Research recently published, 2008, suggests that deceptive communication can serve a functional purpose. The study revealed that a person's motivation to deceive is influenced by his or her/his cultural self-identity [and] that one's cultural identity greatly influences whether a message was perceived to be deceptive. 

The research points out that: 

-- People who strongly valued their own individuality over the social relationships reported having a lower overall motivation to deceive;  

-- People who possessed cultural self-identities which emphasize placing group needs over the individual reported having a greater overall motivation to avoid telling the truth; 

-- When people were presented with a scenario in which deception would serve to benefit them, those who valued their independence were more willing to use deception than in cases where deception would benefit someone else; 

-- People who valued social relationships over individuality, reported a greater willingness to use deception to benefit others rather than for self-serving purposes; 

Western cultures have long been noted to cultivate members who value their individuality. Being a moral and ethical person requires avoiding any communication that would jeopardize one's own personal integrity, such as lying. 

By comparison, East Asian cultures have been well-known for endorsing more indirect styles of communication to protect the image of the other and promote trouble-free relationships. Deceptive communication has and continues to serve as a useful tool in the maintenance and preservation of significant social relationships. 

[Adversely, false identities (about one-self) can throw off and muddle 'well intended' sites. Deceivers of identity are of low moral; impostures, the main form of self-deception involves unreflective acceptance of belief(s) that impartial inspection would readily expose as spurious (ideas, principles, and aims) in the instance of lying to one's self, to deceive others; arises from the failure (or refusal) to analyze appealing ides of others from the perspective of the generalized other which we acquire through participation in the universe of rational discourse. This perspective rejects the two most prevalent explanations of self-deception - namely, Sigmund Freud's psychoanalytic interpretation and Jean-Paul Sartre's phenomenological one - I provide a brief sketch of some of Dewey's and Mead's fundamental insights into the inherently social nature of mind.]