffs imposed in\nwartime under TWEA’s authority to “regulate . . . \nimportation.”20\n THE CHIEF J USTICE’s opinion’s approach to the major\nquestions doctrine is a magi c-words test under another\nname—in contravention of our precedents that make clear \nthat Congress need not use magic words or “highly specif ic” \n—————— \n20Under the Court’s decision today\, the President’s authority to impose \ntariffs under TWEA during wartime is p resumably now gone given that\nTWEA has the same “regulate . . . importa tion” language\, 50 U. S. C.\n§4305(b)(1)(B)—unless the Court thinks that the statutory text somehow \nmeans one thing in TWEA and another in I EEPA\, which would be \nhistorically inaccurate and textually unsupportabl e. One might think \nthat the Court’s opinion would also mean that tari ffs cannot be imposed \nunder Section 232\, which authorizes the President to “adjust the \nimports.” After all\, that statutory provision like wise does not refer to\n“tariffs\,” duties\,” “taxes\,” “fee s\,” or the like. But in Algonquin\, the Court \nread Section 232 to au thorize tariffs. I assume that the Court today does \nnot intend to overr ule Algonquin. \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissen ting \n45 \nterms. Biden v. Nebraska\, 600 U. S.\, at 516 (BARRETT\, J.\, \nconcurring) (quotation marks omitted).21 \nIn previous cases\, the Court has looked at the four factors \nto determine whether there is “clear c ongressional\nauthorization” precisely because the major questions canon \nhas no magic words requirement. If magic words or the\nequivalent were necessary\, that would be the only factor. \nAnd the Court would not need the four factors that the \nCourt has consistently applied.22 \nIn sum\, under the major questions doctrine as the Court\nhas applied it\, this sho uld be a straightforward case.\nCongress supplied clear authorization for the President to\nimpose tariffs under IEEPA. \nB \n1 \nSecond\, there is an alternative and independent reason\nwhy the major questions doctrine do es not apply here: This \nis a foreign affairs case. \nA plethora of st atutes in the U. S. Code grant the\nExecutive the power to act in foreign affairs. And most of \nthe important actions that “presidents take toda y\,\nincluding in foreign affairs\, rest at least in part on statutory \ n—————— \n21Taken at face value\, moreover\, the Court’s maj or questions analysis\nwould presumably also preclude Presidents from impo sing quotas under\nIEEPA. Quotas are justified under the same “regulate . . . importation” \nlanguage. How could the Court distinguish quotas f rom tariffs for major \nquestions purposes? After all\, quotas can be of e ven greater economic \nand political significance than tariffs. \n22In his concurrence\, JUSTICE GORSUCH opines that the phrase\n“monetary exactio ns on foreign imports” would constitute clear \ncongressional authorizat ion\, but that the phrase “regulate . . . \nimportation” does not. An te\, at 30. But if the phrase “regulate . . . \nimportation” has histo rically and commonly encompassed “monetary \nexactions on foreign impo rts”—as it has—and if the four major questions \nfactors taken toget her support the Executive—as they do—then I cannot \nagree with the li ne that JUSTICE GORSUCH is drawing between those two \nformulations. \n46 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \nautho rization.” C. Bradley &\; J. Goldsmith\, Foreign Affairs\,\nNondelega tion\, and the Major Questions Doctrine\, 172 U. \nPa. L. Rev. 1743\, 1745 (2024). \nYet this Court has never before applied the major\nquestions do ctrine—or anything resembling it—to a foreign \naffairs statute. I wou ld not make this case the first. \nRather\, in the foreign affairs context \, this Court has\ninterpreted statutes as written\, with respect for the \nprimacy of Congress’s and the President’s roles in foreign \naffairs and without using the major questions doctrine as a\nthumb on the scale a gainst the President. See\, e.g.\, \nDepartment of Navy v. Egan\, 484 U. S . 518\, 529–530 (1988).\nThat deeply rooted textualist approach to inter preting\nforeign affairs statutes is nothing new. What is new and \nrather extraordinary is the approach embodied in THE \nCHIEF JUSTICE’s opinion for three Justices\, which would\nextend the major questions doctrine int o the foreign affairs \nrealm for the first time. \nRecall that the major questions doctrine is based on two\noverlapping foundations: “separation of powers principles \nand a practical understanding of legislative inten t.” West \nVirginia\, 597 U. S.\, at 723. \nWith respect to separation of powers\, the major questions\ndoctrine serves to reinforce the nondeleg ation doctrine. But \nin the foreign affairs realm\, the Court has recogn ized that\nCongress often broadly delegates authority to the \nExecutive. From the Founding\, numerous foreign affairs\nstatutes “authorizing act ion by the President in respect of \nsubjects affecting foreign relation s” either “leave the\nexercise of the power to his unrestricted judgme nt\, or\nprovide a standard far more general than that which has\nalways b een considered requisite with regard to domestic\naffairs.” United State s v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.\, 299 \nU. S. 304\, 324 (1936)\; Departme nt of Transportation v. \nAssociation of American Railroads\, 575 U. S. 43 \, 80\, n. 5 \n(2015) (THOMAS\, J.\, concurring in judgment). The reason \ n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \n47 \nfor those broad delegations is simple and obvious: If \n“success” for Ame rica’s foreign affairs “aims” is to be\n“achieved\, congressional legislation . . . must often accord to\nthe President a degree of discreti on and freedom from\nstatutory restriction which would not be admissible w ere \ndomestic affairs alone involved.” Curtiss-Wright\, 299 U. S.\, \n at 320. \nStated otherwise\, “Congress—in giving the \nExecutive autho rity over matters of foreign affairs—must \nof necessity paint with a br ush broader than that it \ncustomarily wields in domestic areas.” Zemel v. Rusk\, 381 \nU. S. 1\, 17 (1965).\nAs Justice Robert Jackson summarize d\, the Court’s \nnondelegation cases—consistent with the “unbroken \nlegislative practice which has prevailed almost from the\ninception of t he national government\,” Curtiss-Wright\, 299 \nU. S.\, at 322—have “recognized internal and external \naffairs as being in separate catego ries\, and held that the \nstrict limitation upon congressional delegation s of power to\nthe President over internal affairs does not apply with \nr espect to delegations of power in external affairs.” \nYoungstown Sheet &\; Tube Co. v. Sawyer\, 343 U. S. 579\, 636\, \nn. 2 (1952) (concurrin g opinion)\; see Curtiss-Wright\, 299 \nU. S.\, at 319–322\; Panama Refi ning Co. v. Ryan\, 293 U. S. \n388\, 422 (1935).\nAs Justice Jackson furth er noted\, the Court’s precedents\nrecognize the “‘unwisdom of requi ring Congress in this field \nof governmental power to lay down narrowly d efinite\nstandards by which the President is to be governed.’” \nYoun gstown\, 343 U. S.\, at 636\, n. 2 (concurring opinion) \n(quoting Curtiss -Wright\, 299 U. S.\, at 321–322).\nIf the major questions doctrine is d esigned in part to \nprotect nondelegation principles\, but the nondelegat ion \ndoctrine does not play a substantial role in foreign affairs \ncases (as the Court has held)\, then it follows that courts \nshould not employ the major questions doctrine to put a \nthumb on the scale against the Pr esident when interpreting \n48 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nKAVA NAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \nforeign affairs statutes. Rather\, as Justice Ro bert Jackson \nstated\, courts should interpret those statutes as written. \nRelatedly\, to the extent that the major questions doctrine\nis designed to reflect a “practical understanding of \nlegislative intent\,” West Virginia\, 597 U. S.\, at 723\, the \ndoctrine appropriately plays no rol e in “national security or\nforeign policy contexts\, because the canon does not reflect \nordinary congressional intent in those areas.” FCC v . \nConsumers’ Research\, 606 U. S. 656\, 706 (2025)\n(KAVANAUGH\, J.\, concurring). In the foreign affairs realm\, \nCongress “has good reason to—and intends to—authorize\nmany executive branch actions related to foreign affairs in\nbroad or general terms.” Bradley &\; Goldsmith\, 172 U. Pa. \nL. Rev.\, at 1793. \nCongress ordinarily seeks “to give the President \nsubstantial authority and flexibility to protect America and \nthe American people.” Consumers’ Research\, 606 U. S.\, at \n706–7 07 (KAVANAUGH\, J.\, concurring). After all\, the \nPresident exercises t he “vast share of responsibility for the\nconduct of our foreign relatio ns.” American Ins. Assn. v. \nGaramendi\, 539 U. S. 396\, 414 (2003) (q uotation marks \nomitted). So Congress “often” gives the President “ a degree\nof discretion.” Curtiss-Wright\, 299 U. S.\, at 320. That \n “unbroken legislative practice” from the Founding means \nthat courts interpreting statutes in the foreign affairs field\nshould assume that Con gress meant what it said. Id.\, at \n322. \nStated otherwise\, “if the major questions doctrine turns \non a contextual inquiry into likely congr essional intent\, it \nis likely for a variety of reasons to have less pur chase in the \nforeign affairs area.” Bradley &\; Goldsmith\, 172 U. Pa. L. \nRev.\, at 1790. \nTo be clear\, Congress of course maintains the ultimate \npower over how broadly or narrowly to write statutes in the \nf oreign policy and national security contexts. For example\,\nCongress can write foreign affairs statutes narrowly. \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026 ) \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \n49 \nIndeed\, even for wartime powers\, Congress rarely gives the \nPresident a “blank check.” Hamdi v. Rumsfe ld\, 542 U. S. \n507\, 536 (2004) (plurality opinion). And when Congress\ nwrites a narrow foreign affairs statute\, this Court has \nenforced those statutory limits as written. Cf. Hamdan v. \nRumsfeld\, 548 U. S. 557\, 593–595 (2006)\; id.\, at 638–639 \n(Kennedy\, J.\, concurring in part ).\nMoreover\, when it does legislate more broadly\, Congress \nsometimes claws back the statutory authorization by \nrescinding or amending overbro ad statutes\, or by\nrestricting previously granted Presidential power thr ough\nthe leverage it possesses over appropriations\, new \nlegislation\, or confirmations. See\, e.g.\, Foreign Intelligence \nSurveillance Act of 1978\, 92 Stat. 1783\; Military\nCommissions Act of 2006\, 120 Stat. 2600 \, as amended\, 10 \nU. S. C. §948a et seq.\; Case-Church Amendment\, Pub . L. \n93–50\, §307\, 87 Stat. 129. Either House of Congress alone\,\n through the appropriations process\, can insist on certain \nlimits as a c ondition of approving funding. At the end of the \nday\, given the approp riations power\, Congress holds the\ncards. \nIn short\, in the foreign af fairs context\, this Court has \nnever before super-imposed the major ques tions doctrine (or \nany similar canon or principle) onto ordinary statuto ry\ninterpretation to place a thumb on the scale against the \nPresident. \nRather\, the Court interprets the relevant\nstatutes according to their text\, with respect for Congress’s \nand the President’s central roles in the foreign policy and\nnational security fields. \n2 \nThis tariffs c ase plainly falls into the foreign affairs \ncategory. IEEPA “directly a nd expressly relate[s] to foreign \naffairs.” Bradley &\; Goldsmith\, 172 U. Pa. L. Rev.\, at 1796. \nAnd like quotas and embargoes\, tariffs r egulate the goods \n50 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \nthat are imported into the country from foreign nations. \nThe tariffs do not apply to goods produced in America.\nMoreover\, tarif fs on foreign imports are significant tools \nof foreign policy and nation al security\, whether imposed \nunder IEEPA\, TWEA\, Section 232\, Section 122\, Section \n201\, Section 301\, or Section 338. They are often used t o\n“advance foreign policy goals\, or as negotiating leverage in \ntrade negotiations.” Congressional Research Service\, U. S.\nTariff Policy: O verview 1 (2025). Like other economic tools\, \ntariffs can “serve as a ‘bargaining chip’ to be used by the\nPresident when dealing with a h ostile country\,” Dames &\; \nMoore v. Regan\, 453 U. S. 654\, 673 (1 981)—or to incentivize\na change in behavior by allies\, partners\, or e nemies. Cf. \nAssociation of American Railroads\, 575 U. S.\, at 80 (opin ion \nof THOMAS\, J.) (embargo statute “involved the external \nrelation s of the United States”)\; Gundy v. United States\, \n588 U. S. 128\, 170–171 (2019) (GORSUCH\, J.\, dissenting). \nWith respect to foreign tr ade specifically\, Congress often\n“invest[s] the President with large d iscretion in matters \narising out of the execution of statutes relating t o trade and\ncommerce with other nations.” Marshall Field &\; Co. v. \nClark\, 143 U. S. 649\, 691 (1892). Since the Founding\, that \nlongsta nding practice has included tariff statutes: \nCongress has granted the Pr esident expansive power over\ntariffs and foreign trade. Ante\, at 13–17 (THOMAS\, J.\, \ndissenting). \nAnd this Court has uniformly rejected \nc hallenges to tariffs imposed by Presidents under those \nstatutory authori ties. E.g.\, Federal Energy Administration \nv. Algonquin SNG\, Inc.\, 42 6 U. S. 548\, 558–560 (1976)\; J. \nW. Hampton\, Jr.\, &\; Co. v. Uni ted States\, 276 U. S. 394\, 409 \n(1928)\; Marshall Field\, 143 U. S.\, a t 690–694\; Cargo of Brig \nAurora v. United States\, 7 Cranch 382\, 3 86–388 (1813). \nAs Professors Bradley and Goldsmith well summarized\, \ nthere is a “settled practice of about a century of the \nexecutive bran ch exercising emergency powers in many \nimportant contexts pursuant to th e broadly worded IEEPA \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\ , dissenting \n51 \nand its predecessor\, the Trading with the Enemy Act. And \nthere is an even longer practice\, dating to the Founding\, of \npr esidents exercising trade-related sanctions authority\npursuant to broadly worded statutes. Notably\, the Court\nhas already suggested in both of th ese contexts that one\nshould expect Congress to\, in effect\, paint with a broad \nbrush.” 172 U. Pa. L. Rev.\, at 1796–1797. \nAs with tariffs on foreign imports historically\, the IEEPA\ntariffs on foreign imports a t issue in this case implicate \nforeign affairs. According to the Governm ent\, the President \nhas leveraged the IEEPA tariffs into trade deals wit h major\ntrading partners including China\, the United Kingdom\, and \nJap an\, among other countries. The Government says that\nthe tariffs have hel ped make certain foreign markets more\naccessible to American businesses a nd have contributed to \ntrade deals with foreign nations worth trillions of dollars.\nMoreover\, consistent with history and the traditional \nuses of tariffs\, the President “is exercising his IEEPA \nauthority in conn ection with highly sensitive negotiations\nhe is conducting to end the con flict between the Russian\nFederation and Ukraine.” Decl. of M. Rubio in No. 25–1812 \n(CA Fed.\, Aug. 29\, 2025)\, p. 3. To that end\, on Augus t 6\,\n2025\, the President imposed tariffs on India for “directly or \n indirectly importing Russian Federation oil.” Exec. Order \nNo. 14329\, 90 Fed. Reg. 38701 (2025). And on February 6\,\n2026\, the President redu ced the tariffs on India because\, \naccording to the Government\, India h ad “committed to stop \ndirectly or indirectly importing Russian Federat ion oil.” \nExec. Order No. 14384\, 91 Fed. Reg. 6501 (2026).\nTo be sur e\, most foreign affairs and national security \nactions—whether war\, i nternational agreements\, trade \ndeals\, or tariffs—lead to significant domestic ramifications \nwithin the United States. And this case is no ex ception.\nNonetheless\, in the foreign affairs field\, courts interpret\ns tatutes as written\, with appropriate respect to Congress\nand the Preside nt and without a major questions doctrine \n52 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \nweight on the scale against the President. See Youngstown\, \n343 U. S.\, at 636\, n. 2 (Jackson\, J.\, c oncurring). \nLest there be any remaining doubt that the major\nquestions doctrine does not apply to tariffs on foreign\nimports\, recall again this Court’s decision in Algonquin. \nThat case involved significant tariffs imposed by President \nFord on oil imports. The relevant statute granted the\nPresident the authority to “adjust the imports.” 19 U. S. C. \n§ 1862(b) (1970 ed.). The Court upheld the tariffs by \ninterpreting the sta tute as written. Neither the major\nquestions doctrine—nor anything res embling that \ndoctrine—played a role in that case. \nIn short\, “Pres idential actions pursuant to broad \ncongressional authorizations related to foreign affairs often \nhave long historical pedigrees that can in vari ous ways \ninform congressional intent to approve the actions in \nquestio n. \nTo the extent that this is so in particular \ninstances\, the major q uestions doctrine’s clear authorization \nrequirement does not apply.” Bradley &\; Goldsmith\, 172 U.\nPa. L. Rev.\, at 1794 (emphasis added) . \nSo it is here: Presidents “have long been granted \nsubstantial dis cretion over tariffs.” Id.\, at 1759\, n. 90. This \nCourt has never be fore applied the major questions doctrine \nto a statute authorizing the P resident to take action with\nrespect to foreign affairs in general or tar iffs in particular.\nAnd it should not do so today. \nTHE CHIEF JUSTICE ’s opinion’s reliance on the major\nquestions doctrine in this foreign affairs case is a first—a \nnovel and unprecedented use of the major qu estions\ndoctrine to invalidate Presidential action taken pursuant to\ncon gressional authorization in the foreign affairs area. I \nfirmly disagree with that use of the major questions\ndoctrine here. In the foreign affair s context\, including \ntariffs\, the longstanding rule is simple: Interpr et the \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \n5 3 \nstatute as written\, not with a thumb on the scale against \nthe Presi dent.23 \n3 \nRelated precedent further demonstrates that the major\nquest ions doctrine has not traditionally applied in the \nnational security or foreign policy contexts. Consider \ntwo \nprominent examples. \nFirst\, i n Hamdi v. Rumsfeld\, 542 U. S. 507\, this Court \nconsidered the 2001 Aut horization for Use of Military \nForce\, which Congress passed and Preside nt George W.\nBush signed on September 18\, 2001\, in the wake of the al \ nQaeda attacks on the United States. The law broadly \n—————— \n23In his thoughtful concurrence\, JUSTICE GORSUCH agrees that the \nmajo r questions doctrine often does not apply to foreign affairs statutes\,\nb ut in his view it does not apply only when the President also has \ninhere nt or independent Article II power. Ante\, at 30–31. THE CHIEF \nJUST ICE’s opinion for three Justices also gestures at that position. See \n ante\, at 12–13. I see some analytical and practical problems with that \napproach.\nFirst\, as JUSTICE GORSUCH elsewhere notes\, the major quest ions\ndoctrine serves in part to reinforce nondelegation principles. Yet as I \nhave explained\, the Court’s nondelegation cases from the Foundin g to \nthe present—including numerous cases involving tariffs—have \ n“recognized internal and external affairs as being in separate categori es\,\nand held that the strict limitation upon congressional delegations o f\npower to the President over internal affairs does not apply with respec t \nto delegations of power in external affairs.” Youngstown Sheet & \; Tube \nCo. v. Sawyer\, 343 U. S. 579\, 636\, n. 2 (1952) (Jackson\, J.\ , concurring)\; \nsee also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.\, 299 U. S. 304\, \n319–322 (1936)\; Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan\, 293 U. S. 388\, 422 (1935).\nIn those cases\, the Court has not further subdivide d the foreign affairs\npower in the manner that JUSTICE GORSUCH now sugges ts. \nSecond\, terms such as “inherent” or “independent” in this c ontext \ncontinue to be “used\, often interchangeably and without fixed or \nascertainable meanings.” Youngstown\, 343 U. S.\, at 647 (Jackson\ , J.\, \nconcurring)\; see also id.\, at 637. So it would be both novel an d \njurisprudentially chaotic to try to now create a new approach tying th e \napplicability of the major questions canon in the foreign affairs cont ext \nto such uncertain triggers. \n54 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUM P \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \nempowered the President to use “all ne cessary and\nappropriate force against those nations\, organizations\, or \npersons he determines planned\, authorized\, committed\, or \naided the terrorist attacks” that occurred on September 11\,\n2001. Authorization for Use of Military Force\, 115 Stat. 224 \n(Sept. 18\, 2001).\nIn Hamdi\, the Government militarily detained in the\nUnited States an American citi zen who had taken up arms\nwith the Taliban. 542 U. S.\, at 510–511. The plaintiff\nHamdi argued\, among other things\, that the AUMF\ngenerally a uthorized the use of force but did not specifically \nauthorize military d etention\, at least detention of \nAmerican-citizen enemy combatants in th e United States. \nSee id.\, at 515–517. He contended that his military\ ndetention was therefore illegal.\nIn the principal opinion by Justice O ’Connor\, the Court\nrejected Hamdi’s statutory argument\, explaining that it\nwas “of no moment that the AUMF does not use specific\nlanguage of detention.” Id.\, at 519. Rather\, because \n“detention to preve nt a combatant’s return to the battlefield \nis a fundamental incident o f waging war\, in permitting the \nuse of ‘necessary and appropriate for ce\,’ Congress has\nclearly and unmistakably authorized detention in the \nnarrow circumstances considered here.” Ibid. \nConsider the similariti es between Hamdi and this case. \nBoth involve major questions of foreign affairs. Hamdi \ninvolved U. S. military detention of an American citizen in \nAmerica\, pursuant to a generally worded authorization for\nuse of m ilitary force. This case involves tariffs on foreign \ngoods imported int o America pursuant to a generally\nworded authorization to regulate import ation. Detention is \na traditional incident of the President’s delegat ed power to \nwage war. See id.\, at 518. Tariffs are a traditional incid ent \nof the President’s delegated power to regulate imports and \nforei gn commerce. In Hamdi\, the Court said that as a \nmatter of history\, pra ctice\, and precedent\, the AUMF’s \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nK AVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \n55 \ngeneral authorization for the use of mil itary force clearly \nencompassed detention of enemy combatants. Id.\, at 518– \n522. Here\, as a matter of history\, practice\, and precedent\,\ nIEEPA’s general authorization for regulation of \nimportation likewise clearly encompasses tariffs on foreign\nimports. \nSecond\, in 1981 in Dam es &\; Moore\, 453 U. S. 654\, the \nCourt did not apply the major ques tions doctrine\, even\nthough the Court had recently applied that principl e in a \nsignificant domestic policy case. Cf. Industrial Union Dept.\, \n AFL–CIO v. American Petroleum Institute\, 448 U. S. 607 \n(1980) (plural ity opinion).\nThe Dames &\; Moore case arose in the wake of the Iran \ nhostage crisis where Iran held more than 50 American\nhostages at the U. S. Embassy in Iran for more than 14 \nmonths. As one part of the ultimate settlement of the \nhostage crisis with Iran\, President Reagan suspended\ nclaims by U. S. nationals against Iran that were pending in\nAmerican cou rts. Dames &\; Moore\, 453 U. S.\, at 666. The \nPresident did so unde r IEEPA and the Hostage Act. Id.\, at \n675. \nThere can be little doubt that the question of suspending \nAmerican citizens’ claims against Iran was one of major \neconomic and political significance. And the Court fu rther \nrecognized that the case touched “fundamentally upon the \nmanne r in which our Republic is to be governed.” Id.\, at \n659. Yet the Cou rt did not require “clear congressional\nauthorization” for the Pres ident’s exercise of that authority\nto suspend the Americans’ claims a gainst Iran.\nOn the contrary\, the Court openly acknowledged that the\nre levant statutes—IEEPA and the Hostage Act—did not \nprovide clear or “specific authorization” for the President to\nsuspend those claims. Id.\, at 677. The Court nonetheless \nconcluded that the “general tenor of Congress’ legislation in\nthis area”—combined with Congress’s l ongstanding\nacquiescence to the President’s practice of settling clai ms— \n56 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissent ing \nsupported the President’s suspension of those claims. Id.\, \nat 678. Congress’s “general tenor” and acquiescence are of\ncourse far less than the “clear congressional authorization”\nthat THE CHIEF JU STICE’s opinion today newly demands for \nthe President’s tariffs. \nA gain\, consider the similarities between Dames &\; Moore \nand this cas e. Dames &\; Moore involved complicated\nquestions of foreign policy an d national security. The \nstatutes in Dames &\; Moore were generally w orded and did\nnot specifically authorize suspension of claims. \nBut \nPr esidents had historically exercised a similar power. See \nid.\, at 677 –682. Here\, we likewise have a generally worded\nstatutory authorizatio n to “regulate . . . importation.” And \nPresidents have historically imposed tariffs.\nIf IEEPA permitted the President to lawfully suspend\ncl aims in Dames &\; Moore—despite the Court’s transparent \nacknowled gment that the actual statutory text did not\nclearly authorize the Presid ent’s actions—then surely \nIEEPA’s authorization to “regulate . . . importation” easily\njustifies these tariffs.\nTHE CHIEF JUSTICE’s opinion would chart a new course\nfor the major questions doctrine\, exten ding it for the first \ntime deep into the foreign affairs sphere. If the Court had \napplied the major questions doctrine in Hamdi and Dames \n& \; Moore\, those two landmark cases almost certainly would\nhave been deci ded differently. So today’s opinion marks a \nsignificant change. \nWill the Court apply the major\nquestions doctrine in the foreign affairs cont ext again in the \nfuture? Or is this a ticket good for one day and one tr ain \nonly? Time will tell. But in the meantime\, the decision \ncould eng ender significant uncertainty over the Executive’s \nexercise of statuto ry authority in the foreign affairs realm. \nAs the Hamdi and Dames &\; Moore examples\ndemonstrate\, applying the major questions doctrine in th e \nforeign policy and national security contexts in the past\nwould have seriously hindered the President’s ability to \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \n57 \nexercise power granted by Con gress to achieve important \nforeign policy and national security objectiv es for America. \nAnd if applied in the foreign affairs context in the fut ure\, it \ncould impair Presidents’ vital statutory authorities with \nr espect to foreign policy and national security.24 \n*\n*\n* \nHaving said all of that on foreign affairs\, I reiterate that\nthe major questions doc trine—even if it applies in this \nforeign affairs context—does not de feat major executive \nactions that are clearly authorized by Congress. Se e \nBradley &\; Goldsmith\, 172 U. Pa. L. Rev.\, at 1790–1791. \nAnd as explained in Part III–A above\, in IEEPA Congress \nclearly authorize d the President to impose tariffs to \n“regulate . . . importation” in national emergencies. In \nother words\, even if the major questions doc trine applies in \nthe foreign affairs context exactly as it does in domes tic \naffairs\, the President should still prevail in this case. \nIV \nFi nally\, no Member of the Court today relies on the \nnondelegation doctrin e. But the plaintiffs briefly raise such \nan argument\, and I will theref ore briefly address it. The \n—————— \n24What is the status go ing forward of the major questions doctrine in \nforeign affairs cases? O nly three Justices (at most) today suggest that\nthe major questions doctr ine should apply in the foreign affairs context—\nTHE CHIEF JUSTICE\, JU STICE GORSUCH\, and JUSTICE BARRETT. I doubt \nthat the major questions do ctrine analysis in THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s \nopinion for those three Justice s is controlling for future cases as a matter \nof precedent under the Mar ks rule. See Marks v. United States\, 430 U. S. \n188\, 193 (1977). That is because three Justices (JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR\, \nJUSTICE KAGAN\, and JUSTI CE JACKSON) do not recognize the major \nquestions doctrine at all. Ante\, at 1–2 (KAGAN\, J.\, concurring in part and \nconcurring in judgment). And this dissent would not apply it in the \nforeign affairs context. So it appears that six Justices would not apply it \nin the foreign affairs context. In my view\, the question of whether or how \nthe major question s doctrine applies in foreign affairs cases remains at \nleast an open que stion. \n58 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissen ting \nargument is unavailing for many of the reasons already \nnoted in t he major questions analysis above. This Court \nhas repeatedly rejected co nstitutional challenges to \ncongressional delegations to the President in the foreign \naffairs area\, including delegations of tariff authority. \ nFor matters of foreign affairs and national security\, the\nCourt has tra ditionally recognized that Congress “must of\nnecessity paint with a bru sh broader than that it \ncustomarily wields in domestic areas.” Zemel v. Rusk\, 381 \nU. S. 1\, 17 (1965). And to reiterate\, numerous statutes \n“‘authorizing action by the President in respect of subjects \naffe cting foreign relations’” “‘either leave the exercise of the\npowe r to his unrestricted judgment\, or provide a standard \nfar more general than that which has always been\nconsidered requisite with regard to domes tic affairs.’” \nDepartment of Transportation v. Association of Americ an \nRailroads\, 575 U. S. 43\, 80\, n. 5 (2015) (THOMAS\, J.\, \nconcurri ng in judgment) (quoting United States v. Curtiss\nWright Export Corp.\, 2 99 U. S. 304\, 324 (1936)). Therefore\, \nas JUSTICE THOMAS has explained \, the Court’s precedents \nestablish that “the Constitution grants th e President a \ngreater measure of discretion in the realm of foreign\nrel ations.” Association of American Railroads\, 575 U. S.\, at \n80\, n. 5\ ; see Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.\, 299 U. S.\, at 319– \n322\; Panama R efining Co. v. Ryan\, 293 U. S. 388\, 422 \n(1935).\nJustice Robert Jackso n likewise noted the “‘unwisdom of \nrequiring Congress in this field of governmental power to\nlay down narrowly definite standards by which th e \nPresident is to be governed.’” Youngstown Sheet &\; Tube \nCo. v. Sawyer\, 343 U. S. 579\, 636\, n. 2 (1952) (concurring\nopinion) (quoti ng Curtiss-Wright\, 299 U. S.\, at 321–322). \nAs such\, the “strict l imitation upon congressional\ndelegations of power to the President over i nternal affairs \ndoes not apply with respect to delegations of power in \ n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \n59 \nexte rnal affairs.” Youngstown\, 343 U. S.\, at 636\, n. 2 \n(concurring opin ion).\nBecause statutes that “involv[e] the external relations of \nthe United States” do not trigger the same kind of\ndelegation concerns as p urely domestic ones\, Association of \nAmerican Railroads\, 575 U. S.\, at 80 (opinion of THOMAS\, \nJ.)\, the Court has regularly upheld delegation s of power to \nthe President in the national security and foreign policy \nrealms. See\, e.g.\, Curtiss-Wright\, 299 U. S.\, at 319–322\; \nLovin g v. United States\, 517 U. S. 748\, 771–774 (1996).\nIndeed\, if a stri ct nondelegation doctrine applied in those\nareas\, numerous statutes—in cluding many authorizations \nfor use of military force in the Nation’s history—would have\nbeen unconstitutional delegations of authority to th e\nPresident. See Authorization for Use of Military Force\, 115\nStat. 224 (Sept. 18\, 2001) (“[T]he President is authorized to \nuse all necessar y and appropriate force against those \nnations\, organizations\, or perso ns he determines planned\,\nauthorized\, committed\, or aided the terroris t attacks that \noccurred on September 11\, 2001”). \nAs to tariffs in p articular: Broad delegations of tariff\nauthority to the President have be en in the heartland of \npermissible delegations upheld by this Court. Co ngress\nmay\, without running afoul of the Constitution\, “invest the \n President with large discretion in matters arising out of the\nexecution o f statutes relating to trade and commerce with\nother nations.” Marshall Field &\; Co. v. Clark\, 143 U. S. \n649\, 691 (1892). Congressional d elegations of tariffs and \nother foreign trade authorities to the Preside nt date back\nto near the Founding. And this Court has uniformly\nrejected nondelegation challenges to statutes delegating\nthat authority to the Pr esident. E.g.\, Federal Energy \nAdministration v. Algonquin SNG\, Inc.\, 426 U. S. 548\, 558– \n560 (1976)\; J. W. Hampton\, Jr.\, &\; Co. v. United States\, 276 \nU. S. 394\, 409 (1928)\; Marshall Field\, 143 U. S.\ , at 690–694\; \n60 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. TRUMP \nKAVANAUGH\, J .\, dissenting \nCargo of Brig Aurora v. United States\, 7 Cranch 382\, 38 6– \n388 (1813).\nThis Court’s decision in Algonquin is again instruct ive.\nThere\, the Court held that Section 232 did not constitute an \nunco nstitutional delegation. 426 U. S.\, at 558–560. The \nCourt found it s ufficient that the President could act “only”\nto the extent “he dee ms necessary to adjust the imports” of\nan article such that it “will not threaten to impair the\nnational security.” Id.\, at 559 (quotation marks omitted).\nTo be clear\, I am not suggesting that there is no\nnond elegation doctrine in the foreign affairs realm. But the \nCourt has consi stently recognized that the doctrine affords \nmore flexibility to Congres s and the President in that area\nto deal with the complex foreign relatio ns issues and\nnational security threats facing America. See Association \nof American Railroads\, 575 U. S.\, at 80\, n. 5 (opinion of \nTHOMAS\, J.)\; Youngstown\, 343 U. S.\, at 636\, n. 2 (Jackson\, \nJ.\, concurring) \; Curtiss-Wright\, 299 U. S.\, at 319–322\; \nPanama Refining\, 293 U. S.\, at 422. \nIn all events\, for purposes of this Court’s nondelegatio n \nprecedents\, IEEPA sufficiently constrains the President’s\nauthorit y to declare an emergency and impose tariffs. See \nJ. W. Hampton\, 276 U . S.\, at 409\; FCC v. Consumers’ \nResearch\, 606 U. S. 656\, 673–675 \, 681–691 (2025). The \nPresident may exercise the authorities in IEEP A “only” “to\ndeal with an unusual and extraordinary threat” tha t “has \nits source in whole or substantial part outside the United \nSt ates” and “with respect to which a national emergency \nhas been decla red.” 50 U. S. C. §1701. Congress placed\nnumerous limits on IEEPA\, i ncluding a default 1-year time\nlimit\, an enumerated list of exceptions\, and comprehensive \ncongressional reporting requirements. See §§1622(d )\,\n1702(b)\, 1703.\nIt is also useful to underscore the extraordinary na ture of\nthe plaintiffs’ nondelegation argument here. The plaintiffs’ \nsubmission would mean that these tariffs would be \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \n61 \nunlawful even if IEEPA e xplicitly authorized tariffs. Unlike \ntheir statutory and major questions doctrine arguments\, \ntheir nondelegation argument is not based on a lac k of an \nexplicit reference to “tariffs” or “duties” or the like. Their \nnondelegation argument instead goes much further and\nwould requ ire very specific congressional directions to the \nPresident on when and under what circumstances he could \nimpose tariffs and how high those tari ffs could be. The \nplaintiffs’ theory would have dramatic consequences and \nlikely wipe out many of the existing tariff statutes that have\nlon g been upheld by this Court\, as well as TWEA. And if \nthe tariff author ity here is unlawful\, so too are most if not\nall IEEPA authorities such as asset freezes\, embargoes\, and \nquotas. And it would not stop there. The plaintiffs’ \nnondelegation theory would threaten various other \nna tional security and foreign affairs statutes that similarly \ngrant substa ntial discretion to the President. The Court \ntoday thankfully does not g o down that road.25 \nV \nThe overarching theme of the Court’s opinion i s that\ntariffs are not a clear means to “regulate . . . importation”\ nand that Congress was therefore required to use the word \n“tariff\ ,” “duty\,” or the like in IEEPA in 1977 if it wanted to \nauthorize tariffs on foreign imports. But that conclusion \n—————— \n2 5Some last points for completeness: The plaintiffs also raise two other \ narguments that the Court today does not address or rely on. First\, they \nargue that Section 122\, a non-emergency tariff statute that addresses \ntrade deficits\, implicitly displaces IEEPA’s tariff authority. Secon d\, they \nargue that the tariffs here do not deal with an “unusual and \nextraordinary threat” as to which a national emergency has been \ndecl ared. In my view\, those arguments are insubstantial\, as Judge\nTaranto p ersuasively explained in the Federal Circuit. See 149 F. 4th \n1312\, 135 9–1361\, 1371–1375 (2025) (dissenting opinion). Because the \nCourt t oday does not address or rely on them\, I will not discuss them \nfurther here. Finally\, I agree with footnote 1 of the Court’s opinion\nregardin g jurisdiction. Ante\, at 5\, n. 1. \n62 \nLEARNING RESOURCES\, INC. v. T RUMP \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \ncontravenes text\, history\, and prec edent. To summarize: \nAlgonquin in 1976 unanimously held the opposite. T he \nNixon and Ford tariffs were based on statutory provisions \nthat did not use the word “tariff ” or “duty.” There is a long \ntradition of Presidents imposing tariffs as a means of \nregulating importation and commerce. The predecessor\nTrading with the Enemy Act has long been unde rstood to \nauthorize tariffs during wartime as a means to “regulate . . . \nimportation\,” even though it does not use the word “tariff ” \nor “duty.” The history of the Polk\, Lincoln\, and McKinley \ntarif fs shows that tariffs are a means of regulating\nimportation. Marshall\, S tory\, and Madison stated that \ntariffs are a means of regulating foreign commerce. The \ndictionary definitions and ordinary usage establish that \ntariffs are a means of regulating importation. \nAll of that and much mo re\, in my view\, overwhelmingly \nestablish that IEEPA clearly authorizes the President to \nimpose tariffs.\nThat said\, with respect to tariffs i n particular\, the Court’s\ndecision might not prevent Presidents from i mposing most \nif not all of these same sorts of tariffs under other statu tory \nauthorities. For example\, Section 122 of the Trade Act of \n1974 p ermits the President to impose a “temporary import\nsurcharge” to “d eal with large and serious United States\nbalance-of-payments deficits.” \n19 U. S. C. §2132(a).\nSection 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 provides t hat\, if the \nInternational Trade Commission determines an article is \nb eing imported in such quantities that it is “a substantial \ncause of se rious injury\, or the threat thereof\, to the \ndomestic industry producin g an article like or directly \ncompetitive with the imported article\,” the President may\ntake “appropriate and feasible action\,” including imposing\na “duty.” §§2251(a)\, 2253(a)(3)(A). Section 301 of the Trade \nAct of 1974 authorizes the President through a subordinate\noffice r to “impose duties” if he determines that “an act\,\npolicy\, or pr actice of a foreign country” is “unjustifiable and \n Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) \nKAVANAUGH\, J.\, dissenting \n63 \nburdens or restricts U nited States commerce.” §§2411(a)\n(c). \nSection 338 of the Tariff A ct of 1930 permits the\nPresident to impose tariffs when he finds that “ any foreign \ncountry places any burden or disadvantage upon the\ncommerce of the United States.” §1338(d). And Section 232 \nof the Trade Expans ion Act of 1962 authorizes the \nPresident to\, after receiving a report f rom the Secretary of\nCommerce\, “adjust the imports of [an] article and its \nderivatives so that such imports will not threaten to impair\nthe n ational security.” §1862(c)(1)(a).\nSo the Court’s decision is not li kely to greatly restrict\nPresidential tariff authority going forward. Bu t the Court’s \ndecision is likely to generate other serious practical \ nconsequences in the near term. One issue will be refunds. \nRefunds of b illions of dollars would have significant\nconsequences for the U. S. Trea sury. The Court says \nnothing today about whether\, and if so how\, the \nGovernment should go about returning the billions of \ndollars that it h as collected from importers. But that \nprocess is likely to be a “mess \,” as was acknowledged at oral \nargument. Tr. of Oral Arg. 153–155. A second issue is the \ndecision’s effect on the current trade deals. B ecause IEEPA \ntariffs have helped facilitate trade deals worth trillions of \ndollars—including with foreign nations from China to the \nUnited K ingdom to Japan\, the Court’s decision could \ngenerate uncertainty rega rding various trade agreements. \nThat process\, too\, could be difficult. \n*\n*\n* \nThe tariffs at issue here may or may not be wise policy.\nBut as a matter of text\, history\, and precedent\, they are \nclearly lawful . I respectfully dissent. \n\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n ORIGINAL CONTE NT\n\n From the wiki I learned\n\n [Learning Resources v. Trump\, and Trum p v. V.O.S. Selections\, Inc. is a consolidated case]\n\n\n\n So who are t he plaintiffs\, the complainers in both cases.\n\n\n\n Wiki said the compl ainers in the learning resources case are\n\n [On April 22\, 2025\, Learni ng Resources and hand2mind\, two family-owned educational toy manufacturer s\, sued Trump in the United States District Court for the District of Col umbia ]\n\n ScoutsBlog stated their argument\n\n [The challengers\, Learni ng Resources and hand2mind\, are small family-owned businesses that make a nd sell “hands-on educational toys and products for children.” They “outsource most manufacturing to factories in other countries\,” inclu ding in Asia. The companies say that paying the tariffs in 2025 will cost them $100 million\, “compared with just $2.3 million in 2024—a 44-fold increase.”]\n\n\n\n Justia page said the complainers in the second case are \n\n [V.O.S. SELECTIONS\, INC.\, PLASTIC SERVICES AND PRODUCTS\, LLC \, DBA GENOVA PIPE\, MICROKITS\, LLC\, FISHUSA INC.\, TERRY PRECISION CYCL ING LLC]\n\n\n\n Based on the websites\, linked below\, I can see how lear ning resources + hand2mind + VOS selections+ Genova pipe+ microkits+Fishus a+terry precision would acquire a lot of content from China. They are the types of firms that Schrumpft is functionally trying to kill. People talk about usa made and american made but a lot of firms like the ones stated\, get a lot of content from overseas when they should had been blockaded by the government from doing so. The reality is\, China's manufacturing expl osion\, didn't occur because China had better workers\, that is feces. Chi na's manufacturing explosion happened because the government of the USA al lowed firms in the USA to reach a low wage market outside the usa with wor kers doing the same things the higher wage market laborers in the usa were doing\, and the rest of the governments realized the financial advantage to the usa firms would put them out of business or diminish them to low a market share to be relevant so they followed suit. But I recall being a ch ild\, the advertised reason was greater intelligence of the Chinese indivi dual and a better schools system in the north east Asian countries. Feces^ INF. And it even relates to the 1960s. The push to exit the high wage labo r market in the USA started when the Jim Crow era from 1965 to 1980 had re ached the 1960s and Black people\, nonviolently\, had petitioned to get mo re work. White laborers were willing to accept no unions or less labor opp ortunities in the area to blockade black people from opportunity. \n\n\n\ n Adding the Italian noodle companies that have made a killing selling noo dles in the usa for decades\, SCrumpft is stoping the usa being the engine for foreign industries that it doesn't need to be. \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n N OTES\n\n\n\n Wiki\n\n https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Learning_Resources_v._ Trump\n\n Justia page\n\n https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-c ourts/cafc/25-1812/25-1812-2025-08-29.html\n\n Scotusblog\n\n https://www. scotusblog.com/2025/06/businesses-challenge-trumps-tariffs-before-supreme- court/\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n WEBSITES\n\n learning resources\n\n https://www. learningresources.com/\n\n hand2mind\n\n https://www.hand2mind.com/home\n\ n VOS selections - touted as importer of the year\n\n https://vosselection s.com/\n\n Genova Pipe\n\n https://www.genovapipe.com/\n\n Microkits\n\n h ttps://microkits.net/\n\n Fishusa\n\n https://www.fishusa.com/\n\n Terry P Recision Cycling\n\n https://terrycycling.com/\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n \n POST URL\n\n\n\n Circa half of the populace in the usa wants to dominat e the world using military might gardless of the violence. Circa half of t he populace in the usa wants the usa to be the center of a dysfunctional g lobal order that every human is shackled to gardless the fiscal poverty fo r most humans. Circa nearest one hundred percent of the populace in the us a wants the usa live along time after its two hundred and fiftieth birthda y but nearest zero percent of the populace in the usa want to lead it in u ncomfortable ways to live along time. \n\n\n\n Is the USA in the way of a better humanity? Absent the USA would the militaristic impotency of all o ther governments or racial balance of all other populaces lead to the grea test peace in humanity? \n\n\n\n https://aalbc.com/tc/topic/12484-is-the- usa-in-the-way-of-a-better-humanity/\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n PRIOR EDITION\n\n\ n\n https://aalbc.com/tc/events/event/637-economic-corner-33-01292026/\n\n \n\n  \n\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n NEXT EDITION\n\n https://aalbc.com/tc/events/ event/658-economic-corner-34-02202026/\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n #econ omiccorner #schrumpft #supremecourt #ieepa #learningresources #executiveor der #tariff #trump #usa250 #tobeornottobe #rmaalbc #aalbc #richardmurray # kobo #kwl #hddeviant #deviantart #richardmurrayhumblr #tumblr \n\n\n\n   \n\n\n\n 02212026\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n ABOUT THE INTERNET\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n From @AntonRMisharin\n\n Jews are not a people. Laura Loomer looks like a n Middle Eastern person\, and Goldie Hawn looks like a Scandinavian skier. One must be retarded if not seeing the obvious.\n\n https://x.com/AntonRM isharin/status/2025076657128722661\n\n\n\n My reply\n\n jews are a people in the same way christians or muslims or buddhist are peoples . Not all ch ristians are blond haired or blue eyed. Not all muslims are brown skinned or speak arabic. Not all buddhist have occidental eyes or come from asia. Religious peoples are not(1/3) phenotypical peoples [black or  white or c olored or brown ] or gender peoples [male or female or hermaphrodite] or g eographic peoples[ american/european/african/asian] what makes a person a jew or christian or muslim(2/3) or buddhist or any religion is adherence t o that religion or faith\, your confusing labels of appearance with labels of faith. what makes someone white/black is how they look\, american/afri can where they were raised(3/3)\n\n\n\n From @ThisInvent\n\n found the naz i\n\n https://x.com/ThisInvent/status/2025303755130855637\n\n\n\n My reply \n\n why mention anton as a nazi? why not an american. anti jewish sentime nt isn't foreign to the usa. anti jewish sentiment in the usa is older tha n the nazi's. the nazi's themselves \, i believe hitler in mein kampf admi tted he was inspired by white european(1/2)  descent terrorism of blacks  or native americans in white christian germans approach to white jewish germans . Don't try to make negative biases or violent biases foreign to the usa\, they are native (2/2)\n\n\n\n \n\n 02212026\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n C itation\n\n\n\n https://aalbc.com/tc/topic/12484-is-the-usa-in-the-way-of- a-better-humanity/#findComment-80234\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n sted just now\n\n \n\n @ProfD\n\n\n\n   13 hours ago\, ProfD said:\n\n\n\n No.\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n IMO\, human greed is the biggest impediment to greater peace in humanity. \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n The general population of the world has to decide if/when they no longer want to enable a handful of greedy people to empower &\; enrich themselves.\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n People have to be willing to give up the  comfortability they have taken up in a less peace ful human existence in order to achieve a greater level of peace.\n\n\n\n even enough\, only one question I have\, when you say\n\n\n\n \"The genera l population of the world has to decide if/when\" the financially common section of humanity isn't one peoples\, to first make a collective choice a group of peoples must be an organized collective\, in some fashion. So f irst the masses in humanity have to find a way to be a group that can make a collective decision right?\n\n\n\n Cause as I comprehend your words\, i t seems like said masses can make this decision today or tomorrow as they are\, and I don't see that as true.\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n @Pioneer1\n\n\n\n   3 hours ago\, Pioneer1 said:\n\n\n\n In answer to the question in t he title: No\n\n \n\n Infact\, I truly believe that America is and will c ontinue to IMPROVE and PROGRESS humanity.\n\n \n\n I'm not trying to be fu nny or facetious either\, I sincerely mean that.\n\n \n\n The United Stat es is the main reason racism and sexism and even slavery itself is no long er OPENLY tolerated in most societies.\n\n \n\n Before the existence of th e United States.....racism\, sexism\, and slavery was not only rampant aro und the planet but brazen and openly practiced as a normal way of life for many if not most.\n\n\n\n well... two things\, 1) humanity progresses its elf to whatever end. 2) all governments \, no matter what movies say\, hav e positive or negative results. all governments. and that includes the usa \, but that also includes the peoples republic of china or russia or south africa or haiti or other. \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n you said \" United States is the main reason racism and sexism and even slavery itself is no longer OPENLY tolerated in most societies.\" I don't think that is the truth. in my travels I find many negative biases or openly expressed. I argue many n egative biases are accepted or embraced\, you suggest negative biases are tolerated\, which suggest people don't want them. that isn't what I have f ound. \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n I think what the usa has done positively isn't in the common communities in humanity. I argue\, modern humanity is rife w ith various biases based on a persons gender/phenotype or appearance / fis cal class leading to enslavements. I think many of these negative biases a re openly practiced. Last year was when the usa finally disallowed underag e marriage at the federal level. I did a post about it\, but I couldn't fi nd it to link. \n\n\n\n What the usa has done positively is in government s themselves. In modernity most governments legal codes suggest most negat ive biases\, as you correctly stated\, are illegal. Most governments legal codes don't permit the negative biases the peoples under those codes do e veryday. But the enforcement to such codes is absent. In this way\, the us a breaks even. This goes back to Jim crow usa [ 1846 to 1980] the reality is \, with black tulsa or rosewood as the most known highlighted examples\ , the usa legal code made all the terrible actions by whites to blacks ill egal\, but the usa leading by example shows that legal codes\, don't give the law power. Again\, for all the court cases black people did in 1865 to 1980 based on white terror. What percentage of white terrorist actions to blacks went to court? I argue\, less than 1%.\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n the rule of law makes the law the king\, but the law is the most impotent king. Th e law can't stop any illegal act. the law can't recover damages from illeg al acts. the law can't change the heritages or cultures of any peoples tha t have illegal aspects. The USA has led a governmental legal code modulati on movement where south africa has the most unbiased legal system in human ity\, even though white south africans are as abusive as ever. China thoug h people keep calling it a dictatorship\, which is totally false\, has act ually modified and adjusted their constitution more than any other governm ent of a powerful country\, power defined as nuclear militaristic capabili ty of a global reach. But this doesn't mean the ugyars are safe. The usa s till has black towns throughout the former confederate states\, lviing nea r toxic wastes the states put next to them\, denied water the white towns next to them horde so... the law is nothing\, the law is weak\, the law do esn't make anything better. \n\n\n\n BUT\, the law does allow the abused who have the rare resources/levels of money to utilize legal systems to ch allenge the criminal actions from abusers which are illegal. And that is p ositive. \n\n\n\n Negative biases are still mostly embraced by humans\, w hether legal or not\, and no government has enforced their legal code to d elete or diminish or cause to delay actions reflecting a negative bias or abuse or criminal act that said laws deem illegal. \n\n\n\n BUT\, most le gal codes today\, do have \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n 02212026\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n Citation\n\n\n\n https://aalbc.com/tc/topic/12484-is-the-usa-in-the-way-o f-a-better-humanity/#findComment-80249\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n  @Pioneer1\n\n\ n\n \n On 2/21/2026 at 4:54 PM\, Pioneer1 said:\n \n\n \n \n Laws can' t stop an illegal act directly\, but it can INDIRECTLY by:\n \n\n \n 1 . Establishing law enforcement officers who CAN directly stop illegal acti vity\n\n 2. Discourage illegal activity through deterrence\n\n 3. Chan ge the prevailing attitudes of the current and especially succeeding gener ations by equating that which is illegal to being ethically and eventually morally \"bad\"\n \n\n \n  \n \n\n \n One of the reasons many of the laws around the world don't change things is because they aren't ENFO RCED.\n \n\n \n Ofcourse slavery will continue in a culture where it's illegal only on paper but not ENFORCED.\n\n Ofcourse human trafficking will continue in a culture where it's illegal only on paper but not ENFORC ED\n\n \n\n Laws can definitely change the prevailing attitude and eve n morals and norms of a society when adequately ENFORCED.\n \n \n\n\n\n Y our wrong \, but what is important is that many black people have thought like you from the founding of the usa and many black people have thought l ike me in opposition to you and yours\, since the usa was founded. I don't see how these viewpoints have a bridge and i argue this is the most impor tant issue in the black populace in the usa\, because more than anything e lse\, the black experience in the usa is one of being terorrized abused\, whether legally or illegally by whites. So\, how black people in the usa\, view the law is essential to how we see the usa\, non blacks\, or ourselv es. \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n IN AMENDMENT - my original comment\n\n\n\n  \n\n \n\n Pioneer\, this is the true schism among the descended of enslaved bla ck people. all over the world. \n\n\n\n If I had a nickel for every black person older than me\, my age\, or younger than me in my life that talked like you... I would have quite a bit of cash. \n\n\n\n But the reality i s\, many black people talk like me as well and me and mine think the talk of you and yours is hogwash bullshit \, always has been\, always will be.  \n\n\n\n history proves the following\n\n\n\n Law enforcers problem isn' t their ability to stop illegal activity\, it is their ability to skirt th e law and as long as law enforcers are human they will. \n\n\n\n As long as fiscal capitalism exists\, which is the heart of the usa\, not justice or equality\, fiscal poor people will exist and the only avenue for making money when one doesn't have is always illegal. \n\n\n\n The people who h ave the most money in the entire history of your country the usa is based on morals/cosde of conduct that are the most terrible or cruel in nature\, so how can peoples viewpoints change in the fact of the reality unless th eir simply fools. \n\n\n\n No the reason laws don't change things is caus e laws are impotent. They always have been and always will be\, and all th e law enforcer advocating black people like you \, who speak of law enforc ement like the old black preachers in the past while black people are bein g legally or illegally terrorized by non blacks sickens me. \n\n\n\n  \n \n\n\n But thank you for your honesty. As I said you are not the only blac k person who thinks like that. I just wish black people like you would com prehend\, that your views towards this particular issue is \, arguably\, t he most important issue in the black descended of enslaved populace. \n\n \n\n  \n\n\n\n 02222026\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n Citation\n\n\n\n https://aalbc .com/tc/topic/12484-is-the-usa-in-the-way-of-a-better-humanity/#findCommen t-80250\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n  @ProfD\n\n\n\n \n On 2/21/2026 at 10:47 PM\, ProfD said:\n \n\n \n \n Correct. Tribes must decide what's most peace ful for them &\; build strategic alliances with other like-minded group s. \n \n\n \n  \n \n \n\n\n\n what if their aren't so many like min ded groups? \n\n\n\n \n On 2/21/2026 at 10:47 PM\, ProfD said:\n \n\n \n \n Mainly because people are comfortable as individuals &\; tribes. 😎\n \n \n\n\n\n you think its comfort...  i know a number of blacks w ho have said that... I don't think its comfort. \n\n\n\n I think it is ho nesty. I always tell the children I tutor\, words are the least proving ac tions. In black history month so many black people we refer to have beauti ful speeches\, but little in the way of non verbal actions to prove anythi ng. I think black people and I will argue\, most people\, at some point ge t tired of being told to try again for trying for agains sake. Some will a rgue people should act with a faith but I have always thought that is sill y. faith isn't enough. results profd\, you got to show results to the peop le. People who want to do things have to show results to themselves. \n\n \n\n  \n\n\n\n 02222026\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n Citation\n\n\n\n https://aalbc .com/tc/topic/12484-is-the-usa-in-the-way-of-a-better-humanity/#findCommen t-80268\n\n\n\n osted just now\n\n\n\n @ProfD\n\n\n\n   6 hours ago\,  ProfD said:\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n For example\, the smartest among poor peop le could organize to fight for more opportunities &\; resources.\n\n\n\ n  \n\n\n\n Yet\, poor people keep voting against their own interests &am p\; consuming just enough to survive. They enable the rich &\; powerful . They're comfortable in their station.\n\n\n\n ahh the smartest are among the poor are the ones who get results\, not organize. Organization has no value without results. Results isn't fighting for a thing\, it getting a thing. \n\n\n\n And this goes back to the many black elected\, the many b lack owned business\, many of them will talk about fighting but when black people see their results they see\, little or worse no results\, and blac k people realize the scam. No one wants to spend their whole life a sucker \, voting and carrying on and getting nothing. as James Baldwin near his d eath said\, I paraphrase\,  when will it happen? when I am fifty or a hun dred? will it happen for me or my children or my grandchildren. \n\n\n\n Baldwin's point to me is excellent. His point is that government is result s based\, not faith based\, and when results never come through all the me thodologies present in government people wisely pull out of activity. \n\ n\n\n It isn't that people vote against their interest\, they pull out of the bureaucratic system. To rephrase\, if you look at voting patterns in t he usa\, across all demographic lines\, the biggest winner is none of the above. None of the above isn't against the peoples interest\, none of the above is an indictment on the entire governmental system or its agents ele cted or not. Poor people not voting proves the system's functionality is n egative or dead. It is up to people in the system to prove otherwise and i f they can't... it's over. \n\n\n\n   6 hours ago\, ProfD said:\n\n\n \n What other reason(s) keep people from taking action to improve rheir po sition in the grand scheme of life?\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n I answered honesty\ n\n\n\n   6 hours ago\, ProfD said:\n\n\n\n Correct. Actions speak lou der than words.\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n Exactly\, but not just the voters actio ns speak louder.  the elected people or the appointed peoples actions spe ak louder than their words and in terms of results\, the elected /appointe d peoples actions are more important in getting results.  that is the gre at flaw in the white enslavers called the founding fathers schema that is the us constitution. The rule of law government isn't just the people and the law\, the rule of the law government is the people+ the law+ the gover nment officials. In the usa the government officials who are born from the people have succesfully made the people vote against the government itsel f \, which is what a majority no vote means.  Now people like yourself fi nd that unacceptable\, but that is where your dysfunctional or where said white enslavers made a great error. In the preamble to the constitution\, the incestual rapist\, jefferson\, correctly admitted that if the governme nt of the usa is dysfunctional the people have the right to destroy it. He admitted\, correctly\, that a government can be too dysfunctional to warr ant any thing but destruction\, i argue the usa government is there in the eyes of most people in the usa. The voters are speaking loudly\, they are finished with the usa. that is why they are mostly not voting. Government isn't faith it is results.\n\n\n\n   6 hours ago\, ProfD said:\n\n\n\ n The speeches &\; marches organized &\; conducted by FBA/AfroAmeric an leaders were effective in getting Civil Rights legislation passed.\n\n\ n\n  \n\n\n\n By extension\, those actions by FBA/AfroAmericans made it e ven more possible for Black immigrants to get a foothold into the USA.\n\n \n\n  \n\n\n\n White folks use other Black &\; non-white groups of peo ple in their maintenance of the system of white supremacy. \n\n\n\n Well. ..if a black child asked me\, which some have\, about the black movements in the jim crow era\, 1865 to 1980\, and what they were effective in doing . I have said they failed. Because the goal of most black people wasn't c ivil rights legislation. Again\, knowing history really knocks the bullshi t off of many sayings. Civil rights legislation was an agreement  between a minority of black dosers aside a minority of whites. It was the NAACP v ictory. And I will say it again\, the NAACP was always represented a minor ity within the black dos. the majority movements in black dos populace was not NAACP. The civil rights act was a compromise unwanted by a majority b lack dosers or a majority of non blacks that after the civil rights act wa s used by said minority of black dosers to suggest an improvement to the m ajority of black dosers \, when it wasn't.  Again\, the proof is the jim crow era. alice was enslaved 1963\, so 1965 civil rights act doesn't addre ss her situation. And as the Kern Commission \, sanctioned by lyndon b joh nson\, all members of it white except for one or two people. flat out stat ed\, the usa needed a complete overhaul. Lyndon B Johnson was angry at the kerner commission\, but \, and I must admit it is hilarious that nearly e veryone in the kerner commission was white and they didn't come up with \" gone with the wind\" or \"birth of a nation\" they came up with the usa ne eds a complete overhaul. The kerner commission made in the 1960s literally refutes the position you and many other people\, black or white\, give cl aim to the civil rights acts.  and I think most people\, though tthey don 't know or have heard of the kerner commisison\, concur to the kerner comm ission completely\, and think the position by you and those like you to th e civil rights movement or your assessment of the time after is hogwash.  \n\n\n\n Kerner commission\n\n\n\n https://aalbc.com/tc/profile/6477-richa rdmurray/?status=2685&\;type=status \;\; or https://aalbc.com/tc/event s/event/197-economic-corner-15-02172025/\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n   6 hours ag o\, ProfD said:\n\n\n\n The aforementioned FBA/AfroAmericans put in work over a half-century ago that made it possible for other Black folks &\ ; non-whites to have better opportunities &\; access to resources under the system of racism white supremacy. \n\n\n\n No\, not over a half cent ury ago\, near two hundred and fifty years ago. It was the blacks who foug ht for the usa at its infancy\, who were again\, a minority in the black d os populace. which you never say. But I get it. you are one of those minor ity blacks. Your not thinking of the majority of the black people in the s ame way\, the black people like you and James Forten[  https://aalbc.com /tc/events/event/592-the-american-revolution-pbs-documentary-episode-6/  ]  have always seen the usa in a way unreal to the majority of black peop le and then accuse the majority of black people of various negativies rath er than admit your view doesn't serve the majority of black people.\n\n\n\ n Your correct\, a group of black and whites worked together for this mode rnity but neither were a majority of blacks or whites and when you see the complete canvas of the usa you can see that both of said minorities did w ell for themselves and used their associative majorities to do it... which has led to a lack of results from the government of the usa to most\, and no amount of faith can change that.\n\n\n\n   6 hours ago\, ProfD sai d:\n\n\n\n As I've mentioned above\, the groundwork has already been laid for Black folks to have more access to opportunities &\; resources.\n\n \n\n  \n\n\n\n Unfortunately\, for a half-century &\; counting\, many Black folks have chosen to rest on their laurels under the system of racis m white supremacy.\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n Actions do speak louder than words. Taking up a seat of comfort under the system of racism white supremacy is the action many Black folks have chosen. Same goes for poor people under t he status quo.\n\n\n\n I comprehend your position. I do. Your like James F orten who was a black person\, a DOSer \, who fought alongside a group of whites who to improve white lives while maintaining black peoples lives\, in majority as enslaved. I get it. Forten became a wealthy businessman aft er the secession from the english empire. When I think of you and Pioneer I see James Forten. a black person who doesn't represent the situation of most black in the usa \, as most black people in the usa were enslaved. Wh o doesn't represent most black peoples relationship to whites in the usa o r the usa itself. Forten wished to engage to this usa even when it was onl y a declaration\, but most black people wanted to be as far away from whit es wherever they are\, or kill whites a vendetta whites earned a hundred t imes over. I get your position. But it was never a majority position in th e black dos populace. NEVER. So when James Forten\, Frederick Douglass\, w eb dubois when younger\, mlk jr \, barrack Obama \, yourself\, all talk\, I realize\, this is a heritage of your tribe. You know fully well the trut h for a majority of black people but you don't care. you have made a choic e and can only speak of support for that choice by condemning blacks who d idn't choose that. I get it. \n\n\n\n And it explains why the tribe you a re in\, a minority of blacks DOSers who have always been engaged in the us a\, has such alliance with Immigration aCt of 1965 blacks. Cause said blac ks come to the usa with a similar mind. Thank you\, I get it. \n\n\n\n   \n\n\n\n @Pioneer1\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n   4 hours ago\, Pioneer1 said:\n \n\n\n I think yall may be taking this \"tribes\" business a little too fa r....lol.\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n I argue black people have never been allowed to by white influence or minority black tribes agendas taken our tribes se rious enough and it has cost majority of black peoples. \n\n\n\n You and Pioneer must see the history clearly. When the usa was founded ninety perc ent of black DOSers forebears were enslaved . Seven percent fought for aga inst the creation of the usa or white people of usa or any of the usa incl uding black people like James Forten. three percent of black folk fought f or the creation of the usa. \n\n\n\n What does that mean ?\n\n\n\n Today in modernity\, 2026\, decades after the jim crow era [ 1865 to 1980] over a century and a half since the end of the enslavement era [ 1492-1865] mos t black people in the usa\, with a huge influx of modern black immigrants post 1965 immigration act. are like the three percent of black folk who fo ught for the creation of the usa. but what does this mean for the history of the tribes. \n\n\n\n This means said three percent which you/profd/jam es horten/frederick douglass/webdubois when younger/mlk jr/barrack obama + michelle obama represent a heritage in the Black populace as old as the U SA itself\, BUT also a tribe that worked against the majority of black peo ple with the aid of whites till it became the majority. \n\n\n\n Now my t ribe\, led by people like Titus Cornelius\, who lived at the same time of James Forten\, was a minority as well\, but the larger minority. My tribe would be the majority minority in the black dos populace till circa 1845. You and profd's  tribe became the largest minority starting in the jim cr ow era. My tribe was and is the most disliked by whites for obvious reason s\, variants of my tribe made the successful quilombos/haiti. The best exa mples of black empowerment have always been made by my tribe. Your tribe h as from the beginning only offered an integrated solution which has limits for black growth. \n\n\n\n But the biggest tribe was the black enslaved\ , circa ninety percent who had only one desire\, ESCAPE. They didn't want to kill whites\, like my tribe. But they didn't want to be in any union wi th whites like yours. My tribe always comprehended the largest tribes trut h\, your tribe has always denied their truth or at the least\, in rhetoric opposed it dysfunctionally\, as you and Profd's prose shows. The majority DOS tribe has an interest\, a self interest\, and that is away from the u sa \, away from whites. That has always been their truth. They don't want to be president\, they dont' want to be governor\, they dont' want to a ce o of a fortune 500 company\, they don't want to be a law enforcer\, they d on't want any part of the usa or the whites of the usa. \n\n\n\n Don't yo u see Pioneer. How weakly Black people overall have treated this important issue\, and to be blunt your tribe helped this problem the most. Because your tribe\, has always \, instead of comprehending what most blacks wants always has tried to do prosyletize/preach the black majority out of their truth. And this explains the immigration act. You know\, the civil rights and voting right act serve the function of making federal law make racial [ any type of race: phenotypical/gender/religious] negative biases illagel \, make negatively biased to any groups voting laws illegal. But what is t he immigration act really? the immigration didn't serve the majority of wh ites or blacks in the usa. While it didn't serve the black majority tribe who wanted nothing to do with the usa or my tribe that wants war\, or serv e the majority of whites who want comfort they don't need to work for\, it did serve you and profd's tribe of blacks and the minority white tribes o f wealthy whites\, For the wealthy whites it allowed for cheap labor for t heir profit. but for black integrationists \, james forten to you and prof d\, it flooded the black populace with black immigrants who shared a simil ar philosophy to your tribe. I get it\, well done. \n\n\n\n Your tribe wh ich started at circa three percent has the majority in the Black populace: Black DOS tribes + Black Immigrant tribes in the usa today. The Black DOS majority tribe still doesn't believe in the usa and I argue never will ca use they have never too but without the majority populace they will have a different path. I can see positive plus negative elements in their future . As for my tribe\, we live on\, we have always existed and always will. V endetta is powerful. Blood feuds are powerful. My tribe is small but patie nt. My tribe will get our chance again\, and I can only hope someone like me is at the helm\, cause if someone like me is at the helm\, our successe s will be thorough. \n\n\n\n   4 hours ago\, Pioneer1 said:\n\n\n\n W ell\, that's because there's also been Black people who were NOT so......w ell....never mind....lol.\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n very funny\n\n\n\n   4 hour s ago\, Pioneer1 said:\n\n\n\n Have YOU been personally?\n\n Are you bei ng\, now?\n\n\n\n to your first question\, yes and most black people have throughout all humanity. \n\n\n\n to your second question\, I answer with a situation that brings its issues to bare. If a white man rapes my wife and that is the only moment of white terror I have\, I am not obliged to t reat that moment as a one of. I am free to\, yes\, your correct. A black p erson is free to treat a life absent or with less white terror than the av erage in the past as a betterment or at the least as unwarranting an unmen dable bridge with whites. that the point in your question. But you miss th e important point\,which your tribe always has\, which is very selfish\, i s that no black person is forced or has to come to that conclusion. \n\n\ n\n So to answer your second question\, in my assessment of white terror\, all levels from verbal harassment from white strangers to white people mu rdering my loving ones\, the answer is yes. I think from your tribes asses sment the answer is no. \n\n\n\n   4 hours ago\, Pioneer1 said:\n\n\n \n Because I see myself and other AfroAmericans as valuable CITIZENS of th is nation with power....limited ofcourse...to change the conditions IN thi s nation for our betterment and empowerment.\n\n\n\n It takes unity\, inte lligence\, and a DESIRE to do so\; however it can definitely be done.\n\n  \n\n\n\n That would be more effective and beneficial to us than sitting packed together somewhere in a hot ass room cussing and crying about how h opeless and helpless you are and how you \"don't belong\" in the country y ou were born and raised in\, lol.\n\n\n\n yes\, you and your tribe in the usa from james horton to now have always viewed the majority of black peop le in the usa through your tribe's perspective\, not any other tribes pers pective\, which is your tribes forever dishonor in my view. While my tribe is a minority tribe as well\, at least my tribe is honest. Your tribe has always been wicked tongued.  For all tribes know why the majority DOS tr ibe has never wanted anything to do with the usa or the white people in it . But your tribe would rather criminalize what white terror honestly creat ed. \n\n\n\n The good news for your tribe is in 2026\, you now have a bun ch of black immigrants from outside the usa who have come freely to the us a for the purpose of being citizens\, for the purpose of their betterment\ , and they don't even demand too much empowerment outside of individual ri ghts. So\, your tribe for the first time in two hundred and fifty years tr uly has the numerical advantage in the complete black populace. Your still a minority tribe among DOSers alone\, but you now have the advantage with Black peoples altogether in the usa. Use it\, focus on it. My advice is t o forget about the other two tribes of DOSers you continually complain abo ut. Cause one tribe of DOSers wants revenge on whites which can't work wit h any plan from your tribe of DOSers\,  and the other tribe of DOSers wil l never trust whites enough to be involved in any plan from your tribe. \ n\n\n\n So what are you and Profd going to do to now? forget other DOSers \, like myself for example. We will never join you and you know why\, even if you cant' accept it.  It is the truth. What you are willing to forgiv e\, who you are willing to work with is not what Black DOSers from other t ribes want to do or will do. But the good news is that\, the black one per cent/the black fiscally wealthy in the usa are 99% your tribe\, which make s perfect sense as the usa is a white country and black people making mone y have to be involved with whites\, which is what your tribe has always be en willing to do\, since James Forten.  And with the Black immigrants pos t immigration act 1965\, your tribe have all the pieces to make a level of integration your tribe has always wanted in the usa. In the end I imagine the usa will be split into parts\, which actually make historical sense a s well. The logic/reason/thinking coming from a simple truth. Fiscal wealt h can be very beautiful\, harmonizing even\, but some things a human can w ant can not be bought with money\, or acquired through money\, or can not come from a peaceful life\, or be satisfied with a peaceful life. Thus the usa your tribe has always worked for of fiscal wealth in a peaceful land under the rule of law\, can not satisfy what some humans may want. \n\n\n \n  \n\n\n\n post script\, there is no us. Black DOSers are not an us. Th e larger Black Americans\, canada to argentina\, are not an us. You and bl ack people like you need to stop prosyletizing\, it doesn't help. Most Bla ck Americans\,  share a heritage of being enslaved by whites in the ameri can continent from canada to argentina. But we don't all share the same pe rspectives on who we are or what we want\, and you and yours need to accep t that finally. Stop your damn preaching/prosyletizing. \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n \n Colonel Tye\n\n\n\n https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colonel_Tye\n\n\n\n S tephen Blucke\n\n\n\n https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stephen_Blucke\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n 02222026\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n Citation\n\n\n\n https://aalbc.com /tc/topic/12484-is-the-usa-in-the-way-of-a-better-humanity/#findComment-80 271\n\n\n\n osted just now\n\n\n\n @Pioneer1 \n\n\n\n   2 hours ago\,  Pioneer1 said:\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n Looks to me like YOUR TRIBE needs YOU R OWN land.\n\n\n\n Any plans to get it?\n\n\n\n always has\, the garveyit es/the quilombos/haiti/the black loyalist\, all achieved getting a land\, achieved not merely attempted. Even the exodusters did achieve... we know what happened to malcolm x's father so... Now holding a land well\, some h ave achieved. I know who has kept the land they earned\, even with white t error/power ever present\,  and who has not\, and why. \n\n\n\n So the q uestion is not plans to get\, plans to be apart of\, plans to improve\, or other. Haitii exists right now\, as their constitution under the emperor states\, they are called the blacks technically\, not haitians. That is a nod to all black peoples around the world. Haiti is a geographic distincti on. But in a constitution that black people of haiti had true involvement with\, free from whites or blacks who want to be whites\, or blacks who wa nt to align with whites\, earned through the blood of war. Haiti is the la nd for all Black Peoples. \n\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n So when you sa y get it? it seems you don't comprehend the land is already earned. which. .. goes back to the problem with your tribe. the way you see the black pop ulace is very usa centric and ... Haiti has existed my entire life. Now if you want to ask why I haven't gone. Well\, the cheapest answer is haiti h asn't invited. Which is what haiti did in the time of the emperor or king\ , but your man \, like you\, Frederick Douglass\, couldn't even stomach be ing the ambassador to haiti. I mean\, your tribe\, love hindering all othe rs\, and then get angry when all others don't do what you say... anyway\, modernity demands I make my way in. And I am working on it. I am human. My bloodlines don't have a history of massive wealth to provide for vibrant inheritances for most of the last five hundred years. It will take more ti me. \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n 02222026\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n Citation\n \n\n\n https://aalbc.com/tc/topic/12484-is-the-usa-in-the-way-of-a-better- humanity/#findComment-80273\n\n\n\n sted just now\n\n\n\n @Pioneer1\n\n\n \n  \n\n\n\n   3 hours ago\, Pioneer1 said:\n\n\n\n -Is this not a co ntradiction?\n\n\n\n no because of the following\n\n\n\n   4 hours ago\ , richardmurray said:\n\n\n\n Frederick Douglass\, couldn't even stomach being the ambassador to haiti.\n\n\n\n what I meant by invite was a robus t invitation by the government.  I didn't suggest I couldn't go\, to be b lunt\, I was offered\, but I have my reasons for doing all things. and my primary reasons for not choosing haiti is many things that I am not intere sted in discussing\n\n\n\n   3 hours ago\, Pioneer1 said:\n\n\n\n If H aiti is the land for ALL Black people and being the land for \"the blacks\ " it has given the nod to ALL Black people from around the world....that s ounds to me like the invitation has been issued.\n\n\n\n it was\, to be bl unt\, if you search liberia or sierra leone there are still those in both of those countries who open doors for black folk from the american contine nt to africa for DOSers if they wish. \n\n\n\n The point I was making to you\, which you have missed is that lands already exist in various places for my tribe. It is not a matter of needing a new place. You suggested a l and was needed and that is not the truth\, their are quite a few places on this earth\, for my tribe but\, my relation to them is not what I discuss ed. You do seem to be interested in me \n\n\n\n and thus your following\, very dry joke. As you well know I have never blamed other Black tribes fo r anything concerning my own black tribe. \n\n\n\n   3 hours ago\, Pio neer1 said:\n\n\n\n Don't blame \"my tribe\" or Frederick Douglass becaus e the street lights are on and you still don't want to go home...lol.\n\n\ n\n  \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n In my own mind when I think of detroit\, the sol e black northern [meaning exo southern\, west or north of the confederate states] city of a certain size\, I wonder what it needs. I know wayne coun ty + michigan are enemies to Detroit\, as a black city's growth\, this is well documented. But\, when I look at cities around the world\, the ones t hat financially thrive have an industry and Detroit doesn't have an indust ry. The car companies accountants and administrators are there\, but not t he manufacturing. \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n 02232026\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n Citatio n\n\n\n\n https://aalbc.com/tc/topic/12484-is-the-usa-in-the-way-of-a-bett er-humanity/#findComment-80287\n\n\n\n sted just now\n\n\n\n @Pioneer1 \ n\n\n\n It's funny\, me and a dear friend of mine\, by dear friend I mean a person I know offline who is a friend\, talk about this sometimes. And.. . your assertion to me is incorrect but your assertion to me if applied to the larger populace in the usa is correct. many peoples I have heard say they want to leave the usa\, in various scenarios\, but don't because they enjoy the amenities/friendly things of the usa. But that is not my reason . I have been fortunate to spend enough time outside the usa to comprehend already what I need and don't need to be happy. What is needed or not nee ded to survive or live or thrive for myself. And I am lucky enough to know those who have left the usa successfully\, in my lifetime\, from Harlem\, not merely history books. And they add the last bit of information about the process. So your wrong about me\, not about most people who say they w ill leave the usa \, but it isn't that way for me. I will not give my logi c/thinking\, I am not interested in preaching or guiding.  But I have sai d before in this very forum\, that I love history and history teaches too. .. united states of america/liberia/sierra leone/israel/australia  are ca utionary tales about immigration\, for me anyway. It isn't enough to have resources. I need more than that. I honor my forebears sir and for me what that means is I am not an enslaver nor am I butcher/abuser and the usa/li beira/sierra leone/israel/australia are not born from justice or equality or anything positive usa/liberia/sierra leone/israel/australia are all bor n from two things alone\, an immigrant butchering/abusing  people already there and an immigrant enslaving people already there. I am not intereste d in that. And sadly for me\, modern humanity which has been molded by the usa is ripe most places for immigrants to butcher/abuse or to enslave the people already there. You and your fellow statians only believe in helpin g yourselves individually\, you love to talk of the law but love to abuse others legally\, and then blame those you've abused legally for being them selves. I am a thoughtful person. True honor\, civility\, purpose\, matter to me. \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n 02232026\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n Citation\n\n\n\n https://aalbc.com/tc/topic/12484-is-the-usa-in-the-way-of-a-better-humanit y/#findComment-80294\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n sted just now\n\n\n\n @ProfD\n\n\ n\n   19 hours ago\, ProfD said:\n\n\n\n Please provide examples of th eir accomplishments in terms of Black empowerment. \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n ha iti. the only country started by Black Americans whose forebears were ensl aved to whites.  What is more powerful for any people than starting their own country?  What is hilarious is a black person in modernity asks this \, is ignorant to haiti's value as the greatest symbol of black empowermen t and yet\, the whole reason zionists\, white jews\, made israel was to do what black americans whose forebears were enslaved to whites did in haiti . and profd and other blacks need an example of my tribes accomplishments in black empowerment. And I will add on the cake\, while the white jews of israel use their white status to scheme and plot \, using advantages\, ha iti did this while being attacked in open warfare by france/england/spain/ U.S.A. all recorded as being defeated by haiti. Was it easy? no\, many bla ck people died. it was the hardest of things. but it was done and even tho ugh haiti has suffered surrounded by the two biggest slave states in moder n human history: USA + Brazil or  surrounded by anti black or black integ rationists countries: mexico/jamaica/venezuela/trinidad/puerto rico/cuba/p anama/costa rica Haiti had golden times. \n\n\n\n   19 hours ago\, Pr ofD said:\n\n\n\n Were they able to sustain &\; make it wealthy?\n\n\n \n Yes\, the citadel la ferriere is the biggest fort in the american conti nent and still stands. Built by Blacks of Haiti. \n\n\n\n Did the golden age last forever... no countries golden age last forever. And I will not c hagrin Haiti's golden age not lasting forever when no one chagrin's Rome's golden age not lasting forever\, or England's or China's or the USA's... all  government have golden times\, and not so golden\, and miserable tim es. I don't know what you mean by sustain. \n\n\n\n During HAiti's golden time\, Haiti was littered with beatiful homes\, and the usa circa spanish american war\, stole a lot of gold from haiti\, which is of course breaki ng the law\, your fellow black integrationist  @Pioneer1 of course has little to say when white people or white countries\, like the usa\,  brea k laws\, but.. ok. So They did make it wealthy. I will apologize for Haiti and say\, its not easy being the only country in an entire continent [ fr om canada to argentina ] where black people are free and in charge\, but I have always comprehended you and your tribes love of the usa and unforgiv eness for any other tribes ways. \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n   19 hours ago\,  ProfD said:\n\n\n\n Is this the same Haiti that owes a debt to France int o perpetuity?\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n Haiti might be *free* from white folks bu t it will always be poor because white folks have seized their wealth. \n \n\n\n The USA seized the wealth. The debt to france is not physical. I wi ll explain. One of the governments of haiti\, after the golden time decide d to accept a reparation debt to france\, which is hilarious at some level \, and that is what france suggest is owed to it. And for the record\, Alg eria says France owes them\, but... anyway. Governments of countries have these sorts of arrangements. by france's own record the USA owes france so ... countries say they owe things...I don't know why you made that stateme nt as if you don't comprehend how these things are. The USA owes France\, the USA has tons of money\, can print tons\, has never once thought to pay France so... It seems to me you love to mention anti black . Maybe I am r eading to much into your position\, but very anti black for me. you mentio n a situation that happens. If every coutry/government in the world was ba sed on whether another country said they owed\, the entire college of gove rnments would be in financial destitution. Why does Haiti have a double st andard? why does haiti's supposed debts warrant mention but other countrie s don't? outside of the fact that some blacks\, who love the usa\, who don 't care for other tribes\, like to make uneven arguments. \n\n\n\n The Bl acks of haiti are freer even today than any other black americans includin g in the usa. Not as financially wealthier based on white owned banks and white currencies but... ok. \n\n\n\n As for the eternity of poverty your wrong\, first or foremost because some haitians who live in haiti are weal thy that means a brighter day is always possible. I can't tell you when. I have no foresight\, but it will happen. Again \, Ireland was taken by eng land in 1541\, most of ireland was free from england in 1921 so circa thre e hundred and eighty years and in some parts of ireland from 1100s england was king\, so things take time. I don't know where your from where someho w\, things are supposed to be forever\, nothing is forever. Just so you kn ow\, the usa will fall one day\, through rupture in itself for some reason \, or maybe decay in itself for some reason \, thrugh some opposing gover nment somewhere rising as it falls. It will happen. I think maybe you thin k it will not. \n\n\n\n Haiti had a golden age\, it will have one again.  \n\n\n\n   19 hours ago\, ProfD said:\n\n\n\n Both Freetown in Sierr a Leone &\; Liberia had huge issues with the Black folks that emigrated from the USA.\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n Black folks outside the USA ar e not wel coming to FBA/AfroAmericans with open arms either. They are looking for us to bring a bag of money.\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n I'm a huge proponent of Black folks being empowered &\; self-sufficient &\; autonomous throughout the planet. I would love to see all Black folks winning. \n\n\n\n I rath er reword what you said here. the indigenous black peoples of what would b ecome sierra leone and liberia were treated like the palestiniean while th e black americans who founded freetown or monrovia were like the set white jews commonly called zionists.  \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n I wanted to reword only because the issues you mention are best described in a proper way. In the beginning sierra leone or liberia didn't exist. These were lands of b lack tribes of africa. I forget their names\, but so many exist in Africa.  \n\n\n\n The next step was when black americans financed by whites made monrovia or freetown\, freetown was first actually\, monrovia was second i n time. \n\n\n\n And third step was the creation of sierra leone about fr eetown or liberia about monrovia. I did research on this. The problem  or issues is  between step 2 and 3. \n\n\n\n The black americans who immig rated back\, not all\, it was messy ok\, but many black americans who immi grated back \, like so many immigrants in the USA age\, the last white eur opean imperial era\, think only of themselves and little of the people the y have to interact with. The tragedy for me is the black americans like me who lived with the indigenous blacks weren't strong enough to stop the bl ack americans like you and pioneer who only look to themselves\, which is not a crime it is a choice\,  and were willing to abuse their fellow blac k\, for financial profit\, which came true. the descendents of the black a mericans who were greedy and cruel \, as i guess par the course in all hum anity\, are the wealthiest in sierra leone and liberia today. \n\n\n\n   \n\n\n\n Your right\, most\, not all but\, most blacks outside the usa are n't welcoming to black amerians as strangers although\, we black americans earned that reputation in liberia or sierra leones. \n\n\n\n For me what is sad is\, in freetown or monrovia they could had simply focused on. tho se cities  were enough. they didn't need to take the land about those cit ies. Yes what I am about to say is cheap hindsight\, worth nothing now\, b ut the lesson is\, you have the city\,  make a deal with the remainder pe oples to extend the city's [freetown or monrovia] land for immediate growt h and then make an ironclad law giving the land about freetown or monrovia to the indigenous black folk with the condition that the laws allow for o wnership and sales to allow for black americans to buy land for even rate\ , but also modify the fiscal habits of the indigenous. Allow women to own land\, inheritance to pass to male or female\, block land from being owned by the nonblack. The legal code. But in defense\, most of those black ame ricans who founded monrovia or freetown\, which in my mind are the true in heritances\, not the country of liberia or sierra leone. is that they were country folk. country folk\, don't have experience with cities and more i mportantly\, how cities work. I imagine most of them couldn't comprehend h ow different a city is. when you look at monaco/singapore\, monrovia or fr eetown should had been like them\, but unlike those two \, city states who had a century or more of being a city state province monrovia or freetown were ust made by mostly farmers who were thinking freetown or monrovia ne ed to be like pre civil war atlanta\, not pre civil war nyc.  But they we re wrong\, or at least the black americans who won the war between black a mericans over what to do\, were wrong.  But\, there are still those in si erra leone or liberia who believe in that old purpose\, yes not everyone \ , but still some exist. \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n Your right\, you a nd pioneer and me all want black happiness. I admit that i react negativel y sometimes to the wording of you and pioneer\, either you don't know thin gs you should know or you are rattling the saber which I don't find funny\ , or take lightly. \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n 02242026\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n Citati on\n\n\n\n https://aalbc.com/tc/topic/12484-is-the-usa-in-the-way-of-a-bet ter-humanity/#findComment-80315\n\n\n\n osted just now\n\n\n\n @ProfD\n\n \n\n   On 2/23/2026 at 9:03 PM\, ProfD said:\n\n\n\n A very good frien d of mine is Haitian. He &\; his wife &\; other family members who i mmigrated to the USA have given me the whole run down on their beloved hom e country. They also told me why they're in no rush to go back there to li ve.\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n Certain parts of Haiti are beautiful to visit. Yet\ , there's a lot of infrastructure work that needs to be done in the countr y. The biggest impediment...greed &\; corruption.\n\n\n\n I don't know what relevancy your prose has. You asked me the following. \n\n\n\n   O n 2/23/2026 at 6:41 PM\, richardmurray said:\n\n\n\n Please provide exam ples of their accomplishments in terms of Black empowerment. \n\n\n\n I g ave haiti as an answer\, with full temporal comprehension. Then you replie d with the above\, which has nothing to do with the question you posed. bu t ok. You did not ask me about the condition of modern haiti\, you asked w hat my tribe accomplished\, i gave the truth. I don't know what your highl ighted prose above has to do with the question you posed. \n\n\n\n   On 2/23/2026 at 9:03 PM\, ProfD said:\n\n\n\n Don't know why you keep insi sting I'm an integrationist. \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n What else can anyone who embraces the USA be? You said the USA is your country. I have no problem with that. But\, the USA from its very beginnings was integrated. I didn't say the integration was positive\, it wasn't\, but it was integrated. And it still is today and will always be unless one populace becomes an overw helming majority which is not going to happen any time soon. And the war b etween the states is the proof that whites internally have never seen them selves as unified as some nonwhites suggest. \n\n\n\n   On 2/23/2026 at 9:03 PM\, ProfD said:\n\n\n\n I do not love the USA. It just happens to be my home country. I'm not fortunate enough to have another country to w hich I can return.\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n Even enough. But the usa will always be your home country because \, unfortunately\, for Black DOSers none of us have a country to return too. Our black forebears\, which is what Henry Louis gates rjr shows dismisses so poorly\, didn't come from one place in africa\, they came from various places. As I have said in this very forum . Most of Black DOSers forebears were buried in the ocean\, not any land\, as 90% of the people in the boats died on the journey. Those are all Blac k DOSers initial forebears. And our initial forebears came from all over t he continent of africa\, not any one particular country\, so unless the Af rican Union is handing out citizenship. \n\n\n\n   On 2/23/2026 at 9:03 PM\, ProfD said:\n\n\n\n Haiti doesn't have a double standard.\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n It is a fact that France has been collecting money from Haiti for a couple hundred years now.\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n Part of the reason is H aitian greed &\; corruption starting with the lighter-skinned folks run ning around down there.\n\n\n\n The double standard I referred to wasn't c oncerning haiti paying money\, but the following.\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n   O n 2/23/2026 at 6:41 PM\, richardmurray said:\n\n\n\n Is this the same Ha iti that owes a debt to France into perpetuity?\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n Haiti m ight be *free* from white folks but it will always be poor because white f olks have seized their wealth. \n\n\n\n why Haiti being considered owing something is special or warrants note when I gave multiple examples of man y countries\, whites ones\, that are still stated as owing even if they do n't pay. so countries have relationships. And the reason isn't greed or co rruption\, it is simpler than that\, it is haiti' uniqueness. I don't know why I have to say it cause you know or should know\, that haiti was surro unded by slavers. Haiti's nearest neighbor is modern jamaica which at that time was merely a territory of the british empire and the country garvey wanted to escape which led him to be antiwhite\, that is jamaica. so... Th e reason is when you are surrounded by enemies\, it matters.  Intelligenc e and strategy aren't godly things\, they have limits\, they can't make ev erything happen. A kid surrounded by thirty bullies will never kick all th ose other kids ask or smooth talk his way by them if they want to hurt him . \n\n\n\n   On 2/23/2026 at 9:03 PM\, ProfD said:\n\n\n\n The intent was not an uneven argument. But\, I can see where your sensitivity &\; affection for Haiti might make it seem that way.\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n Haiit i is special for those in my tribe. But my irritation is not from adoratio n to haiti but miscomprehension. You and pioneer love to veer in your pros e. you have a question\, i give a response\, but then you respond to my re sponse with something totally unrelated to my response. \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n \n   On 2/23/2026 at 9:03 PM\, ProfD said:\n\n\n\n That has not stoppe d Haitians from immigrating to the USA.\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n Just think...Wy clef could've started The Fugees down there if his family hadn't posted up in New Jersey.\n\n\n\n hell\, go farther back\, remember\, black people o f haiti literally left former saint dominique with their white owners to n ew orleans\, so the heritage of haitians to the usa is arguably older than any other black populace anywhere outside the usa. \n\n\n\n   On 2/23/ 2026 at 9:03 PM\, ProfD said:\n\n\n\n A very small minority of Haitians are wealthy. More than likely\, they're among the greedy &\; corrupt. T hat's why Bar-B-Que was running amok.\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n yes that is why I call all the rich around the world the global one percent. every country today has wealthy people\, including the somalias/kashmir/east timors of t he world. A very small minority of people under any government are the mos t wealthy in their respective lands.\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n   On 2/23/2026 a t 9:03 PM\, ProfD said:\n\n\n\n You don't have to reword what I have wri tten in order to give your lecture/sermon.\n\n\n\n   On 2/23/2026 at 6:4 1 PM\, richardmurray said:\n\n\n\n hahah I am not trying to give a sermo n\, i have no pulpit in my home\n\n\n\n   On 2/23/2026 at 9:03 PM\, Pr ofD said:\n\n\n\n There you go again casting unwarranted aspersions again st us.\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n I was uneven to you and pioneer. \n\n\n\n   O n 2/23/2026 at 9:03 PM\, ProfD said:\n\n\n\n Most people who have a bias one way or another tend to lack balance in perspective. \n\n\n\n  \n\n\ n\n Regardless of what I type in calling balls &\; strikes\, I always w anted Black folks all over the planet to win.\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n I believe in tough love. What I think &\; type about my people...Black folks.... might be abrasive sometimes.\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n Our people...Black folks a re just as guilty of being greedy &\; corrupt  &\; full of sh8t &am p\; excuses for why they can't do better. I'll never accept it.\n\n\n\n   \n\n\n\n The system of racism white supremacy is a big enough enemy.\n\n\n \n  \n\n\n\n Black folks don't need to be enemies among themselves. Solve s nothing. In fact\, it helps white folks maintain power &\; control.\n \n\n\n Well... onto the future. \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n 02252026\n\n\n\n  \n \n\n\n Citation\n\n\n\n https://aalbc.com/tc/topic/12484-is-the-usa-in-the -way-of-a-better-humanity/#findComment-80320\n\n\n\n sted just now\n\n\n\ n @ProfD \n\n\n\n   1 hour ago\, ProfD said:\n\n\n\n Fair enough. Hai ti did successfully revolt against France. That was a major accomplishment . \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n Free itself from France\, but also stay free from t he likes of England/Spain/USA who all tried to replace france as its owner \, and failed. Not just a major accomplishment to defeat four of the stron gest navies in humanity at that time\, legendary. Very bloody\, many lives lost. I think of a man from north vietnam who once said\, I paraphrase\, he was the only one to return to his building\, all the other homes in his building lost their youngest generations to the vietnam war. \n\n\n\n Le gendary\, extremely costly. \n\n\n\n   1 hour ago\, ProfD said:\n\n\n \n Those who died &\; were buried in the ocean didn't bear fruit on for eign soil.\n\n\n\n well\, but you forget the first problem is\, the roundi ng up of black people was collective. the papers of the hausa caliphate li terally state that their border towns dealt with raiders constantly taking families\, whole towns. It was a serious problem.  So... the point being \, the relatives of the black people who bore fruit on foreign soil are th ose people who didn't make it across the big water.  That female or male who became part of the ten percent who survived the trip\, lost their moth er over the water\, their brothers\, sisters\, uncles\, cousins. The town was gone. I never forget the film CEdou by ousmane sembene\, I think from senegal and remember\, saint lous was a big slave port. Individuals would be taken\, as in the film\, but the majority would be... groups of those n ot in power\, undesiretable/poor... like the untouchable caste in india. S o your correct in that those who died on the water\, the ninety percent \,   didn't bear fruit in the american continent\, but they were family\, or at least clan to the ten percent who became our strict biological forebea rs and so for me\, ... For me\, the people who died over the ocean are mor e my forebears than their living relatives and descendents on the continen t.\n\n\n\n Another great philosophical variance in the tribes of black ame ricans  amazing\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n   1 hour ago\, ProfD said:\n\n\n\ n Rhetorically\, I wonder why Marcus Garvey didn't start his movement in J amaica. \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n  Based on Garvey's words I think it is clear \, garvey didn't see the american continent as a home for Black DOSer. He comprehended that black dosers from canada to argentina\, existed and were born or raised in said lands. But\, from his point of view all of the ame rican continent was anti black. And even in haiti I get his point. If anyt hing haiti proves garvey's point about leaving the american continent. HAi ti's problem sis the american continent. Canada/UA/Mexico/BRasil/Venezuela most of the lands in the american continet are run by those who are anti black. and during his time\, Jamaica was a crown colony\, where you had eu rophile blacks in positive positions. I argue Garvey saw jamaica even with its majority black population as white and that makes sense\, cause if yo u consider how much trouble the rastafarians have in jamaica today while j amaica leeches off of the memory of bob marley\, I think it is all clear. The blacks in jamaica... are very europhile\, even back then. Now one can argue\, maybe garvey should had given the english empire more thought. Sie rra leone existed\, maybe he could had worked to that. But Garvey clearly didn't care/trust/want to work with a majority of the  whites on the land he was raised on. \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n   1 hour ago\, ProfD said:\n\n \n\n Most of the wealthy people in a country are responsible for greed &am p\; corruption.\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n Until people are willing to fight &\ ; seize power in order to redistribute wealth or a sky fairy comes along.. .the status quo will remain unchanged.\n\n\n\n well said:) \n\n\n\n  \n\ n\n\n 02252026\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n Citation\n\n\n\n https://aalbc.com/tc/to pic/12484-is-the-usa-in-the-way-of-a-better-humanity/#findComment-80332\n\ n\n\n sted just now\n\n\n\n @ProfD \n\n\n\n   6 hours ago\, ProfD sa id:\n\n\n\n Garvey was correct in prophecy that a king would ne crowned so mewhere in Africa.\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n oh yeah\, who was the king crowned?\ n\n\n\n   6 hours ago\, ProfD said:\n\n\n\n Yet\, inspired by that kin g\, Ethiopian Emperor Haile Salassie\, the Rastafarians started their move ment in Jamaica &\; spread it beyond the island nation.\n\n\n\n  \n\n\ n\n Rastafarians have their own tribe\, culture &\; music.\n\n\n\n yes\ , the rastafarians is a minority tribe in the village\, but the point abou t jamaica is how negatively they exist in jamaica amongst other blacks\, w hom they never have hurt\, they simply don't concur on what the future loo ks like\, which isn't a small thing.\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n 02272026\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n Citation\n\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n  @Pioneer1 \n\n\n\n \n On 2/26 /2026 at 5:10 PM\, Pioneer1 said:\n \n\n \n \n  \n \n\n \n I truly believe that.\n \n\n \n  \n \n\n \n You THOUGHT about leaving... ...🤔\n\n But then you THOUGHT about how nice EATING is\, and how nice it is to walk on paved streets to the nearest bodega for a snack or two i n between arguing with folks on AALBC.......🤔......and changed your min d\, lol.\n \n \n\n\n\n the proof will be in the future\, which I do not k now\, but if you are alive and wonder one day where is Richard in the aalb c forum\, then if i am alive\, you will know the answer and the proof is m et\n\n\n\n \n On 2/26/2026 at 5:10 PM\, Pioneer1 said:\n \n\n \n \n I won't argue with you over who is actually \"in charge\" in Haiti\, but do you really think most of the people of Haiti are \"free\"?\n \n \n\n\n\n well to be blunt \, like many ideas\, freedom is defined by individuals di fferently\, for me\, the freedom the Black DOSers in haiti have is that th ey are in a country that is actually black in the american continent. \n\ n\n\n Financially\, no one \, even haitians\, can argue that haiti is near the fiscal bottom of countries in the american continent [ canada to arge ntina] and as I have heard many DOSers in the usa say\, or imply as yourse lf\, the amenities is part of life. HAiti at the moment\, is one of the we akest places for amenities in the american continent. \n\n\n\n But freedo m isn't merely access to amenities or even legal codes\, freedom is also t he connection to a place. In that sense\, Haitians will always be freer th an other DOSers. \n\n\n\n Again\, the USA/Brasil/Mexico/Columbia/Jamaica /Trinidad/Puerto Rico/Dominican Republic former Spanish Haiti all have bla ck people in them but all of those countries\, are anti black. The black p eople in each of the countries I just mentioned spend most of their lives battling non black people\, and for the most part losing\,  for an even s hare of things in said countries. I don't consider that freedom. SLavery i sn't merely shackles\, nor are the strongest cages always made of steel. A nd sometimes the strongest cage is the illusion you are not in one.\n\n\n\ n The USA is exhibit A. I don't know how many black people in the usa cons ider themselves free\, because of pieces of paper\, because they have a jo b or are living a happy life or have accumulated a certain level of money. To be even\, if they measure freedom that way\, then they simply do. But for me\, I can't see myself free in a land where my larger people are alwa ys abused. And that to me is the measure. \n\n\n\n Haiti is fiscally poor \, but Haiti's problem is its neighbors\, the neighbors of haiti always ha ve been. None of these countries was pro black\, including the jamaica's o f the world. Haiti no one can deny is a Black DOS country\, that is a rari ty to say. That offers a kind of freedom to haiti that the usa/brasil/mexi co will never have.\n\n\n\n And I will be even to the usa and say\, being a country for all humanity is easy to write down\, easy to put on paper\, it is another thing to manifest. The usa's biggest problem is that it is c lear a majority of people in the usa want its original words written by wh ite european enslavers to have value but words on paper\, the law\, doesn' t have value\, it takes heritages or cultures to make these things. The he ritage path is dead\, the heritage of the usa is totally against any peace ful multiracial coexistence. but\, cultures have to be grown\, they don' s prout from nothing. And cultures require people together \, personal accou ntability can't get you a culture of a people. \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n 022820 26\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n Citation\n\n\n\n https://aalbc.com/tc/top ic/12484-is-the-usa-in-the-way-of-a-better-humanity/#findComment-80444\n\n \n\n osted just now\n\n\n\n @ProfD \n\n\n\n   23 hours ago\, ProfD s aid:\n\n\n\n FBA/AfroAmericans in predominantly Black cities &\; commun ities scattered throughout the USA feel a similar sense of freedom. \n\n\ n\n similar\, yes in very near modernity\,  i concur with many adjectives because in the 1800s the usa had many black towns and they were all under huge duress. What black people were able to feel in haiti throughout ever y corner of haiti in 1800\, no large percent of the black populace felt in the usa till 1990 so... yes\, I concur\, but it isn't the same\, and that matters in the details of things. again\, how to get from here to there i s important. and in the context of this posts original point about the rol e of the usa as an aider in humanity\, I argue\, the lateness of modernity is a discredit. Changing isn't unimportant\, BUT\, I find many in the usa tend to look at scenarios in humanity through the lens of change and chan ging doesn't undo what you were. The USA in the 1900s started or continued every calamity that exist in the humanity today. No matter how much multi racial peace exists in the usa today\, 2026\, that doesn't undo the damage . To be blunt\, in most current events\, the USA made iran\, the USA made israel. I argue all the children killed of and between the geography of th ose two governments is all the USA's fault. ISIS is the USA's fault. The T aliban is the USA's fault. I don't know all the details but I know enough of the history to know the usa[it's government plus people or residents {r esidents include me} plus fiscal firms] are to blame for that entire regio ns calamities. \n\n DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20260220 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;INTERVAL=1 END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR