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Non Profit to Profit in 2025 and vice versa Sociedade Anônima do Futebol is the name of former socios, or social club entities. Socios are non profits, that are not allowed to be taxed, but also can't accept investment control from owners. Meaning, socios can accept money but the use of said money can't be controlled by the person giving the money. And the club members have to vote on various things, from sponsorship contracts to other. Expanding on this idea I thought about the inversion. How can a football club go from paying investors to a Socio, a non profit, that is still profitable? oddly enough I think elements of my thoughts below allow for an inversion. one of the problems with Black countries is the years of fiscal capitalism have taught, very negative lessons, not wrong ones, but negative ones. Meaning what? Most black governments or the populaces in them, love fiscal capitalism. But not the rule of law. They love fiscal capitalism because it allows anyone to: make the rule of law legalize their crimes[ala whites [whether european/muslim/asian or other] with enslaving black people] ,to skip the rule or penalty of law [ala non blacks the world over who used to have the law on their side committing the same acts illegally but evading penalty] , while also skirt the responsibility of government [that many blacks don't want to have while wanting to be very financially wealthy] . So when I look at a Nigeria, the populace will never accept a modulation of For Profit football clubs in Nigeria to a Not For Profit football clubs in Nigeria. Consider that the NFF, nigerian football federation, has never won the African Nations Championship. Now what is the African Nations Championship. It is a championship designed for members of CAF, the confederation of African Football , to field players in their domestic tournament in a flag competition. Meaning what? All members are entered, but each member can only field those who play in their domestic league. Here are the winners, with the number of times they won, from first to most recent, it started in 2009: DR Congo 2, Tunisia 1, Libya 1, Morocco 3, Senegal 1 Now look at some winners of the cup of nations started in 1957, based on quantity, most to least: Egypt 7, Cameroon 5, Ghana 4, Nigeria 3, Ivory Coast 3, Algeria 2, DR Congo 2 so... the top six clubs in the cup of nations, open to CAF players who play anywhere, have never won a tournament based on only domestic players in the same geographic zone. Thus why I think the NFF is a great marker of the quality of CAF football associations. Nigeria recently has complained about their inability to enter the world cup but Nigeria has only been the top two of the Nations championship once. And this goes back to fiscal capitalism. Many Black people love the ability of whites to pay for their services, generational wealth, saving their town or villages or communities. Sadio MAne/Ngolo kante/Koulibaly/Samuel Eto'o ... a long list of CAF players with very financially profitable careers outside CAF have helped the strangers in their bloodline. But,in a competition absent the money focused on the quality, many of those players countries have never placed or have an atrocious record of placement. That proves the profit to nonprofit will probably not be implementable, because affordable, management, isn't where the money is. And that connects to how they view fiscal capitalism. This is what happens when you don't have the "immigrant story" the fiscally poor stranger came into an unwelcomed place and was allowed to work and made a happy life for themselves. The black people in the caribbean/continent/south america/north america who have been in said places since eighteen hundreds have the survived enslavement story. That story isn't about the rule of law, it is about getting enough power to be above the rule of law or to bend the rule of law. And too often black people who have come to embrace the idea of fiscal capitalism aside the rule of law as a brilliant positively inspiring power couple for individual achievement aside collective peace , miss how most other black people have no personal history or historical view to the global black village to come to such conclusions on their own , absent a sickly delusion. My Thoughts After Reading S.A.F. info below and thinking on Santos Interesting how it was admitted dividends are rarely the goal, meaning most of the S.A.F.'s are for resale or part of a Keiretsu-like scenario. But I see the financial action. Socios have to vote on becoming S.A.F.'s with various rules in their voting process they are free to do, thus the vote from the socio members becomes financially huge. If the majority do not vote in favor the socio remains but if the majority vote in favor the rules voted on simultaneously heavily influence the S.A.F. born from the socio. And if the votes are in favor then the socio isn't destroyed, it remains and a S.A.F. takes all of the socios assets and gets none of the socios debt. The S.A.F. given a favorable tax burden for the first five years as well as the ability of members or others to buy bonds for the debt/actions of the club. The S.A.F. has to have a community investment program which is loosely described in the law. While the socio retains all the debt. The S.A.F. has to contribute to payments of the debt. Two methods to pay for the debt exist Centralized Enforcement Regime , Judicial reorganization. In the end Vasco proves Santos was wise to wait. While I know many clubs , like Bahia or Botafogo jumped at the chance to S.A.F. I think Santos and any Socio that waits is wiser. New financial environments historically have mostly bad returns for most early entrants. yes, the minority of early entrants become glorified in magazines like Forbes but the reality is, the majority of early entrants is the truth and I can see that a wise socio look at what others are doing, what is going on wrong, what is going well and then go forward with the experience of neighbors to dictate. yes, it will make these years tough with potential relegation and bigger budget teams about but it will also allow for wiser financial choices. Bahia wants circa 23,000 USA dollars circa 120,000 Brasilian Real to convert a socio to an S.A.F. The Carioca want 94,000 US dollars or 500,000 Real Paulista want nothing for conversion. The three capitals of Brasil before Brasilia show a different tact. Sao Paulo is inviting Socios to modulate. Rio is being most resistant, not enough to stop international sharks but enough to stop little socios. Bahia is inviting Brasilian as well as foreign investors. No socio going into S.A.F. in brasil has consider an initial public offering stock options but I think the realm of more collective shareholder values is interesting. Textor and the 777's of the world, are looking to own, the king's without crowns. But, through futures or bonds a socio can go into S.A.F. inviting investment but still retaining control by members. What about a socio agreeing to become an S.A.F. based on a futures exchange, where each share of the club, each membership becomes a futures contract, and then the exchange is where the contracts can be traded. The future contracts can be based on a combination of (revenue streams in accumulated value substracted by wages-utilities-upkeep) multiplied by athletic achievement as a percentage. For example lets say the following are revenue streams: shirt sponsor, stadium sponsor, tickets, share of media payment for league, local media payment, transfer money income expenses : wages,stadium upkeep, transfer fees,youth development cost Note: S.A.F.'s start debtless athletic achievement in competitions entered so if not in one of the following not related: state championship, brasilierao,copa do brasil, libertadores, intercontinental cup, club world cup. Example : lets say a club is in the state champions, brasilerao, copa do brasil so it is in three competitions: winning each is 100% so winning all three is 300% now the maximum result is 300% so outcome over maximum in the example case gives you 1 so the revenue minus expenses is the result of the contract. But lets say you get 2nd in the state, round of 16 in copa, 8th in brasilerao, you will have 90% 75% 66% , now I argue you can add weights for each tournament, but keeping this simple for the example, you will circa 250% so over 300% means 5/6th of the value of (revenue - expenses) for the future contract. So athletic success influences the returns more potently than the acquisition of sponsors or et cetera. The original socio can become the spot market, thus it doesn't gain debt and is only a place of immediate exchange, with small transactions fees going to the socio to pay off its debt. The spot market has rules like the athletic achievement combined or in part reach 30% relates to automatic revenue deliveries so giving investors back a percentage of what they invested. And since S.A.F.'s start debt free. The socio when it voted to make a S.A.F. needed a debt relief bond, where people give money for potential debt relief to receive the money back in five seasons. This bond money is vital for the SAF to have capitol to spur the futures market. Thus in this way, while the S.A.F. doesn't have a rigid owner, it has futures contracts , that can be traded and a coverage by the socio for debts to allow for a level of feasible risk who also acts as the clearing house between the S.A.F. and investors. Lastly, to grow the quantity of contracts, each new contract for the S.A.F. exchange demands the maker of the contract to pay for a bond in the socio spot market. Yes, an investor is thus paying for their own risk aversion. But the point of that is to clear out wild investors but also keep debt of the S.A.F. to zero by the financial agreements. Finally, while the transactions of the socio spot market each have a small fee to help to pay the socios debts, the transactions of the S.A.F. futures market each have a small fee as revenue to the S.A.F. which can be used to automatically make more contracts and bonds or go into a savings account for a rainy day accumulating over time. Which can be a bond market for the S.A.F. that can be traded. Now outside the yearly mentioned above, who can not vote on the people in the organization, the voting powers should be to those who hold generational futures contracts[ 20 years ] can vote on various people. Thus the socios who originally voted each have one generational contract through their 20 year futures contract. And this is another venue for outside investors, others can buy 20 year futures contracts but they have to pay for 20 year bonds in the spot market. Each time someone buys a 20 year futures contract they increase the value of the futures contracts already present. I think what I suggest while it doesn't provide the financial injections that being sold to billionaire does, I think it provides ,with obvious algorithmic tweaking or specificity, long term longevity and profit making capability, not merely on new investors but really the management of the club. So for example if you are a textor type, and you want to control the club , you can buy a set of 20 years futures contracts in the S.A.F. and parallel 20 year bonds in the socio spot market, thus giving you through the quantity of 20 years futures contracts more votes than anyone, but this doesn't bar others from doing just like you did. Rules in the original vote can make it where voting for ceo's and others doesn't occur till the end of a season so no chaos in administration. but, many can buy investment in the yearlies which are gambles still but have a level of security in that you have to buy a bond to support the security, so it isn't a random house. The goal in my mind of S.A.F. for any socio is how to get what the germans have in the 30% rule but even better. The New York City 1980s was a time for sharks. what are sharks really? sharks are those who buy or sell firms. Nothing wrong with that. Buying and selling firms in whole or part allows for resources to be distributed, debts to be slowed, financial activity to be contained. What don't sharks do? they don't actually run businesses. If I own a film studio and we had ten years of success, 90% of our films made 300% profit or better in the first month of coming out, a shark can look to buy the film studio and the buyers will buy over price, paying me the former owner and other shareholders a lot of money and we can go on and do other things. While the new owners can try and maintain, maybe they succeed and maybe they fail. If I own a music label and we had ten years of falling sales and undesired output after thirty years of industry dominance, a shark can come in and buy my label , getting more money for the parts people may want, like the catalog but the parts people don't want can be split/divested and sold to another or just ended. The new owners to parts of my firm and try to regain the better years. But, the sharks don't actually manage the running of the firms. The sharks only function is the financial industries, but not the actual running of various firms. S.A.F. info Sociedade Anônima do Futebol info What is SAF? Understand the format that changed Brazilian football How does it work and what are the differences between association and company? What are the advantages and disadvantages? And the obligations? Get to know this specific type of company created in 2021 By Rodrigo Capelo 02/09/2022 16h35 Up-to-date a year ago What is SAF? The Sociedade Anônima do Futebol (SAF) is a specific type of company, created by Congress on August 6, 2021, through Law 14.193/2021. The legislation encourages football clubs to migrate from the non-profit civil association to the business one. The SAF Law, as it became known, encourages the change to this club-company format, which has governance, control and specific means of financing for the activity of football. How can the club open a SAF? Clubs can be founded directly with this structure, they can be converted from a civil association to a SAF or they can spin off their football department, with the transfer of all assets related to football activity to the company. Once the company is incorporated, it is possible to sell a majority, minority, or all of its capital to a new owner. John Textor, Ronaldo and 777 Partners were the first cases of great repercussion, respectively with Botafogo, Cruzeiro and Vasco. What is the main change? Historically, most football clubs in Brazil have been structured as civil associations, a private, non-profit organization formed by the union of members. These people elect representatives to the Deliberative and Fiscal Councils, in addition to a president. The association cannot be sold to investors. Unlike what happens in much of Europe, where clubs are companies and can be bought and sold by third parties, associations are managed solely by the membership. The SAF opened the possibility of partial or total sale of football to new owners. They can be entrepreneurs, investment funds and even the IPO on the Stock Exchange – an option not yet tried by any Brazilian club, but common in other countries. What is the difference between president and owner? In football, the civil association usually has a structure similar to that of the government. Members elect representatives to the Deliberative Council, a kind of Legislative, and to the board of directors, which resembles the Executive. The president is the head of the ticket. The chairman of the board is given a term of office, usually between two and four years, with or without the right to re-election, and is joined by statutory vice presidents. In Brazilian football, these figures are not paid and are only in charge temporarily. In the case of a STC, the owner has decision-making power definitively. Whoever buys part or all of a club-company will only leave the business, except on extraordinary occasions, on the day they sell their stake in the company to another person, company or fund. How does SAF management work? The club-company has a professional structure hired by its owner, usually composed of specialists in the main areas: CEO (chief executive officer) Chief Financial Officer (CFO) CLO (chief legal officer) CMO (chief marketing officer) Director of football All these professionals are hired, directed and fired by the owners – whether it is a single person or a composition of partners. These, in turn, are usually organized into a Board of Directors, in which the main decisions are made. Civil associations can also organize themselves in the same way, internally. In theory, the main difference is that, as these entities frequently alternate presidents, there is a constant complaint of instability in Brazilian football, with each change of president. Can associations resume football? It depends on each negotiation. In the cases of Botafogo, Cruzeiro and Vasco, the associations sold a majority stake in the capital of SAF to John Textor, Ronaldo and 777 Partners. In this process, each club established contracts that dictate rights and duties for each party. If there is a violation of this agreement, it is possible that clauses provide for exits. Can SAF be resold? The club-company is an asset, just like a conventional company, and can be bought and sold freely. An entrepreneur who owns 90% of a SAF can resell any percentage under his ownership, including everything, according to his commercial interests. Why buy a SAF? The entrepreneur can have a return on this investment through: Resale of part or all of the club-company for an amount greater than that invested since his arrival; Receiving dividends, that is, profits obtained by the operation of the club-company – a less frequent option. Integration of the football club into a chain of other businesses, so that they are directly benefited What are the advantages of SAF? 1. Tax regime Civil associations are exempt from various taxes, such as Corporate Income Tax (IRPJ) and Social Contribution on Net Income (CSLL). There was resistance from managers to opt for conventional models of companies, as corporations and limited liability companies have a higher tax burden, so the STC has a special regime, in replacement. In the first five years after incorporation, the SAF is subject to the monthly payment of a unified tax, limited to 5% on monthly revenues, except for athlete transfers. From the sixth year onwards, the rate drops to 4%, but is levied on all the company’s revenues, including sales of economic rights of players. 2. Football debentures The SAF can issue football debentures, a debt security. Fans can invest money in the purchase of these bonds, with remuneration not less than the savings account, and redeem the investment after two years. The money contributed can be used to pay expenses, expenses or debts of the club-company by its administrators. What are the disadvantages of SAF? Sociedade Anônima do Futebol is committed to the creation of an Educational and Social Development Program, in which, in agreement with a public educational institution, it will promote measures to develop education through soccer. Girls should also be contemplated, with equal right of access to sport. The STC can invest in: a) renovate or build a public school, as well as a court or field for the practice of soccer; b) to institute a transportation system for students; c) feeding students during periods of recreation and training; d) to train former players to minister and conduct activities; e) hire auxiliary professionals, such as physical trainers, nutritionists and psychologists; f) acquire equipment, materials and accessories necessary for the practice of soccer within the scope of the project. What happens to debt? Debts remain with the civil association, that is, they are not transferred to the newly created company. The STC becomes responsible for contributing to the payment of these obligations, within the limits established by law. Since the association loses almost all of its operating revenues – as football has been transferred to the management of the club-company – there are two options to deal with the debt: 1. Centralized Enforcement Regime The SAF Law created a mechanism called the Centralized Enforcement Regime, which works as a queue for creditors of a civil and labor nature. The company assumes the responsibility of contributing to the payment of this queue, with 20% of its current monthly revenues. In principle, clubs that adhere to this regime have a period of six years to pay their debts. If at least 60% of the debt is paid off in this period, an extension of another four years is granted to pay off the remainder. Therefore, the deadline to pay is up to ten years. The Centralized Enforcement Regime also opens the possibility of reducing debts by at least 30%, through discounts. To define the order of payment of creditors, priority is given to older credits and also to profiles: a) elderly; b) people with serious illnesses; c) people with credits less than 60 minimum wages; d) pregnant woman; e) victims of work accidents in soccer. 2. Judicial reorganization Judicial – or extrajudicial – reorganization is usually used by companies that are almost bankrupt, but which have economic relevance to society. In summary, these companies can renegotiate civil and labor debts with the mediation of the government, so that the credits are written off by discounts and paid in a new term. The role of the SAF Law, in this case, was to guarantee access to this tool for clubs that become companies. The legislation also anticipates that bilateral contracts and contracts with players can be transferred from the civil association to the club-company, without being involved in the agreement to be negotiated during the judicial reorganization. How is tradition protected? As long as the civil association that gave rise to the club has at least one class A common share, regardless of the percentage of the interest, this entity will have veto power over the following items: a) change of name; b) change of symbol, coat of arms, brand, nickname, anthem and color; c) change of headquarters to another municipality. Who created the SAF? The intellectual mentors of the Sociedade Anônima do Futebol are lawyers Rodrigo Monteiro de Castro and José Francisco Manssur. They have dedicated themselves to the study of business structures in football since at least 2015, when they published the book “Football, Market and State”, in which they pointed out foreign proposals and references. Subsequently, the content of this study was presented in the National Congress by Senator Rodrigo Pacheco (PSD-MG), in 2019. Bill 5,519/2019, which culminated in the creation of the SAF Law, was drafted by Senator Carlos Portinho (PL-RJ). The first companies in Brazilian football, under this unprecedented format, appeared in a few months. Article Referral https://ge.globo.com/negocios-do-esporte/noticia/2022/09/02/o-que-e-saf-entenda-o-formato-de-clube-empresa-que-mudou-o-futebol-brasileiro.ghtml What is left to the original association when the SAF has an owner? Experiences from other countries teach a lot about the risks to which Brazilian clubs have exposed themselves for not having developed the necessary mechanisms for their own protection Rio de Janeiro 03/28/2024 03:06 AM Up-to-date a year ago In his first press conference since taking over the presidency of Vasco da Gama, former player Pedrinho raised several questions about the limit of the original association in the direction of Vasco SAF, the company that manages the club’s professional football and which is now controlled by the North American group 777 Partners. “Unfortunately I am not part of the process. But I’m always willing to help Vasco, above any goal (…) Sportingly, I think I could collaborate”, said the president of Vasco about the little space that the association has in the current SAF. “It’s their choice, period. There is no crying, lamentation,” he added. Pedrinho’s complaint is especially due to having been invited, before leaving as a candidate, to give opinions on the club’s sports planning. Once at the head of the association, the treatment changed drastically. As president of the club, Pedrinho is no longer seen as an ally for the SAF. “I have no interest in taking the 777. I’m interested in giving a new direction, a new direction to Vasco. The SAF was created to professionalize football. We expect transparency, sports performance (…)”, justified Pedrinho, still showing himself willing to deal amicably with the employees of 777 Partners. However, the Vasco idol also made clear his disagreement with the SAF model: “The model that was created in a contract, then yes, is no longer very much to my liking. It is a relationship in which I am a partner and I have functions such as supervising and collecting. This cannot be a nuisance to anyone.” “Charging, inspecting is a natural process of a [business] society. I don’t know if the behavior of the previous administration created a different habit, but this is not a pattern”, reinforced Pedrinho. There are several interesting points in these speeches, which today stand out in Vasco’s SAF because of the low sports performance and the errors in the decision-making of the management of the SAF – which has already changed CEO, director of football or coach in just over a year –; but that should be discussed by all other SAFs where the original clubs have become a decorative piece. Basically, all SAFs were structured in the same way: the associative club holds few seats on the Board of Directors and on the Fiscal Council, reducing its participation to access to confidential documents, contracts and financial data and the sporadic moment of transmitting some dissatisfaction at shareholders’ meetings. Which is rarely done in public. In clubs that have 30% (Vasco), 25% (Atlético) or 10% (Bahia, Coritiba, Cruzeiro and Botafogo), the position is always secondary, without enough power. The position of the association in each of them will vary, of course, according to what was discussed in the election of the association. It is where Pedrinho’s press conference matters most. Vasco lives this distancing because it was the first club to hold elections without swearing in a group fully aligned with the management that operationalized the sale of SAF. In the other cases, until then, the association’s command has remained the same or with figures close to the administrations that sold the SAF. As long as the friendship relationship between the association and SAF lasts, we will hardly see situations similar to Vasco’s come to light, even in the worst of sporting scenarios. In the case of Coritiba, for example, the elections scheduled for last December were postponed and have not yet been rescheduled. In the midst of this, there was a vexatious demotion and a lot of contestation from the members to the business model, but the association’s management never manifested itself frontally. The situation of cornering of the associations is not surprising, because it has always been the objective of those who promoted the SAFs as a panacea for Brazilian football. There are understandable reasons for so much repulsion to the original club – for being closed (with the exception of a few cases), for the history of the top hats who have controlled it previously, for the state in which the institution was at the time of sale – but this whole process of demonization of the associations should be expensive. After all, the association will be the last instance of salvation for the club, if everything goes wrong in the SAF. There is no safe choice in extirpating association from decision-making, because at some point it will be necessary. In addition, at the same time that the SAFs have been structured in such a way as to prevent the participation of the association, the business models seem tailor-made to empty these century-old organizations. What is the ideal scenario for those who buy a SAF: not having to be accountable to anyone or, at most, having to communicate with a dying association, without strength and representativeness. If at first this was desired to guarantee the work autonomy of the “qualified professionals hired by investors”, perhaps the occasional sellers have eliminated important escape routes that will be missed at the necessary time. Today it is too early to visualize something catastrophic in this sense, but experiences from other countries should begin to be better studied so that the risks that clubs run for not having developed the necessary mechanisms for their own protection can be perceived. In the current scenario, it is not possible to speculate on the nature or scruples of the groups that took over the SAFs, but it is not just a purely moral issue either. There are a number of possible situations that can drastically alter the pretensions of these “investors” with “their SAFs”, and in the end everything is business: will professional football pass from hand to hand – from buyer to buyer – or will it be allowed to conceive the resumption of its control by the original association? This alternative already seems eliminated from the scenario. A bad early sporting phase for what was expected from the investments of the SAFs has already put Vasco in a situation of worrying distancing. The controllers of the SAF are not obliged to listen to the original club. The original club does not see the tools at its disposal to act positively. In a few years, it will not only be sports results that will be the factors of dissatisfaction and distance between clubs and SAFs. The history of club-companies around the world tells controversial, highly complex situations that are still little visible in the Brazilian scenario. It will be up to the fans to keep the association alive and strong, because it will be through it that things will pass at the necessary time. - Irlan Simões (@irlansimoes) is the author of the book “The Club’s Production: power, business and community in football” (2023) https://morula.com.br/produto/clube/ and organizer of the work “Clube Empresa: global critical approaches to corporations in football” (2020). ARTICLE URL https://ge.globo.com/blogs/blog-do-irlan-simoes/post/2024/03/28/o-que-resta-a-associacao-original-quando-a-saf-tem-dono.ghtml How much does it cost to become SAF? Fees charged by Federations range from R$ 30 thousand to R$ 500 thousand; see list The Federation of Rio de Janeiro is the one that charges the most expensive, followed by those of Pernambuco and Minas Gerais; Paulista, on the other hand, is the only one among the top ten that still does not charge for the change By João de Andrade Neto — Recife 01/19/2024 03:17 PM Up-to-date a year ago Since it was created by the National Congress in August 2021, the Sociedade Anônima do Futebol (SAF) has become a recurring subject in Brazilian football, with many clubs already adhering to the format and many others preparing to make the change from the associative model to club-company. Migration that, to be official, needs to be registered by the state federations, which have been authorized by the CBF, since 2022, to charge the so-called “conversion fee”. Charge that, depending on each state, varies from R$ 30 thousand to R$ 500 thousand. The ge verified in documents made available on the official websites of the entities and in contact with the advisories the amounts charged by the ten best-placed federations in the CBF ranking: São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul, Paraná, Ceará, Goiás, Santa Catarina, Bahia and Pernambuco. The federation with the most expensive rate is Rio de Janeiro. According to the values released by the entity, a club that is in the state’s A1 Series will have to pay R$ 500 thousand to migrate to SAF. The charge is now R$ 300 thousand and R$ 200 thousand for clubs that compete in the A2 and A3 Series of the State, respectively. These amounts started to be charged last year, and are still valid, according to Ferj’s press office. It is worth remembering that Botafogo and Vasco sold their shares in 2022. Pernambuco and Ceará on opposite paths The second federation to charge the most is Pernambucana, which readjusted the fee from R$ 120 thousand to R$ 400 thousand as of this year. An increase of 233%. None of the big three in the state have become SAF so far, but they work for it. Who has more advanced talks is Náutico, which already has an offer from a group of investors that can reach, between investment plan and guaranteed costs, R$ 980 million over ten years for the purchase of 90% of the shares. Sport, on the other hand, is in the process of reformulating its statute with a view to adhering to the SAF model, while Santa Cruz, which even had advanced talks with investors, according to the board that left the club at the end of last year, is again at square one. But the transformation to the SAF is considered a priority by the current president, Bruno Rodrigues. The Ceará Federation, on the other hand, took the opposite path by reducing the value of the fee, from R$ 400 thousand charged until last year to R$ 120 thousand from 2024. In the state, Fortaleza approved in September the change to Sociedade Anônima do Futebol, but without share sales for now, a unique model in Brazilian football so far. In December, the club’s then-president Marcelo Paz resigned to take over as CEO of Fortaleza EC SAF. Ceará, on the other hand, does not treat adherence to the Corporations model as a priority. Bahia, Goiás and Minas The Goiana and Bahia federations also charge R$ 120 thousand for the conversion into SAF. In Goiás, the three main clubs, Goiás, Atlético-GO and Vila Nova, are in the process of moving. Bahia, on the other hand, since March last year, has 90% of football shares controlled by the City Group. Vitória, for now, has not yet taken direction in this direction In Minas Gerais, where the big three have already adhered to the SAF model, with Cruzeiro being the first club in Brazil, still in 2021, the Minas Gerais Federation currently charges R$ 250 thousand for the change. Third saltier rate, behind only Rio de Janeiro and Pernambuco. No charge in São Paulo and “bargain” in the South Leader of the CBF ranking among federations, São Paulo is the only one among the top 10 not to charge the “conversion fee” for the SAF model, according to the resolution published in July last year. The state is the one with the most clubs that have already become a corporation, with 10. One more than Minas Gerais, according to the Academic League of Corporate Law of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. The three federations in the South Region of the country charge the lowest amounts, with Catarinense being the cheapest: only R$ 30 thousand. The state has among its affiliates four clubs that have already joined the SAF model, including Figueirense. In the Paranaense and Gaucho Federations, this amount is R$ 60 thousand, and in Rio Grande do Sul this fee will be charged as of this year. Paraná is the third state in the country with the most SAFS, eight in all. The amounts charged by the federations São Paulo Federation - Does not charge a fee Rio de Janeiro Federation - 500 thousand* Pernambuco Federation - R$ 400 thousand Minas Gerais Federation - R$ 250 thousand Ceará Federation - R$ 120 thousand Goiás Federation - R$ 120 thousand Bahia Federation - R$ 120 thousand Federação Gaúcha - R$ 60 thousand** Paranaense Federation - R$ 60 thousand Santa Catarina Federation - R$ 30 thousand *Clubs that are in the A2 Series of the State pay R$ 300 thousand and those in the A3 Series, R$ 200 thousand ** Charges for the first time in 2024 ARTICLE URL https://ge.globo.com/pe/futebol/noticia/2024/01/19/quanto-custa-para-virar-saf-taxas-cobradas-por-federacoes-variam-de-r-30-mil-a-r-500-mil-veja-lista.ghtml Judicial and extrajudicial reorganization, bankruptcy and civil insolvency: a guide to understanding what can happen to indebted clubs Leaders, politicians and lawyers are beginning to speak publicly about mechanisms that can save associations mistreated by decades of mismanagement. And the fans deserve to understand them São Paulo 06/02/2020 06h00 Up-to-date 5 years ago By Rodrigo Capelo Judicial reorganization, extrajudicial reorganization, bankruptcy and civil insolvency. As soccer clubs collapse financially, officials, politicians and lawyers are beginning to spread these terms as possible solutions to reverse decades of mismanagement in associations. The terms have already entered the vocabulary of the Cruzeirense. Vittorio Medioli, a businessman who briefly participated in the provisional administration of Cruzeiro, publicly defended that the club enter into judicial reorganization to undo the damage caused by the Wagner Pires de Sá and Gilvan de Pinho Tavares administrations. The subject matters to practically every indebted club, however. In the face of the critical situations in Brazilian football, behind the scenes there are people interested in resorting to these mechanisms to clean up the indebtedness of the associations. In some cases, this would help improve the chances of migrating to a business structure. Due to the high degree of complexity and high relevance for the future of Brazilian football, the blog recorded a podcast to explain the mechanisms with the participation of Marcelo Sacramone, https://interativos.ge.globo.com/podcasts/programa/dinheiro-em-jogo/episodio/dinheiro-em-jogo-39-clube-de-futebol-pode-falir-entenda-as-opcoes-para-salvar-os-times-endividados/ judge of the 2nd Court of Bankruptcy and Judicial Reorganization of São Paulo. This text serves as a support to understand each of the ways out for those in debt. Judicial reorganization What is it for? To recover a company that is relevant to society, especially for the jobs it generates, which is going through an economic crisis. What are the requirements? Perform business activity for at least two years. In other words, in order to enter into a judicial reorganization process, the legal entity must be a company – a corporation, limited liability company or other similar corporate structure. Non-profit civil associations – like most football clubs in Brazil – cannot enter into judicial reorganization, unless they migrate to the business structure and wait two years or there is a change in the legislation. What is the procedure? First, the company submits the request for judicial reorganization to the Court, with justifications to obtain the benefit of renegotiating its debts under the supervision of the government. If the Court allows the proceeding, the company (debtor) will have 60 days (two months) to present a plan for payment to the group of people with whom it has accumulated debts (creditors). When the reorganization plan is presented, the creditors will decide whether to accept or reject the proposal. If they accept, creditors will receive the amounts according to the conditions set out in this agreement. If they do not accept, the company will be declared bankrupt. After the agreement, the Court still monitors compliance with this reorganization for two years to ensure that the debtor follows the plan. What are the benefits? Creditors are allowed to receive the amounts that were outstanding, albeit with discounts and in installments. In another hypothesis, they could receive nothing. Judicial reorganization also requires that the agreement be collective, that is, no creditor can take advantage of another with the seizure of revenues, for example. To the company (debtor), the judicial reorganization allows it to reduce its indebtedness and preserve its activity. Additionally, all blockades and seizures suffered by this company are suspended for 180 days (six months). This happens precisely so that no creditor gets ahead of another when it comes to obtaining the money from a lien. “Why will everything be suspended? To prevent a more sophisticated, faster lender from being able to take an asset and harm everything else. The law says: during these 180 days, everything will be suspended against the debtor. The problem with this is that case law has extended this period. Here in the State of São Paulo, this period has taken two years on average. It is very different from the 180 days. It is alleged that creditors are negotiating, so it is better to maintain this suspension than to let someone run outside to pledge a certain asset”, explains Marcelo Sacramone. What does the negotiation depend on? Generally, two factors: 1.Of the assets that can be sold to raise money. This goes for everything that has some value for the company. In the case of clubs, they would be real estate (social and administrative headquarters, training centers and stadiums), player contracts and brand (shield) 2.From the revenue forecast in the new business plan. If the company understands that its financial recovery will allow investments and make it raise more money, part of these resources can be redirected to pay creditors Taking these factors into account, the probability of a good deal for both parties will be determined. In the case of a company that has no assets to sell and/or does not have the potential to increase its revenue, creditors will have problems obtaining good values. Does recovery involve debt forgiveness? Most of the time. The debtor would not have the money to pay all the debts under normal conditions. So he usually bases the recovery plan on extending the payment deadline and negotiating discounts on the amounts due. Lenders may understand that it is better to receive some money than none at all. Therefore, they agree to forgive part of the amounts due in exchange for the scheduled payment. This only happens if the absolute majority of creditors agree with the proposed conditions. “In an average plan, the debtor will pay in 11 years and with half of what he owed. This is an average plan. 30% of the plans involve selling something to make cash to satisfy that plan. Then the creditors will be called to a General Meeting in which they will meet to deliberate if that is the best proposal, if the debtor could not propose something better, make some suggestion, and it is up to the debtor to understand whether or not he will maintain the original proposal”, says Marcelo Sacramone. Are there rules for the formulation of the plan? Labor debts (with former employees) must be paid within a period of less than one year, from the moment the debtor’s proposal is accepted by the creditors. The limitation of labor debts concerns the term, but not the discount. As long as the creditors agree to forgive part of the debt, the debtor can reduce this amount. This is a huge potential problem for football clubs. The labor debts of associations – with players, coaches and employees of other departments – are usually much higher than in conventional companies. Especially in the case of the most traditional and most indebted clubs in Brazilian football. Out-of-court reorganization What is it for? Extrajudicial reorganization has similar mechanics to judicial reorganization, but the negotiation phase between debtor and creditors is done out of court. The agreement needs to be taken to a judge, however, so that he can verify the conditions and ratify the decision. The negotiation does not have to happen with all creditors at the same time. For example, the company can renegotiate only debts with financial institutions (bank debts). In out-of-court reorganization, the negotiation also does not need the approval of an absolute majority to be confirmed. If the debtor obtains the approval of 60% of the creditors, the other 40% are obliged to accept the conditions of the reorganization plan. Bankruptcy What is it for? It is the consequence of a judicial reorganization that did not work out – that is, in which the creditors did not accept the proposal made by the debtor and decided that the best way would be to file for bankruptcy. It is also possible to have direct bankruptcy, but this is a rare case. In the event of bankruptcy, the debtor loses all power over the assets and the power to manage them. He is removed immediately. The court appoints a trustee, and this trustee sells all assets to raise money. Real estate, brands, contracts, everything that is possible to sell on the market, comes into play to pay creditors. What are the requirements? Only companies can go bankrupt. Non-profit civil associations, like most football clubs in Brazil, cannot go through this process without some change in legislation. Who can file for bankruptcy of a company? Debtors or creditors. In practice, no one asks. The debtor usually understands that it is better to continue activity and try to pay off debts, while creditors avoid the risk of receiving nothing if there are not enough assets to sell. In football, filing for bankruptcy of a club would have an additional effect: social pressure on creditors or directors (responsible for the debtor) who filed for bankruptcy of a traditional club. What are the benefits? If the liquidation of all assets generates money to pay off at least 50% of the debts, the company cannot be charged for the other 50%. “Bankruptcy is a prize for the entrepreneur who has had a failure. If I liquidate all the assets and with that amount I manage to pay half of the creditors, he is free the next day to return to his activity. There is an extinction of his debts. Problems with this: bankruptcy lasts an average of 12 years, that is, the process never ends. If the process does not end and he is unable to pay this 50%, he will stay another five years after the closure still linked to these obligations”, explains Marcelo Sacramone. Civil Insolvency What is it? It is a form of liquidation of all assets and payment of creditors. There is no possibility of collective bargaining. The club would need to enter into an agreement individually with all creditors. What are the requirements? Civil insolvency applies to non-profit civil associations. Football clubs can go through this procedure at any time. Who can apply for the insolvency of an association? Debtors or creditors. In practice, no one asks. The debtor does not ask because it would cease to exist and would not be able to preserve its activity, and creditors do not usually ask because they would hardly be able to receive the amounts. In addition, as the negotiations are individual, some creditors could outsmart others by taking advantage of the resources obtained from the sale of assets such as stadiums, venues and players. What is the difference between bankruptcy and insolvency? In a civil insolvency process, even if the sale of all the association’s assets pays more than 50% of the debts, the association will continue to be linked to the rest of the debts until they expire. The statute of limitations can be from five to ten years, depending on whether there has been a crime. In practically all cases, it is not worth it. @rodrigocapelo ARTICLE URL https://ge.globo.com/blogs/blog-do-rodrigo-capelo/post/2020/02/06/recuperacao-judicial-extrajudicial-falencia-e-insolvencia-civil-um-guia-para-entender-o-que-pode-acontecer-com-clubes-endividados.ghtml Bill No. 5516, of 2019 See also: VET 43/2021 Authorship: Senator Rodrigo Pacheco (DEM/MG) No. in the Chamber of Deputies: PL 5516/2019 Generated Rule: Law No. 14,193 of 08/06/2021 Subject: Economy and Development > Taxes, Social Policy > Sports and Leisure Summary: Creates the Brazilian Football System, through the typification of the Football Corporation, establishment of governance, control and transparency rules, institution of means of financing football activity and provision of a transitory tax system. Explanation of the Summary: Creates the figure of the Sociedade Anônima do Futebol, whose main activity consists of the practice of soccer in professional competitions, defines its financing, administration, governance and control; and establishes a special regime for the calculation of federal taxes applicable to the species. PROPOSITIONS Identification: PL 5516/2019 Author: Senator Rodrigo Pacheco (DEM/MG) Date: 10/10/2019 Description/Syllabus Creates the Brazilian Football System, through the typification of the Football Corporation, establishment of governance, control and transparency rules, institution of means of financing football activity and provision of a transitory tax system. Local: Plenary of the Federal Senate https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8023943&ts=1721927154468&disposition=inline Identification: Initial single article Author: Federal Senate Date: 15/10/2019 Description/Syllabus - Local: Plenary of the Federal Senate Legislative Action: Forwarded for publication. To the CAE and EC, the latter being responsible for the final decision. (This processed contains twenty (20) numbered sheets.) | See the procedure https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8025061&ts=1721927154503&disposition=inline OPINIONS Identification: Legislative Report Author: Senator Carlos Portinho (PL/RJ) Date: 08/06/2021 Description/Syllabus Seem Local: Plenary of the Federal Senate Legislative Action: The report and the attachments forwarded by the Rapporteur, Senator Carlos Portinho, were received. | See the procedure https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8977839&ts=1721927154807&disposition=inline Identification: Legislative Report Author: Senator Carlos Portinho (PL/RJ) Date: 10/06/2021 Description/Syllabus Seem Local: Plenary of the Federal Senate Legislative Action: Received the Report of Senator Carlos Portinho. | See the procedure https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978839&ts=1721927155441&disposition=inline Identification: P.S 129/2021 - PLEN Author: Senator Carlos Portinho (PL/RJ) Date: 10/06/2021 Description/Syllabus Opinion No. 129/2021-PLEN/SF - Presentation of Substitute - Amendment No. 32-PLEN. Local: Plenary of the Federal Senate Legislative Action: (Remote Deliberative Session held on 06/10/2021) Opinion No. 129/2021-PLEN/SF was delivered by Senator Carlos Portinho, concluding by the approval of the bill, by the full acceptance of Amendments Nos. 3, 4, 8, 10, 12, 13, 23, 28 and 31-… | See the procedure https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8979014&ts=1721927155406&disposition=inline AMENDMENTS Identification: AMENDMENT 1 - PL 5516/2019 Author: Senator Leila Barros (PSB/DF) Date: 25/05/2020 Local: Committee on Economic Affairs Legislative Action: Amendment sent to the rapporteur, Senator Marcos Rogério, for analysis. | See the procedure https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8114738&ts=1721927154615&disposition=inline Identification: AMENDMENT 2 PLEN - PL 5516/2019 Author: Senator Paulo Paim (PT/RS), Senator Rogério Carvalho (PT/SE) Date: 07/06/2021 Description/Syllabus Amendment 2 to PL 5516 Local: Plenary of the Federal Senate Legislative Action: Received Amendments Nos. 2 and 3, from Senator Paulo Paim. | See the procedure https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8977023&ts=1721927155175&disposition=inline Identification: AMENDMENT 3 PLEN - PL 5516/2019 Author: Senator Paulo Paim (PT/RS) Date: 07/06/2021 Description/Syllabus PL 5516 of 2019 Local: Plenary of the Federal Senate Legislative Action: Received Amendments Nos. 2 and 3, from Senator Paulo Paim. | See the procedure https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8977026&ts=1721927155205&disposition=inline Identification: AMENDMENT 4 PLEN - PL 5516/2019 Author: Senator Jayme Campos (DEM/MT) Date: 08/06/2021 Description/Syllabus Amendment to PL 5516, of 2019 Local: Plenary of the Federal Senate Legislative Action: Received Amendment No. 4, from Senator Jayme Campos. | See the procedure https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8977819&ts=1721927154770&disposition=inline Identification: AMENDMENT 5 PLEN - PL 5516/2019 Author: Senator Veneziano Vital do Rêgo (MDB/PB) Date: 09/06/2021 Description/Syllabus Amendment PL 5516/19 Local: Plenary of the Federal Senate Legislative Action: Received Amendments Nos. - 5, from Senator Veneziano Vital do Rêgo; - 6, from Senator Weverton. | See the procedure https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8977963&ts=1721927155530&disposition=inline Identification: AMENDMENT 6 PLEN - PL 5516/2019 Author: Senator Weverton (PDT/MA) Date: 09/06/2021 Description/Syllabus EMD 1 PL 5516, of 2019 Local: Plenary of the Federal Senate Legislative Action: Received Amendments Nos. - 5, from Senator Veneziano Vital do Rêgo; - 6, from Senator Weverton. | See the procedure https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8977992&ts=1721927155813&disposition=inline Identification: AMENDMENT 7 PLEN - PL 5516/2019 Author: Senator Paulo Rocha (PT/PA) Date: 09/06/2021 Description/Syllabus Amendment to PL 5,516, of 2019 - labor debts Local: Plenary of the Federal Senate Legislative Action: Received Amendment No. 7, from Senator Paulo Rocha. | See the procedure https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978101&ts=1721927155882&disposition=inline Identification: AMENDMENT 8 PLEN - PL 5516/2019 Author: Senator Wellington Fagundes (PL/MT) Date: 09/06/2021 Description/Syllabus emenda_Sistema of Brazilian Football Local: Plenary of the Federal Senate Legislative Action: Received Amendment No. 8, from Senator Wellington Fagundes. | See the procedure https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978120&ts=1721927154843&disposition=inline Identification: AMENDMENT 9 PLEN - PL 5516/2019 Author: Senator Rose de Freitas (MDB/ES) Date: 09/06/2021 Description/Syllabus Amendment to PL 5516/2019 Local: Plenary of the Federal Senate Legislative Action: Received Amendments Nos. 9 and 10, from Senator Rose de Freitas. | See the procedure https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978169&ts=1721927155913&disposition=inline Identification: AMENDMENT 10 PLEN - PL 5516/2019 Author: Senator Rose de Freitas (MDB/ES) Date: 09/06/2021 Description/Syllabus Amendment to PL 5516/2019 Local: Plenary of the Federal Senate Legislative Action: Received Amendments Nos. 9 and 10, from Senator Rose de Freitas. | See the procedure https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978175&ts=1721927154653&disposition=inline Identification: AMENDMENT 11 PLEN - PL 5516/2019 Author: Senator Paulo Rocha (PT/PA) Date: 09/06/2021 Description/Syllabus AMENDMENT to Bill No. 5516, of 2019 Local: Plenary of the Federal Senate Legislative Action: Received Amendments Nos. 11, by Senator Paulo Rocha; and - 12, by Senator Luiz do Carmo. | See the procedure https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978190&ts=1721927155244&disposition=inline Identification: AMENDMENT 12 PLEN - PL 5516/2019 Author: Senator Luiz Carlos do Carmo (MDB/GO) Date: 09/06/2021 Description/Syllabus Bill No. 5516, of 2019 Local: Plenary of the Federal Senate Legislative Action: Received Amendments Nos. 11, by Senator Paulo Rocha; and - 12, by Senator Luiz do Carmo. | See the procedure https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978196&ts=1721927156144&disposition=inline Identification: AMENDMENT 13 PLEN - PL 5516/2019 Author: Senator Fabiano Contarato (REDE/ES) Date: 09/06/2021 Description/Syllabus ensure that the PDES include students from public educational institutions Local: Plenary of the Federal Senate Legislative Action: Received Amendments Nos. 13 and 14, by Senator Fabiano Contarato; - 15 and 16, by Senator Weverton. | See the procedure https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978209&ts=1721927155976&disposition=inline Identification: AMENDMENT 14 PLEN - PL 5516/2019 Author: Senator Fabiano Contarato (REDE/ES) Date: 09/06/2021 Description/Syllabus Increase the transparency of Football Corporations Local: Plenary of the Federal Senate Legislative Action: Received Amendments Nos. 13 and 14, by Senator Fabiano Contarato; - 15 and 16, by Senator Weverton. | See the procedure https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978212&ts=1721927156006&disposition=inline Identification: AMENDMENT 15 PLEN - PL 5516/2019 Author: Senator Weverton (PDT/MA) Date: 09/06/2021 Description/Syllabus EMD to PL 5516 of 2019 Local: Plenary of the Federal Senate Legislative Action: Received Amendments Nos. 13 and 14, by Senator Fabiano Contarato; - 15 and 16, by Senator Weverton. | See the procedure https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978215&ts=1721927155283&disposition=inline Identification: AMENDMENT 16 PLEN - PL 5516/2019 Author: Senator Weverton (PDT/MA) Date: 09/06/2021 Description/Syllabus EMD to PL 5516 of 2019 Local: Plenary of the Federal Senate Legislative Action: Received Amendments Nos. 13 and 14, by Senator Fabiano Contarato; - 15 and 16, by Senator Weverton. | See the procedure https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978218&ts=1721927155315&disposition=inline Identification: AMENDMENT 17 PLEN - PL 5516/2019 Author: Senator Weverton (PDT/MA) Date: 09/06/2021 Description/Syllabus EMD to PL 5516 of 2019 Local: Plenary of the Federal Senate Legislative Action: Received Amendment No. 17, from Senator Weverton. | See the procedure https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978241&ts=1721927156179&disposition=inline Identification: AMENDMENT 18 PLEN - PL 5516/2019 Author: Senator Izalci Lucas (PSDB/DF) Date: 09/06/2021 Description/Syllabus Amendment 02 to PL 5516/2019 Local: Plenary of the Federal Senate Legislative Action: Received Amendments Nos. 18 to 22, from Senator Izalci Lucas. | See the procedure https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978259&ts=1721927154884&disposition=inline Identification: AMENDMENT 19 PLEN - PL 5516/2019 Author: Senator Izalci Lucas (PSDB/DF) Date: 09/06/2021 Description/Syllabus Amendment 01 PL 5516/2019 Local: Plenary of the Federal Senate Legislative Action: Received Amendments Nos. 18 to 22, from Senator Izalci Lucas. | See the procedure https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978262&ts=1721927154916&disposition=inline Identification: AMENDMENT 20 PLEN - PL 5516/2019 Author: Senator Izalci Lucas (PSDB/DF) Date: 09/06/2021 Description/Syllabus Amendment 05 to PL 5516/2019 Local: Plenary of the Federal Senate Legislative Action: Received Amendments Nos. 18 to 22, from Senator Izalci Lucas. | See the procedure https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978267&ts=1721927154950&disposition=inline Identification: AMENDMENT 21 PLEN - PL 5516/2019 Author: Senator Izalci Lucas (PSDB/DF) Date: 09/06/2021 Description/Syllabus Amendment 04 to PL 5516/2019 Local: Plenary of the Federal Senate Legislative Action: Received Amendments Nos. 18 to 22, from Senator Izalci Lucas. | See the procedure https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978270&ts=1721927154981&disposition=inline Identification: AMENDMENT 22 PLEN - PL 5516/2019 Author: Senator Izalci Lucas (PSDB/DF) Date: 09/06/2021 Description/Syllabus Amendment 03 PL 5516/2019 Local: Plenary of the Federal Senate Legislative Action: Received Amendments Nos. 18 to 22, from Senator Izalci Lucas. | See the procedure https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978273&ts=1721927155012&disposition=inline Identification: AMENDMENT 23 PLEN - PL 5516/2019 Author: Senator Eduardo Braga (MDB/AM) Date: 09/06/2021 Description/Syllabus Amendment 1 - PL 5516/2019 Local: Plenary of the Federal Senate Legislative Action: Received Amendments Nos. 23 and 24, by Senator Eduardo Braga. | See the procedure https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978279&ts=1721927155049&disposition=inline Identification: AMENDMENT 24 PLEN - PL 5516/2019 Author: Senator Eduardo Braga (MDB/AM) Date: 09/06/2021 Description/Syllabus Amendment 2 - PL 5516/2019 Local: Plenary of the Federal Senate Legislative Action: Received Amendments Nos. 23 and 24, by Senator Eduardo Braga. | See the procedure https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978282&ts=1721927155079&disposition=inline Identification: AMENDMENT 25 PLEN - PL 5516/2019 Author: Senator Irajá (PSD/TO) Date: 09/06/2021 Description/Syllabus Amendment to PL 5516/2019 - art 2 Local: Plenary of the Federal Senate Legislative Action: Received Amendments Nos. 25 to 28 from Senator Irajá; and 29 to 31 from Senator Romário. | See the procedure https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978291&ts=1721927155572&disposition=inline Identification: AMENDMENT 26 PLEN - PL 5516/2019 Author: Senator Irajá (PSD/TO) Date: 09/06/2021 Description/Syllabus Amendment to PL 5516/2019 - art 10 Local: Plenary of the Federal Senate Legislative Action: Received Amendments Nos. 25 to 28 from Senator Irajá; and 29 to 31 from Senator Romário. | See the procedure https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978294&ts=1721927155603&disposition=inline Identification: AMENDMENT 27 PLEN - PL 5516/2019 Author: Senator Irajá (PSD/TO) Date: 09/06/2021 Description/Syllabus Amendment to PL 5516/2019 - art 15 Local: Plenary of the Federal Senate Legislative Action: Received Amendments Nos. 25 to 28 from Senator Irajá; and 29 to 31 from Senator Romário. | See the procedure https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978297&ts=1721927155637&disposition=inline Identification: AMENDMENT 28 PLEN - PL 5516/2019 Author: Senator Irajá (PSD/TO) Date: 09/06/2021 Description/Syllabus Amendment to PL 5516/2019 - art 21 Local: Plenary of the Federal Senate Legislative Action: Received Amendments Nos. 25 to 28 from Senator Irajá; and 29 to 31 from Senator Romário. | See the procedure https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978300&ts=1721927155669&disposition=inline Identification: AMENDMENT 29 PLEN - PL 5516/2019 Author: Senator Romário (PL/RJ) Date: 09/06/2021 Description/Syllabus Amendment to PL 5516/2019 Local: Plenary of the Federal Senate Legislative Action: Received Amendments Nos. 25 to 28 from Senator Irajá; and 29 to 31 from Senator Romário. | See the procedure https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978305&ts=1721927155946&disposition=inline Identification: AMENDMENT 30 PLEN - PL 5516/2019 Author: Senator Romário (PL/RJ) Date: 09/06/2021 Description/Syllabus Amendment to PL 5516/2019 Local: Plenary of the Federal Senate Legislative Action: Received Amendments Nos. 25 to 28 from Senator Irajá; and 29 to 31 from Senator Romário. | See the procedure https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978309&ts=1721927155779&disposition=inline Identification: AMENDMENT 31 PLEN - PL 5516/2019 Author: Senator Romário (PL/RJ) Date: 09/06/2021 Description/Syllabus Amendment to PL 5516/2019 Local: Plenary of the Federal Senate Legislative Action: Received Amendments Nos. 25 to 28 from Senator Irajá; and 29 to 31 from Senator Romário. | See the procedure https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978313&ts=1721927156035&disposition=inline Identification: Separate amendments Author: Federal Senate Date: 09/06/2021 Description/Syllabus - Local: Plenary of the Federal Senate Legislative Action: The deadline for amending the matter ended at 2 pm on 06/09/2021. Amendments Nos. 2 to 31 were received. | See the procedure https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978336&ts=1721927155848&disposition=inline Identification: Separate amendments Author: Federal Senate Date: 09/06/2021 Description/Syllabus - Local: Plenary of the Federal Senate https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=8978350&ts=1721927154679&disposition=inline LEGAL DOCUMENT URL- all content within , which is more than listed https://www25.senado.leg.br/web/atividade/materias/-/materia/139338 POST URL https://aalbc.com/tc/topic/12082-black-1-percent-have-to-lead-by-example-in-uncomfortable-places-economic-corner/ PRIOR EDITION https://aalbc.com/tc/events/event/600-economic-corner-28-11232025/ NEXT EDITION COMMENTARIES