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SUMMARY:Economic Corner 44 08/12/2026
DTSTAMP:20260813T041006Z
SEQUENCE:0
UID:795-7-c3fe8195a3dde498d013e477e2142422@aalbc.com
ORGANIZER;CN="richardmurray":noreply@aalbc.com
DESCRIPTION:a post about the populace in the usa was presentedhttps://aa
	lbc.com/tc/topic/12856-nilf-neetpeople-who-are-voluntarily-unemployedIt is
	 based on the following articlehttps://www.aei.org/commentary/what-do-prim
	e-age-nilf-men-do-all-day/The following are excerpt response pairs\, excer
	pts from the article and responses from meThanks to the American Time Use 
	Survey (ATUS) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics\, we have detailed\, sel
	f-reported information each year on how roughly 10\,000 adult respondents 
	spend their days—from the moment they wake until they sleep.so they are 
	supporting their position based on a study of ten thousand in a country of
	 three hundred and fifty million. One percent of three hundred and fifty m
	illion is three million and five hundred thousand. A thousandth of one per
	cent is three thousand and five hundred. so ten thousand is three thousand
	th of one percent. Why is a study of three thousandth of one percent adequ
	ate to make any position toward any populace.Just how and why so many men 
	in the prime of life should now be swept up in this flight from work is a 
	matter of continuing scholarly research and debate.So they admit they don'
	t have any position that has been researched adequately to comprehend the 
	processes that are leading to or the causes to the choices in the populace
	 to labor. But they suggest Universal Basic income will be a negative.I se
	e job fairs in New York City where usually hundreds but sometimes thousand
	s of people are looking to land one job\, putting on suits and preparing a
	ll sorts of papers to pitch themselves\, but at the end of the day\, one p
	erson will get a second interview or perhaps accepted for employment while
	 ninety nine to nine hundred and ninety nine will have to continue.The art
	icles argument is that the labor market in the usa is adequate to employ a
	ll in the usa\, if they would gain more education or apply themselves to m
	ore job opportunities.I don't know. The problem with labor in the usa is h
	istorically the labors that generated the most human involvement were labo
	r intensive. When I look at NYC the biggest job markets are not in enginee
	ring but in nursing- the aging populace in the usa needs workers\, law- th
	e city always needs lawyers to fill the low paying legal jobs.Jobs in desi
	gn or engineering are not enough\, to restate if everyone in NYC not emplo
	yed had the experience in various engineering disciplines\, they would not
	 all be hired in 48 hours. And the article criminalizes those in college a
	s unlabored\, when I know many people in the city university of new York h
	ave lived their entire lives as scholars.The reality is ever since circa e
	ighteen hundred and sixty five ( 1865 ) white people in particular have co
	mplained about the viewpoint citizens have in the usa to the idea/role/val
	ue of fiscal capitalistic labor. Before circa 1865 whites never complained
	\, post circa 1865 whites have never stop complaigning until now it is sil
	ly.The reality is\, technology has always deleted human labor \, from the 
	cottin gin doing it before 1865 till various assembly lines to electronic 
	computers to computers called artificial intelligence deleted human labor 
	to the USA has a very powerful mechanical or electronic labor force that a
	llows the fiscal wealthy to maintain plus grow their financial fortunes wi
	th no need of human laborers.The funny thing is in the countries so media 
	labeled hard working or grandly educated populaces you see signs they are 
	going through it. Japan is inviting students from the likes of Africa to h
	ave lives in Japan and build population growth. Many Japanese business are
	 going out of business as Japanese are not coming in to run the business\,
	 either as younger Japanese don't want to or the population simply can't s
	upport the maintenance of the firm.China still has tons of people leaving 
	china to find financial happiness outside china\, even though many say chi
	na has more engineers than anywhere else. But clearly not all.The reality 
	is\, technology has ended in the rich or powerful countries the need for m
	asses of human laborers.But who is the American Enterprise Institute?their
	 founding statement is the followingto promote \"greater public knowledge 
	and understanding of the social and economic advantages accruing to the Am
	erican people through the maintenance of the system of free\, competitive 
	enterprise.\"I restate\, maintaining a set of studies for willing elected 
	officials to support legislation or legislative acts that allow for comple
	te fiscal capitalism\, complete fiscal capitalism defined as fiscal capita
	lism where all can fail or succeed\, allowing criminality in any firm\, de
	manding legal systems penalize.The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) was
	 founded by an asbestos maker who proudly admitted he saved money while ma
	king his workers sick. AEI doesn't mind any business at any size being all
	owed to go bankrupt\, they don't mind any business making money in any way
	\; they don't mind laborers failing\, being fired\, not having enough mone
	y to afford where they live.Thus Universal Basic Income is opposed to how 
	they feel fiscal capitalism should operate.MORE INFORMATIONLewis H. Brown 
	founded the American Enterprise Association (AEA) in New York\, a think ta
	nk which later moved to Washington\, D.C.\, and was renamed the American E
	nterprise Institute. He served as AEA's chairman until his death. Brown al
	so co-founded the Tax Foundation and served as chairman.[ https://web.arch
	ive.org/web/20090708195505/http://www.aei.org/history \, look below for th
	e content ][[ modern aei webpage doesn't refer to what the link above does
	 https://www.aei.org/about/ ]]In 1984\, thirty-three years after Brown's d
	eath\, Johns-Manville was alleged to have prioritized profits over the hea
	lth and safety of employees during the time of his leadership. According t
	o testimony given in a federal court by Charles H. Roemer\, formerly an em
	ployee of Unarco\, describing a meeting between Unarco officials\, Lewis H
	. Brown and J-M attorney Vandiver Brown in the early 1940s\, \"I’ll neve
	r forget\, I turned to Mr. Brown\, one of the Browns made this crack (that
	 Unarco managers were a bunch of fools for notifying employees who had asb
	estosis)\, and I said\, ‘Mr. Vandiver Brown do you mean to tell me you w
	ould let them work until they dropped dead?’ He said\, ‘Yes. We save a
	 lot of money that way.'\"[ Testimony of Charles H. Roemer\, Deposition ta
	ken April 25\, 1984\, Johns-Manville Corp.\, et al. v. the United States o
	f America\, U.S. Claims Court Civ. No. 465-83C\, cited in Barry I. Castlem
	an\, Asbestos: Medical and Legal Aspects\, 4th edition\, Aspen Law and Bus
	iness\, Englewood Cliffs\, NJ 1996\, p.581 ]CONTENT[ History of AEIThe Ame
	rican Enterprise Association (AEA) arrived in Washington in 1943\, in the 
	thick of World War II. In Congress there was talk of making wartime price 
	and production controls permanent to prevent another Depression when peace
	 finally arrived. The tiny AEA\, a business group formed in New York City 
	in 1938\, was horrified\; it resolved to open a Washington office to advoc
	ate rapid postwar economic demobilization and\, more generally\, to improv
	e Congress's understanding of the economic consequences of its actions. Th
	e new AEA office\, which eventually became headquarters and graduated from
	 \"association\" to \"institute\,\" was the avant-garde of two momentous d
	evelopments of the decades to come\, both responding to the growing size a
	nd power of the federal government: the migration of business and trade as
	sociations from commercial centers to the nation's capital and the emergen
	ce of the policy \"think tank.\"AEA was a partnership of top executives of
	 leading business and financial firms (Bristol-Myers\, General Mills\, Che
	mical Bank) and prominent policy intellectuals (Roscoe Pound of the Harvar
	d Law School\, economic journalist Henry Hazlitt\, and disillusioned New D
	ealer Raymond Moley). From the beginning\, however\, the Association's spi
	rit was libertarian and conservative rather than simply \"probusiness.\" I
	ts founding mission statement would still serve well: to promote \"greater
	 public knowledge and understanding of the social and economic advantages 
	accruing to the American people through the maintenance of the system of f
	ree\, competitive enterprise.\" So\, too\, its academic and empirical comm
	itments: AEA was to be \"nonpartisan and nonpolitical\,\" was to \"express
	 no opinion of its own\,\" and was to produce \"accurate\, impartial\, and
	 objective\" research.Following the highly successful dismantling of warti
	me economic controls\, the AEA Washington office began preparing analyses 
	of legislative proposals and publishing studies on subjects that remain AE
	I staples today--Social Security reform\, government health insurance\, th
	e effects of trade on domestic employment\, and the effects of productivit
	y growth on wages and income. In 1950\, a fan letter from freshman congres
	sman Gerald R. Ford began a long and happy relationship with the late pres
	ident. AEA also produced philosophic tracts portraying private enterprise 
	as a form of voluntary social cooperation undergirding strong communities 
	and democratic self-government--intellectual sprouts that would later blos
	som in such landmark works as Michael Novak's The Spirit of Democratic Cap
	italism and Irving Kristol's Two Cheers for Capitalism.The arrival in 1954
	 of William J. Baroody marked the beginning of the modern AEI. The son of 
	a Lebanese immigrant stonecutter\, Mr. Baroody gave up a secure job at the
	 U.S. Chamber of Commerce for the chance to lead a small\, financially str
	apped organization. He was an entrepreneur and risk-taker\, a strong polit
	ical conservative\, and a widely read intellectual convinced of the potent
	ial for ideas to move practical politics. During his twenty-six years at A
	EI\, he demonstrated singular gifts for spotting important academic talent
	 and for promoting dense--and often contrarian--policy-reform ideas for bu
	sy public officials\, business executives\, and journalists. Mr. Baroody e
	xpanded the legislative analyses\, commissioned original research by leadi
	ng scholars\, and raised the money to pay the bills. Within a year of his 
	arrival\, reviews and excerpts of AEA publications began appearing in the 
	Wall Street Journal and Barron's. By the early 1960s\, economists Milton F
	riedman\, Paul McCracken\, and Gottfried Haberler had joined his academic 
	advisory board. Mr. Baroody conceived for AEI a brilliant slogan that comb
	ined the Institute's commitment to freedom and competition with a forthrig
	ht challenge to the liberal orthodoxy of 1960s Washington: \"Competition o
	f ideas is fundamental to a free society.\"Mr. Baroody's leadership produc
	ed a period of astounding growth in the quantity and quality of the Instit
	ute's output\, making it one of the busiest and most productive centers of
	 policy research in the nation and heralding the sea change in American po
	litics to come. In 1972\, Gottfried Haberler was appointed AEI's first \"r
	esident scholar\,\" to be joined the following year by Yale's William Fell
	ner\; the arrival of such renowned scholars signaled the Institute's inten
	tion to become a first-rate research institution in fact and name. When th
	e voters prematurely retired President Gerald R. Ford in 1976\, he became 
	AEI's \"distinguished fellow\" and brought with him a dozen colleagues to 
	pursue work begun in his administration\; among those who would subsequent
	ly return to public service were Arthur Burns\, Robert Bork\, Laurence Sil
	berman\, Antonin Scalia\, James C. Miller III\, John Snow\, Rudolph Penner
	\, and David Gergen. As AEI achieved critical institutional mass\, it was 
	able to attract several of America's most influential thinkers\, including
	 neoconservative godfather Irving Kristol\; economists Herbert Stein and M
	arvin Kosters\; sociologist Robert Nisbet\; political scientists Robert Go
	ldwin\, Jeane Kirkpatrick\, and Walter Berns\; theologian Michael Novak\; 
	and author Ben Wattenberg.Having begun the 1970s with a budget of $1 milli
	on and a staff of ten\, AEI at decade's end had a budget of $8 million and
	 a staff of 125. AEI had become a hotbed of innovative ideas--on deregulat
	ion\, tax reform\, trade policy\, social welfare problems\, and revitaliza
	tion of defense and foreign policy--that were about to debut on the politi
	cal stage.The 1980s were great years for AEI's ideas but troubled years fo
	r the institution itself. President Ronald Reagan appointed several dozen 
	AEI scholars and fellows to his administration and to federal judgeships\,
	 where they helped him to achieve monumental improvements in economic\, re
	gulatory\, and legal policy and to deploy the more assertive foreign polic
	y that dispatched Soviet Communism by decade's end. But Mr. Baroody died j
	ust months before Reagan's election\, and his successor\, son William Baro
	ody Jr.\, struggled to maintain his father's legacy in a transformed polit
	ical environment. With so many prominent AEIers in government\, and with t
	he emergence of several energetic new think tanks such as the Heritage Fou
	ndation and the Cato Institute\, AEI's reputation and finances suffered. S
	till\, many exceptional scholars remained busy and productive at AEI and b
	egan work on audacious new projects--such as producing a new liberal-conse
	rvative consensus on welfare reform that eventually produced the Welfare R
	eform Act of 1996.AEI's trustees appointed a new president in 1986--Christ
	opher DeMuth\, a lawyer and economist who had served in the Nixon and Reag
	an administrations and taught at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. M
	r. DeMuth revamped the Institute's program of foreign and defense policy s
	tudies and focused its domestic research agenda on traditional strengths: 
	public finance and tax policy\; government regulation\; U.S. politics and 
	political institutions\; and cultural\, philosophical\, and social welfare
	 issues. He also instituted major managerial and financial reforms and a n
	ew and variegated publications program.Donors responded with alacrity\; by
	 the early 1990s\, AEI had paid off its debts and was growing mightily in 
	financial resources\, in the size of research staff\, and in the quality a
	nd influence of its output. Soon\, the Institute's eminent senior scholars
	 were joined by a new generation of economists\, social scientists\, forei
	gn policy and trade experts\, and students of social and cultural problems
	. To name only two recent accomplishments\, Institute scholars\, and parti
	cularly Peter J. Wallison\, provided prescient warnings about the problems
	 of the government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. In fo
	reign policy\, Frederick W. Kagan is credited with providing the intellect
	ual and practical rationale for a change in strategy in Iraq in 2007\, whi
	ch came to be known as the surge.Today\, the Institute has a staff of 185\
	, including seventy scholars and fellows. It also has a new president. In 
	2008\, after twenty-two years at the helm\, Mr. DeMuth stepped down as pre
	sident and moved down the hall to do research. His successor\, Arthur C. B
	rooks is a classical musician by training. He came late to the world of pu
	blic policy\, influenced by the innovative and daring social science resea
	rch of Charles Murray.After seven decades\, AEI continues to serve a vital
	 role in the intellectual life of the nation. The Institute furnishes poli
	cymakers with ideas to meet the pressing challenges of today based on the 
	resilient principles of private liberty\, individual opportunity\, and fre
	e enterprise. ]https://www.aei.org/commentary/too-big-to-fail-or-succeed/C
	ONTENT[ Too Big to Fail\, or SucceedAuthorby Peter J. WallisonDateJune 18\
	, 2009ECO-Mon-0017-StockiStockphoto/DNY59In a speech at the White House ye
	sterday\, President Barack Obama outlined what he envisions for future reg
	ulation of the financial system. He called his plan “a new foundation fo
	r sustained economic growth . . . a transformation on a scale not seen sin
	ce the reforms that followed the Great Depression.” Indeed it is.His pla
	n\, if adopted\, will fundamentally change the nature of our financial sys
	tem and economy. The underlying concerns and assumptions are clear\, and t
	hey are made clearer by considering other ways that his administration has
	 dealt with the consequences of competition–particularly the faux bankru
	ptcies of General Motors and Chrysler and the impending change in antitrus
	t policy. Although the president said in his speech that he supports free 
	markets\, these initiatives confirm that the administration fears the “c
	reative destruction” that free markets produce\, preferring stability ov
	er innovation\, competition and change.According to the administration whi
	te paper circulated prior to the president’s speech\, the Federal Reserv
	e would be authorized to create a special regulatory regime–including re
	quirements for capital\, leverage and liquidity–for any firm “whose co
	mbination of size\, leverage\, and interconnectedness could pose a threat 
	to financial stability if it failed.” In addition\, if a large financial
	 firm is failing\, the Treasury is to be given the power–in lieu of bank
	ruptcy–to appoint a conservator or receiver to “stabilize” it.Despit
	e all the talk about credit priorities\, the fundamental point is that the
	 administration used taxpayer money to overturn the market’s verdict.Des
	ignating particular financial firms for this kind of special regulatory tr
	eatment clearly signals to the markets that these institutions are too big
	 to fail. It will reduce the perceived risk of lending to them\, enabling 
	them to raise funds at lower cost than their smaller competitors.In other 
	words\, the administration’s plan would create what are essentially gove
	rnment-sponsored enterprises like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in every sect
	or of the financial economy–insurers\, securities firms\, finance compan
	ies\, bank holding companies\, and hedge funds–where these specially reg
	ulated firms are to be designated. The result will be devastating for comp
	etition. Larger firms will squeeze out smaller ones and aggressive small c
	ompanies will have less opportunity to overcome the government-backed winn
	ers.Moreover\, the administration’s proposal to provide a special bailou
	t mechanism for large firms confirms the likelihood that these firms will 
	never be closed down or liquidated. Citing the market turmoil that followe
	d Lehman’s collapse\, the administration will argue that failures like t
	his are “disorderly.” But failure comes from risk-taking–the very so
	urce of our economy’s strength–and it is ultimately risk-taking and it
	s consequences that the administration’s plan is intended to prevent.The
	 turmoil following Lehman’s failure occurred because market participants
	 expected\, after the rescue of Bear Stearns\, that any larger firm would 
	also be rescued. When Lehman wasn’t\, all market participants were requi
	red to recalibrate the risks of dealing with all others\, causing a freeze
	-up in lending and hoarding of cash. Lehman’s failure itself did not cau
	se any substantial losses\, and within two weeks of its bankruptcy filing 
	Lehman’s trustee sold its brokerage\, investment banking\, and investmen
	t management businesses to four different buyers.Contrast this with AIG\, 
	the administration’s paradigm\, which was saved by the government becaus
	e it was allegedly too big to fail. That firm is gradually wasting away un
	der government control\, with the taxpayers footing the bill.The administr
	ation’s fear of competitive outcomes is not reflected solely in financia
	l-sector policies. Consider General Motors and Chrysler. They were defeate
	d in the marketplace. Simply put\, they failed to build automobiles enough
	 Americans wanted to buy.Their disappearance would not have threatened the
	 stability of the financial system\, although it would undoubtedly have be
	en disruptive for suppliers\, dealers and employees. Yet the administratio
	n wouldn’t allow them to fail\, either. Despite all the talk about credi
	t priorities\, the fundamental point is that the administration used taxpa
	yer money to overturn the market’s verdict. If we want a preview of what
	 the administration will do with the resolution authority it wants for lar
	ge financial companies\, we need look no further.The same pattern with reg
	ard to competitive markets can be seen in the Justice Department’s new a
	ntitrust policy. Christine Varney\, the new assistant attorney general in 
	charge of antitrust policy\, has said that U.S. policy should be more like
	 Europe’s. Until now\, U.S. antitrust policy has tried to protect compet
	ition. Europe attempts to protect competitors. Protecting competitors mean
	s blunting the skills of superior players\, allowing inferior managers and
	 business models to remain in business and thus preventing better manageme
	nts and business models from emerging. Again\, stability wins out over cha
	nge and progress.The president has said on several occasions\, including i
	n yesterday’s speech\, that “I’ve always been a strong believer in t
	he power of the free market.” But his administration’s prescriptions t
	ell a different story. In AIG\, GM\, Chrysler\, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
	 we can see the future that the administration envisions for our economy
	–a sclerotic and unchanging structure of big companies working with\, pr
	otected by\, and relying on big government.Peter J. Wallison is the Arthur
	 F. Burns Fellow in Financial Policy Studies at AEI. ]POST URL https://aal
	bc.com/tc/topic/12856-nilf-neetpeople-who-are-voluntarily-unemployed/#find
	Comment-83003POST CONTENTcontentI read the article...The one thing I notic
	e it doesn't concern itself with is the imprisoned or former imprisoned po
	pulace.Do you know circa forty thousand women in the usa are blockaded fro
	m labor because they had traces or marijuana in their babies when born and
	 the states they were in labeled them as endangering a child/child abusers
	.These women \, most of whom have had multiple children and have no crimin
	al record are blockaded from work because of a situation in which their ch
	ild had a drug in them.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PX-kDnO6GSIwhat is 
	my larger point? How many people in the usa are blockaded from labor becau
	se of their criminal record? A criminal record whcih often is based on the
	 criminal intent of law enforcers applying their activities to specific co
	mmunities for a fiscal or governmental policy agenda.But the reason why sa
	id populace isn't mentioned is because of the fiscal capitalistic philosop
	hy of the AEI \, which i argue is a faith based position toward fiscal cap
	italism which in Universal basic income is seeing the death of their faith
	 as they know it.https://aalbc.com/tc/events/event/795-economic-corner-44-
	08122026/PRIOR EDITIONhttps://aalbc.com/tc/events/event/794-economic-corne
	r-43-08042026/NEXT EDITIONhttps://aalbc.com/tc/events/event/797-economic-c
	orner-45-08162026/COMMENTARY
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